duties of the auditing officer vary greatly in different states. In general, the state treasurer may not pay any bill or claim against the state without the previous approval of the auditor. The auditor is required to examine the treasurer's accounts once a year or oftener and to report periodically to the legislature. In a few states the auditor's accounts in turn are audited by legislative committees, and everywhere the legislature may investigate the accounts of the state at any time. There is a tendency also to give the auditor power both to supervise the accounts of state institutions and to prescribe uniform systems of accounting. In some states, however, as already indicated, special officials have been appointed to supervise the accounts of certain state institutions, and in a few states central boards of control supervise or administer the finances of all state institutions. It might be supposed that the auditor would be able to do much towards checking extravagance and corruption, but this is not the case. In many states the power of the auditor to check extravagance and corruption is seriously impaired by the legislative practice of hearing and deciding claims without previous determination by any administrative officer or court and of granting special financial relief to individuals by private bills. In most of them it extends no further than to see that no money is paid out of the state treasury without authority of law. In short, the auditor is an accountant, and not in general an instrument of economy and efficiency.

PRESENT DISORGANIZATION OF STATE ADMINISTRATION

By the middle of the nineteenth century, as has been previously shown, the governor had practically ceased to be the chief executive in the governments of the states. The process of decentralizing and disintegrating state administration had gone as far as it could. The reconstruction of state administration, which had already begun and has since proceeded with ever quickening pace, has now greatly increased the number of state administrative agencies. It has bestowed upon the central authorities ever-growing powers of direct administrative action and of control over the activities of the local authorities in county, town, village, and city. In short, the process of reconstruction

of state administration has been a process of centralization. But it has not been to a similar extent a process of integration. In most states there are a number of separate administrative agencies performing the duties imposed upon each of the principal departments: education, correction, charity, health, conservation of resources both human and natural, public works, finances, etc. The division of authority between these separate agencies varies greatly in different states, and is often arbitrary and unserviceable. A tendency to integrate the organization of the central authorities in the principal departments of state administration is unmistakable, but in most states on the whole it has not yet gone far. A tendency to integrate the departments themselves into one coherent whole is barely discernible, but has made no headway. The governor to-day, as in the middle of the nineteenth century, has no place in the regular conduct of state administration, except that which results from his power of appointment. In the middle of the nineteenth century the power of appointment was of little consequence because there were in most states no offices of importance not filled by election, either by the legislatures or by the people. To-day many important administrative offices are filled by appointment of the governor, but the increase in the number of appointive offices has not brought a corresponding increase in the administrative importance of the governor.

The governor's power of appointment and removal has not been made commensurate with his nominal responsibility for the conduct of state administration. In New York, in addition to popular election, there are at least sixteen different ways of appointing the heads of state departments, bureau chiefs, and other principal officeholders and members of commissions. Of those appointed directly by the governor, some are appointed by him alone, others only with the advice and consent of the senate. Of the department heads and major officials holding office in 1915, just about one-half were appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Only five department heads, beside the governor, were elected by the people. In most states a much larger proportion of the total number of

1 See Bureau of Municipal Research, The Constitution and Government of the State of New York, charts i, ii, iii, and iv.

department heads are elected by the people. In New Jersey alone is the governor the only executive officer elected by the people. The tenure of office of department heads is almost as various as the manner of appointment. In New York, some officials hold office for a fixed term coinciding with that of the governor, a larger number for a fixed term not coinciding with that of the governor, and in many cases exceeding that of the governor in length. All of these officials may be removed by impeachment, and some in no other way. Some may be removed by the governor at will, others upon the preferment of charges deemed by the governor sufficient to justify removal, others only after a public hearing upon such charges, others only upon recommendation by the senate, others by some other method not subject to the control of the governor. Altogether there are at least seven different methods, besides impeachment, of removing department heads and other principal officials. Less than half of the total number may be removed by the governor upon his own individual responsibility. In other states the situation is much the same. Despite the reconstruction of state administration in response to the increase in the functions of the state governments, the governor remains chief executive in name only. The actual chief executives are the multitude of department heads, bureau chiefs, and other principal officeholders, and members of boards and commissions.

