SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 8, 1834. his duty to remove the deposites; and that the President we already have an absolute, unencumbered despotism, has the supervision and execution of the laws, and, there-beyond which no other can advance. What is despotism, fore, a right to control him in the duty which he has to but the existence in the hands of a single individual of the discharge in relation to this law. power and right to say to all subordinate agents, you are This is a simple statement of his opinion; and it will be to act on my responsibility, and by my opinion? Can the at once perceived that, as he considers his right original, Russian go further? Can the Turk? Are Senators prefrom the nature of his office, so that of the President re-pared to sustain the principle? If they are, and it be sussults from his general authority to see the laws executed. [tained, we have had a revolution already; "hitherto blood"The right is reserved by the bank charter." Then it less," as the Senator from Kentucky has remarked, but existed before the bank charter. "It is unlimited and with- it will not in its continuance be bloodless, when the people, out restriction." Then Congress has no authority of inter- amidst throes and convulsions, shall seek the restoration ference. The Secretary expresses his wonder that Con- of their rights. gress should have given him such a power. In this wonder Sir, if the language to which I have adverted can be used I cordially join him, if his notions have any resemblance to your Secretary, it may to your Comptroller, your Register, to the truth. But I am aware of no such surrender of your Auditor, your Treasurer; and the Executive can dispower by Congress to him or any other executive agent. pose of the treasure at his will. Every possible obstacle is His error is that he has assumed, without proof or argu- removed from before the vaults of your treasury. I have alment, that which did not exist. And I must here be per- ways understood the system of our Government, and so I mitted to remark, that, while the Secretary complains of have read the short but eventful history of my country, that the bank enlarging its discounts, in order to compel Con- it was the fixed purpose of those who fought for, and of those gress to recharter it, he assumes this ungranted power, who created, our institutions, so to arrange them that the and exercises it; to compel Congress to act in unison with purse and the sword should be forever disunited; and the his views, he turns round and does an act, which he be- Executive should not, by possibility, touch or control one lieves, and which is boasted of before the whole nation, dollar of the public treasure, unless he was not only peras changing the deliberation of Congress from the ques-mitted, but commanded by law. There was not, during tion of removal to that of restoration; as compelling the the periods in which our State and General Governments majority of Congress to yield up its rights, and subjecting were formed, one single approved opinion which did not it to the veto power. Whether the complaint against the recognise this doctrine. Separate the purse and the sword! bank be well founded or not, the assumption of the Sec- separate them!-was the language of those times--their retary is unpardonable. And if his complaint be true, union is despotism! This principle is on every page of Congress has been, between these conflicting parties, our history, and was intended to be carried out in the formplaced in a predicament neither honorable to its character, ation of the legislative and executive branches of the nor salutary to the exercise of its powers, unless it shall Government. Their powers were defined as much with firmly sustain its own authority, which I trust it will do. this as any other view. The constitution and laws demand that it should. And, sir, the law creating the Treasury Department With regard to the supervision of the Executive, I was formed in the same spirit. It was necessary-could remark, whether the Secretary acted under the command not be avoided-to leave it, in some sense, an executive of the Executive or not, his own responsibility is not department; but every provision was inserted which could changed. His responsibility is created by the law, and tend to make it subservient to the legislative, and not the can neither be thrown upon nor assumed by another. executive will. The Department of State, created in July, "The President commanded, and I did it"-"Do, and 1 1789; the War Department, created in August, 1789; and will protect you, and it will be the happiest day of my the Navy Department, created in April, 1798, are purely life"-are no apology or justification. They do not, in executive. The officers at the head of the two former the least, remove the guilt of misconduct. The President are commanded, in the same words, to "perform and cannot, under our laws, and agreeably to our system, take execute such duties as shall, from time to time, be enupon himself that which the law has laid upon another, joined on or intrusted to them by the President of the whatever may be his choice or his desire. There are only United States, agreeable to the constitution," relative to two modes in which responsibility and its consequences matters pertaining to their departments. The officer at can be removed from a guilty agent. One, where the the head of the latter was commanded "to execute such commander at the head of his forces, with sword in hand, orders as he should receive from the President of the protects his subordinate-a mode better fitted for eastern United States," relative to matters connected with the nadespotisms than American liberty; the other, where he val establishment. And they all communicate with the possesses popularity so overwhelming, that, when