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thus the fundamental maxim of a republic, that it is a Government of laws, and not of men, will be silently disproved, or openly abandoned.
220. In the next place, all these considerations acquire still more cogency and force, when applied to constitutional questions. These questions may arise, not merely between citizen and citizen, but between State and State, and between the United States and the States. Can it be supposed for a mno. ment, that men, who hold their offices for two, or four, or even six
years, would be generally found firm enough to resist the will of those, who have appointed them, and can so soon displace them ? If they are to administer the Constitution according to its true spirit and principles, to support the weak against the strong, the humble against the powerful, the few against the many; how can they be expected to possess
the requisite independence and impartiality, unless they hold their offices by a tenure beyond the reach of the power of the Legislature and Executive? He is ill-read in the history of human experience, who does not foresee, as well as provide for, such exigencies. In republics, the other departments of the Government may sometimes, if not frequently, be found combined in hostility against the Judiciary; and even the people for a while, under the influence of party spirit and turbulent factions, may be ready to abandon them to their fate. Few men possess the firmness to resist the torrent of popular opinion, or popular prejudice. Still fewer are content to sacrifice present ease and popular favor, in order to earn the blow rewards of a conscientious discharge of their duty. If we would preserve the Constitution from internal, as well as external perils, from the influences of the great, and the corruptions of the selfish, we must place around it every guard, which experience has shown will encourage good men in their integrity, and will awe bad men in their intrigues. If the Constitution perishes, the first step, taken to accomplish the purpose, will be to undermine the stability of the Judi. ciary,
§ 221. But the tenure of office during good behavior would be of little consequence, if Congress possessed an unlimited power over the compensation of the judges. It has been well remarked, that, in the course of human affairs, a power over a man's subsistence is a power over his will. If Congress could diminish at pleasure the salaries of the judges, they could reduce it to a mere pittance, and thus reduce them into an abject dependence. The Constitution has, therefore, wisely provided, that the compensation of the judges shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, and shall be paid at stated times.
$ 222. It is almost unnecessary to add, that though the Constitution has thus sedulously endeavored, from motives of public good, to place the independence of the Judiciary upon a solid basis; yet, the judges are not beyond the reach of law. They hold their offices during good behavior only; and for misconduct may be removed from office upon impeachment. Thus, personal responsibility is brought home to them; and, like all other public functionaries, they are bound by an oath to obey the laws, and support the Constitution.
Powers and Jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
§ 223. The next section contains an exposition of the jurisdiction appertaining to the National Judiciary. The * judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, ' arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under 'their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and 'maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies, to which the United
* States shall be a party ; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and the citizens of another State ; between citizens of different States ; between citi'zens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of dif'ferent States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.'
224. In a work, like the present, it is impossible to present any full exposition of the reasons for conferring the different portions of this jurisdiction, all having the same general object, the promotion of harmony, good order, and justice at home, and the preservation of peace and commercial intercourse abroad. In a general summary it may
be said, that the jurisdiction extends to cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, because the judicial power ought to be co-extensive with the legislative and executive powers, in order to ensure uniformity of interpretation, and operation of the Constitution, laws and treaties, and the means of enforcing rights, duties and remedies, arising under them. It extends to cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, because they are officers of foreign nations, entitled by the law of nations to the protection of our Government;
misconduct towards them might lead to private retaliations, or open hostilities, on the part of the offended Government. It extends to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, because such cases grow out of, and are intimately connected with foreign commerce and navigation, with offences committed on the ocean, and with the right of making captures, and carrying on the operations of war. It extends to controversies, to which the United States are a party, because the Government ought to possess a right to resort to national courts, to decide all controversies and contracts, to which it is a party. tends to controversies between two or more States, in order to furnish a peaceable and impartial tribunal, to decide cases, where different States claim conflicting rights, in order to
prevents gross irritations, and border warfare. It extends to controversies between a State and the citizens of another State ; because a State ought not to be the sole judge of its own rights, as against the citizens of other States. It extends to controversies between citizens of different States ; because those controversies may embrace questions, upon which the tribunals of neither State could be presumed to be perfectly impartial, from the peculiar public interests involved in them. It extends to controversies between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States ; because a similar doubt of impartiality may arise. It extends to controversies between a State, or its citizens, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects; because foreign States and citizens have a right to demand an impartial tribunal for the decision of cases, to which they are a party ; and want of confidence in the tribunals of one party may be fatal to the public tranquillity, or at least, may create a discouraging sense of injustice. Even this cursory view cannot fail to satisfy reasonable minds of the importance of the powers of the National Judiciary to the tranquillity and sovereignty of the States, and 10 the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people.
$ 225. Let us next see the mode in which this jurisdiction is to be exercised. It is as follows: -' In all cases af'fecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, 6 and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme *Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases • before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate * jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.'
$ 226. By original jurisdiction is here meant, that the party may commence his suit directly, and in the first instance, in the Supreme Court; by appellate jurisdiction is meant, a right to revise the decision or judgment, made by some other Court, in which the suit has been instituted.
For reasons of the highest public policy, original jurisdiction is
given to the Supreme Court in cases, in which foreign nations and the States are concerned, as more appropriate to their dignity, and, under all circumstances, more fit to receive the decision of the highest tribunals. Other cases may conveniently be left to the inferior tribunals, and brought by appeal for revision before the Supreme Court, if either party should require it, leaving to Congress the authority to regulate the right of appeal, in the exercise of a sound discretion.
§ 227. Two amendments have been since incorporated into the Constitution, in regard to the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary. The object of one is to prevent a State from being sueable in an original suit by a private person. It is in these words — 'The judicial power of the United 'States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 'or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 'States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or sub'jects of any foreign State. The other has regard to the trial by jury in civil cases; and is intended to prevent the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as to law and fact, from re-examining the facts tried by a jury in any other manner, than according to the course of the common law; that is to say, by a new trial by a jury. It is in these words - In suits at common law, where the value 'in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of a trial by jury shall be preserved. And no fact tried by a “jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the • United States, than according to the rules of the common ‘law.' So that the trial by jury is now as clearly established in civil cases by this amendment, as it is in criminal cases in the next succeeding clause, in the original Constitution.