lying in their route. The troops marching from Wyoming against Niagara were to be met at Anaquaqua by a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men to be collected at Schenectady.

A body of troops were to be stationed on the Mohawk during the winter, for the purpose of preparing every material necessary for building vessels. They were to be reinforced early in the spring by two thousand five hundred men, and were to take possession of Oswego; to launch the vessels constructed of the materials to be prepared during the winter; to secure the navigation of lake Ontario; and to make excursions towards Niagara, for the purpose of alarming the Indian nations, and facilitating the military operations in that quarter.

Several regiments were to be cantoned along the upper parts of Connecticut river, to be recruited during the winter, so as to form a body of five thousand regular troops. Their destina. tion was to be kept a profound secret, and they were to penetrate into Canada by the way of the river François, at the mouth of which a post was to be established, and from thence their attention was to be immediately turned to the reduction of Montreal, St. John's, and the north end of lake Champlain.

These objects being accomplished, they were to co-operate with the troops designed to gain the navigation

navigation of lake Ontario; but as it would be necessary to be guarded against any possible attack from Quebec, they could afford but feeble aid to the operations in that quarter. It was supposed however that a detachment of two thousand men might be spared for this object. These, with as many Canadians as would join them, were to proceed up Cadaroqui, and take a post defensible by about three hundred men, at or near the mouth of lake Ontario. They were then to unite with the troops stationed at Oswego, and, leaving a garrison at that place, march to Niagara, where they were also to be joined by the detachment ordered against Detroit..

Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But this object being accomplished, another campaign would still be necessary for the reduction of Quebec. To carry this on, the army must be wintered in Canada; and, in the mean time, the garrison of Quebec would in all probability be largely reinforced. The difficulties and dangers resulting from this circumstance wore so serious. an aspect, as to render it questionable whether it would not be advisable to relinquish the enterprise on an enlarged scale, and to limit themselves to partial expeditions, unless France could be induced to take a part in it.

The conquest of Quebec, and of Halifax, was supposed to be an object of so much importance,

both

both to France and the United States, that her aid must be solicited to effect it.

It was proposed that from four to five thousand French troops should sail from Brest in the beginning of May, under convoy of four ships of the fine and four frigates. Their destination was to be avowed, but they were to be clothed as if for service in the West Indies, and thick clothes were to be sent after them in August. By the middle of August it was supposed the conquest of Canada might be so far completed, that Halifax might be invested by the ships. A considerable body of American troops might be spared for that service; and if Halifax should fall by the beginning or middle of October, the army might either proceed immediately against Newfoundland, or remain in garrison till the spring, when the conquest of that place might be completed.

It had been supposed probable that the further prosecution of the war on the continent of America would be abandoned by the English; in which case, the government would have at its disposal a respectable force, the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the atten tion of the commander in chief. He had contemplated an expedition against the British posts in Upper Canada, as a measure which might be eventually eligible, and which might usefully employ the arms of the United States, if their troops

might safely be withdrawn from the sea board. He had however considered every object of this sort as contingent, to be pursued or abandoned according to circumstances. To be prepared for a state of things, should it arrive, in which offensive war might be prosecuted without risking too much, he had taken proper measures to inform himself of the state of the garrisons and fortified places in Canada, and of the advantages and disadvantages attending the different routes into that country. He had estimated the difficulties to be encountered in such an enterprise, and had found them so considerable, as to balance on the extent which might safely be given to such an expedition, admitting the United States to be evacuated by the British armies.

He

In this state of mind, he received the magnificent plan already decided on by Congress, which, with his comments on it, was to be delivered to a French nobleman, and also to be forwarded to the American minister at the court of Versailles. was forcibly struck with the absolute impracticability of executing that part of it which was to be undertaken by the United States, if the enemy should continue in their country; and with the serious mischief which would result to the com-mon cause, as well from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other objects to one which was in his opinion so unpromising, as

from

from the ill impression which would be made on the French court and nation by the total failure of the American government to execute their part of a plan originating with themselves; a failure which would most probably sacrifice the force employed in it by their ally.

On taking a serious review of the naval force of England and of France, in the different parts of the world, the former appeared to him to maintain a decided superiority, and must consequently possess the ability of shutting up the ships of the latter, which should be trusted into the river St. Lawrence, from whence it would be almost impracticable to escape. Not to avail themselves of this superiority on such an occasion, would argue a blind infatuation or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which could not safely be assumed in calculations of such serious import.

A plan too, consisting of so many parts, to be prosecuted both from Europe and America, by land and by water, which, to be successful, required such a harmonious co-operation of the whole, such a perfect coincidence of events, appeared to him to be exposed to too many accidents, to risk upon it interests of such high value.

In a very long and serious letter to Congress, he apologized for not obeying their orders in delivering the plan, with his observations on it, to the marquis; and, entering into a perfect investi