he President, and not with Congress. The Legislature makes says a thing, it is therefore believed; when he does it, its calls in regard to their duties, and gives its orders it is therefore applauded. Such a man may say "Do, and through the President, and receives their answers, and the I will protect you;" my approbation shall be sufficient to reports of their conduct and situation, from him. Not so make others approve; my popularity shall be your shield. the Treasury Department. It takes care of the public I will admit, sir, if it will be any gratification, that no man money. But how? As the Legislature directs. It diswho ever lived had better right to say I will take this burses the public money. But how? As the Legislature responsibility on myself. We have seen enough to assure commands. It reports the state and condition of the us that, before his popularity, even constitutional princi- treasury, and the situation of the finances. But to whom? ples have given way in men who were deemed honorable Not to the Executive, but to Congress. Congress calls for and honest. None ever made his followers change opin information, plans, systems of finance. But on whom, ions more rapidly. None ever trampled on covenanted and through whom? Not on or through the Executive, but rights more, and found more ready sacrifices in adulation immediately and directly upon the Secretary. He is reand applause. But, sir, let us beware. It is that very quired to look to the disbursement of the public money. kind of popularity which leads most directly and easily to But by whose orders? The President's? No, sir, no; by the prostration of liberty. It is the paved road to despot- the command of law. He cannot himself take one dollar ism, which offers no obstacle to the progress of the victor. out of the treasury, but in the forms prescribed-the counMr. President, if there does now exist in this country a tersigning of the Comptroller; the record of the Register; power which can, by its single volition and word, relieve the signature of the Treasurer; and "not otherwise;" officers acting under the constitution and laws from their words useless in the construction of the act, except to show responsibility, and this with regard to the treasury itself, the rigor, and caution, and anxiety of those who framed JAN. 8, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [SENATE. it, in regard to the use of the public funds, and their de-President should be permitted to hold office; that the trisire to prevent all executive interference with the trea- umph of party drew after it, as its appropriate incident, sury. Why was not the bond to receive and keep the the dismission of incumbents who did not join in the elemoney given by the Secretary, if he was meant to be the vation of the single occupant of executive power, although keeper of the money? Why are all who hold and disburse their merits were undisputed. Sir, this is an odious enmoney required to give bonds, if the Secretary can dis- largement and perversion of a questionable power. The pose of it as he pleases? Why did the Treasurer select spoils of party, thus secured, are the triumphs of corruphis own places and agents for keeping the money before tion over virtue and the constitution. The power of disCongress prescribed the place and the agents, if the Sec- mission, if to be exercised at all, should be exercised for retary had the power? The design of our laws is obvious; competent cause; and that competent cause must exist in the relative duties of the officers are apparent. They must the law, and by the commands of the law; must be connot be set aside and repealed, because the Secretary may nected with the actual discharge of the duties required by imagine that the interest and convenience of the people law; to prevent the performance of acts expressly forbiddemand it. Of that interest and convenience Congress, den by law; to secure the performance of acts expressly and not the Secretary, will judge. If one dollar of the commanded by law; to relieve from fraud and mental inmoney drawn out shall be lost, the tribunals of the country capacity to discharge the duties arising under circumwill teach the Treasurer that he, and not the Secretary, stances which could not otherwise be controlled. It is, permust find it, and the executive mandate will be insufficient haps, a useful, but temporary agent, to guard against evil, for his protection. The design and the words of the constitution and the laws, in separating the Treasury Department, as far as practicable, from executive control, will in them meet its just illustration and support. But it is said that this course of reasoning is of no avail, because the President has the power of dismissing all except judicial officers, and, therefore, has power to discharge the Secretary, unless he thinks as the President thinks, and acts as the President directs; and that, by this means, he has control over all the actions of all the officers under the Government. Is this, sir, true? Is this power of dismission thus supreme and irresistible? If it be, it is a strange anomaly in a free Government, and under free institutions; and no time should be lost in erasing it. until the legislative body, in its several branches, shall be enabled to act. But where discretion is vested by Congress in an agent, it can never, with propriety, be applied in such way as to control the will of Congress--to take from their agent and trustee the right to judge of their wishes and intentions. The Executive can never say how the officers of the law shall discharge their duties. If it exercise the power of dismission, it must be after and for their acts, and to remove them from doing further mischief. If the President may say to one officer, you must do your duty in this or that mode, he may say so to