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provisions of section 1, article IX, chapter 77, Compiled Statutes, does not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law. Woodrough v. Douglas County, 71 Neb. 354 (98 N. W. 1092).

125. (1904.) An owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law by means of taxation, if he has an opportunity to question its validity or the amount of such tax or assessment at some stage of the proceedings, either before that amount is finally determined, or in subsequent proceedings for its collection. Hacker v. Howe, 72 Neb. 385 (101 N. W. 255).

126. (1904.) Compiled Statutes, article I, chapter 77, pp. 39 and 40, as existing prior to their repeal by the revenue act of 1903, are not invalid as taking property by taxation without due process of law. State, ex rel. Morton, v. Back, 72 Neb. 402 (100 N. W. 952).

126a. (1908.) Due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial hearing in matters of taxation. Trainor v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 80 Neb. 626 (114 N. W. 932).

126b. (1908.) A sale of real estate by the county treasurer, for delinquent taxes, without any proceeding in court, is not a taking of property without due process of law. Trainor v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 80 Neb. 626 (114 N. W. 932).

Local improvements.

127. (1876.) A statute authorizing a city to grade and improve streets, one-half of the expense to be paid by special tax or assessment on lots abutting thereon is constitutional, under that provision authorizing the legislature to organize cities and towns and restrict their power of taxation, and assessment. Hurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336.

128. (1888.) Under section 31, chapter 78, Compiled Statutes, providing for the establishment of roads, a party having due notice of the establishment of a public road over his premises, and having neglected, within the time provided, to remove his fences, the enforcement of penalty and costs for such neglect is not an abridgement of his rights under sections 3 and 15 of article I of the constitution of this state, and he is not thereby deprived of his property without due process of law. Black v. Stein, 23 Neb. 302 (36 N. W. 548).

129. (1895.) The district irrigation law does not conflict with the constitution by authorizing the taking of property for private use only. Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irrigation Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411 (64 N. W. 1086).

130. (1895.) The act providing for or ganization and promotion of irrigation districts, and the voting of bonds therefore. does not contemplate the taking of property without due process of law, by means of taxation, within the prohibition of the state or federal constitution. Board of D1rectors of Alfalfa Irrigation District v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411 (64 N. W. 1086).

131. (1898.) Taxation in aid of internal improvements such as irrigating canals or ditches does not involve the tak ing of property for private use, or without due process of law. Cummings v. Hyatt, 4 Neb. 35 (74 N. W. 411).

132. (1901.) Section 110 of the Omaha city charter act, giving to the mayor and city council unrestricted rights in the improvement of streets and alleys arcund the court house is not unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law. Kountz v. City of Omaha, 63 Neb. 52 (88 N. W. 117).

Imposition of penalty or forfeiture.

133. (1888.) Section 92, chapter 13, Compiled Statutes, 1887, providing that a license to sell intoxicating liquor shall be revoked upon the conviction of the licensee of any violation of any law, ordinance or reguation pertaining to the sale of such liquors, is not a taking of property without due process of law. Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371 (36 N. W. 554).

134. (1904.) Under the police power of the state, the legislature has power to de clare property which may be used only for an unlawful purpose to be a public nuisance and authorize the same to be abated summarily by public officers, but if property of a nature innocent in itself and susceptible of a beneficial use, has been used for an unlawful purpose, a stat utory provision subjecting it to summary forfeiture to the state as a penalty or pun ishment for the wrongful use, without af fording the owner thereof opportunity for a hearing, deprives him of his property without due process of law. McConnell r. Mo Killip, 71 Neb. 712 (99 N. W. 505; 65 L R A. 607).

CONTEMPT.

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135. (1899.) The act of June 22, 1867 (Session Laws, p. 88), making railroad companies liable, in absence of negligence, for injuries to passengers neither deprives carriers of property without due process of law, nor denies them the equal protection of the laws. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Young, 58 Neb. 678 (79 N. W. 556).

136. (1900.) Section 3, article I, chapter 72, Compiled Statutes, making carriers presumptively liable for injuries to passengers is not inimical to the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, nor to section 3, article I, of the constitution of this state, as tending to deprive railroad companies of their property without due process of law. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689 (82 N. W. 26; 55 L. R. A. 610).

