have known of the danger to the plaintiff's decedent in time to avoid the accident, they must find for the defendant; but that, if they believed from the evidence that the servants of the defendant, in charge of the engine, could, in the exercise of reasonable care, under the circumstances surrounding them at the time, by having a proper lookout, have discovered the danger of the plaintiff in time to avoid the accident, they must find for the plaintiff. The result of these decisions is that a railroad company owes no duty of prevision to a bare licensee. It is under no obligation to make preparation in advance for his protection. Its sole duty is to use reasonable care to discover, and not to injure, such persons when they may reasonably be expected to be on its tracks at a particular point. As said in Wood's Case, 99 Va. 156, 37 S. E. 846, such a person is only relieved from the responsibility of being a trespasser, and takes upon himself all the ordinary risks attached to the place and the business carried on there. The uncontradicted evidence of the engineer in the present case is that he did keep a lookout, and did not see the plaintiff, who, he says, must have been walking in the middle of the track, where he could not have seen him on account of a curve in the road at that point; that, if the plaintiff had been on the side of the track at the edge of the ties, he could have seen him. It is earnestly insisted that it was not intended, in the Rodgers Case, 100 Va. 324, 41 S. E. 732, to hold that a railroad company was without fault in running a train on a dark night with no light on its engine, thereby depriving itself of the power to keep such reasonable lookout as the law required; that the declaration in the Rodgers Case meant to charge that the failure to have proper lights on the engine was negligence in itself, without regard to whether or not they were necessary for the maintenance of a reasonable lookout; that the evidence bears out this view of the pleading, because it there appears that it was a bright, moonlight night, and therefore immaterial whether or not there were lights on the engine; that it would be a strange and striking contradiction, if not a curious absurdity, to announce it to be the duty of a railroad company to keep a reasonable lookout, and at the same time to hold that it could so envelop itself in darkness as to prevent its performance of such clearly stated duty. The argument of the learned counsel on this point may be reduced to this proposition: That, if it is a bright, moonlight night, the railroad may run its trains with out lights on its engines; but, if there is no moon, or the moon is obscured so as to make the night dark, it must, for the protection of bare licensees, provide its engines with artificial lights, or be held guilty of a failure to perform a legal duty due to such licensees. To maintain this view would destroy the established rule that a railroad company is under no duty to make previous preparation for the protection of mere licensees; for, if they must provide lights for their protection on a dark night, it could with equal propriety be urged that on a down grade-which it is here contended so reduced the noise of the train as to destroy its value as notice the company should be required to substitute other noises as notice of its approach. It could with equal force be contended that its machinery and appliances, other than lights, should be in order, that competent employees should be provided, and that the speed of its trains should be so regulated as to provide for the increased danger of a dark night to the licensee. Many things could be done which would add to the facility and safety with which bare licensees might, for their own convenience, use the private property of the railroad; but enough has been said to indicate how difficult, if not impossible, it would be to ingraft upon the rule mentioned any exception without ignoring the property rights of the railroad company. There is no contradiction in the rule holding that the defendant company must keep a reasonable lookout to avoid injuring bare licensees, and at the same time providing that it is under no obligation to furnish lights for its engines on a dark nignt for the protection of such persons. There is no obligation upon the defendant to do any thing to make the conditions more favorable than the natural surroundings make them. The obligation is not an absolute one to discover the plaintiff, but it is only the duty of using ordinary care to keep a reasonable lookout under the conditions and circumstances existing at the time the point is reached where the licensee may be reasonably expected. This is shown by the instruction approved in the Rodgers Case, 100 Va. 324, 41 S. E. 732, which told the jury that, if they believed from the evidence that the servants of the defendant in charge of the engine could not, in the exercise of reasonable care, under the circumstances surrounding them at the time, have known of the danger to the plaintiff's decedent in time to have avoided the accident, they must find for the defendant. In the case at bar the defendant discharged its duty to the plaintiff when it kept such reasonable lookout at the time as its servants could keep under the con ditions then existing, among which conditions was an absence of the moon, and no artificial light provided to take its place. The darkness, which it is contended imposed upon the defendant the duty of providing lights for the protection of the plaintiff, also enveloped the latter when he stepped from a place of safety on the pathway to the defendant's track, and should have suggested to him the increased danger of his situation. Having reached the conclusion, however, that the defendant company has failed in the performance of no legal duty that it owed the plaintiff, it is not necessary to consider the negligence of the latter. For these reasons the judgment complained of must be affirmed. WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT. Re Application of James C. BROAD for and contractor, the ordinance deprives the Writ of Habeas Corpus. (36 Wash. 449.) A municipal ordinance fixing the hours of labor and the minimum rate of wages to be paid laborers upon a public contract does not interfere with the constitutional guaranty of liberty and property; since the public has the right to do its work in any manner it sees fit, and to compel those with whom it contracts to perform the work in the same manner. (December 30, 1904.) contractor and laborer of liberty and property, and disturbs them in their private affairs. Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 40 L. R. A. 302, 52 Pac. 333; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 52 L. R. A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 515, 30 Am. Rep. 323; Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313; Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co. 67 Ohio St. 197, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 65 N. E. 885; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. APPEAL by petitioner from a judgment 325, 31 Am. St. Rep. 533, 28 N. E. 1126; the Superior Court for Spokane County refusing to liberate him from the custody of E. M. Woydt, Chief of Police of the City of Spokane, to which he had been committed for violation of a municipal ordinance. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Cullen & Dudley, for appellant: This case is ruled by Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Wash. 327, 79 Am. St. Rep. 939, 60 Pac. 1120. Like all contracts looking to the performance of an illegal act, such a contract is void as an entirety. Bishop, Contr. 2d ed. 59, 467, 469-478, 535, 547, 549; Bach v. Smith, 2 Wash. Terr. 145, 3 Pac. 831; Standard FurnitureCo. v. Van Alstine, 22 Wash. 670, 51 L. R. A. 889, 79 Am. St. Rep. 960, 62 Pac. 145; Tatum v. Kelley, 25 Ark. 209, 94 Am. Dec. 717. Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W. 362; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206, 35 N. E. 63; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109, 25 S. W. 75; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350. The ordinance is not within the police power of the state or city. 1 Tiedeman, State & Federal Control of Persons & Property, § 1; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 706; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 77 Am. St. Rep. 269, 58 Pac. 1071; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465, 17 N. E. 343; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206, 35 N. E. 62; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; Potter's Dwarr. Stat. p. 458. Legislation limiting natural rights and liberties cannot be supported as police measures, unless, first, the interests of the public require legislative interference with the natural rights and liberties; second, the legislation operates equally and uniformly; third, the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the end in view, and are not unnecessarily oppressive. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 443. The city charter contains no provision authorizing the city to legislate with reference to what shall constitute a day's work, or with reference to a scale of wages. The power of any city to enter into a contract creating an obligation which must be paid out of taxes or assessments is limited by the right to levy and collect a tax or assessment for such purpose; and if, in a given case, no tax or assessment can be lawfully levied to pay the debt or obligation, the contract itself is void for want of authority to make it. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; 1 Tiedeman, State & Federal Control of Persons & Property, pp. 4, 5; Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 77 Am. St. Rep. 269, 58 Pac. 1071; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W. 362: People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465, 17 N. E. 343; Yick Wo v. Hop-76-80, 89, 90. kins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239. Whether or not a measure passed ostensibly as a police or sanitary measure is such in fact, or is in excess of the limitations upon the legislative power, is to be determined by the court whenever the valid ity of such measure is properly challenged in a cause before such forum. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Lawton V. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465, 17 N. E. 343; Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313; Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co. 67 Ohio St. 197, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 65 N. E. 885; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621. 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 6 L. R. A. 847, 10 S. E. 283; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W. 362; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 77 Am. St. Rep. 269, 58 Pac. 1071; Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 12 Am. Rep. 694; 1 Tiedeman. State & Federal Control of Persons & Property, § 3; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. 175 N. Y. 84, 65 L. R. A. 33, 67 N. E. 129; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 52 L. R. A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716; Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co. 160 Ind. 338, 61 L. R. A. 154, 98 Am. St. Rep. 325, 66 N. E. 895. The ordinance cannot be sustained upon the ground that it refers only to municipal work. The power of the city to enter into contracts is, like other municipal powers, only such as is expressly conferred by its organic act, or fairly implied in the provisions of such charter. | Citizen's Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 455: 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. §§ 736, 737; Cooley, Taxn. 67-69, The purpose of the charter was to secure the performance of all contract work as economically as possible: and that the city and taxpayers should have the benefit of free competition between the contractors. Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 43 Am. St. Rep. 865, 37 Pac. 695; Berry v. Tacoma, 12 Wash. 3, 40 Pac. 414; Puget Sound Pub. Co. v. Times Printing Co. 33 Wash. 551, 74 Pac. 802; Marshall & B. Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S. W. 815; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 52 L. R. A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716; Holden v. Alton, 179 Ill. 318, 53 N. E. 556; Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill. 194, 42 L. R. A. 718, 69 Am. St. Rep. 222, 52 N. E. 314; Davenport v. Walker, 57 App. Div. 221, 68 N. Y. Supp. 161. The ordinance interferes with the private affairs of the contractor and his employees. People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1. 52 L. R. A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716; Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co. 67 Ohio St. 197, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 65 N. E. 885. With the single exception of the supreme court of Kansas, such legislation has been invariably held void. People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 52 L. R. A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 713; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. 175 N. Y. 84, 65 L. R. A. 33, 67 N. E. 129; Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co. 67 Ohio St. 197, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 65 N. E. 885; Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co. 160 Ind. 338, 61 L. R. A. 154, 98 Am. St. Rep. 325, 66 N. E. 895; Fiske v. People, 186 III. 206, 58 L. R. A. 291, 58 N. E. 985; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 9 L. R. A. 482, 20 Am. St. Rep. 226, 24 Pac. 737; Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. 47, 27 L. R. A. 802, 31 Atl. 375; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 515, 30 Am. Rep. 323; Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W. 362; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 31 Am. St. Rep. 533, 28 N. E. 1126; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 11. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206, 35 N. E. 62; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Ramsey v. People, 142 111. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109, 25 S. W. 75; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 77 Am. St. Rep. 269, 58 Pac. 1071. Mr. E. O. Connor, for respondent: The court will not lend its aid to a party who seeks to escape conditions named in his written contract upon the ground that they are illegal, and enforce such provisions, in the same contract, which are satisfactory to him. Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341; Frost v. Gage, 3 Allen, 560; Shenk v. Phelps, 6 Ill. App. 612. The question of the propriety in enacting the ordinance is for the city council to decide, and not the courts. Stull v. De Mattos, 23 Wash. 71, 51 L. R. A. 892, 62 Pac. 451: Fleetwood v. Read, 21 Wash. 547, 47 L. R. A. 205, 58 Pac. 665; State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 96 Am. St. Rep. 893, 71 Pac. 737; McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co. 30 Wash. 549, 60 L. R. A. 947, 94 Am. St. Rep. 889, 71 Pac. 37; Walla Walla v. Ferdon, 21 Wash. 308, 57 Pac. 796: Cooley, Const. Lim. 164: Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, 12 L. ed. 992; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 287, 402; 12 L. ed. 704, 752: Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759; Pattison v. Yuba County, 13 Cal. 175; Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md. 201: Com. ex rel. Dysart v. M'Williams, 11 Pa. 61: Davis v. State, 3 Lea, 376; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 160, 28 Am. Dec. 417; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508. Statutes to remedy a particular evil must, of necessity, apply only to the particular class of persons committing the offense. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 832, 17 L. R. A. 385, 15 S. E. 1000; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 124, 32 L. ed. 626, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109, 25 S. W. 75; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, 9 L. ed. 662; Brimm v. Jones, 11 Utah, 200, 29 L. R. A. 97, 39 Pac. 825, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 23, 41 L. ed. 619, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. ed. 166, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1086; Devin v. Scott, 34 Ind. 67; Curtis v. O'Brien, 20 Iowa, 376, 89 Am. Dec. 543; neettle v. Newcomb, 22 N. Y. 250, 78 Am. Dec. 186; Bosler v. Rheem, 72 Pa. 54. The decisions in the following cases sustain the validity of the law: Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136; Woods v. State, 36 Ark. 36, 38 Am. Rep. 22; Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 44 Am. Rep. 128; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461, 46 Am. Rep. 637, 17 N. W. 389; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 50 Am. Rep. 610; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552, 30 Am. Rep. 238; State v. Ah Chew, 16 Nev. 50, 40 Am. Rep. 488; Com. v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264, 87 Am. Dec. 711; Smith v. Tyler, 51 Ind. 512; Maloney v. Newton, 85 Ind. 565, 44 Am. Rep. 46; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, K. of P. 102 Ind. 262, 1 N. E. 571; Taylor v. Saurman, 110 Pa. 3, 1 Atl. 40: Herdic v. Roessler, 109 N. Y. 127, 16 N. E. 198; Warren v. Sohn, 112 Ind. 213. 