VI. Foot Passengers. The public, as foot passengers, have the right to use the carriage way as well as the sidewalk.1 Children are not restricted in passing and repassing upon the streets and roads more than adults.2 Walking in the carriageway is not of itself prima facie evidence of want of ordinary care, nor from that fact alone will the law infer negligence.3

VII. Pleading. In a complaint against a traveller for not driving his carriage to the right of the travelled part of a road, it is not necessary to set forth a particular description of the road.1

VIII. Canals. When boats meet on the canals, it is the duty of the master of each to turn out to the right so as to be wholly on the right side of the centre of the canal.5

LAWYER-(See also ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, vol. 1, p.

942.)

Definition. A popular term for a person whose business it is to know and practice law.

It is any person who for fee or reward prosecutes or defends causes in the courts of record or other judicial tribunals of the

the team were engaged in putting a barrel into the wagon the defendant's runaway horse ran into the plaintiffs' horse. Held, in an action to recover for the injury to the plaintiffs' horse that the judge rightly refused to rule, as matter of law, that the plaintiffs were not in the exercise of due care. Greenwood v. Callahan, 111 Mass. 298.

The plaintiff's horse and wagon were standing upon the public highway. Defendant, while driving along the highway, struck the plaintiff's wagon. Held, that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that the collision took place without any negligence on his part. Parks v. O'Brien, 23 Conn. 339. 1. Coombs v. Purrington, 42 Me. 332.

2. Stinson v. Gardiner, 42 Me. 248. 3. Coombs v. Purrington, 42 Me. 332.

4. Com. v. Allen, 11 Met. (Mass.) 403.

5. 1 New York Rev. Stat. 248, § 154; Rathbun v. Payne, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 399.

A boat navigating the Erie canal struck another boat lying in the canal waiting her turn to pass the locks. The judge presiding at the trial charged the jury that the defendant was liable if he had been guilty of negligence, or intended to inflict the injury; but that if there was no negligence or design of injury, and if in attempting to pass, the defendant managed his boat in a prudent and skilful manner and the injury was sustained by means of the acts of

the plaintiff himself, or by mere accident, the defendant was not liable, and the jury found for the defendant. A new trial was granted for the omission of the judge to instruct the jury to enquire whether, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant was not bound to know that his boat could not pass without hazard, and if he was, whether he ought not to have proceeded with greater caution, Dygest v. Bradley, S Wend. (N. Y.) 470.

In passing on the Erie and Champlain canals freight boats are bound to afford every facility for the passage of packet boats as well through the locks as elsewhere on the canal. And where a freight boat passing west on the Erie canal was waiting for the emptying of a lock when a packet boat overtook her, held that the packet boat should pass first. On request, the master of the freight boat refusing to consent to this, the master of the packet may use all necessary means to obtain the preference due to him short of a breach of the peace; as by pulling back the freight boat and forcing his own forward, for which no action of trespass will lie, no necessary damage to the freight boat being done. If the freight boat be detained or injured through the obstinate resistance of the master to the exercise of the right of preference of the packet, this is the fault of the former, for which he cannot recover damages against the master of the latter. Farnsworth Groot, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 698.

6. Anderson's L. Dict. 605.

United States, or any of the States, or whose business it is to give legal advice to any cause or matter whatsoever.1

LAY.-See note 2.

LAY CORPORATION (See also CHARITIES, vol. 3, p. 122; CORPORATIONS (Private), vol. 4, p. 184).

A lay corporation is "a corporation composed of lay persons or for lay purposes."3 They are divided into two classes, eleemosynary and civil, and civil corporations are divided into public and private.5

LAY DAYS-(See also DEMURrage).

I. Definition, 965.

II. Commencement, 965.

(a) In General, 965.

(b) When Specified in Charter, 968. (c) Discharge in Two Places, 973. III. Computation, 973.

