154

PART

I.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Opinion of Neceffity, confidered as influencing Practice.

"T

HROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears, that the Condition of Mankind, confidered as Inhabitants of this World only, and under the Government of God which we experience; is greatly analogous to our Condition, as defigned for another World, or under that farther Government, which Religion teaches us. If therefore any affert, as a Fatalift muft, that the Opinion of univerfal Neceffity is reconcileable with the former; there immediately arifes a Question in the way of Analogy, whether he must not alfo own it ro be reconcileable with the latter, i. e. with the System of Religion itself, and the Proof of it. The Reader then will obferve, that the Queftion now before us is not abfolute, Whether the Opinion of Fate be reconcileable with Religion; but hypothetical, Whether, upon Suppofition of its being reconcileable with the Conftitution of Nature, it be not reconcileable with Religion alfo Or, what Pretence a Fatalift, not other Perfons, but a Fatalift, has to conclude

from his Opinion, that there can be no fuch CHAP. thing as Religion. And as the Puzzle and VI. Obscurity, which muft unavoidably arise from arguing upon fo abfurd a Suppofition as That of univerfal Neceffity, will, I fear, easily be feen; it will, I hope, as eafily be excufed.

But fince it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of Nature, or natural Governor of the World; and fince an Objection may be made against the Proof of this, from the Opinion of univerfal Neceffity, as it may be supposed, that such Neceffity will itself account for the Origin and Prefervation of all things it is requifite, that this Objection be diftinctly answered; or that it be fhewn, that a Fatality, fuppofed confiftent with what we certainly experience, does not deftroy the Proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature; before we proceed to confider, whether it destroys the Proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a State of Religion.

Now, when it is faid by a Fatalist, that the whole Conftitution of Nature, and the Actions of Men, that every thing, and every Mode and Circumftance of every thing, is neceffary and could not poffibly have been otherwife; it is to be obferved, that this Ne

ceffity

I.

PAR T ceffity does not exclude Deliberation, Choice, Preference, and acting from certain Principles, and to certain Ends: because all this is matter of undoubted Experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, be confcious of. And from hence it follows, that Neceffity, alone and of itself, is in no fort an Account of the Constitution of Nature, and how Things came to be and to continue as they are; but only an Account of this Circumftance, relating to their Origin and Continuance, that they could not have been otherwise, than they are and have been. The Affertion that every thing is by Neceffity of Nature, is not an Anfwer to the Question; Whether the World came into Being as it is, by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not: But to quite another Question; Whether it came into Being as it is, in that Way and Manner which we call neceffarily, or in that Way and Manner which we call freely. For fuppofe farther, that one who was a Fatalift, and one who kept to his natural Sense of things, and believed himself a free Agent, were difputing together, and vindicating their refpective Opinions; and they should happen to inftance in a Houfe; They would agree, that it was built by an Architect. Their Difference concerning Neceffity and Freedom, would occafion no Difference of Judgment concerning this; but only concerning another

Matter;

Matter; whether the Architect built it necef- CHAP. farily or freely. Suppofe then they should VI. proceed to enquire concerning the Conftitution of Nature: In a lax way of speaking, One of them might fay, it was by Neceffity; and the Other, by Freedom: But if they had any Meaning to their Words, as the latter muft mean a free Agent, fo the former must at length be reduced to mean an Agent, whether he would fay one or more, acting by Neceffity for abftract Notions can do nothing. Indeed we afcribe to God a neceffary Existence, uncaused by any Agent. For we find within Ourselves the Idea of Infinity, i. e. Immensity and Eternity, impoffible, even in Imagination, to be removed out of Being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there muft, and cannot but be fomewhat, external to ourselves, answering this Idea, or the Archetype of it. And from hence (for This abstract, as much as any other, implies a Concrete) we conclude, that there is and cannot but be, an infinite, an immense eternal Being exifting, prior to all Defign contributing to his Existence, and exclufive of it. And from the Scantinefs of Language, a manner of fpeaking has been introduced; that Neceffity is the Foundation, the Reason, the Account of the Exiftence of God. But it is not alledged, nor can it be at all intended, that every thing exists as it does, by this Kind

of

PART of Neceffity; a Neceffity antecedent in NaI. ture to Defign: it cannot, I fay, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by this Kind of Neceffity, upon feveral Accounts; and particularly because it is admitted, that Defign, in the Actions of Men, contributes to many Alterations in Nature. For if any deny this, I shall not pretend to reason with them.

From these things it follows; First, That when a Fatalift afferts, that every thing is by Neceffity, he muft mean, by an Agent acting neceffarily; he must I fay mean this, for I am very fenfible, he would not chufe to mean it And Secondly, That the Neceffity, by which such an Agent is fuppofed to Act, does not exclude Intelligence and Defign. So that, were the System of Fatality admitted; it would just as much account for the Formation of the World, as for the Structure of an House, and no more. Neceffity as much requires and fuppofes a neceffary Agent, as Freedom requires and fuppofes a free Agent, to be the Former of the World. And the Appearances of Defign and of final Caufes in the Conftitution of Nature, as really prove this acting Agent, to be an intelligent Defigner, or to act from Choice; upon the Scheme of Neceffity, fuppofed poffible, as upon That of Freedom.