an invidious distinction between military education and soldierlike efficiency. In Germany the two are inseparable and go hand in hand throughout the whole career of an officer. In England the chief examination for promotion is in subjects which find no place in regimental works and are therefore considered to be antagonistic to it, especially as the officer is generally taken away from his regiment and crammed for the examination. In Prussia there is no single examination for promotion, but the officer is watched, trained, and tested within the regiment throughout his whole career. Without a sufficient knowledge of the chief branches of military art he is not considered to be a good regimental officer. And the knowledge is not tested by mere answers on paper to a string of questions taken out of a book, but by proved capacity in every-day work-a capacity of imparting information to others as well as acquiring it, and of making use of the knowledge acquired. In England the gates of the staff are opened to those who show that they are in a certain sense students and have a certain amount of training, in which, however, books are, again, rather too prevalent. In Germany the admission to be tested for the staff is gained by the satisfactory issue from trials which are constant from the day of entrance into the army, but the final test is the proof of capacity in actual staff work. No officer can complain unless he dares to question the decisions, first of the regimental colonels, and finally that of Field-Marshal von Moltke. Through his whole career the officer looks to his regiment as the chief school and examining body, and if he wishes to soar higher he can only do so after approval by the greatest master of military science and 'practice in Europe. We cannot

Military Study essential for Officers.

449

import Von Moltke, but we need not, for all that, submit our aspirants entirely to the judgment of examiners, some of whom are not soldiers at all, while others have long ceased to follow the progress of the military art.

"Mr. Childers will of course be told that the German army is not like the English, that our officers cannot be expected to work as hard as those of Continental nations, nor give to the study and practice of their profession the time which they now devote to pleasure. This statement may fairly be challenged, considering the vast numbers who flock to the gates of the profession into which but few can enter. If the army were in want of officers, the rules might be relaxed. As it is, they may fairly be tightened a little. There is, however, nothing dull or dreary about military studies, if conducted, as they are in Germany, regimentally. The case is at present harder and more annoying, inasmuch as the periodical fits of training undergone by officers remove them from their regiments and their mess. The dull routine of parades and barrack square drills is far more monotonous and uninteresting than a better and higher course of instruction would be, and we refuse to accept the damaging statement that the class of Englishmen from which officers come is so void of all sense of duty, so incapable of higher aspirations, that it cannot be lifted out of a sort of mill-horse routine. At least, let it be understood that the persons who vilify the character of the British officer and brand him as incompetent by nature are not those who are striving to improve and raise the standard of military education. Let the regiments be the schools, and each officer be judged by the quality of those for whose training he is responsible. We shall soon find military education rise in popularity G g

as well as in efficiency; outcries against the quality of non-commissioned officers and men will cease when it is understood that the training of the rauks is the business of the officers, who, as they taste the sweets of command, should bear its responsibilities."

Wimbledon has done well its part in creating rifle experts. The Council which has hitherto so ably done its work, should now and at once direct its care to make every Volunteer Rifle battalion practically at home in the use of the instrument it handles. It must be made what it styles itself, an army of marksmen. Mr. Mullens has set an example, which only needs to be practically worked

out.

CHAPTER XIII.

Lessons derivable from the Russo-Turkish campaign -Russian mounted infantry under the younger Skobeleff armed with rifles had range threefold that of ordinary carbines-Russian lancers comparatively useless-The lance an obsolete weapon -Existing cavalry sabre little else-Necessity of mounted infantry being attached to our Volunteer force-Modern firearms have rendered comparatively useless existing cavalry organizations-Cavalry properly availed of none the less important and necessary-Volunteer artillery practice at Shoeburyness meetings admirable-Colonel Keate's testimony to its excellence-The Marquis of Londonderry's 2nd Durham Artillery a type of the force-Necessity for a portion of the Volunteers being provided and instructed in field guns-The Canadian Rifle team under Colonel Oswald-Arrival in England-Their hearty reception, and winning of the Kolapore Prize TrophyMachine gun practice very extraordinary-Desirability of more guns being attached to Volunteer brigades-Officers for the Volunteers will not be wanting-The Public Schools' teams— Major Walter's address to the boys-Joseph Sturge a Christian Volunteer.

MANY are the lessons to be derived through the experience of the Russo-Turkish campaign. Our ablest officers know them, and it is to be hoped we shall see the changes and deductions obtainable from this latest contest carried out in our English forces. Chiefly do they bear on cavalry.

The Russian army of invasion was very well provided with hussars, dragoons, and Cossacks, mounted on very tough, rapidly marching horses-well drilled and armed, and, as a rule, well commanded. The Russian cavalry

did very little towards breaking down the Turkish military strength, in comparison with the cost of forming and maintaining its organization. By far the most valuable work done by the Russian mounted forces was performed by the brigade originally under Skobeleff, junior, consisting of the Kuban and Terek regiments from the Caucasus. These men were really mounted infantry, as they were armed with rifles, which had a range fully three times that of the Winchester magazine carbines carried by the Turkish Cavalry. The lance of the Russian lancer squadrons did little, if any, execution worthy of mention. The sabres of the mounted men came into play only upon one or two occasions, when the Turks were completely surrounded, and, refusing to surrender, were cut down to a man. Such incidents could scarcely be expected to occur with any troops except the Turks, as any other soldiery would surrender upon finding themselves hopelessly surrounded and overpowered. The lance is utterly obsolete; the sabre is of so little practical use that there are many close and careful students of modern warfare who strongly advocate its banishment from future armaments: there is one thing, however, that may be asserted as being beyond argument—that is, if sabres are to be retained for mounted men they should be made very differently from the weapons carried at present, which are little more than flat bars of iron, with points which may be thrust through ordinary clothing by violent exertion, but which cannot be made to cut through the flimsiest sleeve in existence. The cavalry sabre should be, at least, onethird lighter, made of cutting steel, like that used in the better class of knives, and carried in a leathern or wooden scabbard, which will neither rattle on the march