In another case where the putative father swore that on the day before the service of the summons, having reason to anticipate further annoyance from the mother of the bastard, he determined to leave his father's residence and obtain employment in a different part of the country, and he accordingly, on that day, left his father's residence and ceased altogether to reside there, and shortly afterwards went to reside with one L in Bedfordshire, and assisted him in his farm there, and had not when he left, nor since, had any intention of returning to reside with his father, and that he did not become aware of the second summons, until after the date of the hearing; and it appeared that the summons was left at the house of the father of the affiant, with whom he had always resided up to the day before the said service, the court held the service good, LORD CAMPBELL, C. J., saying: "I am of opinion that the summons was served at the last place of abode of the putative father." Queen v. Higham, 26 L. J. M. C. 116. See also Queen v. Davis, 22 L. J. M. C. 143.

The different views taken in these cases caused a difference of opinion among the judges in the case of Reg. v. De Winton. In this case a bastardy summons was issued against the defendant, who had for some years been living at his father's house, as the putative father. This summons and a second one were dismissed for certain defects. On October 8th, a third summons was taken out and served at the house of the defendant's father, who at that time stated to the constable who served the warrant that his son had gone away and that he did not know where he was. This last summons was heard on November 5th, and an order of affiliation and for the payment of two shillings and sixpence a week to the complainant was made against the defendant. On December 10th a warrant was issued against the defendant charging him with perjury committed on the hearing of the first summons, in swearing that he was not the father of the child. On May 12th, 1888, being one year and one day after the birth of the child, the defendant surrendered to the warrant. From October 8th, 1887, to May 12th, 1888, the complainant was unable to discover where the defendant was. The defendant took a rule for a certiorari to remove the bastardy order into the high court for the purpose of

having the same quashed on the ground that the bastardy summons had not been served on the defendant, the putative father, nor left "at his last place of abode," as required by § 4 of 35 & 36 Vict., ch. 65 (the Bastardly Laws Amendment Act of 1872). The defendant made an affidavit in support of the rule, in which he said that in September he left his father's house, as he had found employment with a farmer at Gloucester; that he had no intention of returning, and that from the 26th of September until the 12th of May he had lived continuously in lodgings where he was employed, and that he knew nothing of the third summons until November 16th, when his sister sent him a newspaper containing a report of the case. The rule was discharged in consequence of the disagreement of the court. STEPHEN, J, gave his opinion as follows: "In this case I am sorry to say that the court is divided." The act of parliament says that the summons is to be left at the defendant's "last place of abode." The meaning of the words "last place of abode" was much discussed in Reg. v. Evans (ubi supra), and the court there held that the summons must be left at the defendant's present place of abode, if he has any at the time of the service; at the last place of his abode if he has none. In that case the service was at the house where the defendant formerly lodged, but where he did not lodge at the time of the service, and it appeared that the summons did not reach him until after the day on which the order was made, and it was held that the service was not at the "last place of abode." Now, in the present case, it seems to me that the uncontradicted affidavit is that he resided with his father, then went away and resided at Gloucester, and that he did not return, and had no intention of returning. It appears to me that, according to the authority of Reg. v. Evans (ubi supra), the defendant's last place of abode was at Gloucester, where he was then living. The case of Reg. v. Higham (ubi supra) decides the other way. These cases directly contradict each other. Reg. v. Evans, gives a perfectly plain exposition of the statute, but Reg. v. Higham does not, to my mind, do so. I therefore adopt Reg. v. Evans. At the same time, however, I wish to say that the view taken by my brother Manisty is more in accordance with justice in this particular case. But I look at what the act of parliament says, and