every other. If to a Secretary, then to a marshal, who holds his office by the same tenure. And, by like exercise of authority as that which we are now considering, he may direct a marI do not mean, at this time, to discuss the existence of shal how he shall execute his writs, and whom he shall the power of dismission, or to question its constitutionality. summon on juries; and thus, not our treasury only, but The resolutions do not seem to me to call for it; and the our fortunes, reputations, lives, are in his hands. Where, time may shortly come when we shall be driven to the in- then, where is our security? where our protection? where vestigation, by an imperious sense of our obligations and our legal liberties? where the trial by jury--the last and duties. It is the practice under it, and the principles and motives by which its exercise should be regulated, if it does exist, to which I would call the attention of the Senate. most efficient guardian of the citizen in his dearest interests? It is subject to the control of power; its value is destroyed; it is gone forever. There is no right or privilege which this construction of the power of dismission It was first brought into discussion on the organization will not reach. It changes all the provisions of your laws of one of the departments, in 1789. Parties were divided into the will of one man; you have remaining only a theupon it, and then first measured their strength and intel- ory--a pretence of freedom, with the essence and practice lect. The majority of the federalists were in favor of its of tyranny. You may boast of your liberties, but they are existence in the President alone, without the co-operation in the hands of an individual. You may pass laws, and deof the Senate, the co-ordinate power in appointments. fine the actions of your officers, but the execution of the The anti-federalists, afterwards called republicans, were laws will not be regulated by yourselves, but by the whims, opposed to its existence, and believed they saw danger in the caprice, the passions of one man; and all your purits exercise. Gerry and others pointed out, with the spirit poses may be defeated by his word. Unite to this conof prophecy, the malignant use which might, and, in cor- struction of the power of dismission the exercise of the rupt times, probably would, be made of it. Madison and veto, which the constitution has granted, and human ingeothers, in the purity of their own hearts and purposes, did nuity cannot devise a purer system of unrestrained, unlinot believe in the danger. They thought that its exer-mited power. The Executive has swallowed up the legiscise, for any motive but the support of law, and the faith-lative functions, and there remains but the feeble barrier ful administration of official duties, would justly subject the of the Judiciary, which must speedily fall before it. Are President to impeachment. They did not foresee the com- the people of this country-I ask with the earnestness ing events which were to take place at the close of forty which I feel--are they prepared to sanction such doctrines years from that day. There was not then a man in the --to meet such results? If they are, they are already Congress of the United States who believed that this power prepared and fitted for slavery. Will Senators sustain such could or would be used for mere personal or party pur- principles? poses, for personal or party revenge; much less to obtain If the exercise of this power be now permitted, it will control of the treasury of the country, by the discharge be no apology to aftertimes, to posterity, that we believed of the officer placed over it by Congress, because he would not consent to exercise his discretion in the mode which the President might dictate, and within seventy days of the meeting of Congress. the existing President would not abuse it. It is not neces sary for us to assert that he would. We settle principles, not with reference to any one man and his merits, but to the principles themselves, and their effect upon our instiThe federalists prevailed in that discussion by a small tutions and liberties. Besides, who knows who shall sucvote, and the practice since has been in conformity with ceed, or the extent to which the successor may carry this the decision. The power has been exercised by all the dangerous power? There is not a man on earth to whom Presidents, but to a very limited extent, except by the I would confide it, in the extent now claimed by the advopresent. In no instance--by none of them--upon the avowed ground that none but personal partisans of the VOL. X.-11 cates of the Executive. And if, at this moment, there be party devotion strong enough to sustain it, then is your SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 8, 1834. Government already revolutionized. The conclusion of actions to the will of the President alone? that his power my own mind, and which I desire to convey to those who, would have been unlimited and unrestricted, except by with myself, are to decide this question, is, that it is an the wishes of the Executive, and that they should conabuse of power by the President to dismiss an officer clude him? I cannot persuade myself that one Senator charged by Congress with a trust, because he will not would maintain these propositions. Then why shall they consent to execute it by the executive standard of con- be maintained in relation to the Secretary of the Treastruction; because he does not do the will of the Presi sury? Is the contract changed by the fact that he is the dent, but the will of Congress; and I regard such an act, individual agreed upon to perform the trust? The logic not as a triumph over a Secretary, not as a triumph over which shall sustain the distinction will merit admiration a bank, the mere creature of the law, but as