The confusion that exists in the decided cases on this subject arises, to some extent, from a failure, in some of the cases, to distinguish between courts of limited and courts of special jurisdiction; and yet the distinction, although not easily defined, is clear enough. In a sense, every court is one of limited jurisdiction, both of the subject-matter and of the person. The limitations imposed upon the state courts are usually found in the constitutions, and the codes or statutes, and confine the jurisdiction to certain classes of business, and within certain territorial limits. The extent of the jurisdiction of different courts exercising their powers may be different, and that of one court may be much more general and extensive than that of another, but the jurisdiction of all of the courts of this kind, although statutory, may be general.

The jurisdiction of the United States courts is limited, but it is not for that reason special. The great difference between the state courts and the United States courts is that the jurisdiction of the former may exist without, but is limited by, statute, and the latter is dependent entirely upon express provisions of law for their jurisdiction, except as to those inherent powers that belong to every court of general jurisdiction, and need not be given, and can not be taken away, by statute.

A court of special, as distinguished from one of limited jurisdiction, is one which has a special jurisdiction for a particular purpose, or one clothed with specific powers for the performance of specific duties beyond which it has no authority, and these specific powers to be exercised in a summary way.1

act." In this case the court concludes that the dividing line should be between courts of record and courts not of record.

1 Den v. Hammel, 3 Harrison (N. J.), 78, 79; Kenney v. Greer, 13 Ill. 432, 438; 54 Am. Dec. 439.

In Kenney v. Greer, supra, the court said: "The term limited is ambiguous, and is often confounded with the word special. Every court is limited in its jurisdiction by the constitution and laws. This court is limited to appellate jurisdiction only except in certain specified cases. The true distinction is between such courts as possess a general, and such as have only a special jurisdiction, for a particular purpose, or clothed

with special powers for the performance of specific duties, beyond which they have no manner of authority, and these specific powers to be exercised in a summary way, either by a tribunal already existing for general purposes, or else by persons appointed for the special purpose."

In Den v. Hammel, supra, it was said: "I apprehend the term 'limited jurisdiction,' to be be somewhat ambiguous; and that the books sometimes use it without due precision. Our supreme court is limited, by acts of the legislature, so likewise is the court of common pleas, and the newly constituted circuit courts, yet each of them exercises a general jurisdiction. The word limited seems to be used sometimes carelessly instead of the word special; for I take the true distinction between courts to be, such as possess a general, and such as have only a special jurisdiction, for a particular purpose, or clothed with special powers for the performance of specific duties, beyond which they have no manner of authority; and these special powers to be exercised in a summary way, either by a tribunal already existing for general purposes, or else by persons appointed or to be appointed in some definite form. Such tribunals with special powers for adjudicating in particular cases, under the various names of commissioners, surveyors, appraisers, committees, directors, overseers, and the like, abound in our statute book, little or in nowise relating to the general administration of justice, whose modes of proceeding are prescribed in the statutes by which they are erected; and unless their proceedings, on the face of them, show a compliance with the directions required by the statute under which they act, it never could be known whether they acted within their jurisdiction, or exceeded it. And each case cited in support of the plaintiff's position was that of a tribunal empowered for a special purpose; and that alone; as to liberate from confinement certain prisoners, to make an inquest concerning certain water, or to inquire respecting the value of certain land, and there terminated their functions."

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AFFECTING JURISDICTION.

8. Jurisdiction defined.

9. Different kinds of jurisdiction.

10. How jurisdiction conferred and regulated.

11. How jurisdiction obtained.

12. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter.