what this particular case decides, and I come to the conclusion that this rule ought to be made absolute." MANISTY, J., who favored the discharging of the rule, said: "I am very sorry to be compeiled to differ from my learned brother, but I follow the more recent case of Reg. v. Higham. I think that case is founded on common sense and also on justice. No doubt this § 4 of the act of 35 & 36 Vict., ch. 65, was intended to provide, as it seems to me, for the service of the summons where a person has gone away, and has at the time no known place of abode. The section does not say so in words, but the object of the statute is clearly so. To evade the statute the defendant went away, and kept himself concealed, and the question is whether a person does not evade the statute who leaves his father's house and goes to some distant place, knowing that a charge was made against him, because he knew that although one summons was dismissed, another summons would be taken out, and his relations knew well where to find him, as they knew where to send the newspaper, but they did not know where to send the summons. This was done to evade the statute. But it is unnecessary to base my judgment on this. I base my judgment on the case of Reg. 7. Higham. I quite agree with the recent case of Reg. v. Lee, in which HAWKINS, J., adopts the decision in Reg. v. Higham, saying that that was a strong case. In Reg. v. Lee, the mother was delivered of the child on the 18th of April, 1887, and she obtained a summons against Lee, the alleged putative father, which was served on the 18th of May, 1887, at the house of a baker at Sunbury. Lee had been in the service of the baker, and resided there from the 25th of September, 1886, to the 20th of April, 1887. When a constable left the summons, the baker told him that Lee had left that place, and his place of residence was not known, but that Lee had · called at his place on the 14th of May to take away some things he had left there. Lee stated in his affidavit that he had left Sunbury on the 20th of April to better himself, that he went to Southampton and remained there till the 19th of May, when he got a situation in a ship and sailed for the West Indies. Under these circumstances it was there held that the service was valid, as the summons had been left at the last place of abode. I think we may fairly act upon these cases, and

hold the summons here was left at the last place of abode of the defendant." Reg. v. De Winton, 59 L. I. N. S. 382; s. c., 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 459. See also Reg. v. Lee, 52 J. P. 344.

Last Date. See DATE, vol. 5, p. 77; Bement v. Trenton, L. & M. Co., 32 N. J. L., 515.

Since Last Entering the Service.Upon a claim for pay made by an officer in the navy under the provisions of the act of March 3rd, 1883, ch. 97, 22 St. 473, as follows: "And all officers of the navy shall be credited with the actual time they may have served as officers or enlisted men in the regular or volunteer army or navy, or both, and shall receive all the benefits of such actual service in all respects in the same manner as if all said service had been continuous, and in the regular navy, in the lowest grade having graduated pay held by such officer since last entering the service: provided, that nothing in this clause shall be so construed as to authorize any change in the dates of commission or in the relative rank of such officers: provided further, that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to give any additional pay to any such officer during the time of his service in the volunteer army or navy," it appeared that the claimant was an officer in the regular navy and had served continuously therein since 1860. The court of claims held, that the claimant was entitled under the above act, and upon appeal by the United States this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, BLATCHFORD, J., saying: "It is contended on the part of the United States that the act of March 3rd, 1883, applies to officers serving in the regular navy only when their term of service has not been continuous. The view is urged that the expression "since last entering the service" implies that the officer, to be entitled to the benefit of the statute, must have entered the service more than once. But we think that this is an overstrained interpretation. Mullan entered the service once. It was his last entry as well as his first entry. Where an officer has entered the service twice, the second entry is the last entry, and that entry is to be taken in applying the statute to his case; but where an officer has entered the service but once, that entry is to be taken as the last entry, within the meaning of the statute. So, too, the expression "as if all said service had been continuous" is

not to be held to confine the benefits of the statute to a service which has been noncontinuous The expression is satisfied by considering it as an extension of the benefits of the statute to interrupted noncontinuous service, and by crediting the officer with the actual time of such service, as if it had been continuous service. Otherwise the statute cannot be carried out. It says that "all officers of the navy shall be credited with the actual time they may have served as officers or enlisted men in the regular or volunteer army or navy or both;" and the benefits of such actual service are to be received where the service has been continuous in the regular navy. United States v. Mullan, 8 Supreme Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 79.

Last Examination.-In an action of debt brought against the marshal of the Marshalsea prison for the escape of one while committed to his custody in execution, on the ground that he had brought White before the commissioners in bankruptcy for examination under the act of 49 Geo. III, ch. 121, 13, it appeared that White did not pass his last examination at that time, but after attending the commissioners, he was carried back to prison by the defendant, and continued in custody from that time on, except when he was carried before the examiners for further examination under warrant at various times, until he passed his last examination. It was contended that the commissioners in bankruptcy had no authority to bring the bankrupt before them, except when he was in custody at the time of his last examination, and consequently the fact of his being out of the rules of the prison at an earlier date, constituted an escape, for which the defendant was liable. The court held that there was no escape, and gave judgment for the defendant, ABBOTT, C. J., saying: "The question in this case depends entirely on the construction of the 49 Geo. III, ch. 121, 13. That section recites that great inconveniences had arisen from the necessity which then existed of the attendance of commissioners of bankrupt in prison to take the examination of bankrupts charged in executions; and then it enacts, 'that every bankrupt, being in custody at the time of his last examination, although charged in execution, shall be brought before the commissioners, to be examined by them, in the same manner as is now practiced with respect to bankrupts in custody on mesne process.' Now, this is a reme

