lished principles of financial science which, in their application to war, stamp it uniformly as a political blunder-a weak, and short-sighted resort, unworthy of the wisdom of enlightened legislation.

Behind what pretence can war-makers now retreat? None other than the argument of unavoidable necessity. Nothing short of necessity will longer justify martial operations, in the estimate of the wise and good; or even in the less important estimate of those who have heretofore been fascinated by the glare of martial renown.

This principle of necessity, the ultimate law of self-defence, it is not within the range of our present undertaking to examine. But we are so confident in the principles of the policy we advocate, that we hesitate not to avow our belief, that this last strong hold of violence will shortly be demolished, and that mankind will learn in its true import, and practice in its true spirit, that much misinterpreted and much neglected command; "But I say unto you that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also."

THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REFERENCE TO THE OBJECTS OF PEACE SOCIETIES.

BY FRANCIS FELLOWES, ESQ., HARTFORD.

It is not uncommon to ridicule Societies, which have for their object the abolition of War. Even benevolent and Christian men, who would most heartily rejoice, could such an object be realized, and who perhaps believe that the time is approaching, when the implements of war shall be converted to the uses of peace, are inclined to regard Peace Societies as the result of an excessive refinement of the principle of association for benevolent purposes. What we have to do, in their opin

ion, is to direct all our efforts to the spreading of the Gospel, to disseminating the principles and diffusing the spirit of Christianity as widely as possible, and the abolition of this horrid custom will follow as a matter of course. They cite in effect, in support of their opinion, the very motto, which some of the Peace Societies have appropriated to themselves. "When the spirit of Christianity shall exert its proper influence over the minds of public men, in their public capacities, war will cease throughout the Christian world." For individuals to think that by associating together they can ever induce nations to come to a universal agreement to adopt some other mode of adjusting national differences, to establish some great tribunal, in whose impartiality all will be willing to confide, and whose decisions to obey, is, in their opinion, utterly vain. But, even suppose such a tribunal should be established, and all nations should bind themselves in one common league of perpetual amity, agreeing to leave the adjustment of their differences to this great court of international law, where is the guaranty of the treaty to be found? Such a tribunal must sometimes operate with unequal effect; at all events, so many conflicting interests would require to be reconciled, it is not in human nature that its decisions should be final, should be always acquiesced in. In short, there is no ground to expect such a system will ever be adopted; and if it were, it would not work well in practice.

In addition to this form of prejudice, there is another impression respecting the objects of Peace Societies quite prevalent. It is, that the principles of these Societies necessarily involve the unqualified assertion of the doctrine of absolute non-resistance, and of course, deny all right of defensive war in any case. Many persons seem to imagine that to co-operate with Peace Societies, they are called upon not only to take a ground which, even on that point, and within that limit, is very questionable; but which, if adopted, is also burdened with consequences subversive even of the judicial action of society and government, in regard to the employment of force and the infliction of punishment. Now, not to spend time here to show that the denial of the right of defensive war by no means ne

cessarily involves these consequences, it is enough for our purpose to say, that the objection rests on an entire misconception. None of the Peace Societies in this country, or on the continent of Europe, have asserted the doctrine of absolute nonresistance. They leave the question for every one's own decision. Without deciding this question, they think there is still broad ground enough for operation, and principles of action and influence sufficiently available. Yet under the impression of the questionable character and subversive consequences of the principles of Peace Societies, combined with the persuasion, to which we first adverted, of the impossibility of ever realizing the practical result of substituting any peaceful mode of adjustment of national differences in place of war,-many persons have declined co-operation with Peace Societies. With a sentiment partaking not a little even of contempt, they consider these societies as pursuing a shadow.

These are views which the writer of this article himself once entertained, and he has heard them expressed, even since he began to write this paper, by those, for whose opinions on subjects which they have really examined, he entertains the most sincere respect.

It is not, however, our purpose at this time to discuss the question concerning absolute non-resistance, nor the question concerning a great international court. On these points there may be different opinions. There is high authority on both sides. Our object is, to see if a bread field does not still remain for the operation of societies, and of individuals, for the abolition of war, and for diffusing among the nations of the earth sentiments of peace and friendship.

