res, although persons in interest had no personal notice of the litigation, provided the court had jurisdiction of the res and the " subject matter of the litigation. A foreign judgment in rem may be impeached collaterally by showing that it was procured by fraud, or that it is void on its face or by local law.4 pronounced. Cushing v. Laird, 107 U. S. So; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 362; Crowdson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch (U.S.) 434; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 600; De Mora v. Concha, 29 Ch. D. 268; Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show. 232; Ld. Raym. 473; Big. on Estop. (4th ed.), 45, 213. But see Ocean Ins. Co. v. Francis, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 64; Radcliff v. United States Ins. Co., 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 277; Salem v. Eastern R., 98 Mass. 431; Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411; The Mary, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 126. A decree of acquittal does not establish the claims of any particular person where conflicting claims are not presented and passed upon. Cushing t. Laird, 107 U. S. 69. Foreign condemnations in admiralty are conclusive upon the title to the property. Bernardi v. Motteux, 2 Doug. 574 Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show. 232; 2 Ld. Raym. 893; The Helena, 4 Ch. Rob. 3. Such a judgment has been held conclusive of the facts on which it was based. Crowdson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch (U.S.) 434. But not unless the record shows such grounds of condemnation. Stewart v. Warner, 1 Day (Conn.) 142; Baxter v. New England Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 277; Dempsey v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 1 Binn. (Pa.) 299; Wagorm v. New England Ins. Co., 1 Story (U. S.) 157; Lothian v. Henderson, 3 Bos. & P. 499; Baring v. Clagett, 3 Bos. & P. 201; Bolton v. Gladstone, 5 East 155; Bernardi v. Motteux, 2 Doug. 574; Hobbs v. Henning, 17 C. B., N. S. 791; Dalgleish v. Hodgson, 7 Bing. 495. And even then by some authorities a judgment of condemnation is not conclusive evidence against all persons of the facts on which it is founded. Durant v. Abendroth, 97 N. Y. 132; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Francis, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 64; Radcliff v. United States Ins. Co., 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 277; Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 451; Smith v. Williams, 2 Cai. Cas. (N. Y.) 110. See also De Mora v. Concha, 29 Ch. D. 268 (C. A.); Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 141. 12 C. of L.- 10** It has been held that an unsatisfied judgment against a vessel is not a bar to an action in personam against the owners. Toby v. Brown, 6 Eng. (Ark.) 308. Compare The Griefswald, Swab. 430. Forfeitures.-A decree of condemnation or acquittal of goods in exchequer, district court or other court having cognizance of the forfeiture, is in rem. Big. on Estop. (4th ed.) 215, et seq.; Gelston v. Hoyt, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 561; s. c., 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 246; Scott v. Shearman, 2 W. Black. 977. See also Whitney v. Walsh, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 29; Coffey v. U. S., 116 U. S. 436. A foreign condemnation of wreck or derelict and sale thereunder is conclusive upon the title to the property. Grant v. McLachlin, 4 Johns. (Ñ. Y.) 34. 1. Thomas V. Southard, 2 Dana (Ky.) 475: The Globe, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 427; Banduc's Syndics v. Nicholson, 4 Miller (La.) 81. 2. Freeman on Judg. (3rd ed.), § 611; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 241. See also The Mecca, 6 P. D. 106. Where the record of a foreign judgment in rem is silent as to the jurisdictional facts, jurisdiction will not be presumed. Com. v. Blood, 97 Mass. 538; The Griefswald, Swabey 430. But if the court had jurisdiction when the suit was commenced, it will be presumed, without evidence to the contrary, to have had jurisdiction to the end. Lockhart v. Locke, 42 Ark. 1. Even a party not instituting the proceedings may show that a foreign judgment in rem was pronounced by a person or body of persons not having authority to sit as a court. Snell v. Faussatt, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 271; The Griefswald, Swabey 430; The Flad Oyen, 1 Ch. Rob. 135; The Hendrick & Maria, 4 Ch. Rob. 43. 