Civil remedies and proceedings.

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137. (1893.) Although the right to recover for damage to private property is reserved by the constitution, it is within the power of the legislature to regulate the remedy and prescribe the forms to be observed in order to enforce that right. The only limitation upon the power of the legislature in that respect is that the regulation must be reasonable, and provided by general laws of uniform application. City of Lincoln v. Grant, 38 Neb. 369 (56 N. W. 995).

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. See Notice; Process.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS. See Trusts, I, C.

CONSULS.

Authority of United States consul to take acknowledgment, see Acknowledgment, § 41.

CONTEMPT.

ANALYSIS.

I. ACTS OR CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Kinds of contempt, § 1.

Refusal of attorney to appear before judge, §§ 2, 3.

Affidavit of prejudice of judge, §§ 4-8.

Refusal of witness to be sworn or to testify, §§ 9, 10.

Tampering with jury, § 11.

Disputing charge to grand jury, § 12.

Misconduct of jury, § 13.

Publications relating to pending proceedings, §§ 14-18.

Disobedience of order of court, §§ 19-26.

Attempt to evade judgment by another proceeding, § 27.
Excuses or defenses, § 28-31.

II. POWER TO PUNISH AND PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.
Nature and grounds of power, § 32.

Scope and extent of authority to punish.

Courts in general, §§ 33-35.

Judges, § 36.

Notary public, §§ 37-39.

County courts, § 40.

District courts, §§ 41, 42.

Superior courts, § 43.

Nature and form of remedy, §§ 44-48a.

Joinder of causes, § 49.

Transferring hearing to another judge, §§ 50, 51.

Necessity of arraignment, § 52.

Affidavit, §§ 53-57.

Complaint or information, §§ 58-69.

Answer, §§ 70-73.

Questions of law and fact, § 74.

Evidence and proof of contempt, §§ 75-80. Review, §§ 81-89.

IIL PUNISHMENT.

In general, §§ 90-92.

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1. (1882.) Contempts are either direct or constructive, i. e., in the presence of the court or acts or omission tending to prevent the administration of justice. Gandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445 (14 N. W. 142). Refusal of attorney to appear before judge.

2. (1895.) A candid statement by an attorney, in respectful language, of his reasons for refusing to appear before a particular judge, will not, of itself, sustain a conviction on the charge of contempt. Hawes v. State, 46 Neb. 149 (64 N. W. 699).

3. (1895.) An attorney has a right to refuse a retainer which would require his appearance before a particular judge, and a candid statement to the court or judge, in respectful language of the reasons for such a course, will not of itself sustain a conviction on the charge of contempt. Hawes v. State, 46 Neb. 149 (64 N. W. 699).

Affidavit of prejudice of judge.

4. (1896.) It is not a contempt per se to present to a judge, in respectful language and in a proper manner, an application for a trial before another judge on account of the former's prejudice. Le Hane State, 48 Neb. 105 (66 N. W. 1017).

5.

บ.

(1896.) In a summary proceeding, a person making an application for a transfer to another judge because of prejudice, cannot be punished for contempt because of the character of the original publication of such documents, or of improper motives in making the application. Such a proceeding must be based on information as for con

structive contempt. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 105 (66 N. W. 1017).

6. (1896.) When proof of prejudice of a judge in a contempt proceeding is of a documentary character, the presenting of the application, if it is so made in good faith, is not a contempt of court merely because the documents offered in evidence do reflect upon the character of the judge, and even though their original publication may have been contemptuous or libelous. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 105 (66 N. W. 1017).

7. (1896.) An application to have another judge hear a contempt proceeding must be supported by evidence, and the tender of such evidence is not a contempt of court when made in good faith for the purpose of proving such prejudice and not for the purpose of reflecting upon the judge's honor, integrity, or character. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 105 (66 N. W. 1017)

8. (1896.) An attorney at law applied to a district judge for an order transferring a cause to another judge for trial because of prejudice on the part of the first. He supported the application by proof that be had published a libel of and concerning the judge to whom the application was made. and attached a copy of the libelous publication to his affidavit. The application was itself made in respectful language and it did not appear that it was not presented in a respectful manner. Held, That the attorney could not be summarily convicted of contempt without an information and trial. because of matter contained in the libelous publication. Le Hane v. State, 48 Neb. 1945 (66 N. W. 1017).

