During the term provided by law, the court may regulate the time of its sittings and adjournments, from one day to any succeeding day of the term, or reconvene the court on the same day after an adjournment to the following day. And the failure of the court to appear, for one day, during the term, and during the trial of a cause, does not render its subsequent proceedings, commenced on the following day, void. But with the final adjournment the court not only ceases to be a court for that term, but it thereby loses all control over its judgments and decrees rendered during the term, unless its jurisdiction is saved by some proper proceeding instituted within the time allowed by law.3

A premature adjournment for the term, by a sheriff who is authorized to adjourn the same at a certain time if the judge does not appear, does not affect the right of the judge to open and hold the court for the balance of

the term.'

It is held in some of the states that a valid judgment may be rendered during vacation, and entered as of the preceding or ensuing term. But the weight of authority and reason is against this proposition. The doctrine that

1 Stefani v. The State, 124 Ind. 3; 24 N. E. Rep. 254; Martina v. The State, 105 Ind. 445; 5 N. E. Rep. 20; Bowen v. Stewart, 128 Ind. 507; 26 N. E. Rep. 168.

1 People v. Sullivan, 115 N. Y. 185; 21 N. E. Rep. 1039.

Daniels v. Daniels, 12 Nev. 118; Johnson v. Pacific Cement Co., 50 Cal. 648.

* Thomas v. Fogarly, 19 Cal. 644; People v. Shainwold, 51 Cal. 468. 5 1 Black on Judg., sec. 179, citing: King v. Green, 2 Stew. 133; 19 Am. Dec. 46; Hervey v. Edmunds, 68 N. Car. 243; New Orleans v. Gauthreaux, 32 La. Ann. 1126; Green v. Reagan, 32 La. Ann. 974. See also, Ex parte Bennett, 44 Cal. 84; Roy v. Horsley, 6 Or. 382; 25 Am. Rep. 537.

Puget Sound Agri. Co. v. Pierce County, 1 Wash. Ter. 75; Earl v. Earl, 27 Kan. 538; Bates v. Gage, 40 Cal. 183; Norwood v. Kenfield, 34 Cal. 329; Roy v. Horsley, 6 Ore. 382; 25 Am. Rep. 539, note; Cooley's Const. Lim. p. 399; Francis v. Wells, 4 Colo. 274; Filley v. Cody, 4 Colo. 109; Kirtley v. Marshall Silver M'g Co., 4 Colo. 111; Kinports v. Rawson, 29 W. Va. 487; 2 S. E. Rep. 85; Wells' Jur., secs. 132-139.

Mr. Freeman, in his work on Judgments, says: "If the statute requires regular terms to be held for the trial of causes, the court, in the

such a proceeding can be rendered valid by the mere consent of parties, is certainly not in harmony with well settled legal principles. If, as is almost, if not quite uniformly held, a judgment or decree rendered in vacation is not the action of a court, and is a nullity, it is difficult to see how it can be rendered valid by mere consent. And further, it would seem to be in direct conflict with the well settled principle that jurisdiction can only be exercised by a court, and can not be conferred upon any other person or body by the consent of parties.'

Some of the cases referred to as holding that a judgment may be entered in vacation, by consent, are founded upon code provisions to the effect that a defendant may submit to a judgment in vacation by an agreement in writing, or otherwise. Others of the decisions can not

be accounted for in this way.

Where it is provided that causes may be heard at a special term with the consent of parties, such consent is necessary to give the court jurisdiction."

The question sometimes arises whether, where the trial of an action is commenced during the term, but can not be completed before its close, the court has power to continue the hearing beyond the term fixed by law. On this question the authorities are conflicting. In some cases it is held that the court has no such power, and that its functions as a court cease with the close of the term. In others, it is held that where the case is entered upon with the bona fide expectation and belief that it will be con

intervals between those terms is, for the purpose of conducting trials, in the same condition as though its authority over the case were entirely withdrawn. It is no longer a court. Judicial powers can not be conferred upon it by consent of the parties; and any judgment rendered upon a trial had in pursuance of such consent is void, and is so wanting in even the color of judicial authority that it will not be reversed upon appeal." Freeman's Judg., sec. 121.

1 Ante secs. 1, 10, 12.

Code, Iowa, 1851, secs. 1821, 1822; Hattenback v. Haskins, 12 Ia.

109; O'Hagen v. O'Hagen, 14 Ia. 264; Townsley . Morehead, 9 Ia. 565. Fowler v. Mosher, 85 Va. 421; 7 S. E. Rep. 542.

Davis v. Fish, 1 G. Greene (Ia.) 406; 48 Am. Dec. 387.

cluded before the close of the term, the trial may be completed after the term has closed, where the judge is only directed and not imperatively required by law to hold court during the time in another county. In some of the states provision is made for an emergency of this kind by statute.2

Independent of such a statutory provision, it is not easy to see upon what principle it can properly be held that a term of court, fixed by law, can be extended by the act of the court in commencing the trial of a cause.

A term of court, as fixed by law, can not be abridged by an adjournment of the court before the term expires. So where it is provided that the terms of court in one county shall commence immediately upon the close of the terms of court in another county in the district, the court can not legally adjourn the term in the first county and take up the business of the other county before the expiration of the first term as fixed by law. The adjournment does not shorten the term, it only stops the business.3

A judgment rendered during the term may be entered in vacation. And sometimes the prothonotary of the court is authorized to sign judgments or to enter them in vacation. But where the entries of judgments are required to be read and signed in open court, by the judge, a judgment entered by the clerk after the close of the term is void, although the judge may have signed the

1 The State v. Knight, 19 Ia. 98; Van Riper v. Van Riper, 1 South (N. J.) 156; 7 Am. Dec. 576; Bryceland v. Commonwealth, 74 Pa. St. 467; Johnson v. Pacific Cement Co., 50 Cal. 648.

