1. (1892.) In determining whether one joint wrong-doer is entitled to contribution from another the test is, whether the former knew, at the time of the commission of the act for which he has been compelled to respond, that such act was wrongful. Johnson t. Torpy, 35 Neb. 604 (53 N. W. 575; 37 Am. St. Rep. 447).

2. (1895.) In an action for contribution by one joint wrong-doer against another the test of recovery is whether the plaintiff, at the time of the commission of the act for which he has been compelled to respond, knew that such act was wrongful. Torpy v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 882 (62 N. W. 253).

3. (1903.) When a joint and several judgment for trespass is satisfied by one of the parties, contribution will be enforced, where it appears that the parties acted in good faith and without any intention of committing a trespass. The basis of contribution in such cases is the ratio the claims of the several attaching creditors bear to each other. First Nat. Bank of Pawnee v. Avery Planter Co., 69 Neb. 329 (95 N. W. 622; 111 Am. St. Rep. 541).

3a. (1908.) One who sues for contribution on the ground that he has satisfied a judgment for a trespass committed against

a third party must show that the defendant joined in committing the trespass and was liable therefor equally with the plaintiff. Schappel v. First Nat. Bank, 80 Neb. 708 (115 N. W. 317).

Stockholders of corporations.

4. (1898.) An agreement by stockholders of a corporation to indemnify one for the personal assumption or payment of a corporate debt, or to contribute, may be enforced. Gorder v. Connor, 56 Neb 781. (77 N. W. 383).

5. (1898.) A voluntary assumption of the debt of a corporation, or a voluntary payment of its debt, or the two in combination, will not alone confer on a stockholder of the corporation the right to contribution from the other members. Gorder v. Connor, 56 Neb. 781 (77 N. W. 383).

6. (1898.) As between the stock subscribers and the creditors of a corporation, each stock subscriber is liable to the extent of his unpaid stock subscription As between themselves, each stock subscriber is liable for his proportionate share of the corporate debts, and one stock subscriber who has been compelled to pay more than his proportionate share may sue his co-subscribers for contribution. Van Pelt v. Gardner, 54 Neb. 701 (75 N. W. 874).

7. (1898.) A subscriber to corporate stock who has paid off a deficiency judg ment against the corporation is not estopped from maintaining a suit for contribution against his co-subscribers by the fact that he participated in a distribution made of the assets of the corporation by the stockholders, the debt discharged by him not being provided for in such distribution. Bennison v. McConnell, 56 Neb. 46 (76 N. W. 412).

8. (1898.) Where a subscriber discharges a debt of an incolvent corporation for which all the stock subscribers thereof

are liable, he may maintain an action for contribution against his co-subscribers. Bennison v. McConnell, 56 Neb. 46 (76 N. W. 412).

9. (1903.) Where trustees of an insolvent corporation have, with knowledge of the pendency of an action against it, divided among shareholders nearly all its available assets, one of the trustees, who is also treasurer and who paid out the money divided, cannot recover contribution from another director, because of payment of a judgment against him, as trustee, for so converting the company's assets. v. Call, 69 Neb. 72 (95 N. W. 16).

Sharp

10. (1904.) Where a stockholder of a state bank advances his own funds to pay the debts of the bank in pursuance of an agreement of the stockholders that each should contribute in proportion to the number of shares of stock held by him, the ad

vancing stockholder may maintain an action against the other stockholders for an ac counting and contribution, without having first exhausted the assets of the bank. Dar idson v. Gretna State Bank, 59 Neb. 63 (80 N. W. 256).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. As against carriers, see Carriers, §§ 301347.

In actions against cities, see Municipal Corporations, §§ 785-794.

See Negligence, III.

In actions against railroads, see Railroads, §§ 239-248; 309-315; 350-352.

In actions against street railroads, see Street Railroads, 33-35.

CONVENTIONS.

Nominating conventions, see Elections. {}

38-58.

CROSS-REFERENCES.

See, also, Trover and Conversion.

Effect of conversion of homesteads, see Homesteads, §§ 48-56.

Effect of conversion of personalty on title.