Refusal of witness to be sworn or to testify.

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10. (1895.) It is not a contempt of court for a witness to decline merely to be sworn, but he must also refuse to be affirmed, and the record must so disclose. Wilcox v. State, 46 Neb. 402 (64 N. W. 1072).

Tampering with jury.

11. (1907.) All wilful attempts of whatever nature, seeking to improperly influence jurors in the impartial discharge of their duties, whether it be by conversations or discussions, or attempts to bribe, constitute contempts Emery v. State, 78 Neb. 547 (111 N. W. 347).

Disputing charge to grand jury.

12. (1894.) Where a court gives an inflammatory charge to a grand jury, attorneys for a person indicted thereby, who in good faith allege in respectful language that the charge is inflammatory, and move to quash the indictment on that ground, are not guilty of contempt, although he mistakes his remedy by motion instead of by plea. Clair v. State, 40 Neb. 534 (59 N. W. 118; 28 L. R. A. 367).

Misconduct of jury.

13. (1880.) A jury is liable to a fine for contempt if they return a verdict that they agree to disagree. Green v. State, 10 Neb. 102 (4 N. W. 422).

Publications relating to pending proceedings.

14. (1896.) Where a newspaper article is not per se contemptuous, or where it is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, one of which is innocent and requires an innuendo to apply its meaning to the court, and the record fails to disclose that the language was employed in its culpable sense, the publisher is not liable for contempt. Rosewater v. State, 47 Neb. 630 (66 N. W. 640).

15. (1896.) To constitute any publication contemptuous it must reflect upon the conduct of the court in reference to a cause or proceeding then pending in court and undetermined, and be of a character tending to influence its decision, or obstruct, interrupt, or embarrass the due administration of justice. Rosewater v. State, 47 Neb. 630 (66 N. W. 640).

16. (1900.) A newspaper corporation which deliberately seeks to influence judicial action by the publication of articles threatening the judges with public odium and reprobation in case they decide a pend

ing cause in a particular way, is guilty of constructive contempt. State v. Bee Publishing Co., 60 Neb. 282 (83 N. W. 204; 83 Am. Rep. 531; 50 L. R. A. 195); State v. Rosewater, 60 Neb. 438 (83 N. W. 353).

17. (1900.) The press and the public have the right to freely discuss, criticise and censure the decisions of the courts; but they have no right, while a cause is pending, to attempt, by threats or other form of intimidation, to control judicial action. State v. Bee Publishing Co., 60 Neb. 282 (83 N. W. 204; 83 Am. St. Rep. 531; 50 L. R. A. 195); State v. Rosewater, 60 Neb. 438 (83 N. W. 353).

18. (1895.) A publication regarding a cause during its pendency in court, which tends to corrupt or embarrass the administration of justice and to produce a prejudice in the minds of the public with respect to the merits of the cause, is a contempt and punishable. Percival v. State, 45 Neb. 741 (64 N. W. 221; 50 Am. St. Rep. 568). Disobedience of order of court.

19. (1894.) When by an order of a district judge a county clerk has been required to place upon official and sample ballots the name of a candidatee and to make due return of his compliance at a time fixed, a failure to comply may be punished as being in contempt of the authority of such judge. McAleese v. State, 42 Neb. 886 (61 N. W. 88).

20. (1895.) A defendant in a civil action who has failed to comply with an order of court directing the payment by him of a certain sum of money to apply on a judgment recovered therein against him is not liable to punishment as for a contempt in refusing to comply with such order where such disobedience was not wilful, but was solely on account of his being insolvent and wholly unable to pay the amount in the order required. Hawthorn v. State, 45 Neb. 871 (64 N. W. 359).

21. (1895.) Unless the disobedience of an order of court is wilful there is no contempt. Hawthorn v. State, 45 Neb. 871 (64) N. W. 359).