13 N. E. 863; Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380; Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. 120 Mass. 383. The city has absolute control over the streets and alleys within its corporate limits, and power to make all improvements. The manner and mode of making the improvements, and the payment of the cost thereof, and all matters connected therewith, have always been exercised by the municipality. Re Dalton, 61 Kan. 257, 47 L. R. A. 380, 59 Pac. 336; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 397, 42 L. ed. 792, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. The ordinance should be sustained as a valid exercise of police power. Ah Lim v. Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 9 L. R. A. 395, 24 Pac. 588; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 59 L. R. A. 342, 92 Am. St. Rep. 930, 70 Pac. 52; State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 96 Am. St. Rep. 893, 71 Pac. 737; McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co. 30 Wash. 549, 60 L. R. A. 947, 94 Am. St. Rep. 889, 71 Pac. 37. The freedom to contract, guaranteed by the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, is not infringed by the ordinance making it a criminal offense for a contractor for a public work to permit or require an employee to perform labor upon that work in excess of eight hours each day. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 48 L. ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Re Ashby, 60 Kan. 101, 55 Pac. I done under the provisions of this ordin- Special burdens are often imposed upon individuals who come within the purview of the law, for the public good. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 394, 42 L. ed. 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 96 Am. St. Rep. 893, 71 Pac. 737. ance: Provided, that in cases of extraordinary emergency, such as danger to life or property, the hours for work may be extended; but in such case the rate of pay for time employed in excess of eight hours of each calendar day shall be one and onehalf times the rate of pay allowed for the same amount of time during eight hours' service. And for this purpose this ordinance is made a part of all contracts, subcontracts, or agreements for work done for the city of Spokane. Sec. 4. Any contractor, subcontractor, or agent of contractor, foreman, or employer, who shal! violate the provisions of this ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined in a sum not less than $25 nor more than $200, or by imprisonment in the city Dunbar, J., delivered the opinion of the jail for a period not less than ten days nor court: more than ninety days, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. This is an appeal from a judgment denying appellant's application for an order discharging him from custody, and remanding him to the custody of the chief of police. The appellant was arrested October 15, 1903, upon a warrant duly issued by the justice's court on a complaint charging appellant with violating ordinance No. A1114, as amended, of the ordinances of the city of Spokane. This ordinance as passed January 7, 1902, was as follows: Ordinance No. A1114. An Ordinance to Establish the Hours to Constitute a Day's Work on All Municipal Construction, or Such Work Done by Contract or Subcontract, and Providing for the Wages to be Paid Laborers Employed in Doing the Same, and Providing Penalties for Its Violation. The city of Spokane does ordain follows: Sec. 5. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force ten days after its passage. 66 The complaint charged that on the 12th day of October, 1903, the petitioner, James C. Broad, in violation of said ordinance No. A1114, as amended, did then and there unlawfully and wilfully permit one Martin Devereux to work and labor more than eight hours in one calendar day upon the fourth ward sewer system in the city of Spokane, Washington, which said work was being done upon said sewer for the city of Spokane, Washington, by said James C. Broad under contract with the city of Spokane, Washington." A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was duly issued, and petitioner arrested. A writ of habeas corpus having been sued out, the respondent as chief of police made return, setting up the complaint and warrant, and stating that, under and by virtue of said warrant, he held the petitioner in custody to appear and answer to said charge before the court. The petitioner duly excepted to the sufficiency of this return, upon the ground that the ordinance of the city of Spokane under which the petitioner was held was in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, with the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, and was unreasonable. The court overruled the petitioner's exception to the sufficiency of the return, denied the petition, and ordered the petitioner remanded to the custody of the chief of police. From such order this appeal is taken. Sec. 1. Hereafter eight hours in any calendar day shall constitute a day's work on any work done for the city of Spokane, subject to the conditions hereinafter provided. Sec. 2. Hereafter all laborers employed on municipal work, which is being done by contract or subcontract, as in this ordinance specified, shall receive and be paid the sum of not less than two ($2.00) dollars for a calendar day's work of eight hours, which sum of two ($2.00) dollars shall be the minimum price paid to all day laborers hereafter employed to do the work hereinbelow specified. Sec. 3. All work done by contract or sub contract on any building or improvements, or work on roads, bridges, streets, alleys, or buildings for the city of Spokane, shall be The appellant makes several assignments of error, but they are all embraced in the proposition that the ordinance was in viola |