1. (1894.) Where one wilfully, as a trespasser, takes the property of another and alters it in substance or form by his own labor, the manufactured article belongs to the owner of the original material. Carpenter v. Lingenfelter, 42 Neb. 728 (60 N. W. 1022; 32 L. R. A. 221).

Conversion by direction of will.

2. (1902.) Will examined, construed, and held that it worked an equitable conversion of the testator's real estate into money at the time of his death. Chick v. Ives, 2 Unof. 879 (90 N. W. 751.)

3. (1902.) Where the provisions of a will are of such a character as to amount to a positive direction to convert the testator's real estate into money or personalty, or where by a fair construction of the will such intention of the testator is clearly shown by implication, a court of equity will

1. (1896.) Section 5, chapter 66, Session Laws, 1895, providing for the leasing of convict labor, is not within the title of the act, and is, therefore, in conflict with the provisions of section 11, article III of the constitution, requiring the subjects of acts to be clearly expressed in their titles. State, er rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

2. (1896.) The power conferred upon the board of public lands and buildings by sec tion 17, Session Laws 1877, page 194, to lease the convict labor of the state for a period not exceeding ten years is not a continuing power, but was exhausted by a single user. State, ex rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb. 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

Right to lease convict labor.

3. (1896.) The board of public lands and buildings is by section 19, article V of the constitution, and the act of February 13, 1877 (Session Laws 1877, p. 188), invested with the genaral management and control of all of the public institutions of the state, except those for educational purposes, and may, in its discretion, lease the convict labor, penitentiary grounds, shops, and machinery therein, together with any property connected with or incident thereto. State, ex rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

4. (1903.) The board of public lands and buildings is vested with the general management and control of the penitentiary

and may, at its direction, let out by contract the labor of any or all the convicts. State, ex rel. Davis, v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376 (95 N. W. 831).

Validity and rights of labor contracts.

5. (1903.) A contract for convict labor, made between the warden of the penitentiary and a manufacturer would, if valid, impose no active duties upon the board of public lands and buildings, and hence cannot be enforced by mandamus against such board. State, ex rel. Davis, v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376 (95 N. W. 831).

6. (1903.) A written contract for the hiring of convict labor, drawn under the provisions of section 16, chapter 86, Compiled Statutes, is not valid unless executed by the warden of the penitentiary, and approved by the governor and the board of public lands and buildings. State, ex rel. Davis, v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376 (95 N. W. 831).

7. (1903.) The state, like an individual or private corporation, may refuse to keep its engagements; and the board of public lands and buildings, as a governmental agency having full authority in all matters relating to the management of the penitentiary, is vested with power to determine whether a contract for the leasing of convict labor shall be kept or broken. The action of the members of the board in the matter is the action of the state; their determination is its determination. State, ex rel. Davis, v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376 (95 N. W. 831).

Power of lessee of convict labor.

8. (1896.) The contractor or lessee, of convict labor, cannot, even with the assent of the board of public lands and buildings, usurp any of the functions of the warden as the keeper of the prison, although he may, and doubtless should, be

accorded such privileges, consistent with the rules prescribed for the government of the prison and the health and safe-keeping of the convicts, as are necessary to carry into execution his agreement with the state. State, ex rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

Contract to feed convicts.

9. (1896.) It is within the power of the board of public lands and buildings to provide by contract for the feeding and clothing of the convicts in the penitentiary as one of the considerations for the leasing of their labor, and such a contract is a sufficient justification for a proceeding to compel the state board to furnish provisions and supplies. State, ex rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

Agent to manage convict labor, and machinery.

10. (1896.) An agreement whereby the state board of public lands and buildings gives control of all convict labor, and the machinery in the penitentiary, to another, who is to account for the earnings of the convicts and to retain not less than $3,000 per year for services is a mere appointment of such person as an agent of the state to lease the convict labor to third persons and

to disburse the funds appropriated for the support of the penitentiary. State, er rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

11. (1896.) In absence of statutory restriction it is within the power of the board of public lands and buildings to appoint an agent to lease or manage the convict labor and the shops and machinery within the penitentiary. State, ex rel. Leidigh, v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 612 (65 N. W. 873).