TYPES OF DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION

At present there are three principal types of departmental organization in which the department head is elected by the people, and five principal types in which the department head is selected in some other way. The three types of departmental organization with popularly elected head are the following: (1) a single-headed department; (2) a multi-headed department, the members being elected in the state at large by all the voters; (3) a multi-headed department, the members being elected by districts. The first type is the most common. The second type is best illustrated by the boards of regents of the state universities in certain states; the third, by several railroad commissions and state boards of equalization. The third

type has proved very unsatisfactory in a number of cases, partly because of the tendency of the members of such boards and commissions to place the local interests of their respective districts above the general interests of the whole state. The second type has in most cases proved less unsatisfactory, partly, it may be suspected, because few states have entrusted much power to such bodies. The first type has proved least unsatisfactory. Under the system of making nominations for elective office by delegate conventions, the nominations for such places as commissioner of agriculture or labor, where elective, were commonly awarded by the managers of the major parties to candidates known to be acceptable to the farmers or to organized labor, as the case might be, and the nominees were commonly supported by all partisans without question. Under the direct primary system the distribution of the nominations in a manner generally acceptable to the interests most concerned is less certain. The results, particularly in states where extensive powers have been conferred on the elective officials, have been less satisfactory. In general, with the exception of the attorney-general, the more important administrative offices are those of comparatively recent creation and are not filled by popular election. The question of popular election would be comparatively unimportant, if it were not for the fact that some of these offices control the distribution of a good deal of patronage.

The unsystematic character of state administrative organization is clearly revealed by the illogical application of the principle of popular election to the choice of administrative officials. Almost everywhere attorneys-general, secretaries of state, treasurers, and auditors are elected by popular vote. Yet some of these are administrative officers with important discretionary powers, whilst others have purely perfunctory powers involving no exercise of discretion. In all states there are officers who exercise more important powers than, for example, the secretary of state, who are not elected by the people. In most states, too, some officers are elected by the people who in other states are chosen in some other way. Why should the members of the state board of equalization be elected by the people in Illinois, for example, although the members of the far more

important tax commission are not so elected in the neighboring state of Wisconsin? Why should the members of a state railroad and warehouse commission be elected by the people, when the far more important public utilities commissioners are not so elected? Why should superintendents of public instruction be elected by the people in many states, whilst the far more important commissioners of education in other states are not so elected? If commissioners of agriculture and dairy commissioners are to be popularly elected, as is the practice in many states, why should not commissioners of public health and workmen's compensation commissioners be similarly elected, as is the practice in no states? If the principle of popular election be sound, why so many exceptions? If unsound, why should it not be abandoned?

The principal types of departmental organization, where the head is not elected by the people, are the following: (1) the department with a single head appointed by the governor, usually with the consent of the senate; (2) the department with a single head appointed not by the governor but by a separate board or commission, usually unpaid, which exercises, however, only advisory powers in addition to the power of appointment; (3) the department with a multiple head, consisting of a board or commission, usually unpaid, which exercises its powers mainly through the instrumentality of a paid expert secretary; (4) the department with a multiple head, consisting of a board or commission, usually paid, which exercises its powers directly through its own members; and (5) the department with a single head appointed by the governor, with or without the consent of the senate, but dependent upon the advice of an advisory council for the exercise of certain of his powers. The first type is found in all the states and is commonly employed where the duties of the department are largely of a ministerial character, not involving the exercise of much discretionary authority. Such, for example, is the type of organization generally adopted for departments of banking and insurance.

The second type of departmental organization is comparatively rare. It is employed most frequently for the organization of state departments of education. The best illustration of this type is the department of education of the state of New

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