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Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14; Hale v. Finch, 104 U. S. 261; Flanders 7. Seelye, 105 U. S. 718; McIntosh v. Jarvis, 8 Up. Can. Q. B. 535. But see School Directors v. Hernandez, 31 La. An. 158; Louisiana Levee Co. v. State, 31 La. An. 250; Folger v. Palmer, 35 La. An. 743.

A judgment does not bind an original party to the suit who has been permitted to withdraw. Owens v. Alexander, 78 N. Car. 1. Compare Am. Bell Telephone Co. v. National Tel. Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 663.

A judgment against a surviving partner is not an estoppel against the representative of a deceased partner. Buckingham v. Ludlum, 37 N. J. Eq.

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The officer who served a summons, not having been a party to proceedings setting it aside, is not bound by them, but may attack their regularity and validity in an action against him for a false return. Mabbett v. Vick, 53 Wis. 15S.

A sheriff having possession of property under a writ of attachment is not bound by the judgment in a replevin suit to which he was not a party, and in which he was not served with process, and did not appear, and which he did not defend, although his under sheriff, as an individual, was a party to the suit. Geekie v. Kirby Carpenter Co., 106 U.

S. 379.

A judgment for plaintiff in an action of replevin against a police officer for property, taken on a search warrant is not a bar to an action for conversion of the same property brought by the alleged owner against the plaintiff in the former action. Scott. Drennen, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 226.

It has been held that a servant or agent sued separately for infringing a patent is not bound by a former judgment against the master or principal upon the question of the validity of the patent. Hayes v. Bickelhoupt, 24 Fed. Rep. 806.

A judgment against an endorser is

not evidence for him against the maker. Fenn v. Dugdale, 31 Mo. 580; Brooklyn etc. R. Co. v. Republic Bank, 102 U. S. 14.

A judgment against the plaintiff in an action for trespass is not evidence against him in an action against another joint trespasser. Sprague v. Oakes, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 455.

A judgment in favor of one creditor, declaring a conveyance by the debtor void, is not evidence in favor of another creditor. Winston v. Starke, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 317.

A decree of dismissal in a divorce suit is not evidence against third persons of the facts found therein. Needham v. Brenner, 12 Jur., N. S. 434; 14 W. R. 694. See also Burlen v. Shannon, 3 Gray (Mass.) 387.

A judgment against the defendant in a criminal case is evidence for the State in a civil action for the same offence. Webbs v. State, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 199.

Seemingly against the general principle it has been held that where a defendant defended an action and was compelled to pay to the plaintiff money belonging to another, the judgment was a defence to an action by the true owner. Mayer v. Foulk rod, 4 Wash. (U. S.) 349. Compare Schrauth v. Dry Dock etc. Bank, 86 N. Y. 390.

And a finding by the jury that a person was not an endorser but the original promisor of a note, was held binding on all other parties to the note. Sturtevant v. Randall, 53 Me. 149.

It has been held that a town sued for injuries from an obstruction in a highway might set up by way of estoppel a judgment in favor of the defendant in a former action brought by the same plaintiff to recover for the same injuries against a person alleged to have caused the obstruction. Hill v. Bain, 15 R. I. 75; s. c., 2 Am. St. Rep. 873.

A judgment in favor of an infant son suing by a guardian ad litem for injuries was held sufficient proof that the injuries were caused by defendant's negligence in a subsequent action by the father against the same defendant. Anderson v. Third Av. R., 9 Daly (N. Y.) 487. But a judgment in favor of the wife of the plaintiff in a former action for the same injury complained of was held not to be admissible in favor of the husband. Neeson v. Troy, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 173. See also Groth v. Washburn, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 324.

judgment because he conducted the suit ; nor is a witness bound by a judgment in an action in which he testifies.2 But in the absence of fraud and collusion, a judgment is conclusive evidence, even against a stranger, of the relation of debtor and creditor between the parties thereto,3 and of the amount of the indebtedness.+ As a muniment of title, also, a judgment may be conclusive evidence against a third person.5 Ordinarily, a judgment against a deceased party is erroneous but not void.

1. Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (La.) 353; Thrasher v. Haines, 2 N. H. 443. 2. Blackwood v. Brown, 32 Mich. 104; Wright v. Andrews, 130 Mass. 149; Yorks v. Steele, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 397; Schrauth v. Dry Dock etc. Bank, 86 N. Y. 390; Parker v. Moore, 59 N. H. 454. Nor is he estopped to deny what he admitted as a witness. Wilkinson v. Thigpen, 71 Ga. 497. Compare Folger v. Palmer, 35 La. An. 743. Unless in a proper case the admission has been acted upon. Leinkauff v. Munter, 76 Ala. 194.