I. DEFINITION.—Lay days, strictly speaking, are the number of days specified in a charter party that the charterer is permitted to detain the boat for the purpose of delivering the cargo to and receiving it from the boat without incurring any liability to pay the boat owners for such detention.6

II. COMMENCEMENT (a) In General.-The lay days all belong to

1. Act of July 13th, 1866. See 9 U. S. Stat. at Large, 121.

2. A Lay, in Maritime Law.-In the New England ship owning States, "when the owners of vessels agree with a mariner that he shall sail the vessel on 'a lay,' both parties understand that the mariner is to take command of her as master, to victual and man her and pay half the port charges; the owner to keep the vessel in repair, and the freight and earnings to be equally divided between them. Upon a contract of this kind, the vessel, during its continuance, is under the exclusive control of the master as respects her voyages and employment. He alone has the right to determine what voyages he will undertake-what cargo he will carry-upon what terms-and to what ports he will sail in search of freight. His share of the earnings of the vessel are his wages, and he receives no other compensation for his services as master." TANEY, C. J., 19 How. (U. S.) 33.

Laying Out a Highway. When is the act of laying out complete? See Hitchcock v. Alderman of Springfield, 121 Mass. 382; Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597.

The laying out of a highway includes a survey of it. Small v. Eason, 11 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 94.

The opening of a street is a part of

the charterer; he is not obliged to deliver the cargo to or receive it from the boat upon the demand or request of the captain, but may suit his own convenience for doing this, provided he does not exceed the specified number of days allowed him.1

But if he detains the vessel longer he will have to pay demurrage for such excess of time at whatever rate per day the charter party stipulates.2

Such days allowed for a ship to load or discharge, in the absence of any stipulation in the charter party or otherwise, as to their commencement, or as to the time to be allowed for loading or unloading, commence to run and are to be reckoned from the

1. Poland v. Maryland Coal Co., 14 Blatchf. 519; 8 Ben. 347.

Where the consignee was to have twenty running days after the vessel arrived at the port of her destination for unloading, and if detained longer he was to pay the owners $50 per day demurrage for every additional day he detained her. The consignee detained the vessel longer than the stipulated lay days, and while she was held on demurrage she was lost with the cargo. Held, that as the consignee did not unload and discharge the vessel within the specified time, and there was no impossibility to prevent him from so doing, and that the loss occurred without the default of the master or mariners, the owners were allowed to recover freight as well as the demurrage. Brown v. Ralston, 9 Leigh (Va.) 532; s. c., 4 Rand. 504.

a

Under an agreement between charterer and the owners the charterer was to have twenty-five days for unloading. The boat arrived and there being opportunity to unload the captain offered to discharge the cargo. The consignee declined to accept the offer, and, in the meantime, but within the twenty-five days, the boat was lost by storm in the harbor. Held, that there was no freight earned, as the consignee had the right to receive the goods any time he chose within the twenty-five days. Lacombie v. Waler, 4 Binn. (Pa.) 299.

2. Brown v. Ralston, 9 Leigh (Va.) 532; 4 Rand. 504; Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268.

According to a charter party the charterers or their assigns were to have five working days in which to receive the cargo. She arrived in port on the 9th of March, the cargo was sold on the 10th, and the vessel entered by the charterers for a meter. She was not ordered by the harbor master to proceed to the pool for unloading until the

20th, and on Monday, the 22nd, she began unloading her cargo, and was cleared on the 27th. It seems that according to the factor's certificate she was a metered vessel, and that if she had not been on the metered list she could have proceeded to the pool at once and would not have been obliged to be entered for a meter and would not have sustained the delay by waiting until the 20th before it was her turn to go to the pool. It also appeared that occasionally it was the practice for the factor not to enter such vessels in the meter's list, and that it was desirable that the cargo should be sold subject to metage by a sworn meter. Held, that the vessel did not arrive at her place of discharge until the 20th, and that the lay days did not begin to run until then, and that the owner could not recover demurrage. Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498; 12 L. J. Exch. 101.

