Such is the character of human language that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single, definite idea; and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions contain words which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is essential to just construction that many words which import something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated sense-in that sense which common usage justifies. The word 'necessary' is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by these several phrases. This comment on the word is well illustrated by the passage cited at the bar from the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare the sentence which prohibits a state from laying 'imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,' with that which authorizes Congress 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution' the powers of the general government, without feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of the word 'necessary,' by prefixing the word 'absolutely.' This word, then, like others, is used in various senses; and in its construction the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them are all to be taken into view.

"Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execution of those powers on which the welfare of a nation depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human af

fairs. To have prescribed the means by which government should, in future time, execute its powers, would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been foreseen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legis lature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If we apply this principle of construction to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it so pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to discard it. The powers vested in Congress may certainly be carried into execution without prescribing an oath of office. The power to exact this security for the faithful performance of duty is not given, nor is it indispensably necessary. The different departments may be established; taxes may be imposed and collected; armies and navies may be raised and maintained; and money may be borrowed, without requiring an oath of office. It might be argued with as much plausibility as other incidental powers have been assailed that the convention was not unmindful of this subject. The oath which might be exacted-that of fidelity to the Constitution—is prescribed, and no other can be required. Yet he would be charged with insanity who should contend that the legislature might not superadd to the oath directed by the Constitution such other oath of office as its wisdom might suggest.

"The good sense of the public has pronounced without hesitation that the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into execution all sovereign powers, and may be used, although not indispensably necessary. It is a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise. If this limited construction of the word 'necessary' must be abandoned in order to punish, whence is derived the rule which would reinstate it, when the government would carry its powers into execution by means not vindictive in their nature? If the word 'nec

essary' means 'needful,' ' requisite,' ' essential,' 'conducive to,' in order to let in the power of punishment for the infraction of law, why is it not equally comprehensive when required to authorize the use of means which facilitate the execution of the powers of government without the infliction of punishment? In ascertaining the sense in which the word 'necessary' is used in this clause of the Constitution, we may derive some aid from that with which it is associated. Congress shall have power 'to make all the laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution' the powers of the government. If the word necessary' was used in that strict, rigorous sense for which the counsel of the state of Maryland contend, it would be an extraordinary departure from the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited in composition, to add a word, the only possible effect of which is to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning; to present to the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not straitened and compressed within the narrow limits for which gentlemen contend.

"It is to be observed that the clause of the Constitution which embraces the revenue power authorizes Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises in order to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, and that the clause which follows after all the express powers of the Constitution authorizes Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution. If Congress is of opinion that in levying duties on foreign merchandise it will promote the common defence and general welfare of the United States to lay the duties so as to protect our own manufactures from the injurious effect of foreign competition, it is perfectly legitimate and constitutional for it to do so. This is neither a strict nor a latitudinarian construction. It is a necessary and rational construction."

Until the year 1892 no political party or faction in this country, excepting the nullifiers of South Carolina, had ever seriously questioned the constitutional power of Congress to enact protective tariffs. But in the summer of 1892 the representative men of the Democratic party assembled in convention at Chicago to nominate candidates for the offices of President

and Vice-President of the United States. They adopted what in political parlance is called a platform, in which they denounced protection as unconstitutional, and declared that Congress has no authority to lay duties on foreign merchandise for any purpose but to obtain revenue for the uses of the government. This dogma of a tariff for revenue only is specious, but false and delusive. There never was and never can be a tariff for any purpose but revenue. The highest protective tariff that was ever enacted was enacted for the purpose of obtaining revenue for the support of the government, and as we have seen, from the preamble of the law of 1789, its provisions were framed for the express purpose of protecting and encouraging American manufactures. So it has always been until a recent period. It has been claimed, however, that because the candidates nominated by the Democratic party in the summer of 1892 were elected in the autumn of that year, the principle of protection was overthrown by the votes of a majority of the people of the United States. This, however, is not likely to be accepted as final.

See Note in Appendix on tariff for revenue only.—J. C. C.

CHAPTER VIII.

ADMISSION OF NEW STATES.-HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE TERRITORIAL CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.-ACQUISITIONS OF LOUISIANA, FLORIDA, CALIFORNIA, AND OTHER PARTS OF MEXICO.-ANNEXATION OF TEXAS. THE MEXICAN WAR. - THE SO-CALLED MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS REPEAL.-THE DRED SCOTT CASE. -THE CONTROVERSY IN KANSAS. RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN

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PARTY. SECESSION OF THE SOUTHERN STATES.

SEVEN different periods of unequal length now claim the attention of the reader. They may be stated in the following order:

First, the events which took place at the time of the formation and adoption of the Constitution, and immediately afterwards, which illustrate and explain the scope and purpose of its territorial clause, and the clause for the admission of new states.

Second, the acquisition of Louisiana by a treaty with France in 1803, and the events which followed that acquisition down to and including the admission of Missouri into the Union in 1820.

Third, and as a separate event, the acquisition of Florida by a treaty with Spain in 1819.

Fourth, the annexation of Texas; the war between the United States and Mexico, resulting in the acquisition of California and other Mexican provinces.

Fifth, the so-called Compromise Measures of 1850.

Sixth, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854, the Dred Scott case in 1857, and the Controversy respecting Slavery in Kansas.

Seventh, the rise of the Republican party, the election of President Lincoln in 1860, and the secession of the Southern States.

With regard to the first of these periods, it must be remembered that the convention of the states by which the Constitution was framed, and the Congress of the Confederation were in ses