13. Jurisdiction of the person.

14. Jurisdiction in rem.

15. Territorial jurisdiction.

16. Jurisdiction as to amount.

17. Exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction.

18. Assistant jurisdiction.

19. Terms of court as affecting jurisdiction.

20. Special and inferior jurisdiction; how obtained and exercised.

21. Original and appellate jurisdiction.

22. When and how question of jurisdiction may be raised.

23. How jurisdiction proved and disproved.

24. How jurisdiction may be lost, taken away, or suspended.

25. Presumptions in favor of jurisdiction.

26. Effect of want of jurisdiction.

27. Inherent powers of courts.

28. Powers of illegal and de facto courts.

29. Constitutional limitations of jurisdiction.

30. Jurisdiction in summary proceedings.

31. Control of attorneys.

8. JURISDICTION DEFINED.-Jurisdiction has been defined to be the power to hear and determine a cause.

"The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction. It is coram judice whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action. If the petitioner states such a case in his petition, that on a demurrer the court would render judgment in his favor, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction." 1

This definition is generally accepted as sufficiently broad

1 United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 709; Smiley v. Sampson, 1 Neb. 70; Elliott's App. Pro., sec. 12.

and comprehensive. But care must be taken not to give the term "power to determine" too broad a construction. Undoubtedly where the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and of the parties, it has jurisdiction to decide the case rightly or wrongly. If the judgment rendered is erroneous, it may be attacked by appeal or writ of error, but it is not for that reason void or subject to collateral attack. But a judgment may be both. erroneous and void. The court may have jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and of the parties, and yet the particular judgment rendered in the particular case may be void because in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment rendered must be one that is authorized by law in the class of cases to which the case before the court belongs. Therefore, where the validity of a judgment is in question, it must appear that the court had power to render that particular judgment in that case, without reference to the rights of the parties before it. It does not fol

1 Freeman on Judg., sec. 118; 1 Works' Ind. Prac. and Pl., sec. 4; Board, etc., v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96; Lantz v. Maffett, 102 Ind. 23, 28; 26 N. E. Rep. 195; Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233, 239; 1 N. E. Rep. 476; Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 292; Ex parte Bennett, 44 Cal. 84.

2 Post, sec. 23.

"The doctrine invoked by counsel, that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment, however erroneous, can not be collaterally assailed, is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition, but like all general propositions, is subject to many qualifications in its application. All courts, even the highest, are more or less limited in their jurisdiction. They are limited to particular classes of actions, such as civil or criminal; or to particular modes of administering relief, such as legal or equitable; or to transactions of a special character, such as arise on navigable waters, or relate to the testamentary disposition of estates; or to the use of particular process in the enforcement of their judgments. Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subjectmatter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes of procedure, and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and can not then transcend the power conferred by the law. If, for instance, the action be upon a money demand, the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the subject and parties has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment in the peniten

low, therefore, necessarily, that because the court has the power to hear and determine the cause, that it has the power to render the judgment brought in question. To this extent the definition given is too broad, and is for that reason inaccurate. If any particular act of the court is in question, it must have had the power, not only to hear and determine the cause, but to render the judgment, or do the act, brought in question. That the court ought not to have rendered such a judgment, as between the parties to the action, does not affect its validity if the judgment is one authorized by law to be rendered in such an action. No matter how erroneous or unjust the judgment rendered may be, if it is one that might, under any condition of the evidence, be rendered in an action of that kind, it is not invalid or subject to collateral attack. The remedy is by appeal or writ of error.1

tiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a libel or personal tort, the court can not order in the case a specific performance of a contract. If the action be for the possession of real property, the court is powerless to admit in the case the probate of a will. Instances of this kind show that the general doctrine stated by counsel is subject to many qualifications. The judgments mentioned given in the cases supposed, would not be merely erroneous, they would be absolutely void; because the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of its authority in those cases. So a departure from established modes of procedure will often render the judgment void; thus the sentence of a person charged with felony, upon conviction by the court, without the intervention of a jury, would be invalid for any purpose. The decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations, without written pleadings, would be an idle act, of no force beyond that of an advisory proceeding of the chancellor. And the reason is that the courts are not authorized to exert their power in that way. The doctrine stated by counsel is only correct when the court proceeds, after acquiring jurisdiction of the cause, according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not transcend, in the extent or character of its judgment, the law which is applicable to it. The statement of the doctrine by Mr. Justice Swayne, in the case of Cornell v. Williams, reported in the 20 Wallace, is more accurate. The jurisdiction,' says the justice, 'having attached in the case, every thing done within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud.'" Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 282. See also Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Id. 351; In re Pierce, 44 Wis. 411.

1 Post, sec. 23; Freeman on Judg., sec. 135; Chase v. Christianson,