or remain unsettled. But when they have been thus settled, is it indubitably certain that justice between the parties has been done? What is the evidence of universal history upon this point? Does the issue of all the contests which have ever been settled by the sword, as written upon its pages, accord with this principle? Can the eye of human judgment, viewing the apparent merits of every disputed case, discern in the event an apparently just decision? Review the history of wars and conquests, Chaldean--Grecian-Roman--European. How many nations, whose greatest and only crime with regard to the other party, was that they were weak and defenceless, have fallen a prey to the ambition or rapacity of superior power.

Let us not, however, be supposed to deny that there is any virtue in the consciousness of superior rectitude and justice. We admit that the idea of the justice of the cause goes far toward reversing the maxim, that might makes right. This consciousness, animating the breasts of our fathers, was without doubt of powerful efficacy in the decision of their struggle for independence. We contend, however, that it is but a constituent element in the great compound of causes which produce the result. The other elements may be famine, pestilence, cold, heat, the tempest, the earthquake, any of the great agents of nature, the superior numbers, strength, discipline, arms, and bravery of the men, superior genius, skill and wisdom in the commanders. Let us not be misunderstood. Let us not be reproached with denying the existence of a superintending Providence, whose government is administered on the principles of immutable and universal justice. What we affirm is that the event of wars is by no means necessarily a decision of the case according to its merits, as between the parties. We have not the slightest authority for believing it to be so, and the analogy of the procedure of Providence in regard to individuals is entirely against such a doctrine. Indeed, so far as we can discern, it appears in a vast number of instances to be far otherwise. The orientals have aptly illustrated the mysterious relation between Divine Providence and human

events by a fable: A hermit ardently desired to understand the method of the divine administration of human affairs. He was directed by an angel to go to a certain fountain by the side of a public road. Near the fountain stood an aged and • venerable tree. On the one side it was excavated by the hand of time so as easily to admit within its trunk the body of a man. On the other side was a small aperture, through which might be seen the fountain and a part of the surrounding landscape. Within the trunk of this tree the hermit was directed to take his position. As he stood there, musing upon the strange instructions which he had received, and looking out upon the scene before him, a horseman suddenly appeared galloping towards him. He was dressed in the richest style of eastern magnificence. A sabre of the most exquisite workmanship hung by his side, and in his hand he carried what seemed a bag of gold. His whole appearance bespoke a man of wealth and distinction. As the fountain caught his eye, he alighted and threw down his gold. Having refreshed himself with the delicious waters, he remounted and rode away, forgetting his treasure. Soon appeared a man tottering upon a staff, and dressed in the garb of poverty. As he approached and saw the gold, he eagerly seized it and soon disappeared from the view. Presently appeared a third traveller, who, wearied with his journey, seated himself near the fountain. The horseman, missing his gold, soon returned and seeing him seated there, naturally supposed that he had taken it. With a voice of stern authority he bade him to restore it. Upon his declaring that he knew nothing of it, and appealing to heaven to attest his innocence, the horseman with a single stroke of his sabre, laid him dead on the hermit; is this thy justice? the ways of heaven rashly. The rich man whom you saw was an extortioner. The man whose lifeless body lies bleeding yonder, was a perjured witness. By means of his testimony the extortioner wrested a piece of land from the poor man who has departed with the gold. The value of the land was the exact sum which he has now borne away. The extor

spot. O heaven! exclaimed the Stay, cried the angel; judge not

tioner has gone safe; but he has gone to receive the justice which awaits him in some scene yet to transpire.—In this case justice was done, though incomplete; but it was not justice as between the parties. So far as the extortioner was concerned, the false witness was perfectly innocent. So it may be with regard to nations. Their disputes may be decided in a manner perfectly compatible with the justice of heaven, and yet the event by no means accord with the merits of the particular question between the parties. Doubtless the overthrow and ruin of the nations who were subdued or exterminated by the people of Israel were just, as between Jehovah and the creatures of his hand and subjects of his empire. As measures of his administration they were undoubtedly founded in that absolute justice which he alone can administer. But as between these nations and the Jews, they had no such foundation. How many times did the Jews themselves in the course of their history suffer chastisement at the hand of nations whom they had never injured. We might cite here the history of the Grecian and Roman Empires in their progress to universal conquest. History is full of examples to our purpose. It is only necessary to allude to the fact and they will occur at once to the memory.