An indemnitor who acts as a witness may be estopped by the judgment. Barney v. Dewey, 13 Johns. (N. Y.)

224.

3. "Supposing such third persons were not bound with or for the parties found liable," the rule applies. Big. on Estop. (4th ed.) 142. See Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520; Fuller v. Foote, 56 Conn. 341; Way v. Lewis, 115 Mass. 26; Cutter v. Evans, 115 Mass. 27; Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411; Wingate v. Haywood, 40 N. H. 437; Raymond v. Richmond, 78 N. Y. 351; Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N. Y. 351; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; Hall v. Stryker, 27 N. Y. 596; Swihart v. Spaum, 24 Ohio St. 432; Cincinnati v. Dickmeier, 31 Ohio St. 242.

According to some authorities, the judgment is prima facie evidence in such cases. Atkins v. Hosley, 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 325; Garland 7. Rives, 4 Rand. (Va.) 282; s. c., 15 Am. Dec. 756.

4. Candee v. Lord, 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 269; s. c., 51 Am. Dec. 294; Voorhees v. Seymour, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 569; Sidensparker v. Sidensparker, 52 Me. 481; Hills v. Sherwood, 48 Cal. 386; Chamberlain v. Carlisle, 26 N. H. 540. See also infra, this title, JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE.

Partnership.-A judgment in a suit determining the existence or nonexist. ence of a copartnership relation between the parties thereto is not binding

on or admissible in evidence against strangers to such proceeding. McDonald v. Matney, 82 Mo. 358.

Big.

5. "A distinction has been made between cases where the only fact to be established is the right of a creditor against the judgment debtor himself and cases where such a right may incidentally affect third persons, as where a person is affected by a chain of title under a judgment sale and conveyance. In this case it is held that third persons cannot impeach the judgment.' on Estop. (4th ed.) 142; Taylor 7. Phelps, i H. & G. (Md.) 492; Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. (Md.) 182; Baylor v. Dejarnette, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 172. See also Inman v. Mead, 97 Mass. 310; Casler v. Shipman, 35 N. Y. 533; Secrist v. Green, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 744See also infra, this title, JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE. Compare Pratt v. Jones, 64 Tex. 694.

6. Deceased Persons.-See generally DEATH, vol. 5, p. 130, et seq.; Powell v. Washington, 15 Ala. 803; Elliott v. Paterson, 65 Cal. 109; Phelan v. Tyler, 12 Pac. C. L. J. (Cal.) 38; Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364; Stoetzell v. Fullerton, 44 Ill. 108; Spalding v. Wathen, 7. Bush (Ky.) 659; Case v. Ribelin, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 30; Hayes v. Shaw, 20 Minn. 405 Reid v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 326; West v. Jordan, 62 Me. 484; Coleman v. McAnulty, 16 Mo. 173; Webber v. Stanton, 1 Mich. N. P. 97; Jennings v. Simpson, 12 Neb. 558; Swasey v. Antram, 24 Ohio St. 87; Yaple v. Titus, 41 Pa. St. 195; Day v. Hamburgh, 1 Browne (Pa.) 75; Carr v. Townsend, 63 Pa. St. 202; Collins v. Knight, 3 Tenn. Ch. 183; Taylor v. Snow. 47 Tex. 462; s. c., 26 Am. Rep. 311: Fleming v. Seeligson, 57 Tex. 524; Milan County v. Robertson. 47 Tex. 222; McClelland v. Moore, 48 Tex. 355; Holt v. Thacher, 52 Vt. 592; Neale v. Utz, 75 Va. 480. Compare McCreery 7. Everding, 44 Cal. 286; Edwards v. Whited, 29 La. An. 647; McCloskey v. Wingfield, 29 La. An. 141; Parker v.