22. (1895.) An order in proceedings in aid of execution as provided for in the code of civil procedure, to a third person to turn over property in his or her possession to be applied in discharge of the judg ment, if disobeyed, cannot be enforced by imprisonment of the party so ordered, as for a contempt under section 546 of the

CONTEMPT.

code. In re Havlik, 45 Neb. 747 (64 N. W. 234).

23. (1899.) One who wilfully disobeys a restraining order is guilty of contempt. Hydock v. State, 59 Neb. 296 (80 N. W. 902).

24. (1899.) A party is guilty of ccntempt who wilfully disregards, or refuses to comply with, an order of court directing him to restore the subject-matter of litigation, if the court possessed jurisdiction to enter the same, although the proceedings may have been never SO erroneous. Jenkins v. State, 59 Neb. 68 (80 N. W. 268).

25. (1898.) Ordinarily the non-compliance with an order for payment of permanent alimony is not punishable as for contempt of court. Leeder v. State, 55 Neb. 133 (75 N. W. 541).

26. (1900.) A party who, after vacation of judgment, wilfully fails to comply with a lawful order for restitution may be proceeded against as for a criminal contempt. Jenkins v. State, 60 Neb. 205 (82 N. W. 622).

Attempt to evade judgment by another proceeding.

27. (1906.) A proceeding

commenced

in a county court for the evident purpose and intent of evading the effect of a determination of a proceeding of the same cause in the district court is a contempt of the district court. Terry v. State, 77 Neb. 612 (110 N. W. 733).

Excuses or defenses.

28. (1899.) In a contempt proceeding based on the alleged violation of a judicial order, such order may be examined only with a view to ascertaining whether it was coram judice. No mere error or irregularity therein, or in the proceedings leading thereto, excuses its disobedience. Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765 (78 N. W. 267).

29. (1900.) One who is in contempt of court by reason of disobeying an order to restore the subject of litigation, may purge himself of such contempt by showing that his failure to comply with the order was not atributeable to mere contumacy, but was due to an inability (not voluntarily created) to comply with such order. Jenkins v. State, 60 Neb. 205 (82 N. W. 622).

30. (1900.) A disavowal by contemnor of intention to commit a contempt of court, when made in good faith, though insufficient to purge the contempt, is, at least, re

§ 37 ceivable in extenuation of the offense. Mackay v. State, 60 Neb. 143 (82 N. W. 372).

31. (1901.) Inability to obey a writ resulting from an act done knowingly and wilfully does not purge of contempt. Huckins v. State, 61 Neb. 871 (86 N. W. 485).

II. POWER TO PUNISH, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR. Nature and grounds of power.

32. (1899.) Contempt proceedings may be punitive merely, or they may be remedial, to compel obedience to an order for the time resisted. Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765 (78 N. W. 267).

Scope and extent of authority to punish.

Courts in general.

33. (1888.) The power to punish for violation of its orders or judgments is inherent in every court having common-law jurisdiction, without any expressed statutory authority. Kregel v. Bartling, 23 Neb. 848 (37 N. W. 668).

34. (1899.) The power to punish for contempt is incident to every judicial tribunal, derived from its very constitution. without any express statutory aid, and may generally be exercised only by that tribunal whose order has been violated or proceedings interfered with. Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765 (78 N. W. 267).

35. (1900.) The common law power of the courts to punish for constructive contempts is, in this state, expressly confirmed by legislative enactment. lishing Co., 60 Neb. 282 Am. St. Rep. 531; 50 L. v. Rosewater, 60 Neb. 438 (83 N. W. 353). Judges.

State v. Bee Pub(83 N. W. 204; 83 R. A. 195); State

36. (1899.) A judge in vacation, vested by law with jurisdiction to conduct certain proceedings, has the inherent power, incident to that jurisdiction, to hear and determine proceedings for contempt for the purpose of enforcing his orders in the principal matter. Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765 (78 N. W. 267).

Notary public.

37. (1887.) A notary public has power to commit for contempt a witness who refuses to give his deposition in a proper case. Dogge v. State, 21 Neb. 272 (31 N. W. 929).

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