Application of proceeds from convict labor.

12. (1877.) Proceeds of "convict labor" uncollected for the year 1876 may properly be applied in payment of outstanding indebtedness for support of convicts incurred during that year. Opinion of the Judges, 5 Neb. 566.

Actions on labor contract.

13. (1903.) A contract with the board of public lands and buildings for the leasing of convict labor is in substance a contract with the state; and an action against the members of the board to compel specific performance of such a contract is in substance an action against the state. State es rel. Davis, v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376 (95 N. W. 831).

CROSS-REFERENCES.

See, also, Literary Property.

Infringement on right to trade-marks or trade-names, see Trade-Marks and TradeNames, §§ 4-15.

1. (1906.) The word "copyright" is generally used to mean the "exclusive right of multiplying copies of a work already published." This right can only be preserved by complying with the act of congress for that purpose. The word has scmetimes also been used to denote the right which an author has in his literary work to keep it for his own private use, to publish it, or to refrain from publishing it, at his pleasure.

This right exists at common law. It does not depend upon any statute. It can only exist as long as the work is kept private. If it is published without complying with the copyright act the right is abandoned. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 752 (110 N. W. 763).

2. (1906.) Manuscript of the state law reports intrusted to a publishing company to enable it to perform its contract to pub lish such reports for the state is not copy righted, and is already given to the public. Any citizen has full right to print and sell the same on his own account. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 752 (110 N. W. 763).

Inquest, when, §§ 1, 1a. Definition of viewing, § 2.

Fees, §§ 3-3c.

Action on bond, § 4.

CROSS-REFERENCE.

Authority to serve process or summons, see Process, §§ 62-68.

Inquest, when.

1. (1893.) A coroner can lawfully hold an inquest upon the dead bodies of only such persons as are supposed to have died by unlawful means. Lancaster County v. Holyoke, 37 Neb. 328 (55 N. W. 950; 21 L. R. A. 394).

1a. (1907.) Jurisdiction to hold an inquest is conferred upon a coroner by his finding and custody in his county of the body of a person who has apparently come to his death by violent, mysterious or unknown means, and such jurisdiction is not defeated by the mere fact that the violence was inflicted or the death occurred in another county. Moore v. Box Butte County, 78 Neb. 561 (111 N. W. 469).

Definition of viewing.

2. (1893.) The word "viewing" as found in section 7, chapter 28, Compiled Statutes, means something more than looking, seeing, beholding; it means inspection and investigation by a coroner and a jury. Lancaster County v. Holyoke, 37 Neb. 328 (55 N. W. 950; 21 L. R. A. 394).

Fees.

3. (1893.) A coroner, without impaneling a jury is not entitled to any fees for inspection and examination of a person found dead in his county. Lancaster County v. Holyoke, 37 Neb. 328 (55 N. W. 950; 21 L. R. A. 394).

3a. (1907.)

An undertaker who, acting in good faith pursuant to a direction by a coroner, causes the decent burial of a dead body found and being in the county, upon which the latter had held an inquest, will not be denied reasonable compensation for his services and expenses for the sole reason that it may afterwards be shown that the inquest was unnecessary. Darling v. Box Butte County, 78 Neb. 564 (111 N. W. 470). 3b. (1907.) Whether, in any case, the circumstances are such as to require an inquest into the cause of the death of a person whose body is found within the county is a matter left very largely to the discretion of the coroner, and he will not be denied compensation for his services in holding such an inquest in the absence of a showing that he has acted in bad faith. Moore v. Box Butte County, 78 Neb. 561 (111 N. W. 469).

3c. (1907.) Jurors and witnesses have no discretion justifying their disobedience to a summons by a coroner to attend upon an inquest held by him, and cannot be denied their fees, solely because it may afterwards appear to have been unnecessary. Moore v. Box Butte County, 78 Neb. 561 (111 N. W. 469).

Action on bond.

4. (1898.) In an action on the bond of a coroner the introduction of evidence of a copy of such bond is not erroneous, where the execution, delivery, and approval are admitted by the answer. Maul v. Drexel, 55 Neb. 446 (76 N. W. 163).