Welles v. Rhodes. It is preventive, as we have said, and very much must depend upon the extent and imminence of the danger threatened and the view which will be taken of the case by a discreet judge." Munson v. Munson, 28 Conn., 586. "The injury to be apprehended therefore is by no means irreparable, and the court might well act upon its discretion and deny the injunction." Waterbury Savings Bank v. Lawler, 46 Conn., 246. Thus, even if we leave out of view the fact of the pending trespass suit and assume that the discovery asked for had been obtained, still even then the court below would have been justified in dismissing the complaint. If then we take into account the fact that the complaint shows a suit pending and apparently being prosecuted in good faith, the trial of which will speedily and effectually settle the question of title in dispute, it affords an additional reason, if one were necessary, why a court of equity should refuse to interfere by injunction. And as to the discovery sought, it is very doubtful whether the plaintiff could not have obtained, under the provisions of chapter 22 of the Public Acts of 1889, all that she seeks here by way of discovery. We have been referred to no case, nor do we know of any, where equitable relief of the kind here sought has been granted under circumstances at all similar to those stated in the complaint. The plaintiff relies upon the authority of Chipman v. City of Hartford, 21 Conn., 488, but the two cases are widely different. In that case the statute laws relating to the city of Hartford gave the common council power to order the owners of land fronting on streets to build sidewalks at their own expense. If the orders were not obeyed the city might perform the work, and in such case the expense became, by force of the statute, a lien or real incumbrance" on the land, which could be foreclosed "as if said land *** were mortgaged to said city." No certificate of lien was required to be filed anywhere. Under this statute the city had instituted certain proceedings which it claimed resulted in a lien upon the land under the statute. Whether 66 Welles v. Rhodes. it had such a lien depended upon whether it had pursued all the necessary steps pointed out by the statute. Whether it had done so was to be proved partly by written evidence and partly by evidence not written, and all peculiarly within the knowledge of the city officials, and, from the nature of the case, probably nothing short of legal proceedings could effectually determine the question. Parties dealing with the property were affected by the lien, if one existed, and yet they had no means of knowing whether it existed or not. The city had neglected and refused to enforce its claim in any proceeding for years, and could not be compelled to do so, and yet it insisted that such a lien existed. In the meantime the plaintiffs had conveyed the land with the usual covenants, but the grantees, hearing of this claim of the city, refused to pay all of the purchase money until the lien was removed. The bill set out these facts and asked for a disclosure of the grounds of this claim for a lien, that the premises be discharged therefrom if none existed, and that the plaintiff be allowed to redeem if it did exist. The bill itself showed the existence of a claim whose validity, which the city insisted upon, could only be settled in a suit of some kind, and which, whether valid or not, was working the plaintiffs an actual present injury, for which they had no redress except in the suit they had brought. This presented a very strong case for equitable interposition. The case at bar shows no prima facie adverse right, and if the discovery should show one, states no present actual legal injury resulting there from, and does show that the remedy invoked here is by no means the only one the plaintiff has, and that she is amply prepared, without the aid of a court of equity, to successfully vindicate her rights. In many important respects therefore the case at bar differs very materially from the case cited, and the latter was decided upon grounds rightfully calling for equitable relief which are not present in the case at bar. There is no error in the judgment of the court below. In this opinion the other judges concurred. In re Clayton. IN RE JOHN M. CLAYTON. Hartford Dist., Oct. T., 1890. ANDREWS, C. J., Carpenter, Loomis, The act of 1889 (Session Laws, ch. 167,) provides that "on the trial of any person prosecuted for intoxication, if he shall be found guilty, it shall be the duty of the prosecuting officer to request him to disclose under oath when, where and from whom he procured the liquor by which his intoxication was produced," and that "if he shall refuse to make such disclosure it shall be the duty of the magistrate before whom such trial is had to commit the accused for contempt of court to the common jail for not less than ten nor more than thirty days." On a writ of habeas corpus prayed out by a person committed under the statute it was held 1. That the statute was not unconstitutional as depriving the prisoner of the right to a trial by jury, as secured by art. 1, sec. 21, of the state constitution. 2. Nor as depriving him of liberty without due process of law, as forbidden by art. 1, sec. 9, of the state constitution. 