It was stipulated in a charter party that a vessel was to go to Plymouth, not higher than S or N, or as near thereunto as she can safely get, and deliver the cargo, having certain lay and demurrage days. When she arrived the consignee ordered her to proceed to M, it being an ordinary landing place, and not so high as S or N. The tides were neap, and she went as near M as possible in that state of the tide. She was obliged to lay on the sand for several days before the tide became high enough to proceed to M. Held, that the naming of any landing-place within the port of Plymouth was optional with the consignee, provided he kept within the limits stated in the charter party and that the lay days did not begin until the ship reached the place thus designated, and the delay in reaching it was caused only by the ordinary course of navigation in a tidal harbor. Parker 7. Winlow or Winlo, 7 El. & Bl. 9429 4 Jur., N. S. 63; 84 L. J., Q. B. 49.

time she arrives at the usual place of discharge in the port and not when she first arrives at the port. If the loading or unloading place is within a dock they begin to run from the time she enters the dock, and not from the time she reaches some particular place in the dock to receive or discharge her cargo.2

In this case the only ground for holding the charterer or consignee liable for demurrage is some fault on his part by which the loading or receiving of the cargo is delayed longer than is necessary. Each party must use reasonable dispatch in performing his part of the contract; for this reasonable time will always

1. Breeton v. Chapman, 7 Bing. 559; Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268; Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498; 12 L. J., Exch. 101; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Weaver v. Walton, 1 Flip C. Ct. 441; Manson 7. New York N. H. & H. R. Co.. 24 Blatchf. C. Ct. 448; McIntosh v. Sinclair, 11 Ir. C. L. 456; Alward v. Smith, 2 Low. 192; Parker v. Winlow, 8 El. & B. 942; Hodgdon v. R. R. Co., 46 Conn. 277.

This is the case when the cargo is brought by a general ship.

But it may be otherwise when the charterer or consignee assumes all the obligations of the charter party. Gronstadt v. Whitthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265.

If a vessel wishes to protect herself against delays not arising from the fault of the shipper or his agents, she must do so by stipulating for a stated period of discharge after arrival or for dispatch. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201.

The charterer is not liable for detention caused by the vessel having to wait her turn to unload when the goods are such that they have to be discharged into bonded warehouses. Rodgers v. Torresters, 2 Camp. 483; Brumester v. Hodson, 2 Camp. 488.

2. Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268; McIntosh v. Sinclair, 11 Ir. L. S. 456 Exch.; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 89; Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331; Kell v. Anderson, Id. 498; Nelson v. Dahl, 12 Ch. Div. 568; Gibbens v. Buisson, I Bing. N. Č. 283; Balley v. De Arrogave, 7 A. & E. 919.

When the delivery by the terms of the charter party was to be made alongside the vessel within reach of her tackle and the consignee directed the captain to take the vessel to a certain dock, the working lay days commenced from the time she was in readiness alongside the dock to discharge her cargo. Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 268.

According to a charter party a vessel was to proceed direct to any Liverpool or Berkenhead dock, and there in the usual and customary manner take on a full and complete cargo of coal, and that she should be loaded at the rate of one hundred tons per working day, but that loading should not commence until after July 1st. She was ordered to the Wellington dock (a Liverpool dock) by the charterers, and was ready to enter it on July 3rd, but was not permitted to enter the dock until July 11th, because the coal agent whom the charterers had employed to furnish the coal had three vessels at that time inside the dock and two others booked to enter. The dock regulations would not allow a coal supplier to have more than three ships inside the dock at the same time, it being the usual custom to employ coal agents to furnish cargoes, and it appeared that the charterers had not made an unreasonable selection of the agent. Although she entered the dock July 11th, her turn to proceed to the spout to receive the coal did not arrive until July 23rd and loading began the day after. It also appeared that it was the usual custom to load coal from the spout, and also that it was not unusual to load from lighters. Held, that the lay days began to run when she entered the dock, and that they were not postponed until her turn arrived to go to the spout. Tapscott v. Balfour, 42 L. J., C. P. 16; 8 L. R., C. P. 46; 21 W. R. 245; 27 L. T., N. S. 710.

