7. Term. An estate for years necessarily implies a certain and definite period for which possession is to be held. It has acquired a designation proper to this character, namely, that of a term, derived from terminus, signifying that it is bounded and precisely determined, having a certain beginning and a certain end.1 with it only such portions of the land as will be necessary to their enjoyment. McMillan v. Solomon, 42 Ala. 356; Oliver v. Dickinson, 100 Mass. 114; Bennett v. Bittle, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 339. By the lease of a building, everything that belongs, or is used with it, and which is reasonably essential to its enjoyment, passes as incident to the principal thing and as part of it unless especially reserved. Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503; In re New York Cent. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 414; Mott v. Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564; Public Schools v. Hollingsworth, 34 Mo. 191; Canfield v. Ford, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 336; Hay v. Cumberland, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 594; Green v. Armstrong, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 550; Isham v. Morgan, 9 Conn. 374; Holy v. Roeback, 7 Taunt. 157. A lease of a building conveys the land under the eaves and projections, if that land is owned by the lessor. Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481. A lease of ten acres of land in a quarter section did not designate what ten acres was intended; was held to be void for uncertainty. Patterson v. Hubbard, 30 Ill. 201; Dingman v. Kelley, 7 Ind. 717. Where the description of premises in the lease is imperfect and the question arises as to whether certain premises are included in the grant, the intention of the parties may be taken into consideration in aid of the words of the lease, and this intention may be gathered from extrinsic facts explaining the words. Trimble v. Ward, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 8; Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73 Ill 453; Putnam v. Bond, 100 Mass. 58; Whipple v. Shewalter, 91 Ind. 114; Tiley v. Moyers, 25 Pa. St. 398; Seamen 7. Hogeboom, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 398: Doe v. Burt, 1 Term Rep. 701. But where the language is not ambiguous, evidence of the intention of the parties is not admissible. Davis v. Rainsford, 17 Mass. 207; Brainerd v. Arnold, 27 Conn. 617; Burr v. Spencer, 26 Conn. 163; Clark v. Baird, o N. Y. 183. A leased an indefinite quantity of land to B for fifty years, to be by him used as a vineyard. A. after the land had been selected and improved, died, hav ing devised the land to C, his wife, who thereafter divided said vineyard, and conveyed by accurate description the one half of it to B. Held, that B did not acquire a fee simple to the premises by such conveyance; held, also, that the indefinite description of the premises was supplied by the subsequent deed of C, and both must be construed together as constituting one contract, the former measuring the time and the latter describing the premises, and hence the estate of B was not a tenancy from year to year, and could not be terminated by a notice to quit. Hunt v. Campbell et al., 83 Ind. 48. A owned two lots of land, one fronting on E street and the other adjoining the first in the rear. Both lots were bounded on one side by M street. Before A acquired title, a building had been erected, three stories in height, covering both lots, and having a partition wall, through which there was no passageway between the two on the line of the two lots. A took down the partition wall on the first floor, thus making one large room, but did not alter the partition wall above. The entrance to this room, and to the rooms above on the front of the building, was from E street. The rooms in the rear on the two upper floors were reached by an outside staircase, in the rear of the building, from M street. A then made a lease to B, in which the building was described only by its number on E street. Held, that the rooms in the rear in the upper stories were not included in the lease. Houghton Moore, 141 Mass. 437; Kerslake v. White, 2 Stark. 508. . With regard to duration of the term it may be for a number of years absolutely, or for a number of years determinable upon some contingency, such, for instance, as the expiration of a life or lives.1 When no date is fixed for the beginning of the tenancy, the time at which the tenant enters into possession of the premises is to be regarded as the beginning of the tenancy.2 The word "from" may be either exclusive or inclusive, according to the intention of the parties. It is now usually, but not necessarily, construed to be exclusive.3 1. Smith's Landlord & Tenant, p. 85. 2. Eberlein v. Abel, 10 Ill. App. 626. If no time is mentioned at which a lease shall commence, the date of the lease is to be regarded as the time from which the period of the lease is to commence. Keyes v. Dearborn, 12 N. H. 52; Enys v. Donnithorne, 2 Burr. 1197; Rowe v. Huntington, 1 Vaughan 73. If the term be not definitely expressed in a lease, it may be fixed by collateral or extrinsic circumstances. Horner v. Leeds, 25 N. J. L. (1 Dutch.) 