SENATE.] Public Distress.-Removal of the Deposites. [MARCH 26, 1834. been struck-a chord which is entwined in all our hearts, terested was the administration in the hurly-burly of its and vibrates with a deep and universal sympathy through- attack upon the bank; so engrossed in the removal of out our whole country. We feel no influence of the the deposites, that the notice was forgotten, the debt was bank; it does not reach us-we don't know it; and where not discharged, the Government continued to pay interdo the people stand up with more opposition to those est, and kept its money idle in an overflowing Treasury. measures of the administration than the people of the These, said Mr. P., are specimens of the conduct of South. Let me not be told, then, of this all-pervading this administration. influence of the bank, upon which gentlemen are so willing to lay all the cries of the times. They are mistaken, utterly and entirely mistaken. The memorials, as moved, were then referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed. REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES. The CHAIR having called the special order, being the resolutions offered by Mr. CLAY, and the report of the Committee on Finance The honorable Senator from North Carolina, in alluding to what I had said concerning the mission to England, dropped a remark of much import. I complained that we had had no minister to England for two years, notwithstanding our intimate and important relations with Mr. FORSYTH said he would, with the permission of that country, and notwithstanding the President had offi- the gentleman who was entitled to the floor, correct a cially announced that delicate and difficult negotiations misrepresentation of his remarks yesterday, so great that were in progress with that Government. To this the Se- he was led to apprehend that it was designed to do him nator replied, that nominations of ministers to England or another person injury. The Senator from Kentucky, had not always been confirmed. This remark, said Mr. introducing his resolution of inquiry into the amount of P., indicates the feeling and policy of certain politicians. the public money on deposite in the Union Bank of MarySir, the nomination was not confirmed, whether wisely or land, had said he hoped it would turn out that the Seunwisely, he would not now consider; but does that au-cretary of the Treasury was not a stockholder in this thorize the President to keep the mission open for years? bank to any extent which could authorize an impression Is the country to be punished because the Senate thinks that he had suffered his own interests to enter into the proper to exercise its undoubted constitutional function of considerations which led him to select this bank as one of rejecting a nominee? Are we to be told, that, if we do the depositories of the public money." Without then not implicitly bow with submission to the first indication knowing, as he now did, that the amount of stock owned of Executive will, our foreign relations shall be neglect- by Mr. Taney was small, Mr. F. rose to protest against ed? That, if we do not take the first nomination, none the sentiment expressed, and to appeal to the justice and other shall be made? generous feelings of the Senator from Kentucky, that no amount of stock owned by Mr. Taney could justify an [Mr. BROWN explained.] Mr. P. resumed. The gentleman did not assert this inference to his prejudice-that his character was a suffistate of things, but his remark implied it. If the rejec- cient guarantee that his official acts could not be infution, two years since, is the reason why there is no minis-enced by his pecuniary interests. Now, Mr. F. said, he ter now in England, it is the reason why the President was represented in the National Intelligencer, as endorshas made no new nomination. He has then refused, for ing the Senator's remark; he was made to say-"he did two years, to make a nomination, because his nominee not imagine, however, that it would be found, on examiwas rejected. He refuses to exercise his constitutional nation, that the Secretary held sufficient stock to render power he refuses to perform his constitutional duty-it an object with him to select this bank for the custody he refuses to attend to the foreign relations of the of any part of the public money;" thus admitting what he country, because the Senate has not thought proper, in a had risen to deny, that there was an amount of stock, single instance, to be the passive instrument of his will. which, if owned in the bank by Mr. Taney, could, by This non-exercise of power which the constitution has possibility, govern his official conduct. confided to him, is but little less dangerous than his assumption of power which the constitution has withheld from him. He keeps open all the high offices of the Mr. W. said he rose with unfeigned reluctance to adGovernment, or fills them at his pleasure, with an entire dress the Senate; that the debate had been so long prodisregard of the concurrent rights of this body. He fills tracted, and had been so full and able upon all the points the great departments at home without consulting the Se-involved in the discussion, that he felt fully conscious he nate, and keeps foreign missions open for hungry and subservient expectants. Mr. WRIGHT then rose, and addressed the Senate as follows: could give no light, and add no interest, to what had been already advanced. He would have