3. Nor as violating the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the 4. Nor invalid as making that a contempt of court which had no relation [Argued October 10th-decided December 15th, 1890.] APPLICATION to Hon. S. O. PRENTICE, a judge of the Superior Court, for a writ of habeas corpus. The return set forth the following mittimus, under which the complainant was held by the sheriff of Hartford County in the county jail :— "To the sheriff of the county of Hartford, or his deputy; the marshal of the city of Hartford, or his deputy; or either policeman of said city; or any constable of the town of Hartford in said county, and to the keeper of the jail in Hartford in said county.-GREETING: "Whereas John M. Clayton was this day, at a session of the City Police Court, holden within and for the said city In re Clayton. of Hartford, by said court found guilty of contempt of court, by refusing, upon request of Francis H. Parker, prosecuting attorney for the city of Hartford, on the trial of the said Clayton for the crime of drunkenness, after said Clayton had been found guilty of intoxication, to disclose under oath when, where, how and from whom he procured the liquor by which his intoxication was produced, against the peace and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided;* whereupon it was considered and ordered by said City Police Court that the said Clayton be imprisoned in the jail in the town of Hartford, in the county of Hartford, for the period of ten days; said sentence to take effect from the expiration of the sentence passed this day for being found drunk, for his said contempt of court, whereof execution remains to be done. "And whereas the said Clayton, now before said Police Court, neglects and refuses to comply with and perform said sentence "These are therefore, by authority of the state of Connecticut, to command you to take and convey the said Clayton to the jail in the town of Hartford in said county, and him deliver to the keeper thereof, and leave with him this warrant; and the said keeper is hereby commanded to receive said Clayton into his custody within said jail, and him confine and imprison within the same for the period of ten days *The following is the statute under which the complainant was committed to prison, being chapter 167 of the acts of 1889: SECTION 1. On the trial of any person prosecuted for intoxication, if he shall be found guilty, it shall be the duty of the prosecuting officer to request him to disclose, under oath, when, where, how, and from whom he procured the liquor by which his intoxication was produced; and if the accused shall make such disclosure, the same shall not be used against him on any prosecution; but if he refuse to make such disclosure, it shall be the duty of the magistrate before whom such trial is had, to commit the accused for contempt of court to the common jail for not less than ten nor more than thirty days. If the accused shall be guilty of false swearing in making such disclosure, it shall be perjury. SEC. 2. The disclosure, so given as aforesaid, shall be taken down in writing by said magistrate or his clerk, and certified by said magistrate or clerk, and forwarded to the state's attorney for the county where such trial is had. In re Clayton. from the expiration of the sentence passed this day for being found drunk, for his said contempt, and him safely keep till he shall be otherwise discharged by order of the law. Dated at the city of Hartford, this 15th day of August, 1890. ALBERT C. BILL, Clerk of the City Police Court." To this return the complainant filed the following de murrer: "The complainant demurs to the return because he says it is insufficient in law, in that the statute on which the commitment is based is obnoxious to constitutional provisions in the following particulars: "1. It is a deprivation of the right to trial by jury, as provided by section 21 of article first of the constitution of Connecticut. "2. Such a commitment on said statute is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, as forbidden by section 9 of article first of the constitution of Connecticut. "3. The matter made a contempt of court by the statute is not a proper contempt, and it is incompetent for the legislature to suspend or abrogate the prisoner's constitutional prerogatives by making such refusal a contempt and providing a summary commitment therefor, since the refusal is entirely disconnected with any proceeding pending before the court, and has no relation whatever to the dignity or duty of the court, or to the administration of justice in any present or future case. "4. The statute is in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, in that it deprives the prisoner of the equal protection of the law in subjecting him to inquiries under summary proceedings and penalties, to which other citizens who procure liquor are not liable. "Wherefore the complainant prays this honorable court that the return of the respondent officer may be adjudged insufficient in law, as being based on a statute obnoxious to constitutional rights as herein before set forth, and that therefore judgment be rendered forthwith for the discharge and release of the petitioner from further confinement." |