(b) PERSONS UNDER DISABILITIES—(1) Infants.—A judgment rendered against an infant on confession or default, or on an appearance by an attorney, or without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, is erroneous but not void, and except where the infant is given a day on coming of age to show cause why the judgment should not conclude his rights, he is bound by it

Horne, 38 Miss. 215; Tarleton v. Cox, 45 Miss. 430; Young v. Pickens. 45 Miss. 553; Burke v. Stokely, 65 N. Car. 569; Colson v. Wade, 1 Murph. (Tenn.) 43; Carter v. Carriger, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 411; s. c., 24 Am. Dec. 585; Morrison v. Deaderick, to Humph. (Tenn.) 342. See subtitle NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRIES. Extinct Corporation. — Judgment against an extinct corporation has been held void. Clay Township v. District of Buchanan, 63 Iowa 188; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384; McCulloch v. Norwood, 58 N. Y. 562; Thornton v. Marginal Railway, 123 Mass. 32. Compare Muscatine Turn Verein v. Funck, 18 Iowa 469; Hunt v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290; City Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 68 Ill. 348; Platt 7. Archer, 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 559. See also May v. State Bank, 2 Rob. (Va.) 56; s. c., 40 Am. Dec. 726. Such a judgment is at least erroneous. rill. Suffolk Bank, 31 Me. 57; Rankin v. Sherwood, 33 Me. 509.

Mer

A judgment against a party in an action commenced after his death is void. Loring v. Folger, 7 Gray (Mass.) 505; Neale v. Utz, 75 Va. 480.

1. Emeric v. Avarado, 64 Cal. 531; Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484; Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 273; Brown . Lawson, 51 Cal. 615; Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa 17; Cuyler v. Wayne, 64 Ga. 78; Sharp v. Findley, 71 Ga. 654; Chalfant v. Monroe, 3 Dana (Ky.) 35; Pond v. Doueghy, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 558; Beeler v. Bullitt, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 280; s. c., 13 Am. Dec. 161; Townsend v. Cox, 45 Mo. 401; McLemore v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 58 Miss. 514; Marshall v. Fisher, 1 Jones L. (N. Car.) 111; Grantham v. Kennedy, 91 N. Car. 148; Larkins v. Bullard, 88 N. Car. 35; Mills v. Dennis, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 367; Bloom v. Burdick, I Hill (N. Y.) 131; Wright v. Miller, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 103; English v. Savage, 5 Oreg. 518; Montgomery v. Carlton, 56 Tex. 361; Wills v. Spraggin, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 567; Barber v. Graves,

18 Vt. 292. Compare Whitney v. Porter, 23 Ill. 445; Bigelow on Estop. (4th ed.) 102; Dailey v. Reid, 74 Ala.

415; Shaefer v. Gates, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; s. c., 38 Am. Dec. 164. See also Rutter v. Puckhover, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 638; Richards v. Richards, 10 Bush (Ky.) 617. See INFANTS, vol. 10, p. 690; GUARDIAN AND WARD, vol. 9, p. 158.

Since judgments against infants are not void, they must be attacked by some direct proceeding when erroneous. Preston v. Dunn, 25 Ala. 507; Allman v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 185; cases cited above in this note.

An infant can dispute an absolute decree against him only upon the same grounds as an adult might dispute it, such as fraud, collusion or error. Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 273; s. c., 89 Am. Dec. 172; Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa 17; s. c., 74 Am. Dec. 291; Loyd v. Malone, 23 Ill. 43; s. c., 74 Am. Dec. 179; Kuchenbeiser v. Beckert, 41 Ill. 172; McLemore 7. Chicago etc. R. Co., 58 Miss. 514; English v. Savage, 5 Oreg. 518. See INFANTS, vol. 10, p. 694.

Judgment against an infant for costs in action brought by him by his next friend is binding upon him. Albee v. Winterink, 55 Iowa 184.

An absolute judgment or decree against an infant, in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person of the infant, is so binding that he cannot disturb the rights acquired under it by bona fide purchasers without notice. Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 273; s. c., 89 Am. Dec. 172; Gronfier v. Puymirol, 19 Cal. 629; Allman v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 185; Gwinn v. Williams. 30 Ind. 374; Porter v. Robinson,

A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 254; s. c., 13 Am. Dec. 153; England v. Garner, 90 N. Car. 197; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 350; Bennett v. Hamill, 2 Scho. & Lef. 575. Compare McLemore v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 58 Miss. 514. See also Weidersum v. Naumann, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 369; s. c., 10 Abb. N. C. 149.

Failure to Appoint Guardian ad Litem. But while not void, judgment against an infant is erroneous unless a guar

as fully as an adult.1 The record of the judgment must show, however, that the infant was made a party to the action in a legal manner.2

dian has been appointed. Dailey v. Reid, 74 Ala. 415; Chalfant v. Monroe, 3 Dana (Ky.) 35; Ewing v. Ferguson, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 548; and case cited above. See also INFANTS, vol. 10, p. 691. And judgment should not be rendered on the answer of a guardian ad litem without full proof. Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa 17; s. c., 74 Am. Dec. 291; Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 42 Miss. 155; Johnson v. McCabe, 42 Miss. 255; McIlroy v. Alsop, 45 Miss. 365; Mills v. Dennis, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 367: Wright 7. Miller, Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 103; Walton v. Coulson, 1 McLean (U. S.) 120. Compare English v. Savage, 5 Oreg. 518. See also Hanna v. Spott's Heirs, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 362; s. c., 43 Am. Dec. 132.

