Napoleon at Boulogne.

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ports. Sometimes the seamen and marines landed, cut out vessels, destroyed signal-posts, and dismantled batteries. Such events, frequently costing the lives of gallant men, had their use in encouraging the spirits of our men, and damping the confidence of the enemy, who must have looked with more doubt than hope to the invasion of the English coast, when the utmost vigilance could not prevent their experiencing insults on their

own.

Buonaparte himself visited Boulogne more than once during this period of menaced attack, and was active in preparing his army for the grand effort. He reviewed them in an unusual manner, practising them in manœuvres by night, and in the arranging of soldiers in the flatbottomed boats, also in disembarking with celerity. Omens were resorted to for keeping up the enthusiasm which his presence naturally inspired. A Roman battleaxe was pretended to be found when they removed the earth to pitch Buonaparte's tent; and medals of William the Conqueror were exhibited as having been dug up on the same spot. These were pleasant forebodings, yet did not altogether, in the minds of the soldiers, counterbalance the sense of insecurity impressed on them by the prospect of being packed together in the miserable shallops, and exposed to the fire of an enemy so superior at sea, that during his review of the fortifications, their frigates stood in shore with composure, and fired at him and his suite as at a mark.

When at St. Helena he frequently made reference to the causes which prevented his accomplishing his project of invasion, always asserting that he was serious, and that the scheme was very practicable. At times, long after, he talked slightingly of the causes which

prevented the project's accomplishment, and admitted that his sole hope of effecting an invasion was by assembling such a fleet as should give him the temporary command of the Channel. He dared not pit his navy against Nelson and the other British naval heroes whose very names sounded only of victory over anything afloat. Nelson was at the time keeping sentry over Toulon and Genoa, Cornwallis lay before Brest, Pellew had charge of the harbours of Spain, and the French fleet would have had to fight their way through these in order to form the devised union at Martinique. His failure to decoy our fleet into distant seas was the sole cause of break-down.

In a recorded conversation with Las Casas, Napoleon said, "On what trifles does the fate of empires depend! How petty and insignificant are our revolutions in the grand organization of the earth! If, instead of entering upon the Egyptian expedition, I had invaded Ireland ; if some slight derangement of my plans had not thrown obstacles in the way of my Boulogne enterprise, what would England have been to-day? What would have been the situation of the Continent, and the whole political world? And yet the obstacles which made me fail were not of human origin-they were the work of the elements. In the south, the sea undid my plans; in the north it was the conflagration of Moscow, the snows and ice that destroyed me. Thus, water, air, fire-all nature, in short-have been the enemies of a universal regeneration, commanded by Nature herself. The problems of Providence are inscrutable." To Montholon, also at St. Helena, he also emphatically thus declared, the very words are recorded by that general :-"The invasion of England was always practicable, and if once the descent

Terror of England's Wooden Walls.

185

had been effected, London must infallibly have been taken. The French being in possession of the capital, a very powerful party would have arisen against the oligarchy. Did Hannibal look behind him when he passed the Alps, or Cæsar when he landed in Epirus or Africa? London is situated only a few marches from Calais; and the English army scattered for the purpose of defending the coasts, could not have joined in time to have covered that capital after once the descent had been actually made."

In the face of most cunningly-devised arrangements for throwing dust in our eyes, and decoying our naval heroes from Channel watching, England's wooden walls were floating about in all directions, looking for squalls where least expected, and foiling his cherished plans. Moreover the attitude of the other Powers demanded attention, and we find Jomini thus recording for his master:"The news of the hostile préparations of the Cabinet of Vienna, and its menacing movements in Bavaria and Italy reached me almost at the same time as the news of the naval battle between Calder and Villeneuve, and the retreat of the latter on Vigo. Even had the English expedition been my only object, it was now necessary to renounce it,"

CHAPTER VI.

Rifle-shooting of other European nations-The future of artillery— The military lessons forced on England by past errors and revolutions of modern warfare-Our musketry instruction very deficient and obsolete Our rifle-shooting greatly behind necessities of the time and pretension of the force-Mr. Mullens' prizes for shooting at moveable targets a national benefit-Old military organization contrasted with that of modern times-The power of the rifle--Colonel Loyd Lindsay's description of the force, and what under wise Government help it may become-The Hon. Artillery Company of London, history-Auxiliary forces' defensive strength stated-The Volunteers an important factor in the nation's military resourcesWindsor and Edinburgh Reviews demonstrate the force's reality and thoroughness-Volunteers as indifferent to flattery as to gratuitous contempt-Strict discipline shown at the reviews unrivalled by any of the world's armies -- Expansive strength of the Volunteers including those of Canada and other colonies The patriotic character of the force-The story to be read from the great reviews of Windsor and Edinburgh-The conversion of the force into a completely constituted army the outcome of existing improved efficiency-Volunteer cavalry needed Artillery Volunteers far ahead of nation's beliefAdmirable practice of certain corps winners of Queen's Shoeburyness prizes.

Ir is unnecesssary to remark on rifle-shooting or artillery practice beyond repeating their known results. The hardy and independent mountaineers of the Tyrol, the free Swiss, and the Americans, have long been noted for their proficiency in it. Garibaldi's riflemen in the war in Italy gave us evidence as to what Volunteers can do with the rifle. Acting at every disadvantage, and

The Rifle can change the face of a battle. 187

supported only by patriotic enthusiasm and knowledge of the country, they operated with extraordinary success upon the left flank of the Austrians, occupied town after town, defeated bodies of the enemy far stronger than themselves, and brought away as much glory from the campaign as any troops engaged. Now it has been well said, that if Garibaldi's volunteers could render all this service, what may we not expect from our own? Our Volunteers would be far more numerous; they would be all trained shots, all ready disciplined, and would be acting on their own native land, and under the influence of enthusiasm in no degree inferior to that of the chasseurs of the Alps. As a sample of what even the Enfield rifle could do when in the hands of ordinary skilled men, it has been related that at the siege of Cawnpore an officer and his company were charged by a body of irregular cavalry, sowars; he drew his regiment up in square, and at the first fire sixty-nine out of seventy sowars fell dead, one man alone escaping; and a private who stepped from the ranks shot him dead when 1300 yards distant. It cannot be too carefully impressed on the minds of our Volunteers, that half the great battles of history have been fought by men who never saw a shot fired before. We have seen, both in the Crimea and in India, that the rifle can change the very face of a battle. Everything with its shooting depends upon individual aptitude, intelligence, and self-reliance; and we find excellence in the use of this weapon almost invariably proportioned to the general intelligence of the people employing it. Now all experience teaches that exactly in proportion to the superiority of the individual soldier is the superiority of the army.

With this conviction we Englishmen should train our