Opinion. thereon to Dulaney, being as of February 15, 1882, principal $6,000, and interest $1,680; and (2) the said Beach debt, being as of March 21st, 1882, principal $2,275, and interest $1,740. Those were all the debts reported as liens. The commissioner reported specially the claim by said Alexander Hunter that he had conveyed said eastern half of "Abington" to Miss Alice Swain, in consideration of marriage, shortly thereafter to be consummated. Afterwards, and before the cause was heard, Alexander Hunter and Miss Alice Swain were married, and then the said Hunter and wife excepted to said report in so far as it ascertained the Beach debt to be secured by the deed from said Hunter to Arthur Herbert, trustee. The circuit court of Alexandria county, at the hearing, to wit: on the 8th day of November, 1882, entered a decree overruling the exception thereto, and confirming the said commissioner's report, and directing said land to be sold. From that decree the case is here on appeal. On the part of the appellants it is insisted that Mrs. Hunter is a purchaser for valuable consideration (marriage) of the east portion of Abington, and as such the owner thereof, subject only to the lien of the Dulaney debt created by the deed to Herbert, trustee, of February 15th, 1876. The appellee, Beach, claims that his debt, originally secured on the west half of Abington, but subject to the prior lien thereon of the Mitchell debt, is also secured on the east half of said estate by said deed of February 15th, 1876, which is prior in point of time to the deed under which Mrs. Hunter claims. The deed of February 15th, 1876, certainly had for its primary object the security of the Dulaney debt; nor does it by name secure or provide for any other debt. But, as we have seen from the language of the deed, after securing the Dulaney debt, the deed raises a further express trust in behalf of the interest and principal of the other debts due by Alexander Hunter, and secured on "any portion of said Abington estate." We have seen that the Beach debt was then secured on the west half Opinion. of said estate, but was subordinate to the lien thereon by the Mitchell debt, and that said west half was subsequently sold and the proceeds entirely absorbed in the discharge of the last named debt. But the further trust thus raised, if read apart from and independently of the concluding paragraph in the deed, only dedicates the rents, issues and profits on the entire tract, for the period of five years and until the Dulaney debt became due, to the payment (1) of the interest on the debt, and (2) to the interest and principal of the other debts secured on any portion of said estate, which provision, to the extent named, necessarily embraced the Beach debt, which was theretofore secured on only the west part of said estate. As to the rents, issues and profits thus dedicated, the trustee, Herbert, was directed to take charge of, receive and apply the same, according to the provision aforesaid. It will be observed that this provision of the deed, in respect to rents and profits, directed their application only to the interest on the Dulaney debt during the five years credit thereon, but to principal as well as interest on the Beach debt, thereby evincing an intention to better secure the Beach debt. This was then, clearly a provision for the Beach debt, for the period aforesaid, to the extent of the rents and profits, after paying the interest on the Dulaney debt; but this provision does not of itself devote the corpus of the estate conveyed by this deed (the east half), to the payment of the Beach debt. This, however, is done by the last clause in the deed, which provides, that in the event of default by Alexander Hunter of payment of the Dulaney debt thereby secured, when it becomes due, or on his failure to pay out of the rents and profits of said lands, or in some other way, the interest on said sum (the Dulaney debt), then, in the event of default therein for thirty days, the trustee, Herbert, was authorized to sell said east half, and after payment of costs and expenses, expressly directs the proceeds to be applied, first, to the discharge of the Dulaney debt; second, to anything remaining of the debts therein provided for; and third, to pay over the remainder to the said Opinion. Hunter. Unquestionably, by the preceding clauses, the Beach debt was embraced, and provision made therefor out of the rents and profits to arise during said period of five years; and inasmuch as, at the end of that period, except the sum of $125.00 paid thereon from said rents and profits, the