would seem to be proper to consider briefly the question of their jurisdiction, with the view, chiefly, of ascertaining to what extent the states may confer, and the state courts exercise, jurisdiction in such cases.1

This jurisdiction of the state courts is not, strictly speaking, admiralty jurisdiction. It is confined to interior navigation not upon tide waters or inland lakes and rivers where no commerce is carried on between different states or with a foreign nation. Over matters growing out of such interior navigation, the federal courts have no jurisdiction. Claims against vessels, not maritime in their nature, are within the jurisdiction of state courts."

The states may and frequently do provide by law for liens upon vessels in certain cases, but it does not follow that such liens must or can be enforced in the state courts. They are frequently enforced in the federal courts, and, if maritime contracts, the state courts can not enforce them.'

The extent to which the federal courts of admiralty jurisdiction may entertain jurisdiction of claims arising under state laws does not depend upon such statutes. Whether they are enforcible in the state courts, depends, of course, upon whether the jurisdiction falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. And this depends, not upon the character of the parties, but upon the character of the contract."

It is held, with reference to some of the state laws, pro

'As to what courts exercise maritime jurisdiction, see Ante, sec. 5.

2 Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175; King v. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413.

3 Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; 3 Am. Rep. 731; Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52; 3 Am. Rep. 660.

Meyer v. Tupper, 66 U. S. 522; Peyroux r. Howard, 7 Pet. 324; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; Rodd v. Heartt, 21 Wall. 558; The Oregon, 45 Fed. Rep. 62.

5 Steamboat Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; 3 Am. Rep. 731; Poole v. Kermit, 59 N. Y. 554; King v. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific El. Co., 119 U. S. 388; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Gindelve v. Corrigan, 129 Ill. 582; 22 N. E. Rep. 516; Crawford v. Bark Caroline Reed, 42 Cal. 469.

6 McDonald . Prioleau, 44 Fed. Rep. 769.

viding for such liens, that it is discretionary with the federal courts whether they will entertain jurisdiction to enforce them or not, and that this may be determined by the rules of the court. And in the regulation of commerce, congress may provide for such liens. But, so long as congress does not interpose to regulate the subject, the rights of material-men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port may be regulated in each state by state legislation. And a state may regulate fisheries in the navigable waters within its territory where there is no federal statute or treaty on the subject. So it may impose proper police regulations affecting vessels navigating the waters of the state so long as such regulations do not conflict with congressional legislation. But it can not enforce a maritime claim or contract in its own courts, except by common-law remedy."

The states can not, by laws providing for liens, extend or enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts, nor, if the lien is one cognizable in the admiralty courts, can the courts decline to exercise jurisdiction because the enforcement of the lien is provided for and regulated by a state law. Therefore, a state may provide for a lien upon a domestic vessel, and the federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce it, although the general maritime laws would give a lien only upon foreign vessels or upon a vessel in the port of a state to which she does not belong. But a lien given by state laws for supplies furnished to or repairs made upon a vessel engaged in foreign commerce can not be enforced in the state courts, although such supplies were furnished or repairs made in her home port.

1 Meyer v. Tupper, 66 U. S. 522.

2 Rodd v. Heartt, 21 Wall. 558.

3 Commonwealth v. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230; 25 N. E. Rep. 113; Manchester v. Commonwealth, 139 U. S. 240; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559. 'Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. 400; 51 Am. Rep. 698.

5 Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; 3 Am. Rep. 731; Poole v. Kermit, 59 N. Y. 554.

6 Meyer . Tupper, 66 U. S. 522.

'Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; McDonald v. Prioleau, 44 Fed. Rep. 769.

Poole v. Kermit, 59 N. Y. 554.