If the general guardian of an infant is served with summons and appears and defends for the infant, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is unnecessary. Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484; Colt v. Colt, 19 Blatchf. (U. S.) 399.

1. The right of an infant to pray that the "parol demur" has been abolished. Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 273; s. c., 89 Am. Dec. 172; Harris v. Youman, Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 182; English v. Savage, 5 Oreg. 518.

It is usual to give the infant a day after he comes of age to show cause why the judgment should not bind him, where the effect of the judgment is to divest him of an estate in land, or where a conveyance is required of him. Lockwood v. Stradley, 1 Del. Ch. 298; S. c., 12 Am. Dec. 97; Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa 17; s. c., 74 Am. Dec. 291; Hanna v. Spott's Heirs, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 362; s. c., 43 Am. Dec. 132; Waring's Heirs v. Reynolds, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 59; Richards v. Richards, 10 Bush (Ky.) 617; Powell v. Gott, 13 Mo. 458; Townsend v. Cox, 45 Mo. 401; McLemore v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 58 Miss. 514; Mills v. Dennis, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 367; Harris v. Youman, Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 178; Wright v. Miller, Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 103; s. c., S N. Y. 9; s. C., 59 Am. Dec. 438; Brick's Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 12. Compare Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 273; s. c., 89 Am. Dec. 172; Walsh v. Walsh, 116 Mass. 377.

Where the judgment or decree gives

the infant time upon attaining majority to have it set aside, it becomes binding, if the infant does not avail himself of the opportunity. Waring v. Reynolds, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 59; Porter v. Robinson, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 253; s. C., 13 Am. Dec. 153; Moss v. Hall, 79 Ky. 40; Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa 17; s. c., 74 Am. Dec. 291; Kuchenbeiser v. Beckert, 41 Ill. 172; Seward v. Clark, 67 Ind. 289; Powell v. Gott, 13 Mo. 458; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 153; McLemore 7. Chicago etc. R. Co, 58 Miss. 514; McAnear v. Epperson, 54 Tex. 220; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 625; Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130; s. c., 79 Am. Dec. 681. Compare Tiernan v. Hammond 41 Md. 548.

A judgment for an infant defendant is binding on an adult plaintiff. Kendall v. Titus, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 727.

2. Coleman v. Coleman. 3 Dana (Ky.) 398; s. c., 28 Am. Dec. 86; Shaefer v. Gates, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; s. c., 38 Am. Dec. 164; Pond v. Doueghy, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 558; Hunter v. Hatton, 4 Gill (Md.) 115; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 117.

Service of Writ on Infant.-By the weight of authority, a judgment against a minor, affecting real property in the State, which shows his appearance and the appointment of a guardian ad litem, who appeared and defended the suit, but does not show personal service of citation upon the minor, is voidable and not void. Preston v. Dunn, 25 Ala. 507; Gronfier v. Puymirol, 19 Cal. 629; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494; Robb v. Irwin, 15 Ohio 689; Taylor v. Rowland, 26 Tex. 293; Taylor v. Whitfield, 33 Tex. 181; Nelson v. Moon, 3 McLean (U. S.) 319. See also Cocks v. Simmons, 57 Miss. 183: Simmons v. McKay, 5 Bush (Ky.) 25; Larkins v. Bullard, 88 N. Car. 35; Bernecker v. Miller, 44 Mo. 102. See INFANTS, vol. 10, p. 691.

Against Person in Penitentiary.— Where, pending a civil action against a defendant, and prior to the trial thereof, he was imprisoned in the penitentiary under a sentence and conviction for a term less than his natural life, and while thus imprisoned, without the appointment of a trustee to manage his estate or defend the action, a judgment was obtained against him, it was held that the judgment was a

(2) Married Women.-In the absence of a statute authorizing it, personal judgment should not be rendered against a married woman; but, by the weight of authority, a personal judgment against a married woman is not absolutely void, although the action was founded upon a contract which she was incompetent to make.2 Personal judgment may be rendered against a married woman in any case where she is authorized to sue and be sued

nullity, and might be revoked or set aside upon proper proceedings had before the court rendering the same. Com. of Rice County v. Blackman, 29 Kan. 158.