declined troubling the The Senate is superseded-designedly, deliberately, Senate at all, at this late stage of the debate, were it not systematically superseded, because it dares to be what, that he considered the first resolution as particularly exin its creation, it was intended to be, a check upon the ceptionable in every sense in which he had been able to dangerous power of the Chief Magistrate. He will not view it. He had, at an early period of the debate, intrust the Senate with his nominations to foreign courts, tended to offer his views at large upon the whole subject, and therefore the missions are not filled. He will not and he had made some propositions to fulfil that intention; trust the Senate with his nominations to the high offices but the progress of the discussion had induced him to at home, and he fills them by his own will. In some in- abandon position after position, which it had been his pur stances, after his favorites have been rejected by the Se- pose to occupy, in consequence of the full and able views nate, he has continued them in office, and nominated them given of them by others, until he had brought himself to over and over again. For what practical purpose does the conclusion to confine his remarks wholly to the first this body exist? The President has annihilated us. Sir, of the resolutions offered by the Senator from Kentucky. there is nothing left us but to protest against these usur- He had come to this conclusion definitively, after the very pations. The liberty of occupying these seats, and of able argument of his honorable colleague, recently made speech, is yet a while graciously permitted to us. to the Senate, upon all the grounds covered by the se Let me add, said Mr. P., to the catalogue of extraordi- cond resolution, and generally embracing all the reasons nary events that characterize these times, a fact in regard of the Secretary of the Treasury. He could add nothing to the public debt. The 4 per cent. stock was redeem- to that argument, and any attempt, on his part, to do so, able on the 1st of January, but could not be paid but after would be more likely to weaken the positions which had six months' previous notice. An abundance of money been so well defended, than to secure the defences, al was in the Treasury for its discharge; but so deeply in-ready, in his judgment, sufficiently impregnable. Mr. W. also said he did not expect to advance any thing in relation to the first resolution, which had not before, in the course of the debate, been suggested; but he did hope to offer a more detailed and connected argument upon that single point, than had been offered by those who had preceded him, and who had embraced the whole scope of the special order. He owed it to himself, however, as well as to the Senate, to say that it was his intention to confine himself to a strict legal argument, of the most dry and uninteresting character, and that he could neither expect, nor ask, that attention which he might hope, were the subject less exhausted, and the topics less techinical. The resolution, he said, was in the following words: "Resolved, That, by dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury, because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposite with the Bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the President's opinion, and by appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done, the President has assumed the exercise of a power over the Treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the people." This, said Mr. W., is the resolution, and I consider it, in the broadest sense, judicial, as far as the action of the Senate upon it is concerned. I, therefore, preliminarily, lay down the following proposition, which I believe I shall be able to sustain, not only from the language and import of the resolution itself, but from an examination of the grounds upon which its friends seek to justify that action by this body. My proposition is, that the resolution contains matter of impeachment, and matter of impeachment only, and, therefore, that it is unconstitutional for the Senate to act upon it, other than judicially, and upon an impeachment sent up from the House of Representatives. Article 1, section 2, clause 5, of the constitution of the United States, reads as follows: "The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment." Section 3, clause 6, of the same article, says: "The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments." [SENATE. "The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The advocates for the resolution do not deny that it contains impeachable matter, but they justify the action of the Senate, as they say, "legislatively," upon it. The honorable Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY,] says, "the Senate ought to act upon the resolution to protect its legislative powers." It is not pretended that the legislative powers of the Senate have been assailed. The resolution does not assume to recite an act of infringement upon the legislative powers of the Senate. It assumes Executive encroachments, and Executive encroachments only, and proceeds at once to pronounce judgment upon them. It proposes no legislative act, nor does it assert any legislative power. If, then, the Senate have the right to protect its legislative powers, as it no doubt has, this resolution neither asserts the right contended for, nor mentions the violation against which protection