a triumph for its ingenuity, but not applause for its support of law over the law itself; a triumph over the rights of the peo- or morality. It is precisely because it is a contract-and ple; a triumph over the constitution and laws of the land. one, too, of a high and solemn character, affecting the But I return to the power which the Secretary says faith and honor of the Government-that the Secretary is pre-existed in him, as Secretary, and repeat that it could not permitted to take its words alone, without regard to not pre-exist in him, because there was no absence of its objects, and infer a license of action and decision which legal provision; for it was given by law to another officer. knows no restraint. He was bound, by every principle The Treasurer, in the absence of other legal provision, is of fairness and duty, to look into the history of that conbound "to receive and keep" the money, and to select tract; to examine the purposes of the parties; and to the places of deposite, as a part of receiving and keeping. limit himself by its spirit and intentions, and by the actions He must keep it safely; the places must therefore be on of the parties in relation to its stipulations. his responsibility. If the power existed before the 16th section of the bank charter, it existed in the Treasurer, and not in the Secretary. I recur again to the principle of the Secretary. He says it is a power reserved, without limitation or restriction; of course it is not created nor enlarged by the bank charter. It is now what it was before that law was pass ed. He argues that this charter is a contract; that there is no limitation to the power in its words; and that what?-therefore that there is no limit to his power, nor to the motives by which he shall be governed in exercising it. The Secretary could not act correctly without doing this, nor can Senators truly estimate his conduct without a similar examination. I hope the Senate, therefore, will bear with me, while I make a brief reference to the history and objects of this contract, with a view to just conclusions upon the Secretary's principles, and reasons, and actions. The contract is the charter of the Bank of the United States, created by Congress, of its own unsolicited will, to accomplish certain defined and specified objects of national interest; the whole of those objects being perfectly understood and explicitly stated. It was unsolicited by those who subsequently became If this be true, as respects the Secretary and the United interested in its provisions. None of them applied for it; States Bank, it is true in no other instance in law, usage, none asked it as a favor to them. It was a voluntary act or the concerns of human life. In construing contracts, of the Government, so far as they were concerned, though whether general in their words or not, we confine our- not voluntary, I admit, in relation to the necessities of the selves to their objects, and do not go beyond the subject- Government itself. It was forced on Congress, but not matter to find motives for construction or action. We are by the stockholders, as the best mode, in their opinions, governed by the intent of the parties, and by what they of removing the evils under which the nation was at that have respectively agreed to do; and our construction time laboring. It was suffering incalculable injuries from must be reasonable as regards both, and not such as may the insecurity, and inequality, and unsoundness of the suit the convenience or interests of only one of them. If currency, and from the want of a fiscal agent to aid in the they have confined their contract to certain specified financial action of the Government, and to manage its objects, we cannot look to other objects to find reasons pecuniary concerns with advantage. To remove these to govern our decision upon these. If a party performs evils, some modern quackery, some combination of State the conditions of his contract, no conduct of his, in rela- banks on safety-fund principles, or something else of that tion to other matters, can affect our decision. The trus- kind, might have been resorted to; but the wise and distee, or umpire, who is appointed to decide upon a con- creet men who then filled public stations were not skilled tract, and admits that its terms have been kept by one of in such devices, and they determined to create a bank the parties, and yet decides against him because he has with a capital competent to the objects, and bound to acted incorrectly in matters which are not mentioned, exert its influence to remove the suffering, and perform exceeds his authority, violates his duty, disregards the in- the fiscal action which was necessary. In 1815 they junctions of law, and acts dishonestly. In the instance formed a charter with these objects. The then Presiunder consideration, where there are mutual covenants by dent, Mr. Madison, returned it to Congress, with his reathe Government and the bank, and the Secretary is au- sons for not approving it. He waived his constitutional thorized to decide in relation to one of them, there is no objections, but returned the bill on the ground that it principle of common law or common justice which will would not answer its objects, in restoring a sound currenauthorize him to look beyond the covenants, out of the cy, and performing the duties required of it by the Govcontract, to find motives to govern him. The parties ernment. At the next session the public difficulties had meant, honor and good faith require, that his action should increased to an alarming extent, and there was no alterbe confined to the terms and objects of the contract. He native; action could not be postponed, and the present must look to them for his motives, and the grounds of his bank was created, designed to effect two objects: i. The action. He