The FIRST VOLUME consists of ELEVEN CHAPTERS.

IN the first chapter of his excellent treatise, he reasons philosophically concerning the nature of the soul of man, and those qualities which render it susceptible of lies. He supposes the soul to be of the nature of a plano-cylindrical speculum, or lookingglass; that the plain side was made by God Almighty, but that the devil afterward wrought the other side into a cylindrical figure. The plain side represents objects just as they are; and the cylindrical side, by the rules of catoptricks, must needs represent true objects false, and false objects true: but the cylindrical side being much the larger surface, takes in a greater compass of visual rays. That upon the cylindrical side of the soul of man depends the whole art and success of political lying. The author, in this chapter, proceeds to reason upon the qualities of the mind: as its peculiar fondness of the malicious and the miraculous. The tendency of the soul toward the malicious, springs from self-love, or a pleasure to find mankind more wicked, base, or unfortunate, than ourselves. The design of the miraculous proceeds from the inactivity of the soul, or its incapacity to be moved or delighted with any thing that is vulgar or common. The author having established the qualities of the mind, upon which his art is founded, he proceeds,

In his second chapter, to treat of the nature of political lying; which he defines to be, "the art of convincing the people of salutary falsehoods, for "some good end." He calls it an art, to distinguish it from that of telling truth, which does not seem to

want

want art; but then he would have this understood only as to the invention, because there is indeed more art neceflary to convince the people of a salutary truth, than a salutary falsehood. Then he proceeds to prove, that there are salutary falsehoods, of which he gives a great many instances, both before and after the revolution; and demonstrates plainly, that we could not have carried on the war so long without several of those salutary falsehoods. He gives rules to calculate the value of a political lie, in pounds, shillings, and pence. By good, he does not mean that which is absolutely so, but what appears so to the artist, which is a sufficient ground for him to proceed upon; and he distinguishes the good, as it commonly is, into lonum utile, dulce, et honestum. He shows you that there are political lies of a mixed nature, which include all the three in different respects that the utile reigns generally about the Exchange, the dulce and honestum at the Westminster end of the town. One man spreads a lie to sell or buy stock to greater advantage; a second, because it is honourable to serve his party; and a third, because it is sweet to gratify his revenge. Having explained the several terms of his definition, he proceeds,

In his third chapter, to treat of the lawfulness of political 1,ing; which he deduces from its true and genuine principles, by inquiring into the several rights, that mankind have to truth. He shows that people have a right to private truth from their neighbours, and economical truth from their own family; that they should not be abused by their wives, children, and servants; but that they have no right at all to political truth; that the people may as well all pretend to be lords of manors, and possess great

estates,

estates, as to have truth told them in matters of government. The author, with great judgment states the several shares of mankind in this matter of truth, according to their several capacities, dignities, and professions; and shows you, that children have hardly any share at all; in consequence of which, they have very seldom any truth told them. It must be owned, that the author, in this chapter, has some seeming difficulties to answer, and texts of Scripture to explain.

The fourth chapter is wholly employed in this question, "Whether the right of coinage of political lies "be wholly in the government?" The author, who is a true friend to English liberty, determines in the negative, and answers all the arguments of the opposite party with great acuteness: that as the government of England has a mixture of democratical in it, so the right of inventing and spreading political lies is partly in the people; and their obstinate adherence to this just privilege has been most conspicuous, and shined with great lustre, of late years: that it happens very often, that there are no other means left to the good people of England to pull down a ministry and government they are weary of, but by exercising this their undoubted right: that abundance of political lying is a sure sign of true English liberty that as ministers do sometimes use tools to support their power, it is but rea onable that the people should employ the same weapon to defend themselves, and pull them down.

In his fifth chapter, he divides political lies into several species and classes, and gives precepts about the inventing, spreading, and propagating the several sorts of them: he begins with the rumores and libelli

famosi,

famosi, such as concern the reputation of men in power where he finds fault with the common mistake, that takes notice only of one sort, viz. the detractory or defamatory; whereas in truth there are three sorts, the detractory, the additory, and the translatory. The additory gives to a great man a larger share of reputation than belongs to him, to enable him to serve some good end or purpose. The detractory, or defamatory, is a lie, which takes from a great man the reputation that justly belongs to him, for fear he should use it to the detriment of the publick. The translatory is a lie, that transfers the merit of a man's good action to another, who is in himself more deserving; or transfers the demerit of a bad action from the true author to a person, who is in himself less deserving. He gives several instances of very great strokes in all the three kinds, especially in the last, when it was necessary, for the good of the publick, to bestow the valour and conduct of one man upon another, and that of many to one man: nay even, upon a good occasion, a man may be robbed of his victory by a person, that did not command in the action *.

Major-general Webb obtained a glorious victory over the French, near Wynendale, in the year 1708. He was sent with 6000 of the confederate troops to guard a great convoy to the allied army besieging Lisle: count de la Motte came out from Ghent, with near 24000 men, to intercept them; but major-general Webb disposed his men with such admirable skill, that notwithstanding the vast superiority of numbers, by the pure force of order and disposition, the French were driven back in two or three successive attempts; and, after having lost 6 or 7000 men, could be brought to charge no more. This may justly be reckoned among the greatest actions of that war: but the duke of Marlborough's secretary, in his letter written to England, gave all the honour of it to general Cadogan, the duke's favourite, who did not come up till after the engagement. This was so re

The

The restoring and destroying the publick, may be asscribed to persons, who had no hand in either. The author exhorts all gentlemen practitioners to exercise themselves in the translatory, because the existence of the things themselves being visible, and not demanding any proof, there wants nothing to be put upon the publick, but a false author, or a false cause; which is no great presumption upon the credulity of mankind, to whom the secret springs of things are for the most part unknown.

The author proceeds to give some precepts as to the additory: that when one ascribes any thing to a person, which does not belong to him, the lie ought to be calculated not quite contradictory to his known qualities: for example, one would not make the French king present at a protestant conventicle; nor, like queen Elisabeth, restore the overplus of taxes to his subjects. One would not bring in the emperor giving two months pay in advance to his troops; nor the Dutch paying more than their quota. One would not make the same person zealous for a standing army, and publick liberty; nor an atheist support the church; nor a lewd fellow a reformer of manners; nor a hotheaded, crack-brained coxcomb forward for a scheme of moderation. But, if it is absolutely necessary that a person is to have some good adventitious quality given him, the author's precept is, that it should not be done at first in extremo gradu. For example; they

sented by general Webb, that he left the army in disgust; and, coming into England to do himself justice, received the unanimous thanks of the house of commons, for his eminent services by that great action; which was also acknowledged, in a distinguishing manner, by the king of Prussia, who bestowed on him. the order of generosity.

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