Beach debt remained unsatisfied, with large accumulations of interest thereon; and inasmuch as, at the end of said period, the default in respect of the Dulaney debt, provided for, had occurred, the case provided for by the deed arose, and the corpus of the east half of said estate became charged with the payment of the whole of the Beach debt remaining unpaid, after first discharging the Dulaney debt. That this is clearly the import of the deed, when all its provisions are looked to, there can hardly be a doubt. This being so, and the deed being long prior to the deed under which Mrs. Hunter claims, her rights are subordinate to those of the appellee Beach. There is no error in the decree appealed from, and the same must be affirmed, with costs to the appellee. DECREE AFFIRMED. Syllabus. Richmond. CHRISTIAN & GUNN V. KEEN. APRIL 2nd, 1885. 1. MARRIED WOMEN-Separate Estate-Alienation.-A wife may make her separate estate liable for the debts of herself, her husband or any other person, unless the instrument creating the estate, expressly or impliedly, denies or limits such power, but the intention so to deny or limit must be clear. Bain & Bro. v. Buff, 76 Va. 371. 2. IDEM-Conveyances for advances to husband.-Where real estate is granted to a trustee for separate use of married woman, free from her husband's debts, to be disposed of upon her written request, for reinvestment, the proceeds to be held for her benefit upon like restrictions, and she, her husband and her trustee unite in deed conveying the property to secure advances of money to be made by another to her husband, she has the power of alienation, and the grant of special power to dispose of the property in a particular manner, does not divest her of her general power to dispose of it in any other manner. Finch v. Marks, 76 Va. 207. 3. IDEM-Settlement to secure home.-But where the settlement is not only to provide, but to secure a home for the wife and her children, the intention is manifest to withhold the power of alienation. Bank of Greensboro v. Chambers, 30 Gratt. 202. 4. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Change of contract.-Surety is discharged by any change of contract, however immaterial, if made without surety's consent. Dey v. Martin, 78 Va. 1. 5. MARRIED WOMEN-Husband-Surety.-Where the wife charges her property to secure a debt of her husband, she becomes the surety of her husband, and is entitled to all the rights of a surety. Nermcewicz v. Gahn, 3 Paige, 614. 6. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Acceptance-Payment.-Payment, not acVOL. LXXX-47 Statement. ceptance merely, entitles acceptor to sue the drawer. Braxton v. Willing, Morris & Co., 4 Call, 288. 7. CASE AT BAR.-A credit on the account of the principal debtor should discharge pro tanto the lien on the surety's estate. Appeal from decree of corporation court of town of Danville, entered September 6th, 1882, in an injunction suit, wherein Mary V. Keen, widow of John T. Keen, deceased, was plaintiff, and Edward D. Christian and Thomas H. Gunn, partners in the name of Christian & Gunn, were defendants. Mrs. Keen owned real estate in Danville, which had been conveyed to a trustee on the following terms: "For the separate use of the said Mary V. Keen, wife of John T. Keen, free from all debts of her husband; and if at any time she shall consider it to her interest to sell, or otherwise dispose of the said lot of land, and invest the proceeds thereof in other real or personal estate, the said trustee, whenever she shall signify in writing, her wishes in relation to such sale or other investment of the said property, shall make such sale or other investment, the proceeds thereof to be held by him for her like benefit, upon like conditions and with like restrictions as those first mentioned in this instrument." John T. Keen, in 1876, bargained with Christian & Gunn to ship to them at Richmond, to be sold on commission, all tobacco bought by him, with such advances as they should make to him during that year. And in consideration of such advances, John T. Keen, his wife and her trustee, executed a deed dated 29th February, 1876, conveying said property to a trustee to secure any sums which might be due Christian & Gunn, after applying the proceeds of sale of the tobacco to the repayment of such advances. This arrangement proved successful. At the end of the year it was renewed until March 1st, 1878, and a similar deed was executed by the same parties on March 1st, 1877. The transactions of this year resulted in a balance of about $6,000 due from John T. Keen to Christian & |