is required, nor does it propose any sort of protection. It does not, therefore, come, in any sense, within this principle of the Senator, and the action of the Senate upon it finds no justification in his remark. I pass to the Senator's second ground: "The Senate may properly act upon the resolution, because the President may perform an unconstitutional act without the quo animo, the intention to violate the constitution." It is impossible to consider this position in connexion with the objection to which it is intended to be an answer, without taking it as an admission that the action of the Senate upon this resolution is judicial. The quo animo of the President, or of any other officer of the Government, as to any act performed by them bearing upon their constitutional powers, cannot possibly be material to the Senate in its legislative character. If legislation should be required, growing out of any such act, it would be legislation to provide a remedy for the wrong committed, or to prevent a repetition of the act, and, in either case, the quo animo of the officer performing the act complained of, could not be material. The wrong would not be less, or the remedy different, whether the action should proceed from design or ignorance. If, therefore, the determination of the existence or not of the quo animo, in the acts recited in the resolution, be material to the question whether the Senate can, or cannot, properly act upon it legislatively, that fact proves the resolution to be judicial, until that point shall be judiIt charges that the President has assumed the exer-cially decided. And as no object of legislation is either cise of a power over the Treasury of the United States, proposed or to be accomplished by the passage of the not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dan-resolution, any action of the Senate upon it, going to degerous to the liberties of the people." And that he has cide this preliminary question of the quo animo, is clearly assumed the exercise of that power," "by dismissing a judicial action, and therefore an assumption of power, the late Secretary of the Treasury, because he would not, in violation of the constitutional powers of the body. contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposite with the Bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the President's opinion; and by appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done." Here, then, sir, are the constitutional divisions of power between the two branches of Congress, as to impeachments. Does the resolution under consideration contain impeachable matter, so as to call upon these powers to enable us properly to act upon it? The position concedes that if the quo animo be assumed, the question would be judicial, while the resolution, the quo animo, being added, would, according to a further admission by the ground taken, be not only an impeachment, but a judgment of condemnation upon the charges The first of these charges, if well made, must be a high made. It follows then, irresistibly, that the action of the crime. An assumption of a power over the public Trea- Senate legislatively, would be a judgment of acquittal as sury, not granted by the constitution and laws, and dan-to the quo animo, and that judgment is as much judicial gerous to the liberties of the people, can surely be no- as a judgment of condemnation could be. Again, therething less. fore, I repeat, that the Senate cannot act upon this resoThe second, to wit, the removal of a Secretary of the lution constitutionally, in any other than its capacity of Treasury for an insufficient cause, and under the influ- the high trust for the trial of impeachments. The Senaence of an improper motive, viz. to acquire a power over tor says, thirdlythe public Treasury, "not granted by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the people," if sustained as charged, cannot be less than a high misde meanor. Article 2, section 4, of the constitution, says: "The Senate may act upon the resolution, because the President may not be impeached, even if the act and the quo animo are both found against him." Here we meet a most singular reason for action. The court will condemn the accused, because the grand jury SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [MARCH 26, 1834. may not find a bill against him: the Senate of the United the United States. It has no reference whatever to the States will convict the President of the United States of President, the late Secretary of the Treasury, his appoint a flagrant violation of the constitution of the United ment or removal, or to the appointment of the present States, because the House of Representatives, those who Secretary. It relates solely to a single official act of his hold in their hands the voice of the people of the country, own, the change of the deposites; and merely assigns, may not impeach him. But again, the fourth reason for in obedience to an express requirement of law, his reasons action is still more singular. for that act. It says nothing of his predecessor in office, of what he would or would not do, or what was or was not his sense of duty. It makes no allusion to him whatever. Where, then, is the relevancy of this resolution to this special order? The action of the Senate is proper, "because a call upon the Senate to act judicially in this instance, depends upon a contingency which no one now expects will happen.' This throws the last