3. Freeman on Judg. (3rd ed.), § 612; Big. on Estop. (4th ed.) 246. 4. Freeman on Judg. (3rd ed.), § 612. As where it does not show any monition or that any hearing was had, or the formalities of the law were gone through with. Big, on Estop. (4th ed.) 244; Sawyer v. Maine Ins. Co., 12 Mass. 149x XVI. SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS (See PAYMENT; SUBROGATION). Payment of the amount due under a judgment may be made to one of joint judgment creditors; to the next friend of an infant who has no guardian;2 to the judgment creditor's attorney while his authority in the case remains unrevoked ;3 to an officer authorized by law to receive payment of judgments.4 Where the debtor has notice that a judgment has been assigned, payment must be made to the assignee; and where the judgment creditor of record is only a nominal party, payment must be made to the real party in interest. A judgment may be paid in anything of value which the creditor will accept.8 According to some authorities, a judgment is not discharged by the acceptance of part payment under a parol agreement to receive it in full satisfaction of the judgment, but 291; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 600. But mere errors of law on the face of the proceedings will not be considered. Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508; Moore v. Douglas, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 184; Townsend v. Moore, 8 Jones (N. Car.) 147; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 423; Imrie v. Castrique, 8 C. B., N. S. 405; L. R., 4 H. L. 414. See also Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass. 218. But see Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch (U. S.) 185. 1. Erwin v. Rutherford, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 169. See also Roberts v. Roberts, 1 McMull. Ch. (S. Car.) 49. 2. Freeman on Judg. (3rd. ed.), § 462, and cases cited. 3. Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517; s. c., 10 Am. Dec. 179; Baltimore etc. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Md. 624; Wilkinson v. Holloway, 7 Leigh (Va.) 277; Harper v. Harvey, 4 W. Va. 539. 4. Governor v. Read, 38 Al. 254; Beard v. Millikan, 68 Ind. 231. 5. See subtitle ASSIGNMENT. 6. Guthrie v. Bashline, 25 Pa. St. So. See subtitle ASSIGNMENT OF JUDG MENTS. 7. Thatcher v. Rockwell, 4 Cal. 375; Triplett v. Scott, 12 Ill. 137; Hodson v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 170; McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N. Y. 237. 8. The judgment creditor cannot afterwards revoke his acceptance. Lyon v. Northrop, 17 Iowa 314; Ives v. Phelps, 16 Minn. 451; Weston v. Clark, 37 Mo. 572; Witherby v. Mann, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 518. But the taking of a note will not discharge a judgment, unless it is agreed that it is in satisfaction thereof. McCoy v. Hazlett, 14 Kan. 430; Riggs v. Goodrich, 74 Mo. 108; Sturdevant Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512. See also Terrett v. Brooklyn Improvement Co., 87 N. Y. 92; Kusler v. Crofoot, 78 Ind. 597; Shields v. Moore, 84 Ind. 440; Presley v. Lowry, 26 Minn. 158. Where a party, against whom there exists a number of judgments which are barred by limitations, gives a mortgage as additional or collateral security for the payment of such judgments, they are not merged in the mortgage. Johnson v. Hines, 61 Md. 122. On a note made by the complainant for the accommodation of the endorser, with the payee's (the defendant's) knowledge that it was made for accommodation, the defendant recovered a judgment at law. Afterwards, the defendant, without the complainant's knowledge or consent, took the endorser's notes, some of which were paid and others renewed and not paid, on which judgment was recovered. was held that the giving of time to the endorser, by taking his notes, discharged the maker from liability on the original judgment. Westervelt v. Frech, 33 N. J. Eq. 451. It Tender. A second accommodation endorser of a bill of exchange against whom and the first accommodation endorser a joint judgment has been recovered, will be released from liability by a valid tender by the first endorser to the judgment creditor of the full amount of the judgment in a currency which the creditor was bound by law to receive, but refused. Ewing v. Sugg, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 375. 