must make a decision, reasonable in its char- restoration of a sound state of the currency; 2. The manacter, and equally regardful of the rights and interests of agement of the concerns of the treasury-the creation of both. a fiscal agent. To effect these, Congress prescribed its Any other individual, not in office, might have been own terms; and held out to all the people of the Union a agreed upon by the Government and the bank to perform pledge of its faith, that, if they would subscribe to the the duty of deciding upon the removal of the deposites. bank, and undertake the responsibilities which it imposed, Does any man imagine, will any man affirm, that he would the benefits of that charter should be fully and faithfully have been at liberty to find motives out of the charter for yielded to them. All those who chose did subscribe; his decision? to have exercised an unlimited license, which Congress offered-it is not too much to say, solicited should be regulated by feelings or objects not embraced them to undertake it. Shall it now be said that for slight within the contract? to have subjected himself and his causes-for any causes but a failure to keep the contract JAN. 8, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [SENATE on their part-that these subscribers shall be deprived of confounded the stock with the deposites, in his action as their benefits? that there is an unrestrained license in the their representative, or trustee, or umpire. Did it occur Secretary of the Treasury to disregard the objects of the to those who passed the law, or to those who subscribed, contract, and, looking without it, to cheat them of their that the concerns of the bank were to be regulated by privileges whenever he pleases, and for whatever cause these directors, and its transactions governed or influenced he pleases? It would be worse than punic faith. Con- by them further than their opinions and votes would gress is bound, in honor, to prevent it, if attempted by reach? Did it occur to them that they were to act as inany officer, for any cause but a violation of the agreement, formers under executive appointment and order? secret and that violation established by law in the mode agreed spies, who were to give information to the President, upon by the parties. without the rest of the directors being aware of it? Sir, The benefits offered were, the act of incorporation, by no man would have subscribed his money on such terms. which their joint funds might be used for their profit; a No honorable mind then dreamed of such degradation of partnership by the Government to one-fifth of the whole principle and action. On the contrary, Congress and the amount and relative proportion of directors; and the de- subscribers knew that it would be important and necessary, posite of the public money, on which they could discount at some periods, for the Government to be informed rewhile it remained there. The duties demanded on the other specting its proceedings and transactions, as they would hand were, to pay one and a half million of dollars; to affect the stock, the deposites, and fidelity to the terms pay specie; to restore the currency-an Herculean task; to of the charter. They therefore expressly provided modes keep the public money safely, and furnish it for the Gov-in which this knowledge should be acquired, by monthly ernment wherever it was wanted, from one extreme of and other reports, by committees of Congress, by agents the Union to the other, without expense or loss. There expressly appointed for that object. But they did not was no added condition, that the owners of the stock provide for placing the directors under the secret orders should surrender their rights as freemen, should be of of the Executive, to make partisan reports and partial this or that party, should support this or that man for Pre-statements on such facts as they could secretly obtain sident. Congress presented no such terms then, and it without the knowledge of the other directors. There will be false to itself if it permits them to be prescribed are ample means in the power of the Government to know now. The terms of the contract were all explained, and every thing which is done, and which is proper or importI know of no honest or just principle which can justify a ant to be known, without their humbling the Governrefusal by the Government to fulfil the conditions, and ment directors by turning them into agents to discharge leave the public moneys in the bank, so long as the bank the lowest services to which men can be degraded. The shall fully satisfy all that it promised to perform as the very order to the directors to do this service was a tresterms on which it was to keep them. The bargain was pass on the rights of the bank, a violation of the contract. offered by the Government, made by the Government, and Mr. President, has the bank performed the conditions must be kept by the Government. Whether it shall do of the contract? If it has, the Secretary had no right to so is of comparatively little moment to the personal and pe-take away the deposites, no matter how unlimited the cuniary interests of the stockholders. By bad faith towards words by which his power is recognised. That it has it, a number of orphans and widows and the helpless may performed them fully, amply, there can be no just quesbe injured, and their wrongs be remembered in the account tion. I am not its advocate or apologist. To almost all against national injustice; still the great mass of stockholders can probably bear it without much suffering. But this evil is swallowed up, and may be forgotten, in the more extensive injuries which will result from violated faith, from disordered currency, from lost confidence at home and abroad. who have ever been in its direction I am a stranger; with not five of them