proposition into the shade. Here I next assume that the resolution, if within the constithe sentence of condemnation is to be pronounced, be- tutional jurisdiction of the Senate, and relevant to the cause no one expects the grand inquest will even indict. subject of the special order, is erroneous in both of its The Senate of the United States are to convict the Pre- conclusions, and in the fact assumed, upon which the sident of the United States of a flagrant violation of the conclusions depend. The fact stated, is, that the Presiconstitution, because "no one expects" the House of dent "assumed the exercise of a power over the Trea Representatives will impeach him. Strange cause indeed sury of the United States," and the sense in which the for performing judicial duties in a legislative character. The Senator has told us of the "bleeding constitution of his country;" and is this the way in which the wounds of that instrument are to be healed? Is an alleged violation of the constitution by the Executive to be cured by a palpable violation of that instrument by the Senate' Will the Senate sanction such reasons for acting upon such a resolution? But the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SOUTHARD] sanctions the same idea by the following language: "It is objected to the first resolution, that the Senate ought not to act upon it, because this body may be called upon to act upon the same matter, brought before it in the shape of an impeachment. An impeachment of whom says the Senator; "an impeachment of Andrew Jackson? an impeachment of Roger B. Taney? Look at the history of the country. Did any one ever hear of the impeachment of those who stand in an overwhelming majority? No, sir. Such persons have a shield impenetrable to the Senate.". charge is made is learned from the language of the advo cates of the resolution. The President is said to have taken possession of the public money; to have opened the public Treasury, and taken therefrom its contents; to have united the sword and the purse of the country in the same hand; to have robbed the Treasury, and taken into his own keeping the money of the people. Now, said Mr. W., in this sense, I affirm that the President has exercised no power whatever over the Treasury of the United States. What acts are mentioned as constituting this charge? The resolution recites that the President removed from office the late Secretary of the Treasury. One of the earliest debates in the first Congress convened under the present constitution of the United States, was upon the question of the power of the President to remove from office, according to the provisions of that constitution. The question was decided by that Congress in favor of the power, as a part of "the executive power vested in the President by that instrument; and the whole Here we have the principle fully developed. The practice of the Government, and of every President, from Senate is to proceed to judgment of condemnation against Washington to the present incumbent of that high office, the President, because the representatives of the people has been in conformity with that decision. The power will not impeach him; and the representatives of the was decided to exist, and to be derived from the constipeople will not impeach him, because an "overwhelm-tution itself. ing majority" of the people themselves, whom they re- It is particularly worthy of remark, that the power to present, are in favor of the President, and approve his remove the Secretary of the Treasury occupied a conconduct. If any cause can be more sure than another, spicuous place in the debate, and furnished a very conto render the Senate odious to the people of this country, siderable portion of the argument of the speakers upon it will be attempts here to assume the duties of the imme- both sides of the question. The decision, therefore, was diate representatives of the people; to constitute ourselves made after full argument as to the power to remove this the accusers as well as the judges; and, having done this, very officer. The President, then, in the removal of the to resist the known and expressed will of the people, by late Secretary of the Treasury, did not "assume the exbringing down upon the head of some too popular public ercise of a power not granted to him by the constitution servant the tremendous judicial sentence of this body, and the laws." But a removal of the Secretary of the without the form of a trial, or even the exhibition of a Treasury does not enable the President to gain access to constitutional accusation. the Treasury of the United States. There is a Treasurer, Do these sentiments come from men who have been appointed by the President and Senate, who keeps the raised high in the honors of the republic? Who have keys of the public Treasury. Were the President, therethemselves been counsellors of a former President? And at a time, too, when a majority of this body, holding this judical power over their acts, was politically opposed to the admistration with which they were thus connected? If so, I venture the assertion that they never found that majority attempting thus to condemn them, or their principal, without a trial; and I further venture to say, that that majority, so acting, were sustained by the people. fore, to remove the Secretary, he would meet the Treasurer, and must dispose of him before he could reach the public Treasury. This officer is remorable by the President, but