9. Deland v. Hiett, 27 Cal. 611; Fletcher v. Wurgler, 97 Ind. 223; Garvey v. Jarvis, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 179. Compare Reed v. Hibbard, 6 Wis. 175; it may be discharged on part payment by the execution of an instrument under seal acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment. An attorney2 or an officer authorized by law to accept payment of a judgment,3 has no general authority to accept payment in anything but money, or to satisfy the judgment on part payment. Where there are several judgments against the same or differ v. Miller v. Lilly, 84 Ind. 533; Jackson v. Smock v. Dade, 5 Rand. (Va.) 639; s. c., 16 Am. Dec. 780; Wilkinson v. Holloway, 7 Leigh (Va.) 277; Abbe v. Rood, 6 McLean (U. S.) 107. But see Jeffries v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., I McCrary (U. S.) 114. The party claiming that an attorney was authorized to accept less than the whole amount of a judgment in money has the burden of proof. Portis v. Ennis, 27 Tex. 574 1. Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. 665; Braden v. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518. The rule of law that the payment of a less sum of money cannot be pleaded in satisfaction of a larger sum, is confined to the case of the payment of or agreement to pay a less sum of money, merely, and does not apply to the case An attorney has no implied power to of the payment of a less sum of money satisfy a judgment by discharging the and some other thing. Thus, where a judgment debtor from custody under party paid $100 and gave a cow to one execution. Kellogg v. Gilbert, 10 in full satisfaction of a judgment Johns. (N. Y.) 260; s. c., 6 Am. Dec. against him for $200,which was accepted 335; Simonton v. Barrell, 21 Wend. as such, and a receipt given him for the (N. Y.) 362. $200 in full, and the attorney of the plaintiff in the judgment sued out an execution thereon, giving credit of $140 on the same, under which the defendant's land, without any notice to him, was sold, it was held that the sale was properly set aside in equity. Neal v. Handley, 116 Ill. 418. A quit-claim deed by the owner of a judgment purporting to release to the judgment debtor the lien of the judgment on land described in the deed, does not satisfy said judgment so as to avoid a sale thereunder to a purchaser without notice, actual or constructive, of their lease. Huff v. Morton, 83 Mo. 399. It has been held that the entry of satisfaction by one of two judgment creditors, upon part payment thereof only, may be set aside on the application of the other judgment creditor. Haggin v. Clark, 61 Cal. 1. 2. Chapman v. Cowles, 41 Ala. 103; Jones v. Ransom, 3 Ind. 327; McCarver v. Nealey, 1 Iowa 360; Trumbull v. Nicholson, 27 Ill. 149; Rounsaville v. Hazen, 33 Kan. 71; Garthwaite v. Wentz, 19 La. An. 196; Jewett v. Wardleigh, 32 Me. 110; Lewis v. Woodruff, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 539; Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. 665; Benedict v. Smith, 10 Pai. (N. Y.) 126; Lewis v. Gramage, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 347; Vail v. Conant, 15 Vt. 314; The satisfaction of a judgment by an attorney who is a co-owner thereof, binds his interest and satisfies the judgment to that extent. Roberts v. Nelson, 22 Mo. App. 28. 3. Ellis v. Smith 42 Ala. 349; Aicardi v. Robbins, 41 Ala. 541; Mitchell v. Hackett, 25 Cal. 539; Codwise v. Field, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 263. Money paid to a justice to be applied upon a judgment in garnishment cannot be used to satisfy a different judgment against the same party, even though the time had expired during which the fund could be bound by the proceedings in garnishment. Nor can a justice's docket entry that money paid into court is in satisfaction of a particular judgment make him liable to the judgment creditor for the money, if it was actually meant to be applied upon a different judgment. McDonald v. Lewis, 42 Mich. 135. 4. As separate judgments upon an original and collateral obligation. Craft v. Merrill, 14 N. Y. 456. Where one only of two judgments, by the record shown to be for the same cause of action, purports to have been discharged, one purchasing land subject to the lien of the judgments buys at his peril, and if it subsequently appears that the discharge was inadvertently entered, the judgment creditor may enforce his undischarged judg ent persons for the same cause of action, the satisfaction of one judgment discharges all. Courts of law2 as well as of equity have the power to satisfy judgments by setting off against them other judgments rendered by the same or different courts.3 But this power will not be exercised except where substantial justice can be rendered.4 At common law, a judgment was presumed to have been paid ment, although the purchaser acted upon the presumption that the discharge of one judgment was equivalent to the discharge of the other. Burgett v. Paxton, 99 Ill. 288. 