A state may provide for, and enforce through its own courts, liens upon vessels navigating the interior streams. of the state and not engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. So it may enforce, through its courts, liens for work and supplies in the construction of a vessel not yet launched, because contracts for such work and supplies are not maritime. But a state law providing for such a lien could not extend the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. to a case where the lien grew out of a contract or other transaction upon the interior streams of the state, over which the federal courts have no jurisdiction, because it would not be a maritime contract or a transaction within the rules of the admiralty laws.3

The general rule of admiralty jurisdiction is that it is confined to tide waters, and does not extend to navigable streams above the ebb and flow of the tides. But the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not so confined under the Constitution of the United States, as held by later decisions, but extends to the navigable lakes and rivers above the tides where commerce is carried on between different states or with a foreign nation.5

The laws of the United States reserve to the states the right to enforce, through their courts, any common-law remedy which the common law is competent to give in matters growing out of maritime transactions. And the foundation of the cause of action is not material. It is the remedy and not the right that is reserved to the states." The fact that the common-law remedy is aided by a lien

3

1 King v. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413.

2 King v. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413; Wilson v. Lawrence, 82 N. Y. 409. Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324; Steamboat Orleans v. Phœbus, 11 Pet. 175.

4 Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324.

'The Genessee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Eagle v. Fraser, 8 Wall. 15. Rev. Stat. U. S., sec. 711; Cowden v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 94 Cal. 470; 29 Pac. Rep. 873; Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; 3 Am. Rep. 731; Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 1.

'Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 1.

provided for by a state law, does not affect the jurisdiction. of the state courts. Therefore it is held that a foreign attachment provided by a state law may be enforced against a vessel in aid of a common-law action in personam in a state court.2

71. IMPEACHMENT.-Jurisdiction of proceedings for the impeachment of public officers is usually vested in some political body. The Constitution of the United States provides for the removal from office, on impeachment, of the president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States. And the sole power of impeachment is vested in the house of representatives. But this clause of the constitution confers upon the house of representatives the power to prefer charges of impeachment and thereby institute the proceedings, and does not confer jurisdiction to try such charges. This jurisdiction is vested by the constitution in the senate."

The jurisdiction, as to the punishment to be inflicted, is limited by the express terms of the constitution, and a conviction can not be had without the concurrence of twothirds of the members present.5 When the president of the United States is tried the chief justice of the supreme court is made a part of the court, and must preside. In other cases the court is purely a political body possessing, for the time being, the limited jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it by the constitution.

The senate, in impeachment cases, acquires jurisdiction by charges or articles of impeachment being preferred by the house of representatives, without which it has no power to act. The impeachment of an officer does not affect the jurisdiction of the courts to try and convict him, under indictment, for the same offense for which he was impeached."

1 Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. El. Co., 119 U. S. 388; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Gindele v. Corrigan, 129 Ill. 582; 22 N. E. Rep. 516.

2

Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583; Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. El. Co., 119 U. S. 388; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254.

3 Const. U. S., Art. II, sec. 4.

Art. I, sec. 3.

Const. U. S., Art. I, sec. 2.

As to state officers, similar provisions are made by constitutional provision for their impeachment by the legislature. But in some of the states provision is made for the impeachment of certain officers before the courts upon information filed by the proper prosecuting officer. But a prior hearing and finding or report by a grand jury or some other designated body, is usually required as a foundation for the information. In such cases the filing of an information is not left to the discretion of the prosecuting officer. Without the finding or report required he has no authority to act, nor will an information filed without the finding or report required being made uphold the proceeding. In the exercise of such jurisdiction a substantial compliance with the constitution or statute authorizing it, and providing the proceeding to be taken, is necessary.1

There is very little law to be found on the subject of impeachment, and jurisdiction in such cases has rarely been raised or considered. This is probably because proceedings of this kind have generally resulted in the acquittal of the officer charged.

72. CONTEMPTS.-This subject has received some attention in discussing the inherent powers of courts. But it is believed that a fuller consideration of the questions of jurisdiction growing out of proceedings of this character is necessary, in this connection, without repeating what has been already said.

Jurisdiction in cases of contempt does not, in all cases, depend upon express law, and is sometimes exercised by the courts, in spite of statutory provisions forbidding or limiting its exercise. It belongs to the courts as a part of their inherent powers, of which they can not be deprived by the legislative branch of the government.

2 Ante, sec. 27.

And

1 State v. Savage, 89 Ala. 1; 7 Sou. Rep. 7. Ante, sec. 27; Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570; 25 N. E. Rep. 818; In re Shortridge, 34 Pac. Rep. 227; In re Terry, 128 U. S. 289; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Cartwright's case, 114 Mass. 230, 238; Cooper v. People, 13 Col. 337, 373; 22 Pac. Rep. 790; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; 16 Am. Rep. 528; Clark v. People, 12 Am. Dec. 178,