he has not removed him, which fact, of itself, repels the idea that he has attempted to "assume the exercise of a power over the public Treasury." Here might be rested the proof of the falsity of the fact stated in the resolution, that the President "assumed I assume, in the second place, that the resolution, if the exercise of a power over the public Treasury;" but such as the Senate could properly entertain, is irrelevant it shall be carried one step further. It is not even conto the subject before this body, and in relation to which tended that one cent of money was taken from the public it purports to have been introduced, and, therefore, Treasury between the time of the removal of the late should not be entertained. The special order before Secretary of the Treasury, and the appointment of the the Senate is the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, present incumbent of that office, nor is it contended that assigning his reasons for the change of the deposites of any change of the deposites of money standing to the the public moneys of the United States from the Bank of credit of the Treasurer, or any other change or order MARCH 26, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [SENATE. affecting the public Treasury, was made during that in-power of the President to remove a Secretary of the terval. The advocates for the resolution, then, admit Treasury, but the attempt seems to be to prove that the that the power exercised over the public Treasury, by removal of the late Secretary was made under circumstanthe President, was not so exercised during the vacancy ces to which the power of removal does not extend. What created in that office by the removal of the late Secretary. are the circumstances upon which the gentlemen rely to The resolution further recites, that the President take this case of the general power of removal conferred appointed the present Secretary in the place of the late upon the President? I take their own statements. Secretary removed. The constitution says, "The President shall have power to fill any vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session." The President, then, had power to appoint a Secretary of the Treasury in the place of the late Secretary removed, and in this act he did not "assume the exercise of a power not granted to him by the constitution and laws.' When, then, has the President, "assumed the exercise of a power over the Treasury of the United States not granted to him by the constitution and laws?" It has not been contended that, since the appointment of the new Secretary, any money has been drawn from the public Treasury but by his direction. His report before the Senate shows that the deposites were changed by his order, and gives to Congress his reasons for the act; though it should be borne constantly in mind, that the change of the deposites took not one dollar from the Treasury. There is a law of Congress incorporating the stockholders to the Bank of the United States. That law directs the deposite of the public moneys of the United States with that bank; but gives to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to change that deposite. The President thought the late Secretary ought to exercise that power, and divert the public moneys from the bank. The Secretary thought that he ought not to exercise the power, and refused to do so. The President considered the execution of the law important to the country, and removed the Secretary who refused to execute it. Here we meet with what has been harshly termed "the act of persecution, usurpation, tyranny, a most flagrant violation of the constitution and the laws of the land, an assumption of the exercise of power not granted to him" (the President) "by the constitution and laws and dangerous to the liberties of the people." I propose to look at this state of facts, at the constitution and the law, and then to test the applicability of these strong denunciations against the President of the United States, made in the Senate of the United States. It was, said Mr. W., if I may be allowed the expres- The positions assumed to justify the conclusions in sion, the mere change of the location of the chest, of the favor of the resolution and against the President, arestrong box; it was not the use of the Treasurer's key; it First. That the removal was made because the late Sewas not taking any thing from the Treasury, or substract-cretary refused to do an act "contrary to his sense of ing any thing from the amount for which he stood his own duty." In other words, it is called “an act of perchargeable to the country. The power was exercised secution for opinion's sake." over the place for keeping the Treasury, not over the money itself. The foregoing remarks seem to establish conclusively the following propositions: That the President "assumed the exercise of a power" over the late Secretary of the Treasury, by removing him from office, as he had a constitutional right to do. That he assumed the exercise of a power," granted to him in terms by the constitution, to appoint, "during the recess of the Senate," the present Secretary, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the removal of the late Secretary. That he has not assumed the exercise of a power over the Treasury of the United States," or over the Treasurer of the United States, of any description what soever. That he has not "assumed the exercise" of any power, in reference to the subject