dial law, and ought to be so construed as to extend to the whole mischief intended to be remedied. If we were to hold the words 'ast examination to mean only the last day or time of examination, a great proportion of the mischief recited in the statute would not be remedied. For, it is obvious that the examination of the bankrupt must frequently continue for several days, and it may be impossible, in many instances, for the commissioners to know beforehand what may be the last day of examination. Supposing the bankrupt not to be in custody, it is clear the commissioners might bring him before them as often as they thought necessary for the purposes of examination, and there can be no reason why they should not do so where the bankrupt is in custody in executions. By the 5 Geo. II, ch. 30, § 6, it is enacted: That in case the bankrupt is in execution, the commissioners are to attend him in prison, and to take his discovery as in other cases, and the assignees are empowered to appoint persons to attend the bankrupt, being in custody as aforesaid, and to produce to him his books, in order to prepare his last discovery and examination, a copy of which the bankrupt is to deliver to the assignees ten days at least before such last examination. It is quite clear that in this statute the word examination, being coupled with the word discovery, means that discovery and examination which may become final by a full and satisfactory discovery and disclosure of his estate. The words last examination seem to have been copied from this statute into the 49 Geo. III, ch. 121, § 3, and these provisions being in pari materia ought to receive a similar construction. I am, therefore, of opinion that the words last examination mean that examination made from time to time, which is ultimately to be the final discovery of the bankrupt's estate and effects. That being so, the commissioners in this case were authorized to have the bankrupt brought before them on the occasion in question." Spence v. Jones, 5 Barn. & Ald. 705.

Last Past. Where a date is stated and this is followed by a date in the same month which is described as of the said month last past, this latter date will be held to be in the same year as the antecedent date, not in the previous year, the words last past referring to the day of the month, and not to the month. The King v. Crisp, 7 East 389.

Thus of a lease, in a declaration of ejectment, is stated to have been made on July 7th, 1825, to hold from "the 6th day of July then last past," it will be construed to mean July 6th, 1825, and not July 6th, 1824, when the earlier date is prior to the accrual of the title of the plaintiff's lessor; for where the words may be rendered in either way that construction which renders the demise useful to the action will be adopted rather than that which would destroy it. Doe v. Vanness, 5 Halst. (N. J.) 102.

So where arbitration bonds were executed August 21st, 1813, and the award was dated August 23d, 1813, reciting bonds dated "the 21st of August last past," in an action of debt upon the arbitration bonds, it was pleaded "no award," the award was objected to, as not pursuing the authority conferred by the bonds. Upon this point the court decided against the defendant, SUTHERLAND, J.. saying: "The objection taken to the award below was, that it bore date the 23d August, 1813, and purported to be made by virtue of a bond of submission, which bore date “August 21st, now last past," whereas the bond declared on and produced in evidence bore date August 21st, 1813, being August instant instead of past. The arbitrators also awarded general releases between the parties, from the beginning of the world until the "21st day of August last past, being the day of the date of the arbitration bond," thus showing that the award was made under a bond of submission of August 21st, 1812, whereas the bond declared on was dated August 21st, 1813; and consequently no authority was shown to make the award. The strict grammatical construction of the award is. perhaps, as contended for by the plaintiff in error. But the intention of the arbitrators is perfectly clear. They run into a mere inaccuracy of expression. To avoid such an expression we may, without any great violence, suppose that the words last past were intended by the arbitrators to refer to the day and not to the month. Vid. Dy. 376 c; Ord on Usury, 61 n, Cro. Jac. 646. These awards are frequently made and drawn up by illiterate men, and it will not do to test them by the strict rules of grammar. If there had, in truth, been another bond of submission in 1812, it was competent for the defendant to show it." Brown v. Hankerson, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 70.