106. A lease for a year from the 1st of April expires on the last day of the succeeding March. Marys v. Anderson, 24 Pa. St. 272. The term must be a shorter period than the duration of the interest of the lessor. Bouv. L. Dict. Where after a lease for one year has expired a new lease is made by the month, the landlord has the undoubted right to terminate the lease at the end of any month by giving the proper notice. Brownell . Welch, 91 Ill. 523. A lease for "as long as wood grows or water runs" conveys a fee. Arms v. Burt, 1 Vt. 306. A lease to one for Soo years, then to his heirs, some of whom were at the time in esse, is an encumbrance on the estate not being controllable by him. Sawyer v. Little, Vt. 414. 3. Smith's Landlord & Tenant, p. 85, note; Wilkinson v. Gaston, 9 Q. B. 137 (58 E. C. L. R. 137); McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384; Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass. 94, Pellew v. Wonford, 9 Barn. & C. 134; People v. Robertson, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; Deyo v. Bleakley, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; Marys v. Anderson, 24 Pa. St. 272; Lysle v. Williams, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 135. A lease for a term of years "from" a certain day begins with the following day. Atkins v. Sleeper, 7 Allen (Mass.) 487; Doe v. Smyth, Anth. 243; Goode v. Webb, 52 Ala. 452; Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M. & W. 473. A lease to two lessees, providing that it should continue for and during their natural life, held to continue during the life of each. Kenney v. Wentworth, 77 Me. 203. Where a lease provided for clearing and three crops on each piece cleared, it was construed to extend the whole lease until the time on the last clearing ran out. Dodson v. Hall, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 198. A written lease of land for so long a time as it may be used for a certain business does not constitute a tenancy at will nor a licence. It is a grant to use and occupy. Gilmore v. Hamilton, 83 Ind. 196. A lease for the whole time that the lessee may be postmaster, held to have expired with the expiration of the commission held by him at the time of execution of the lease. Easton v. Mitchell, 21 Ill. App. 189. An agreement reciting that the lessor leased to lessee, "his heirs and assigns," certain described premises "for the term of five years from the first day of December next for the yearly rent of three dollars," held not to be a perpetual lease, but for a term of five years. Berridge v. Glassey, 112 Pa. St. 442; s. c., 56 Am. Rep. 322. A stipulation in the lease of a store for a term certain that the lessee is to have the preference of renting said property so long thereafter as it shall be rented for a store, held void for uncertainty. Delashmutt v. Thomas, 45 Md. 140. Where a tenant, who is in possession of farm premises under a lease for one year, with the privilege of three, prior to the expiration of the year notifies the lessor that he has rented another farm and will at once vacate the premises held under such lease, and thereupon the former arrangement is mu 8. Signature to Lease.-One of the essentials to a complete lease is the signature of the parties thereto, or such a recognition as would in law amount to a signature. Until some such act or thing is done it is no lease.1 This may be done by writing the name with lead pencil or in ink, and if the party so signing is in the habit of using a stamp. with his name upon it, an impression by this, if intended as his signature, is sufficient.2 Or the name of the party may be attached to the instrument by another person if done in the presence of such party and by his consent.3 And it has been held that a letter has been written by a party to a lease to another party to it, or to a third person, referring to it and acknowledging it as his contract, was sufficient to bind such party.4 tually rescinded, such tenant thereby elects not to hold such premises longer than one year, and the tenancy is terminated at that time. In such case, the mere occupancy of the land at and after the expiration of the year cannot be deemed an election to hold it for three years, in the face of an express notification of a different election, and after the opposite party has acted upon the same by leasing the land to other parties. Barnett v. Feary, 101 Ind. 95. K and N leased certain premises for six months from the sixth day of December, 1881, for $750 to be paid in instalments of $125, on the first of each month. It was stated in the lease that it would terminate May 6th, 1882. Held, there was no ambiguity in the lease; that it ran for six months from December 6th, 1881, and the date May 6th, 1882, as the time of the termination, was an error in computation. Nindle v. State Bank, 13 Neb. 245. Under a written lease for the term of one year for a certain sum, with the privilege of continuing five years at an increased rent, it was held that the latter clause created a present demise if the occupation was continued after the first year. Kimball v. Cross, 136 Mass. 300. While the statute declares that "no leasehold estate can be created for a longer term than twenty years" (Ala. Code 2190), it does not declare a lease void in toto; and on general principles such a lease is void only as to the excess above twenty years. Robertson v. Hayes, 83 Ala, 290. 