It is often said, as we have before remarked, that the promotion of peace must be left to the general diffusion of the spirit of Christianity. The assertion is correct, though not in the sense in which it is intended to be made. It is by diffusing the spirit of Christianity, that this Society expects to accomplish its object. But instead of extending its labours over the whole field of Chris tian exertion, it proposes to disseminate Christian principles, and to diffuse a Christian spirit on this one subject of peace and war.

The causes of peace and war, it must be universally admitted, lie in the general opinion and feelings of mankind. To enlighten and correct the public mind, and especially to arouse it to such a sense of right and wrong, and of true expediency, that public practice shall be changed,—these are the great points in our enterprise. And has the public mind no need of being enlightened, corrected and aroused?

Men, in all their relations and intercourse with each other, have ever been backward enough to acknowledge the obligations of justice, humanity and benevolence; but especially have they been so in their relations and intercourse with each other as nations.

The early oriental monarchies, those first civilizers of the world, have left enduring and astonishing proofs of their notions of national intercourse. They owed no small part of their stupendous advancement to the spirit of conquest. In the words of a writer,* who seems to have examined human society in all ages, with a most philosophic eye, "the policy and civilization of these nations was gigantic and disproportionate, their aim was vastness, and their means, violence; the colossal piles of their towers and walls were reared by slaves; and these slaves were the vanquished nations, torn up by the roots, and transplanted entire into countries scarcely known to them by report. Compared to their works, the buildings of the Romans, who possessed a wider empire, and enlarged science, appear like the edifices of individuals eclipsed by the efforts of kings. Their structures are as astonishing, as if the dreams of oriental romance had been realized, and the genii of the elements had been tasked to superhuman exertion by the seal of Solomon, or the talisman of the pre-Adamite kings. The ancient method of war, as it swept along with it the wealth and the population of every conquered country, furnished hands for these works, in the enslaved inhabitants, and funds in their plundered property." The sentiments of humanity, justice and benevolence were all absorbed in the spirit of conquest, and in the desire of physical grandeur.

* Douglass on the Advancement of Society in Knowledge and Religion.

If we advert to the ancient Greeks, we meet with many circumstances which, it might naturally be supposed, would have had a mitigating and softening effect upon their international policy. We allude to the passion for beauty, so remarkably developed in this people, to their taste, refinement, extraordinary attainments in the elegant arts, to their poetry, philosophy, eloquence; in short, to whatever has contributed to adorn and render them illustrious in the eyes of all subsequent ages. To beauty of external form, to harmony of sound, to every thing which can please the ear or delight the eye, they were exquisitely sensible. But for moral beauty and harmony, so far as the intercourse of nations was concerned, history compels us to say, they had neither ear nor eye. Maxims of the most terrific import composed their code of international law. "The most refined states among the ancients," says Chancellor Kent,* 'seem to have had no conception of the moral obligations of justice and humanity between nations. They regarded strangers and enemies as nearly synonymous. In the most enlightened ages of the Grecian republics, piracy was regarded as an honorable employment. Even the fleets of polished Athens were exceedingly addicted to piratical excursions. It was the received opinion, that Greeks were bound to no duties, nor by any moral law without compact, and that prisoners taken in war had no rights, and might lawfully be put to death, or sold into perpetual slavery, with their wives and children."

The Romans made some little approach towards a regular system of international law. They were somewhat in advance of the Greeks, in their notions upon the subject of war. Their superiority consisted, however, rather in a regard to the decencies of form, than in any improved sentiments of humanity or duty towards other nations, or in any mitigation of the rigorous maxim, that any thing whatever might be lawfully done to an enemy. The history of the Roman State is little else

* Commentaries on American Law, Lecture I.

+ Ac belli quidem æquitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani jure perscripta est. Ex quo intelligi potest, nullum bellum esse justum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatum ante sit et indictum. Cic. de Offi