Limitations and laches.

19. (1902.) The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an action to cancel a deed, constituting a cloud on the title to real estate, until some right or title is asserted under such deed, and such fact is brought to the knowledge of the holder of the title. Palmer v. Mizner, 2 Unof. 899 (90 N. W. 637).

20. (1902.) Laches will not be imputed to one from a mere failure to watch the records to guard against the recording of a forged or undelivered deed purporting to be a conveyance of his real estate. Palmer v. Mizner, 2 Unof. 899 (90 N. W. 637).

21. (1906.) An action to set aside a deed twenty-eight years after the conveyance, on the ground of insanity of the grantor, is on its face barred by the statutes. Hawley v. Van Lanken, 75 Neb. 597 (106 N. W. 456).

Parties.

22. (1887.) Heirs at law of a deceased grantor may prosecute in their own names, a suit to set aside the conveyance on the ground of incompetency. Cole v. Cole, 21 Neb. 84 (31 N. W. 893).

23. (1891.) In an action to set aside a deed, alleged to have been fraudulently obtained, the immediate grantee, who has conveyed away the entire interest, is not a ncessary party. Dailey v. Kinsler, 31 Neb. 340 (47 N. W. 1045).

Pleading.

24. (1902.) In view of the other allegations as to the nature and circumstances of the conveyance, showing fraud and undue influence, the allegation that it "was without consideration" sufficiently states a fact, and is not open to objection. Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432 (91 N. W. 409).

25. (1902.) In a suit to cancel a conveyance by an old man alleged to have been of weak mind, allegations that the defendant represented that the grantor's son and son-in-law were conspiring to defraud him of his land; that they were intending to bring an action against him and would be able to procure a judgment by false evidence, and cause the land to be sold to satisfy it unless conveyed to the defendant; that the defendant promised to hold the land in trust and reconvey it; that such representations were false; that the conveyance was without consideration; and that it was procured by said false rep

resentations in consequence of the extreme old age, mental weakness and childishness of the grantor, state a cause of action. Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432 (91 N. W. 409).

26. (1907.) In a petition to cancel a conveyance of real property alleged to have been obtained by false and fraudulent representations, an allegation that the plaintiff, in reliance upon such representations, parted with the title to the land is a suffi cient plea that he was damaged by the fraud. Rihner v. Jacobs, 79 Neb. 742 (113 N. W. 220).

Burden of proof.

27. (1902.) The circumstances under which a conveyance was made, the condition of the grantor at the time, and the injustice to him and his heirs if it is upheld, may be such as to cast upon the grantee the burden of showing that it is untainted with undue influence, imposition, or fraud, but is the intelligent and deliberate act of the grantor. Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432 (91 N. W. 409).

Admissibility of evidence.

28. (1906.) The fact that the attending physician prescribed certain drugs for a patient which are used in the treatment of mental disorders is not competent evidence tending to establish the insanity of the patient. Ames v. Ames, 75 Neb. 473 (106) N. W. 584).

29. (1906.) In a suit by one of the representatives of a deceased person to set aside a conveyance made by the deceased on the ground that he was mentally incompetent to execute such conveyance, an answer filed by the deceased in a suit pending in his lifetime, in which he averred that at the time of executing the contract then in suit he was suffering from mental and phys ical prostration, and non compos mentis, is inadmissible in evidence on the question of the mental capacity of the grantor. Ames v. Ames, 75 Neb. 473 (106 N. W. 584). Weight and sufficiency of evidence.

30. (1887.) The evidence examined, and held to sustain the finding and decree of the district court, and not to present a case of fraud or undue influence. Holmes v. Hill, 22 Neb. 425 (35 N. W. 206).

31. (1892) In an action to cancel deed and quiet title in grantor, evidence examined, and held to sustain finding that the conveyance by plaiuriff was without consideration, and that defendant was not

a bona fide purchaser from the grantee. Rakes v. Brown, 34 Neb. 304 (51 N. W. 848). 32. (1892.) In an action to set aside a deed made by a father in his dotage to his youngest son, held, that the testimony tended to show undue influence on the part of the son, and that the father was not in a mental condition to transact important business. Loder v. Loder, 34 Neb. 824 (52 N. W. 814).

33. (1894.) Evidence, in an action to cancel certain notes alleged to have been obtained by fraud, showing that the notes. were given in the belief that they were to cover part of the interest on a loan secured by the defendant for plaintiff, from a third party, but in fact were made to defendant and kept by him, is sufficient to sustain a decree of cancelation. Galloway v. Merchants Bank of Neligh, 42 Neb. 259 (60 N. W. 569).

34. (1895.) Evidence in an action to set aside a deed on the ground of fraud and duress held to sustain a decree for defendant. Firestein v. Horwich, 43 Neb. 453 (61 N. W. 592).

35. (1895.) Evidence discussed held insufficient to show plaintiff's right to have a conveyance executed by her canceled on account of fraud, duress, and undue influence. Firestein v. Horwich, 43 Neb. 453 (61 N. W. 592).

36. (1896.) Evidence in an action to cancel a deed from a mother to a son held to sustain a decree for defendant. Issitt v. Dewey, 47 Neb. 196 (66 N. W. 288).

37. (1896.) Evidence in an action to rescind a contract of conveyance and cancel a deed on the ground of fraud held to sustain a decree for defendant. Stochl v. Caley, 48 Neb. 786 (67 N. W. 783).

38. (1899.) In an action to cancel and set aside a deed on the ground of fraud and duress, evidence held to sustain a finding of no existing oral contract with plaintiff whereby the father was to convey the premises to him at his death, and decree for defendant sustained. Moore v. Moore, 58 Neb. 268 (78 N. W. 495).

39. (1899.) Evidence examined, and held to sustain a finding that a deed was forged. Lindsay v. Palmer, 58 Neb. 168 (78 N. W. 371).

40. (1905.) Evidence in an action for the cancelation of a deed in blank, delivered to a real estate broker, who was to obtain the signature of the plaintiff's wife thereto, held to sustain a decree for plaintiff. Lucas v. County Recorder of Cass County, 75 Neb. 351 (106 N. W. 217).

40a. (1908.) In an action to set aside a conveyance on the ground that the deed had not been delivered, the evidence held sufficient to sustain a judgment for plaintiff. Wetherell v. Adams, 80 Neb. 584 (114 N. W. 778).

41. (1907.) Evidence in an action to cancel a deed to land sold by plaintiff, for which certain trust company stock was given to secure the mortgage back, which stock was shown to be of little value, and was given to pay for the land, which in effect, was in turn given to pay for the stock, sustains a decree for plaintiff. Rihner v. Jacobs, 79 Neb. 742 (113 N. W. 220).

Adjudicating right of possession.

42. (1907.) In an equitable action to set aside a deed, where the right of possession is in issue and depends upon principles of equity that must necessarily be determined by the court, it is the duty of the court to determine the right of possession, if all parties in interest are before the court, and put the parties entitled thereto into possession. Hobson v. Huxtable, 79 Neb. 340 (116 N. W. 278).

CANVASS.

Of election returns, see Elections, §§ 118141.

CAPITAL STOCK.

Of corporations, see Corporations, §§ 49123.

Of banks, see Banks and Banking, II, B.

CAPTION.

See Indictment and Information.

CARLISLE TABLES.

Admissibility in evidence in action against saloon-keeper for loss of support, see Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 416-418.

Admissibility in evidence in general, see Damages, §§ 135-138a; Death, §§ 38-41.