of the resolution, "not granted to him by the constitution and laws." What practical meaning has this position? Was ever an officer removed where the cause of removal did not exist in a difference of opinion between the power of removal and the agent to be removed? where the agent, or officer did not refuse to do an act which the removing power thought he ought to do? or insist upon doing an act which the removing power thought he ought not to do? I answer, there is but one possible case in which a removal can take place, without a cause, in one shape or another, growing out of these differences of opinion between the removing and the removed officer; and, as that case must be utter incompetency, I congratulate the advocates of the resolution upon the fact that they are not compelled, in reference to the late Secretary, whom they so warmly eulogize, and towards whom their sympathies are so kindly extended, to resort to this cause alone for his removal; but are able to show that a difference of opinion between him and the President furnishes I might here safely rest my argument upon this first reso- a probable ground for his loss of office. Removal" for lution, merely drawing from the foregoing propositions the opinion's sake" then, is nothing more, or less, than a renatural corollary, that, as the President has only assum-moval growing out of a difference of opinion between the ed the exercise" of powers expressly granted by the con- removing power and the officer to be removed. The stitution, he has not "assumed the exercise" of any pow. power to remove is admitted; but the power to remove er "dangerous to the liberties of the people," unless the on account of a difference of opinion between the removpowers granted to him by the constitution of the United ing officer and the officer to be removed, is denied. States, and exercised by all the Presidents of the United What is the practical effect of this construction of the States, from the commencement of the Government power of removal conferred by the constitution upon the under the constitution to the present time, are "dan- President? It is, that he may remove those who agree gerous to the liberties of the people." But I feel bound, with him in opinion; those who are willing and desirous from a sense of respect to the gentlemen who advocate to aid his measures and give efficiency to his administrathe resolution, as well as from a disposition to place this tion; those with whom he can live and act in harmony; whole subject in a clear light before my constituents and his political and personal friends; but that he cannot rethe country, to notice the positions taken upon the other move those who differ with him in opinion; those who side, from which the inference in the resolution is drawn will not carry into effect the measures of his administrathat the President, in changing his Secretary, has "assum- tion; those who are personally and politically hostile to ed the exercise of a power not granted to him by the him. I shall presently examine this power, and see if its constitution and laws." proper construction leads to such absurdities. Neither of the gentlemen [Messrs. CLAY and SOUTHARD] has been understood as denying the constitutional Second. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] lays down the distinct proposition, that "the Secretary of the SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [МАКСИ 26, 1834. Treasury is not an executive officer, nor is the Treasury when called for, in any matter relating to the executive A sufficient answer, in legal argument, to this proposi- fore, are purely executive. But, if not executive, to tion is, that the power of removal, conferred upon the which of the other great departments does it belong? President by the constitution, extends to the removal of The constitution has created another, called the legislative the Secretary of the Treasury, whether he be or be not department. The following is the provision: an executive officer, and whether his Department be or "All legislative powers herein granted, shall be vested be not an executive department; and this the advocates in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of of the resolution admit. The whole proposition, there- a Senate and House of Representatives." fore, in its application here, goes merely to question the Surely, the Treasury Department can find no place sufficiency of the cause of the removal, and not to deny under this grant. Its duties are, in no respect, legislative. the constitutional or legal power. It stands, then, with The Secretary does not receive his appointment from the the proposition just examined, in this respect, and will people, the States, or the legislature, and he is removable be further replied to when the power of removal shall be at the pleasure of the President, but not otherwise, exexamined. I cannot, however, be understood as admit- cept upon an impeachment by the House Representatives, ting the facts assumed by this proposition, "that the Se- and a judgment of condemnation by the Senate. The cretary of the Treasury is not an executive officer," and legislature cannot remove him. The constitution has that his Department is not an executive department." created a third great department of the Government, callI will not, however, enter, in detail, into the proofs which ed the judicial department. The following is the provi show that the position, in every sense, is mistaken in sion: fact, as others have already fully done this, but will con- "The judicial power of the United States shall be tent myself with taking a very brief view of the proposi- vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts tion, as compared with the provisions of the constitution as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab alone, wholly without reference to the laws establishing lish." and regulating the Department. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] read from the President's communication to his cabinet as follows: "Upon him (the President) has been devolved by the constitution and the suffrages of the American people, the duty of superintending the operations of the executive departments of the Government, and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed." The Treasury Department surely is, in no judicial sense, a court, and cannot, therefore, be a judicial depart ment. From the constitution itself, then, it appears that the Treasury Department is an executive department, and cannot belong to either of the other great departments into which that instrument has divided all the powers of the Government of the United States; that Congress has When he says, "This I deny! The constitution does not the power, by the constitution, to establish a similar not devolve these duties upon the President. The laws department, and divest it of the executive character given organizing the executive departments, except the Trea- to all these departments by the constitutional disposition sury Department, put these departments under the direc- of the Government powers; that the constitution has vested tion of the President; but it is the law, not the constitu- in the President of the United States "the executive tion, from which he derives his authority." power," and by virtue of that grant of power, has We will see what the constitution does confer upon the devolved upon him "the duty of superintending the President in relation to the executive departments. It operations of the executive departments of the Governreads as follows: ment." What, then, is this supervisory power of the President over the executive departments? The constitution answers in the following language: "He [the President] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." "The executive power shall be vested in a President I am discharged, therefore, from all necessity of an of the United States of America." examination of the laws relative to this Department, as Now, as I cannot yield to the force of the comment of they surely will be so construed as to make them conform the learned Senator, in another part of his argument, to the constitution, unless provisions shall be found wholly that the provision in the bank charter" that the business irreconcilable to it, and no such provisions have been of the institution should be conducted by a board of pointed out. directors" was not saying "that all business" should be so conducted, I must be permitted to believe that the constitution, when it says," The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America," means that all the executive power, not otherwise expressly granted, shall be so vested, and not that a part of it In what manner is he to do this? The Senator from only should pass by that grant, and that the residue Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] contends this clause of the constishould be conferred by Congress, to which body, as a tution only means "that if resistance to the laws be made, Congress, that instrument gives no executive power. the President shall see that such resistance be overcome." The only grant of executive power to be found in the The Senator considers the power as intimately connected constitution, other than that above quoted, is the grant with the power to call out the militia to enforce the laws, to the Senate in relation to appointments to office, and as and as going no farther than to oppose and overcome rethis last grant is defined and specific, it certainly cannot sistance offered against the execution of a law. This extend to an executive supervision over the executive would confound this most important duty of the Presi departments. dent with his powers and duties arising under the various if, then, the Treasury Department be an executive laws which have been passed "to provide for calling department, the constitution has devolved upon the Presi- forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, supdent the duty of superintending its operations, as it has press, insurrections, and repel invasions," powers and "vested" in him all the "executive power" of the Govern- duties strictly military, and derived by the President, ment, except the specific grant to the Senate relating not from the constitution, but from lays of Congress passexclusively to appointments. ed in pursuance of the power given to that body by the Is the Treasury Department an executive department? provision of the constitution above recited. The duties of it are executive. The head of it is appoint- With proper submission to the views of the honorable ed as the executive officers are; is made one of the Senator, I think it most clear that the power in question constitutional advisers of the Executive; a member of his is wholly of a civil character, and that the duty imposed confidential cabinet; and is bound to give his opinion, pertains exclusively to the executive powers of the Pre |