have I been on terms of intimate acquaintance. I have never had a dollar from its vaults, and never but once have I been within its walls. I have no cause for partiality towards it, and have never been affected in my interests by it, except in the way that every other citizen The bank was bound to the performance of certain du- of the Union has. I am here to pass upon its rights; to ties; if it failed, a remedy was provided in the contract. do justice, and nothing more; and to this I am bound by After it had discharged them, it had a perfect right to seek the highest and most solemn earthly obligations. And its own profit, by all fair, and honorable, and legal means. I cannot perceive in what it has failed to comply with its It was bound to do so, on every correct principle. The engagements to the Government. It has fulfilled them all, Government itself, as a partner, had a right to expect it. and more. It has paid the million and a half into the It appointed its directors to look to this object; and it was treasury; it has transferred the funds of the Government for this, and this only, that they were appointed; not to wherever it has been requested, without risk, without extake care of the deposites-not to give secret informa- pense. More than three hundred millions of your money tion-not to be spies and informers-not to control the has passed through its hands, without the loss of a single whole management of the bank, and complain if their dollar. It restored your currency, in four or five years, opinions did not prevail. They represented one of the from a depreciation of from five to twenty per cent., partners; and the sole effect of their dissatisfaction should until Congress, by its committees, have declared that it be, if Congress concur with them, to sell their stock and was as sound as that of any country. All its duties have eease to be partners; not to withdraw the deposites while been performed; all the facilities which the Government they were safe, and all the duties of the bank in relation to them fully discharged. The interest of the nation in the stock, and the propriety of leaving the deposites there, are constantly confounded by the Secretary, the directors, and others, but are distinct in their nature, and the principles applicable to them. It may be wise in the In transferring your funds, it has saved millions to the Government to sell its stock when it finds it to be its Government; in restoring the currency, it has cast milinterest to do so; and yet every regard for good faith may lions into your treasury. By one single operation, you require that the deposites remain. Mismanagement, less saved between six and seven millions. It received twelve profits than might fairly be made, might justify the one but millions of State bank notes in 1817; and you promptly not the other, if the deposites be safely and correctly used. paid, by that means, nine millions of debt several years The Secretary, acting for both parties, or for Congress before it could otherwise have been discharged. The alone, could not properly reason otherwise on the subject Bank of Columbia gives an example of this process, than Congress should reason; and he ought not to have and of the losses to which you would have been subjected. asked or expected have been furnished; so that Secretary after Secretary, administration after administration, have bestowed upon it the highest eulogiums. Senators bave only to refer to the documents published to the world by this body to confirm these assertions. SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 8, 1834. It owed you more than a million of dollars; about one-stricted power to remove, or not to remove, the deposites. half was transferred to the bank, and immediate credit Congress cannot act until he has acted. The Executive given for it, and the bank has thereby lost more than one has a right to control the Secretary; and thus Congress hundred thousand dollars. It became trustee for the bal- has surrendered its legislative power, and cannot exercise ance, to collect it for the joint benefit of itself and the it except at the will of the Secretary or Executive. Now, Government. There is, perhaps, four hundred thousand sir, I have by me an opinion, given in relation to a grant dollars still due, on which you may yet lose one hundred by a State Legislature of exclusive powers to a company and fifty thousand dollars. And you will lose all--if I am to construct rail-roads within defined limits, and to prevent correctly informed, every dollar--which was not so trans- competition; an extract from which I will read, although ferred. It was by a process similar to this, in other cases, I do not concur in the conclusions of the writer. that this abused bank restored your currency, and saved your money. It must be acknowledged that there would appear to be high authority for regarding this power as an inciSir, it is now, even when the Secretary assumes the dent to the power of legislation. In the act of Congress discharge of his high power, admitted by him that your incorporating the Bank of the United States, there is an money in the bank is safe. It is admitted by all, even by agreement, on the part of the United States, not to authe reader of the state paper to the cabinet, that the de- thorize any other bank out of the District of Columbia posites are safe--nay, too safe: for there is too much during the existence of that charter; and similar pledges specie in its vaults. Where, then, is the failure in per- may be found in similar cases, in the legislation of differforming the covenants which can justify the removal? ent States, where the constitution has not expressly conShall we adopt the doctrine of the Secretary, and say that ferred on the Legislature the power to make them. any motive, any object, may justify