Opinion. suit to compel the execution of the release. In 1871 the circuit court decided that the payment in Confederate money was a valid credit on the trust-debt, but ordered the true balance to be ascertained, and did not order the release to be executed. Walton Craig, adm'r, &c., was no party to that suit, and had no authority to have it reheard or appealed. Helsley ceased to be executor in 1872, but took no step to have the decree of 1871 reheard or appealed, as no release had been decreed. In 1878 Walton Craig, adm'r, &c., sued Helsley, curator, &c., for the derastarit. Helsley attempted defence by demurrer, but failed in that, and then it was he conceived the idea of avoiding his liability by appealing from the decree of 1871, which was in the way of the enforcement of the deed of trust. That impediment being removed by the reversal, three months afterwards-to-wit, in the month of December, 1882-the circuit court refused to decide the question of derastarit until the Foltz lands had been sold under the trust-deed of 1856. And in June following the appellee instituted his suit to remove the difficulties which the trust-debtor, Foltz, and his alienees, including the appellant, had placed in the way of the enforcement of said deed of trust. This history of these various transactions seems to evince not abandonment, but long and pertinacious efforts to hold on to the lien of the trust-deed on all the land embraced therein, as a security for and means of payment of the debt thereby secured, on the part of the representatives of Peter Craig. It is true that the appellant paid his money for the parcels of land, and doubtless thought himself safe in so doing; but in this he disregarded the knowledge or means of knowledge at his command amply sufficient for his protection. There was the recorded trust-deed, unreleased. That clew, diligently followed up, could but have afforded all needed information as to the exact condition of the title he was paying his money for. It would have led him to knowledge of Foltz's suit for the release; to the decree of 1871, which did not order the release, Opinion. and which was interlocutory, and amenable at any time to be reheard and reversed. And surely so long as that decree was liable to reversal, on appeal or upon rehearing, it was reckless in Wissler to rely on it as a finality. "Purchasers are bound to use a due degree of caution in making their purchases, or they will not be entitled to protection. Caveat emptor is one of the best-settled maxims of the law, and applies exclusively to a purchaser. He must make due inquiry, or he may not be a bona-fide purchaser. He is bound not only by actual but also by constructive notice, which is the same in effect as actual notice." Burwell's admʼrs v. Fanber, 21 Gratt. 446. And in Cardoter v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, it is said: "Means of knowledge, with the duty of using them, are, in equity, equivalent to knowledge itself." In the light of these principles it is clear that the loss and hardship of which the appellant complains is attributable solely to his own careless neglect of the ample opportunities of information at his command, and not to any laches of the appellee, and that the decree of April 14th, 1884, must be affirmed, with costs to the latter. DECREE AFFIRMED. Syllabus-Statement. Richmond. MILLER V. THE COMMONWEALTH. JANUARY 8th, 1885. 1. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-Exemption from jury duty.-Where, under section 16 of the act approved March 17th, 1884, to provide for the government of Virginia volunteers, Acts 1883-'84, page 615, a roll of a volunteer military company is filed with the clerk of the court, the members thereof are exempt from summons for jury duty, and, if summoned, need not attend to make their excuses. Error to judgment of corporation court of Danville, rendered June 12th, 1884, sentencing one E. II. Miller to pay to the Commonwealth the sum of $20 for an alleged contempt of said court in failing to obey a summons executed upon him to appear and serve on a jury. In answer to a rule to show cause why such fine should not be imposed on him, he appeared and answered that he was a contributing member of a volunteer military company, the "Danville Grays," and had complied with the statute in such case provided, and was exempt from service as a juror. A. M. Aiken, for the plaintiff in error. Attorney-General F. S. Blair, for the Commonwealth. LACY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff in error, E. HI. Miller, was summoned to serve as a juror in the corporation court of Danville on the 2d day of VOL. LXXX-5 Opinion. June, 1884. The said Miller, failing to attend in obedience to the said summons, was summoned, by order of the court, to appear at once to show cause why he should not be fined for contempt. He thereupon appeared in court, in response to the summons, and being duly sworn, answered that, being a contributing member of a volunteer military company of the city, known as the Danville Grays, organized under the laws of Virginia, he did not consider himself liable to be summoned and to be compelled to serve as a juror, and therefore did not attend the said court as a juror as aforesaid. But the court, deeming this answer insufficient, and his refusal to attend as aforesaid contemptuous to the said court, fined him $20. To this judgment of the corporation court of Danville, upon the petition of the said E. II. Miller, a writ of error was awarded to this court. The record shows that the plaintiff in error was a contributing member of a volunteer military company, organized under the laws of Virginia, and that the chief officer of said company had duly filed, with the clerk of the said corporation court, the roll or list of the active and contributing members of said company, in conformity with section 16 of an act approved March 17th, 1884, to provide for the government of Virginia volunteers, and that the name of said E. II. Miller was upon said list. The said sixteenth section of the act in question provides that: "Each active and contributing member of every legallyorganized volunteer company shall be entitled to receive from the commanding officer thereof a certificate of membership, which certificate of membership shall exempt but not disqualify the person therein named from jury duty, for the period of one year from the date of his said certificate, in any and all the courts of the Commonwealth. But to entitle the members of such company to this exemption, the captain or chief officer of such company shall, annually, on the first of May in each Opinion. year, furnish to the clerk of the hustings or county court of the county, city or town wherein such company may be, a list containing the name of each member of his company; and where there are contributing members to his company, the name of each contributing member shall be furnished likewise." This law was complied with in all respects. The plaintiff in error was a contributing member of this military company, duly organized under the laws of Virginia; the chief officer of his company had duly filed the list of the company with the clerk of his court, and his name appeared thereon; he was exempt from the duty required of him, by the law, and he duly pleaded his exemption before the court in his answer to the rule awarded against him. And yet the presiding judge considered this answer insufficient. We are not furnished with any reasons for this judgment by the judge who rendered it, and imposed this fine. But it is suggested in argument by the Attorney General, on behalf of the commonwealth, that when a person summoned to serve as a juror is exempt by law from such service, he is nevertheless obliged to attend and get himself excused from service by the court, or he will be in contempt; that the duty of the plaintiff in error when summoned to attend the court to serve as a juror, was to submit the question as to whether he was exempt from such service or not to the court, and not undertake to be the judge of the question himself. Under the 13th section of the act of 1871-12, page 393, after which section sixteen, just considered, was modeled, and which was repealed by the act in question, which was approved March 17th, 1884, this exemption was provided for in similar language; but the provision of the law which requires the list to be left with the clerk by the chief officer of the company was not a part of the former law, and was doubtless enacted to provide for the very circumstance suggested by the argument just cited. It would often happen that although a citizen would have in his hands a certificate of membership, the officers of the county preparing |