1. Clemens v. Bloomfield, 19 Mo. 118; Wade v. Newbern, 77 N. Car. 460; Harrison v. Parmer, 76 Ala. 157; Hyatt v. Third Baptist Church, 10 Mo. 2. Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 484. 3. Frost v. Deering, 21 Me. 156; Raymar v. Clarkson, 1 Phillim. 422. 4. Welford v. Beazeley, 3 Atk. 503;. Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 Ad. & E. 344. Where a lease was signed by the lessor and by certain officers of the lessee, a corporation, and left with a third person to procure the signature of the other officers, and then deliver it to the town clerk, held that it did not take effect until signed by all the other officers. Whitford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145; s. c., 46 Am. Rep. 131. When a lease provides that lessee shall pay a certain sum as rent, his acceptance of the lease makes him liable to pay rent, although he has not signed the lease. McFarlane v. Williams, 107 Where a lessee accepts a lease and enters into the possession of the premises, although he does not sign the lease, it was held that the acceptance of the possession by the lessee was equivalent to an execution of the instrument itself in proper form. Filton v. Hamilton City, 6 Nev. 196; Worcester v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 41 N. H. 18; McFarlane v. Williams, 107 Ill. 33; Libbey 7. Staples, 39 Me. 166. A lease written by the lessee containing his name as one of the parties, signed by the lessor and recorded by the lessee, who took possession and occupied under it, though he did not Formal Parts. LEASE. 9. Sealing of Lease.-The statutes of some of the States require that all leases be by deed, or under seal, while others require that leases exceeding a certain number of years shall be underseal, and still others do not require the instrument or lease to be sealed at all.1 An agent who executes a lease under seal must in most States be authorized under seal.2 But in some of the States it is only required that the authority to an agent to make a lease under seal be in writing.3 10. Delivery of Lease.4-A lease takes effect from its delivery An actual to the lessee or to a party authorized to receive it. manual delivery of the instrument is not necessary when it is understood by all parties that delivery is made.5 sign it, held to be sufficiently executed by the lessee to make him liable thereunder. Traylor v. Cabanne, 8 Mo. App. 131. 1. Taylor's Landlord & Tenant, par. 34. In Illinois, a lease need not be under seal to be valid between the parties. Lake v. Campbell, 18 Ill. 106. Unless an instrument is sealed according to the method adopted in the State where executed, or where the land lies, it is not a deed. Jones v. Crawford, J McMull. (S. Car.) 373; Taylor v. Morton, 5 Dana (Ky.) 365; Davis v. Brandon, 2 Miss. 154; Arms v. Burt, 1 Vt. 306; Kelleran Brown, Mass. and 4 passes no title; Short443; ridge. Catlett, I A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 587; Harley v. Ramsey, 49 Mo. 309: Pratt v. Clemens, 4 W. Va. 443. 2. Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Beidler v. Fish, 14 Ill. App. 29; Steightz v. Eggington, Holt N. P. 141; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 68. 3. Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 179, note I. A lease under seal may be modified by parol agreements. Horgan v. Krumweide, 25 Hun (N. Y.) 116. The word, seal written against the signature of a party to an instrument is treated as a seal in Mississippi. Hudson v. Poindexter, 42 Miss. 304; Whittington v. Clarke, 16 Miss. 480. In Virginia and Indiana, an instru- "Witness my hand and seal" without 3 Ala. 145; Doe v. McMahan, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 12, and note, Eames v. Preston, 20 Ill. 389. In Virginia, Louisiana, Missouri, Iowa, Delaware and Alabama, a writing with a scroll annexed and the word "Seal" written therein, but having no a sealed expression in the body of the instrument denoting that it is not a been held instrument, has Moore v. Leseur, sealed instrument. 