the act, whether con- "But, with every respect for the distinguished men nected with the conditions of the contract or not? In who have sanctioned such legislation in the General what an odious light this principle exhibits Congress! As Government, or in the States, I cannot think that a legisa mere cheat, sir! The amount of the argument is this, lative body, holding a limited authority under a written and this the language which Congress must use, if it ap- constitution, can, by contract or otherwise, limit the legis prove the act: It is true, we offered you the deposites to lative power of their successors. The power which the tempt you to enter into the contract; you accepted; but constitution gives to the legislative body must always exist we cunningly inserted a provision that our agent might in that body until it is altered by the people, and cannot deprive you of them whenever he chose. We promised be restricted by a mere legislative act. If they can deyou the benefit of them, but we used such language as to prive their successors of the power of chartering compapermit us to trick you out of them whenever a Secretary nies of a particular description, or in particular places, it is could be found to order their removal. You have, it is obvious that, upon the same principle, they might deprive true, kept your contract, but that is of no importance; we them of the power of chartering any corporations for any shield ourselves under the words of the agreement to purpose whatever; and if they might, by contract or otheravoid performing ours. Sir, it is mockery. The ap-wise, deprive their successors of this legislative power, proval of such reasoning would exhibit a depreciated they could surrender any other legislative power whatever standard of public and private morality which I hope does in the same manner, and bind the State forever to submit not yet exist. to it. The existence of such a power in a representative But the Secretary does not stop here. As if to add to body has no foundation in reason or in public convenience, the insult, he claims the power to remove the deposites and is inconsistent with the principles upon which all our whenever, in his judgment, the convenience and interests political institutions are founded. For if a legislative body of the people require it in any degree. He is thus consti- may thus restrict the power of its successors, a single imtuted the judge of the interests and convenience of the provident act of legislation may entail lasting and incurable people, and the slightest reason is to justify him in vio- evil on the people of a State. It may compel them to lating the charter, when the faith and honor of the Gov- forego the advantages which their local situation affords, ernment may be implicated by the act. By what rule is and prevent them from using the means necessary to prohe to judge? The convenience of the people! It is the mote the prosperity and happiness of the community.' stale apology to which tyrants and usurpers have always This extract was not written by R. B. Taney, Secretary resorted for the violation of the requirements and sanc- of the Treasury, but by R. B. Taney, Attorney General of tions of law. The Secretary says the bank cannot com- the United States, within twenty-one days of the date of plain. Now, as there are two parties to the contract, if the order for the removal of the deposites. the bank cannot complain, let the Secretary do what he Mr. President, the Secretary, under the charter of the pleases, has Congress any right to complain? If one party bank, holds a mutually delegated trust, which he is to exemust be silent, must not the other also? And did the bank cute, according to the meaning and objects of the contract, believe that, by its charter, such power was granted to the for the benefit of both parties, and upon principles which Secretary? Did the Senator, then a member of the other are applicable to all officers and to all official duties, to all House, who drew this section, believe it? [Mr. WEBSTER. powers, and to every trust. The original power of the No--certainly not.] Did any of those Senators, then mem- legislative body still remains the same. The sole intenbers of that body, who voted for the act, believe it? Not tion was to create an agent, which, in the absence of Conone. They all regarded it as a solemn contract, to be gress, might guard against danger. But neither Congress kept, like all other contracts, in good faith by one party nor the Secretary has a right to violate the conditions of as well as by the other; and never imagined that the Sec- the charter. Congress would not, and it is our duty to retary, under the general words used, could violate it at arrest the Secretary in his attempt to do it. But the Secwill. retary endeavors to sustain his course by a resort to preSir, it is necessary that Congress should look to their cedent, to usage, and practice. I have not yet had the legislative rights. A power has been claimed over the benefit, on this point, which would arise from reading his whole treasury of the Union. The control of that trea- answer to the resolution offered by the Senator from Kensury is one of the highest legislative powers granted by tucky, just printed and laid upon our tables, and may not the people to Congress. It cannot, must not, be con- have all the light which that answer will afford. But I strued away. There are, indeed, those who believe that present to the Senate what I believe to be the truth in rea surrender of this control would be utterly unconstitu- lation to this subject. The Secretary offers one, and only tional and void. The argument, it will be observed, one, authority; and that is the postscript of a letter from stands thus: By the contract, the Secretary has unre- Mr. Crawford to the Mechanics' Bank of New York, of |