1. First Nat. Bank v. Indianapolis etc. Co., 45 Ind. 5; Sherman v. Brett, 7 Wis. 139. Compare Meixell v. Kirkpatrick, 29 Kan. 679. See also Boardman v. Acer, 13 Mich. 77; Browser's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 466. The rule is the same, although the judgment paid is smaller than the other. Cox v. Smith, 10 Oreg. 418; Breslin v. Peck, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 623. Entry of Satisfaction by Payment.In some States at least the court in which judgment is rendered may enter satisfaction thereof upon proof that the same has been paid. Felt v. Cook, 95 Pa. St. 247; Gorusch v. Thomas, 57 Md. 334; Lough v. Pitman, 26 Minn. 345. In the absence of statutory authority, a court has no jurisdiction to cancel a judgment on motion based upon grounds existing prior to its rendition. Brett v. Myers, 65 Iowa 274. 2. Pierce v. Bent, 69 Me. 381; Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 190; Kimball v. Munger, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 364; Brown v. Warren, 43 N. H. 430; Brown v. Hendrickson, 39 N. J. L. 239; Coxe v. State Bank, 3 Halst. (N. J.) 172; Best v. Lawson, 1 Miles (Pa.) 11; Duncan v. Bloomstock, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 318; s. c., 13 Am. Dec. 728. Compare Webster v. McDaniel, 2 Del. Ch. 297. But the question may be too complicated to be adjusted in a court of law. Story v. Patten, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 331. 3. Skrine v. Simmons, 36 Ga. 402; Quick v. Durham, 115 Ind. 302; Ballinger v. Tarbell, 16 Iowa 491; Prior v. Richards, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 356; Palmeteer v. Meredith, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 74; Ames v. Bates, 119 Mass. 397; New Haven Co. v. Brown, 46 Me. 418; Chandler v. Drew, 6 N. H. 469; Brown v. Warren, 43 N. H. 430; Stilwell v. Carpenter, 2 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 238; Simpson v. Hart, 14 Johns.(N. Y.) 63: Kimball v. Munger, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 364; Burns v. Thornburgh, 3 Watts (Pa.) 78; Williams v. Evans, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 203; Duff v. Wells, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 17; Rix v. Nevins, 26 Vt. 384. But see Riddle's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 171. 4. Colquitt v. Bonner, 2 Ga. 115; Temple v. Scott, 3 Minn. 419; Alexander v. Durkee, 112 N. Y. 655; Baker v. Hoag, 6 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 201; Brown v. Hendrickson, 39 N. J. L. 239; Meador v. Rhyme, 11 Rich. (S. Car.) 631; Low v. Duncan, 3 Strobh. (S. Car.) 195; Burns v. Thornburgh, 3 Watts (Pa.) 78; Connable v. Buckland, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 221. After it has accrued the right of setoff cannot be destroyed by an assignment. Pierce v. Bent, 69 Me. 381; Makepeace v. Coates, 8 Mass. 451; Williams v. Evans, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 203; Wells v. Clarkson, 5 Mont. 336. See also subtitle AsSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENTS. Nor can the right be destroyed by a fraudulent assignment made at any time. Russell v. Conway, II Cal. 93; Morris v. Hollis, 2 Harr. (Del.) 4; Hurst v. Sheets, 14 Iowa 322. In some cases, judgments in favor of individuals may be set off against judgments against the same persons jointly with others. Allen v. Hall, 5 Met. (Mass.) 263; Pierce v. Bent, 69 Me. 386; Simpson v. Hart, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 63; Wright v. Cobleigh, 23 N. H. 32; Brown v. Warren, 43 N. H. 430. If, after the breach of a warranty of title to land by the establishment of an adverse title paramount to that warranted, the warrantee purchases such paramount title, he has the right to maintain an action against the warrantor for money paid to his use; but a circuit court has no power to order a judgment obtained by the warrantor against the warrantee for the purchase money of the land to be credited with the amount paid out by the warrantee for the paramount title, the claim therefor not having been reduced to judg after twenty years from the time of its rendition. The presumption arises after a less period in some States. It may ordinarily be rebutted.3 In connection with other circumstances, a prima facie presumption of payment may arise after a less period than that provided by law.