Last Legal Settlement.-This expression was construed under the New York poor laws upon the question as to the settlement of a bastard, when it was decided that the last legal settlement of the bastard's mother, however obtained by her, and whether before or after the bastard's birth, was the settlement of the bastard. This case arose on a question between the overseers of the poor of Canajoharie and those of Johnstown. It appeared that the pauper was a bastard, about 14 years old. At the time of his birth the mother was about 16 years of age and lived with her father in Johnstown, where he had a legal settlement. When the child was a year old the mother's father removed with his family, including the mother and child, to Canajoharie, where he acquired a legal settlement; and the mother and her child continued to live with him. It was contended that the time of birth fixed the settlement of the child, but the court held that the common law rule was altered by the statute, saying: "The town of Canajoharie was the place of the last legal settlement of the pauper's mother. The pauper was an illegitimate child. At common law, a bastard child was settled where it was born; but our statute (1 N. R. L. 280, Sess. 36, ch. 78, § 3) has altered the common law and declares, 'that every bastard child shall be deemed and adjudged to be settled in the city or town of the last legal settlement of the mother.' It is, however, urged that the statute contemplates a settlement acquired by the mother; and not one that is derivative, or in consequence of the acquisition of a new settlement through the father of the pauper's mother as in this case. We are not at liberty to proceed on such an ingenious distinction; the language of the statute is clear and precise, that the last legal settlement of the mother, however acquired, is that of her illegitimate child. The very expression last legal settlement supposes that the settlement of the mother might be changed." The Overseers of the Poor of Canajoharie v. The Overseers of the Poor of Johnstown, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 41; See also DOMICIL, vol. 5, p. 866.

Last Sickness. See NUNCUPATIVE WILLS. This phrase, as used in the Pennsylvania act of February 24th,1834. in regard to preferred claims, has been held to refer only to the illness of which the patient dies. Consequently where a person received a severe injury,

and called in a physician to attend him, but partially recovered, so as to be able to attend to his business, the physician's bill was held not to be a preferred claim, although the patient subsequently became ill again from the same injury and died. During the latter part of his illness he had a different doctor. In re Reese's estate, 2 Pearson (Pa.) 482.

Even where death results, if the illness be a lingering one, the phrase last sickness will not be extended to the whole of it, so as to make the medical attendance therefor a preferred claim. It will include the services of the physician only after the patient is virtually prostrated, and the services constantly necessary. Duckett's Estate, I Luzerne Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 227. Compare these decisions with that in Rouse v. Morris, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 328 (1828), under the prior act of 1794 upon the same subject.

In Maine, on the other hand, under a similar statute, it has been held that the sickness which is terminated by the death of a patient, is his last sickness, and the physician attending him therefor is entitled to be paid as a preferred creditor, no matter how long its duration. Huse v. Brown Exr., 8 Me. 167.

1. In California, under the statutes of 1851, p. 448, making it the duty of the public administrator to take charge of the estate of any stranger, or person without known heirs, dying intestate, and to account for the same subject to the control of the probate court, and 置 rther authorizing the court to make hin special administrator, and to direet him to take charge of the estate, it appeared, in the case of the estate of one James Beckett, that the public administrator filed his petition for letters of administration, which stated that the said Beckett, late a resident of the state and county, died etc., and asked that he be appointed a special administrator. This petition was granted, and subsequently the widow and heir of the said Beckett intervened on the ground that the words of the statute had not been complied with, which are that adminfstration must be granted in the county of which the deceased was a resident at or immediately previous to his death, etc., and therefore the probate court never had jurisdiction, and grant of administration was void. Certain credi

are stated. But it seems to be supposed that the residence of Beckett is not sufficiently alleged under the expression James Beckett, late a resident of this state and county, etc.' Webster defines late, among other definitions, as meaning last' or 'recently in any place or office.' It is a legal term, in fact, and is as such in the superlative degree and means last. In ancient times, when the addition of a man's residence was necessary in an indictment for a crime, the term 'late' was always used as descriptive of his last residence, and was held a sufficient allegation of his residence in the most technical terms of the common law." This was confirmed by the court, BURNETT J. saying: "The jurisdictional facts in this case were the death and residence of the deceased. words of the statute are that 'administration shall be granted, first, in the county of which the deceased was a resident at or immediately previous to his death, in whatever place his death may have happened, etc. The

The

meaning of this provision is, that administration must be granted in the county of which the deceased was a resident at the time of his death; and the words or immediately previous to' must be considered as mere surplusage. A man cannot reside at two places at the same time, and unless the intention was to allow two administrations to be granted, the statute must receive the construction given. The public administrator, in his petition, described the deceased as late a resident of San Francisco county,' and it was objected that this was not sufficient, as it did not follow the words of the statute. But this objection would not seem to be fatal. There is no provision of the statute requiring the very words of the law to be used, as no precise form of petition is given. In such cases, though always safe to fol. low the words of the statute literally, it