18 Ala. 606; Bell v. Keefe, 13 La. An. 524; Baynton v. Reynolds, 3 Mo. 79; Morr. (Jowa) 43; Long v. Long, I Walker v. Keile, 8 Mo. 301; Armstrong v. Pearce, 5 Harr. (Del.) 351; Jenkins v. Hurt, 2 Rand. (Va.) 446; Deming v. Bullit, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 241. In Tennessee and Pennsylvania, the contrary doctrine is held. Hudson v. Poindexter, 42 Miss. 304; Whitley v. Davis, Swan (Tenn.) 333 Where a seal is not essential to the validity of the contract or instrument, it may be rejected as surplusage, and the instrument will be treated as a simple contract. Long v. Hartwell, 34 N. J. L. An agreement in writing not under seal to rent premises for a term of five years, held under the Delaware Rev. Code, 421 pars. 1-3, regulating such demise, etc., to constitute only a demise or renting at first for one year, and, after that, from year to year, so long as the tenant continues to hold them. Stewart v. Apel. 4 Houst. (Del.) 314 987 4. See generally DEEDS, vol. 5, p. 4455. Taylor's Landlord & Tenant, par. 167; Browning v. Haskell, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 310; Tatham v. Lewis, 65 Pa. St. 65; Kelsey v. Tourtelotte, 59 Pa. St. Md. 259 184; Simon . Bewick, 52 Mich. 388; Howard . Carpenter, 11 Smith 7. McGowan, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) To constitute a delivery it is necessary that the grantor should `put himself in such a position in reference to it that he cannot recall it, and that all legal formalities shall have been complied with.1 11. Acceptance of Lease.2-In order to charge a party to a lease or enforce its covenants against him, he must accept the lease.3 And his acceptance may often be presumed, as where it operates entirely to his benefit, or his acceptance thereof may be inferred from his entering into possession of the premises.4 404; De Ronde v. Olmstead, 5 Daly (N. Y.) 398. 1. Brevard v. Niely, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 164. To constitute a delivery by placing the lease in the hands of the lessee it must be understood that it is completed and ready for delivery. If it is merely left with the lessee for examination, or if anything remains to be done to perfect it, it is not a delivery. Stiles v. Probst, 69 Ill. 382; Graves v. Dudley, 20 N. Y. 76. Since the Revised Statutes of New York, the presumption that a deed was delivered on the day it bears date, does not prevail in respect to deeds not acknowledged or proved, and which have no subscribing witnesses; and such presumption never obtains where the deed is proved to have been in the hands of the grantor at a period subsequent to its date. Elsey v. Metcalf, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 323. But see Rhone v. Gale, 12 Minn. 54. A formal delivery of a deed is not necessary to give it effect; and though left in the possession of the grantor it will pass the property embraced by it, if it appears that it was executed with that intent. But in such a case it is apprehended that the grantee must be shown to have had possession of the instrument fully executed, and with the assent of the grantor, and that it was left with the grantor by him for safe keeping, or other purpose, so that the power of recalling it by the grantor is lost. Hammell. Hammell, 19 Ohio 17; Clark v. Gifford, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 310; Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 240; Austin v. Fendall, 2 McArthur (U. S.) 362; or that a fixed intention should be shown on the part of the grantor, that the title under the conveyance should vest in the grantor. Newton 7. Bea'er, 41 Iowa 334; Ward v. Ward, 2 Hayw. (N. Car.) 226. But if the grantor holds the deed until some condition is performed by the grantee there is no delivery, and the deed is inoperative; and especially is this so if the grantor subsequently deals with the land in a manner inconsistent with the idea that he intended the deed to be operative. Jackson v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) Cas. 114. Leaving a written lease when signed with the scrivener who prepared it, for the benefit of both parties and that a copy may be made for the lessee, is a sufficient delivery to make it binding. Reynolds v. Greenbaum, So Ill. 416. A lease calling for the payment of rent in advance monthly was signed by both parties and left with the lessor's agent to be delivered when the first month's rent should be paid. The lessee desired to take the lease to show to his attorney, but the agent refused to permit him to do so except on payment of the rent; the lessee refused to take it at all. Held, that he was not bound by it. Wittheus v. Starin, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 226. It is not a sufficient delivery to a lessee where a lease was prepared by lessor or his agent and lessee, and signed by lessee, and then taken by lessee to have surety sign same, which was done and returned to lessor, who did not sign lease until some time afterwards and never delivered it to lessee, and lessee never took possession of premises. Kelsey v. Tourtelotte, 59 Pa. St. 184. 2. See generally DEEDS, vol. 5, p. 445. 3. Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456; Hedge v. Drew, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 141; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307; Jackson v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 114. 4. Jackson v. Bodle, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 184. The acceptance by the lessee of a lease sealed by the lessor only is not such an assent to the stipulations contained therein as to make it his deed. Hinsdale v. Humphrey, 15 Conn. 431. Although the law will presume the |