2 In Indiana it is provided by statute that "whenever a trial is begun and in progress at the time when, by law, the term of such court would expire, the term shall be extended until the close of such trial.” Rev. Stat. Ind., 1881, sec. 1349; Elliott's Supp. Ind. Stat., sec. 284; Addington v. Wilson, 5 Ind. 137; 61 Am. Dec. 81; 1 Rev. Stat. Ohio, 1886, secs. 453, 470; Dorsch v. Rosenthal, 39 Ind. 209; Wayne Pike Co. v. flammons, 27 N. E. Rep. 487.

3 Batten v. The State, 80 Ind. 394.

* Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148; 2 Pac. Rep. 901; Board of Supervisors v. Sullivan, 51 Wis. 115; 8 N. W. Rep. 12.

5 Beyerle v. Hain, 61 Pa. St. 226; Board of Supervisors v. Sullivan, 51 Wis. 115; 8 N. W. Rep. 12.

record in blank, with direction to the clerk to fill in the judgment over his signature.1

In order to constitute a legal term of court, the same must be convened at the time provided by law. But provision is usually made for the opening and adjournment. of the court from day to day by some officer, either the clerk or sheriff, until the appearance of the judge.3 If the court is not opened, and the term can not be held, the business goes over, without any action on the part of the court or parties, until the next term in course, or the next special term, if one is provided for.*

When the court is once opened, the presence of the judge is necessary at all times when judicial business is being transacted. And where a certain number of judges is required to transact business, the presence of any of their number can not be dispensed with. But the fact that one of the judges, necessary to constitute the court, is called as a witness in the cause on trial, and temporarily leaves the bench and takes the witness stand for that purpose, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court."

It is held in New York, that where three judges are necessary to constitute a court, and a judge who did not hear the argument is not allowed to participate in the decision, that such judge may, nevertheless, sit at the time of the decision, in order to constitute a court, and a decision by the two judges who heard the argument, is valid.3

20. SPECIAL AND INFERIOR JURISDICTION HOW OBTAINED AND EXERCISED. Courts are frequently vested with inferior or special jurisdiction only, or courts of general and superior jurisdiction are given jurisdiction in special or particular

cases, to be exercised to the extent and in the manner

1 Passwater v. Edwards, 44 Ind. 343; State v. Thistlethwaite, 83 Ind. 317; Mitchell v. St. John, 98 Ind. 598.

People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; The State v. Roberts, 8 Nev. 239.

2

* People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17.

8

Meredeth v. The People, 84 Ill. 479.

Blend v. The People, 41 N. Y. 644.

Whitman v. Fisher, 74 Ill. 147.

People v. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374; 17 Am. Rep. 349.

Corning v. Slosson, 16 N. Y. 294.

specially provided by statute. These courts of inferior or special jurisdiction are said to act by virtue of the statute, and to be controlled by it, as contradistinguished from courts which proceed according to the course of the common law.1

A court of general jurisdiction, and which, in the ordinary exercise of its jurisdiction does proceed according to the course of the common law, may have conferred upon it statutory jurisdiction, as, for example, in case of attachment, garnishment, and other similar proceedings which were unknown to the common law.2

Where the statute provides for the manner of acquiring jurisdiction, and the mode of proceeding thereafter, in this class of courts and cases, the provisions of the statute must be followed or the court will be without authority to act. And the proceedings must show upon their face that jurisdiction has been obtained, and the power delegated by the statute has been exercised in the appointed mode.* But in construing the records of such tribunals, acting within the scope of their authority, in ascertaining whether they have followed the statutory requirements, technical precision is not required. It is enough, if, taking the whole transcript of the proceedings, giving it a reasonable construction, it appear, though informally, that

1 Ante, sec. 7; Cox v. Groshong, 1 Pinney (Wis.), 307; Galpin v. Page, 85 U. S. 350.

2 Gunn v. Howell, 27 Ala. 663; 62 Am. Dec. 785; Chollar Mining Co. v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 374; 5 Pac. Rep. 670.

3 Grimes' Estate v. Norris, 6 Cal. 621, 625; 65 Am. Dec. 545; Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 206, 228; In re Grove Street, 61 Cal. 438; Cox v. Groshong, 1 Pinney (Wis.), 307; The State v. Hoelz, 69 Wis. 84, 88; 33 N. W. Rep. 597; Mossman v. Forrest, 27 Ind. 233; The State v. Gachenheimer, 30 Ind. 63; The Dayton, etc., R. R. Co. v. Marshall, 11 Ohio St. 497; English v. Smock, 34 Ind. 115; 7 Am. Rep. 215; Chollar Mining Co. v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 374; 5 Pac. Rep. 670; Williams v. Barnaman, 28 How. Prac. 59, 65; Root r. McFerrin, 37 Miss. 17; 75 Am. Dec. 49.

Post, sec. 25; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 257; Rosenthal v. The Madison, etc., Plankroad Co., 10 Ind. 358; Rhode v. Davis, 2 Ind. 53; Straughan v. Inge, 5 Ind. 159; Cobb v. The State, 27 Ind. 134; Root v. McFerrin, 37 Miss. 17; 75 Am. Dec. 49; Horton v. Elliott, 90 Ala. 480; 8 Sou. Rep. 103.