* A judgment which has been satisfied by payment cannot be restored or kept alive to secure other liabilities. A judgment which has been paid is absolutely extinguished, although the payment was made by a person other than the judgment debtor, unless such person took an assignment of the judgment or was compelled to pay it to protect his own rights. A surety who pays a judgment against his principal may be sub ment against the warrantor, and being unliquidated as to him. Turner v. McAdory, 58 Miss. 27. 1. Morrow v. Robinson, 4 Del. Ch. 521; Tennessee v. Virgin, 36 Ga. 390; Willingham v. Long, 47 Ga. 545; Miller . Smith, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 425; Cope v. Humphries, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 15; Biddle v. Girard Nat. Bank, 109 Pa. St. 349; Tobin v. Myers, 18 S. Car. 324. See also Barnard v. Onderdonk, 11 Ab. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 349. Palen v. Bushnell, 58 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 423. After a judgment was recovered in a certain court, the court was made a court of record. It was held that the judgment was to be treated as the judgment of a court of record and that there was therefore no presumption of its payment before the expiration of twenty years from the date of its rendition. Camp v. Hallawan, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 628. It has been held that the provision of the New York statute making the statute of limitations applicable to an action on a justice's judgment after six years does not preclude the docketing of the judgment in the county court after that time and the issuing of execution thereon. Rose v. Henry, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 397. Compare Lindgren v. Gates, 26 Kan. 135; Williams v. Williams, 85 N. Car. 383. 2. Anderson v. Settle, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 202; McDaniel v. Goodall, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 391. 3. As to the evidence necessary to rebut the presumption, see Boardman v. De Forest, 5 Conn. 8; Burt v. Casey, 10 Ga. 179; Denny v. Eddy, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 533; Knight v. Macomber, 55 Me. 132; Bissell v. Jawdon, 16 O. St. 498; Yarnell v. Moore, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 173; Mower v. Kip, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 165; Van Loon v. Smith, 103 Pa. St. 238. No particular kind of evidence is required to rebut the presumption that a judgment of a court of record has been paid and satisfied at the expiration of twenty years after the rendering thereof, but any legal evidence having a tendency to show that such judgment has not been paid or satisfied is competent; and if the evidence furnished is such as to produce conviction that the judgment has not been paid or satisfied, it is sufficient to rebut the presumption. Walker v. Robinson, 136 Mass. 280. 4. Baker v. Stonebraker, 36 Mo. 338; Wherry v. McCammon, 12 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 337; Kinsler v. Holmes, 2 S. Car. 483; Leiper v. Erden, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 97; Husky v. Maples, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 25; Thompson v. Thompson, 2 Head (Tenn.) 405; Goldhawk v. Duane, Wash. (U. S.) 323; Renwick Wheeler, McCrary (U. S.) 119; Fuller v. Lendrum, 58 Iowa 353; Porter v. Nelson, 121 Pa. St. 628. 2 v. 5. Averill v. Loucks, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 19; Winslow v. Clark, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 380. 6. Truscott v. King, 6 N. Y. 147; Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 228; Craft v. Merrill, 14 N. Y. 456. Compare Pierce v. Black, 105 Pa. St. 342. See also Brown v. Vancleave, 86 Ky. 381. Costs.-Entry of payment of the debt and interest does not satisfy the judgment to prevent the collection of costs. Altman v. Klingensmith, 6 Watts (Pa.) 445. 7. Null v. Moore, 10 Ired. (N. Car.) 324; Sandford v. McLean, 3 Pai. (N. Y.) 117; s. c., 23 Am. Dec. 773; Head v. Gervais, Walker (Miss.) 577; S. C., 12 Am. Dec. 577; St. Francis Mill Co. v. Sugg, 83 Mo. 476. |