1. Against Separate Estate of Married Women.-The proper manner to enforce a contract which a married wo

man might make is by a proceeding in equity to charge her separate estate. Winston v. McAlpine, 65 Ala. 377; Wolff v. Van Metre, 19 Iowa 134; Reed v. King, 23 Iowa 500; Patton v. Stewart, 19 Ind. 233; Kirby v. Childs, 10 Kan. 639; Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53; Burgwald v. Weppert, 49 Mo. 60. See also Kirk v. Fort Wayne Gas Light Co., 13 Ind. 56; Lynch v. Elkes, 21 Tex. 229.

The record of a judgment against a married woman, under enabling statutes which allow her to charge her separate estate, should show that the debt for which the judgment was rendered was one for which her separate estate was liable. McGlaughlin v. O'Rourke, 12 Iowa 459; White v. Baillio, 12 La. An. 663; Robson v. Shelton, 14 La. An. 723; Cary v. Dixon, 51 Miss. 593; Magruder v. Buck, 56 Miss. 314; Lewis 7. Perkins, 36 N. J. L. 133; Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. St. 436; Hecker v. Haak, 88 Pa. St. 238; Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 638; Menard v. Lydnor, 29 Tex. 257; Allver v. Johnson, i Flipp. (U.S.) 346. But see Robinson v. Stadeker, 59

Miss. 3.

Personal Judgment.-Judgment on a contract which a married woman has no power to make will be reversed. Doyle v. Kelly, 75 Ill. 574; Ferguson v. Reed, 45 Ill. 574.

A personal judgment for the deficiency on a mortgage of her separate estate cannot be rendered against a married woman, unless the mortgage was for a debt upon which she would be liable to personal judgment under some special statute. Jones v. Merritt, 23 Hun (N. Y.) 184; Rogers v. Weil, 12 Wis. 664; Platner v. Patchin, 19 Wis. 333. See also Cashman v. Henry,

75 N. Y. 103; Alexander v. Bouton, 55 Cal. 15.

2. The judgment is simply erroneous and must be corrected in a direct proceeding. Gambette v. Brock, 41 Cal. 78; Washburn v. Gouge, 61 Ga. 512; Glover v. Moore, 60 Ga. 189; Thomas v. Lowry, 60 Ill. 512; Guthrie v. Howard, 32 Iowa 54; Wolf v. Van Metre, 23 Iowa 397; Hinsley v. Feeley, 62 Ind. 85; Burk v. Hill, 55 Ind. 419; Elson v. O'Dowd, 40 Ind. 300; McDaniel v. Carver, 40 Ind. 250; Spalding v. Wathen, 7 Bush (Ky.) 659; Grantham v. Kennedy, 91 N. Čar. 148; Green v. Branton, 1 Dev. Eq. (N. Car.) 500; Patterson v. Fraser, 5 La. An. 586; Vantilburg v. Black, 3 Mont. 459; Sheppard v. Kendle, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 81; Chatterton v. Young, 2 Tenn. Ch. 768; Howell v. Hale, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 405; Keith v. Keith, 26 Kan. 26; Vick v. Pope, 81 N. Car. 22; Howard v. North, 5 Tex. 290; s. c., 51 Am. Dec. 769; Baxter v. Dear, 24 Tex. 17; Phelps v. Brackett, 24 Tex. 236; Hartman v. Ogborn, 54 Pa. St. 120; Dillon v. Cunningham, 8 L. R., Ex. Cas. 23; Moses v. Richardson, 8 B. & C. 421. Compare Bowman v. Kaufman, 30 La. An., pt. 2, 1021; Magruder v. Buck, 56 Miss. 314; Mallett v. Parkham, 52 Miss. 921; Griffin v. Ragan, 52 Miss. 78; Cary v. Dixon, 51 Miss. 593; Davis v. Foy, 15 Miss. 64; Griffith v. Clarke, 18 Md. 457; Higgins v. Peltzer, 49 Mo. 152; Asbury v. Odell, 83 Mo. 264; Weil v. Simmons, 66 Mo. 617; Wilson v. Garaghty, 70 Mo. 517; Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53; Morse v. Toppan, 3 Gray (Mass.) 411; Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. Št. 439; Hecker v. Haak, 88 Pa. St. 238; Faithorne v. Blaguire, 6 M. & S. 73. See also Freison v. Bates College, 128 Mass. 464.

It has been held that a judgment entered by confession by an attorney under a bond and warrant of attorney, which she was incompetent to give, was void. Dorrance v. Scott, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 309; Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. St. 79; s. c., 55 Am. Dec. 592; Graham

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