The Economics of Organised CrimeGianluca Fiorentini, Sam Peltzman Cambridge University Press, 14 de ago. de 1997 - 320 páginas This is the first book to use economic theory in the analysis of all the different aspects of organised crime: the origins, the internal organisation, market behaviour and deterrence policies. The theory of rent-seeking is adopted to help understand the origin of criminal organisations from a state of anarchy, while modern industrial organisation theory is used to explain the design of internal rules in the organised crime sector. The market behaviour of organised crime is analysed taking into account its double nature of competitive firm and of monopolist on rule-making. Finally, the 'crime and economics' approach is applied to the analysis of corruption that occurs when the organised crime sector and the government collude to exploit their monopoly on rule-making. This book provides a careful balance between theoretical and institutional or empirical contributions. Each chapter outlines the normative results of the analysis in order to design more sophisticated deterrence policies. |
Conteúdo
Introduction | 1 |
Gangs as primitive states | 3 |
Organised crime mafia and governments | 33 |
Internal cohesion and competition among criminal | 87 |
Internal organisation and competition among rival families | 97 |
Conclusions | 103 |
the mafia in legitimate industries | 116 |
Conditions of emergence | 125 |
the mafia versus the state | 143 |
armslength relationships and markets | 161 |
Auditing with ghosts | 185 |
The reputational penalty firms bear from committing | 199 |
Regulating the organised crime sector | 253 |
Oligopolistic competition in illegal markets | 274 |
296 | |
Prices and profits | 132 |
Termos e frases comuns
agencies agents agreements allocation analysis appropriative activities assumption audit behaviour cartel Catanzaro cent collusive comparative advantage competition conflict constraint contract corporate fraud criminal firms criminal organisations criminal penalties date types decrease deterrence activity deterrence policy deviation drugs earnings change economic effects efficiency equilibrium external extralegal production firm's forecast errors fraud announcement function Gambetta gangs groups illegal activities illegal markets illegal organisations incentive incentive compatibility increase individuals industry institutions investment in violence involved kleptocratic law enforcement legal production loss market value maximise money laundering monopoly over coercion Nash equilibrium optimal organised crime output paper pay-off political rent probability problem profits public services punishment reduce regulation relevant rent-seeking repeated game reported representative producer reputation Reuter rival role rules Savona Schelling sector Sicilian mafia Sicily social social capital strategy structure transaction costs utility violence and corruption Wall Street Journal