Let not therefore Nations vainly imagine that because God is just, they by making an appeal, no where authorized either in substance or in form, shall obtain the reparation which they seek. Let the nature of war be rightly understood, and let war be rightly named. Call it a contest between force and force, courage and courage, ferocity and ferocity, skill and skill, numbers and numbers, discipline and discipline, all modified by the power, it may be, of ten thousand circumstances; but call it not an appeal to the God of armies to decide disputes between nations according to their merits. The dispensation of divine justice is made upon a scale whose dimensions are too vast to be comprehended by human minds. How vain for men to erect in heaven a tribunal to decide the differences of nations by a mode of their own invention! Let it be said if you will, that there is a limit beyond which forbearance to assert our rights by force, all other means having been tried in

vain, is no longer a virtue. Let it be said that there may be cases, as things now are, in which a resort to arms is matter of inevitable though dire necessity, to prevent the extinction of our dearest rights, nay, even of our very existence. Let us be told that it is better to fight, than to fall defenceless and undefended before the savage ferocity and murderous fury of robbers and assassins. Let us be told that such men place themselves without the pale of humanity, and that concession and persuasion to them, would be like concession and persuasion to the wild beasts of the desert. But let not war be falsely dignified as a tribunal of heaven; nor let its merits be magnified by ascribing to it an efficacy which it does not possess.

We will not conceal from our readers that in the course of this discussion we have felt some misgivings lest we might be thought to be combatting a shadow. When, however, we reflect that men, profound in learning and high in office, the one a most illustrious sage of the law, once lord high chancellor of England, and the other a most distinguished commentator upon the English jurisprudence, and a man of high judicial station, have advanced the opinion in question, it seems to us that what we have done has not been done without sufficient cause. Not that our modesty will allow us to set ourselves up as censors over the opinions of men of such weight of authority; we merely claim the privilege of our birthright, the privilege of the birthright of every man, namely that of subjecting all opinions by whomsoever uttered, to the test of full and free discussion. When also we reflect that the same opinion is cited by eminent legal authority in our own country and in our own times, when we reflect that it is usual for writers and speakers to employ a language in reference to war, derived from an analogy purely imaginary, thus giving currency to erroneous ideas of its real nature, we are more strongly convinced that we have done rightly. If then the opinion in question be a shadow, it is a shadow which serves to darken the understanding and to lead astray the fancy. It is a shadow which should be made to flee away before the light of truth. Should these few pages contribute in any humble measure to produce such a result, our purpose will be accomplished.

ARTICLE III.

REMARKS ON THE POLITICAL CONDITION AND PROSPECTS OF EUROPE.

BY THE EDITOR.

It is not our design to attempt a full view of the political relations of the different governments of Europe; nor to enter into any discussion of some of the great questions involved in the present condition of European affairs. Our design is more limited and special. We wish to show what there is in the influences that have been at work for the last forty years, and in the present political and social aspects of Europe, to justify the hope, that that portion of the world is not destined again to be the theatre of such general and bloody conflicts as it has exhibited. We wish at least to indicate the causes by which the policy of Europe has been essentially modified; and to appreciate the influences which favor or retard the ultimate triumph of freedom and of public order, and the final adoption of a pacific international policy.

The French revolution is rich in all manner of instruction to the thoughtful observer of human nature, and of the progress of society. It is the true point of departure from which to estimate the progress, the present condition and future prospects of Europe. No just and philosophical view of these subjects can be formed which does not proceed upon a true apprehension of that period, its causes and its effects. Every great movement of society and of government has been directly or indirectly affected by it; its influences are yet far from being exhausted; its lessons are far from being all gathered up.

We have before adverted* to the influence of the career of Napoleon in creating a reaction against the spirit of war and conquest. This reaction was felt both by the people and by the

Advocate of Peace, No. I. p. 8, 9. Also Address before the Hartford County Society, p. 22, 23.