3. Fish v. 150 Tons Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Hayden v. Whitmore, 74 Me. 230; Rodgers v. Torresters, 2 Camp. 483; Burmester v. Hodgson, 2 Camp. 488; Henley v. The Brooklyn Ice Co., 14 Blackf. C. Ct. 522; Schroll v. Albany Iron and Steel Co., 101 N. Y. 602; Finney v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 171; The L. Z. Adams, 26 Fed. Rep. 655; The Mary Riley v. 3000 Tons Railroad Ties (D. C., E. D., Pa.),

be implied, and this is always a question for the jury to determine from all the circumstances legitimately bearing upon the case.1

(b) When Specified in Charter.-If the parties stipulate as to when the lay days are to commence, or limit the time in which the loading or unloading or one of these operations is to be performed, they will be governed by such stipulation, and such limitation is construed in maritime law as a stipulation for the benefit of the ship, designed to cast upon the charterer or consignee all risk of detention beyond the stipulated period; and if the stipulation is for the discharging of cargo, the lay days commence from the time she arrives at the port and notifies the consignee that she is ready to discharge, he is bound to find a suitable. place of discharge, and is liable if she is detained longer than the

38 Fed. Rep. 254; Sweeting v. Darthez, 14 C. B. 538; Eng. L. & Eq. 326; Harris v. Dresman, Exch. 1854, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 526; Clendaniel v. Tuckerman, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 184. If the vessel is unnecessarily delayed by the fault of the consignee he is liable, although the charter party does not contain an agreement for demurrage. The Norman, 16 Fed. Rep. 879.

delay. Ford v. Coles worth, 39 L. Q. B. 188; 18 W. R. 1169; 23 L. T., N. S. 165; 5 L. R., Q. B. 544 Exch. Cham.

Where a bill of lading fixed no period for the discharge of the cargo, the only obligation of the consignee or his vendee was to use due diligence in procuring a berth and to discharge, according to the custom of the trade. The Z. L. Adams, 26 Fed. Rep. 655.

If no lay days are provided for in the charter party or bill of lading, and no stipulation is made as to the time of unloading, the consignee will not be held liable for delays occurring without his fault. The Glover, 1 Brown Adm. 166.

In the absence of express stipulation it is the duty of the consignees to furnish within a reasonable time a suitable place for her discharge, and also to complete it within a reasonable time; and that the fact that a considerable number of vessels consigned to the charterers had arrived with cargoes. But where a charter party did not about the same time and there was a stipulate a certain number of lay days delay in consequence in assigning her a at the expiration of which demurrage birth was a circumstance for which the was to run, yet it indicated the rate at ship owners were not responsible. It which the cargo was to be discharged, was a risk the consignees themselves to-wit: "Not less than one hundred took when they agreed to freight the tons per day." The total tonnage of schooner. Esseltyne v. Elmore, 7 Biss. the cargo was 1,808 tons, and dividing (U. S.) 69. this by 100 made nineteen working days. The court held that this period was fixed with as much certainty as though nineteen working days had been written in the charter party as the number of lay days. Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; citing Sanquinetti v P. S. Nav. Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. Div. 238.

In the absence of any express agreement for discharging, a vessel had to wait its turn at a grain elevator, it being the only one in the place. Held, that the consignees were not liable for the detention. Finney v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 171.

In the absence of any express agreement the consignee is not liable for delay caused by the vessel waiting her turn to be unloaded at an elevator where it is the custom of the port that all grain shall be unloaded at an elevaWeaver v. Walton, 1 Flip C. Ct.

tor.

441.

Where it is impossible for the consignee to receive the cargo by circumstances over which he has no control he is not liable to pay damages for the

1. Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; The L. Z. Adams, 26 Fed. Rep. 655; Fish v. 150 Tons Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Brown v. Certain Tons of Coal, 34 Fed. Rep. 913.

2. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Northam, 2 Ben. 1; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Ping, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36; Randall v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352; Hayden v.