ernment is to be continued. I think it is to be continued. Unlike Mr. O'Conor, I believe that the struggle to get it honestly administered is not hopeless. We are not yet reduced to the necessity of choosing between a republic wholly corrupt and a monarchy founded pure force. Therefore I conclude with Jefferson that, if any man (General Grant particularly) "consent to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he will be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views."

in

J. S. BLACK.

THE THIRD TERM: REASONS FOR IT.

MANY estimable citizens have assumed that a third Presidential term, if held by the same person, would under any circumstances be opposed to the solid and permanent interests of our country. Upon what ground this amiable prejudice can be vindicated, the majority of those adopting it do not inquire. They entertain it as an article of political faith-as a vague but absorbing sentiment. They know that, during our entire national existence, the same person has never been more than twice elected President of the United States; and many regard the example of Washington in declining a third election as an impressive warning that two terms should be the practical limit-not being aware, perhaps, that he so declined upon purely personal grounds, and not from motives of public policy.

If asked to state reasons for this faith, some would doubtless answer that a President desiring a renomination could corruptly and wickedly employ the power and influence of his great office to attain it, and finally perpetuate his rule by methods hostile to the Constitution and destructive of our liberties; and this is, indeed, the only substantial objection to the enjoyment of consecutive Presidential terms by the same person; for all must admit that the wide and deep knowledge of public men, of domestic affairs, and of foreign relations, which should be possessed by our Chief Magistrate, can be best acquired by practical experience and actual administration. Apart, then, from the objection named, the more experienced the incumbent-assuming him to be otherwise qualified— the better fitted is he to discharge the duties of that office; for I do not quite agree to what, many years since, was uttered by that great soldier, General Scott, who, during a conversation in which I had referred to his then not improbable nomination for the Presidency, said there were many thousand men in our country fitted to be its President; "for," said he, "the principal qualification is that

he should be able to say 'No' good-naturedly"; and when I, expressing surprise at this, asked for an explanation, he added: "No man can successfully and faithfully perform his duties as President who fails to maintain in union and strength the party which elected him, for upon that he should depend for support. He must, of course," continued he, "appoint thousands of that party to office, and he will be urged to appoint many, very many, who are unworthy, and, if he can not say 'No' as to those good-naturedly and without offense, he will make enemies, and thus weaken, distract, and perhaps divide his party."

Returning to the subject in hand, it is doubtless true that so long as the tenure of tens of thousands of office-holders depends, as it now substantially does, upon the President's will and continuance in office, so long will he be able, by their influence and aid, and the power of his place, to hold rivals for renomination at a disadvantage, and we shall doubtless look in vain for an incumbent so pure and unselfish as not to employ more or less of influence to secure his own reëlection or that of some favorite. And yet danger from this is quite remote and improbable, for it requires but a feeble intelligence to perceive that the objection invoked against the enjoyment of a third consecutive term by the same person applies with equal force to a second, through the ordeal of which the nation has many times passed unscathed. The people seem, indeed, to have heretofore exercised commendable discrimination and freedom of will upon this subject, by rejecting-as in the case of the two Adamses, Van Buren, and Polk-those they did not want for a second term, and reëlecting those they preferred-as Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, and others. The ablest, wisest, and most patriotic of our Presidents have usually been reëlected, and the failure of others to secure this has not been from too great scrupulousness in using the power of their office for that pur

pose.

The truth is, our institutions are not likely to be endangered by frequent elections of the same person to the Presidential office, and especially not after he shall have been deprived of it and of its influence for the period of three or four years; and those, who, under such circumstances, object to a second or third term, fail to restrict the objection to cases where its reason applies.

It is, indeed, founded solely upon the presumption that the President will use the power of his office to secure his own renomination in opposition to all other candidates; and, therefore, should

another be selected, his merits and the need of him must be such as to overwhelm and break down the official influence exerted against him.

Apply these remarks to the case now before the American people. It will not be pretended that the influence of this Administration has been exercised to secure the reëlection of General Grant, and perhaps it may be fairly suggested that its tendency has not been to much increase the chances of reëlecting any Republican candidate. Certainly office-holders have not been instructed or encouraged to labor for his renomination, and it may not be unreasonable to assume that the bulk of them would prefer that of some other person. If, then, he shall be reëlected, it will be by the free choice of the people of the United States.

It is due to the subject to pursue this line of thought a little further. The renomination and election of a prior incumbent, after a term has intervened since his retirement, must be deemed strong if not decisive evidence of his great merit and fitness; for such a renomination would be not only without official influence, but presumptively against it. Under these adverse circumstances he would be elected only because the people believed they had need of him in the great place he had before filled; and, until a constitutional provision shall prohibit this freedom of choice, no solid objection can be urged against it.

An extension of the Presidential term beyond four years and the restriction to one term by the same person have sometimes been recommended. I do not believe such extension would be wise until a responsible Cabinet can be organized under an amended Constitution, making the continuance of its members in office depend, as in England, upon a change in the sentiment of the people, as expressed through their representatives in Congress; and this perhaps is neither probable nor desirable. At present, the Cabinet is selected by, and in substance retained during, the will of the President. They are in a sense his clerks-not responsible to the people but to him only. His policy is their policy, which the will of the people, however expressed, can not change. During four years he has great, and, within constitutional limits, uncontrolled power, from which there is no appeal; and, to my mind, this period of irresponsibility to the people is sufficiently long. If they reëlect him, they thereby express approval of his policy, and their purpose to continue it during another term. And should this reëlection occur after he has been out of office during four years, an opportunity has been afforded to

compare his acts and policy with those of his successor, and to pronounce upon their respective merits. Thus an able, patriotic, and experienced ex-President may be recalled to redress the errors and repair the weaknesses of a preceding Administration, without the reproach of using the power of his office to secure a reëlection.

It would perhaps be prudent so to amend the Constitution that a reëlection of the same person should only be permitted after an intervening term had been held by another. In such case, reëlections would be rare, and only where national emergencies might demand the services of former Presidents who had been tried and found equal to the impending crisis. While the objection to a second or third term would thus be deprived of all force, the nation would preserve the right to services which in times of great danger might prove invaluable.

And yet contingencies may arise demanding repeated consecutive elections of the same person to the Presidency. Our late civil war presented one of the most terrible of these, and it was met by the reëlection of Abraham Lincoln, who would doubtless have been a third time elected had he survived his second term, to find his country still in need of his services. If, at the close of his first term, a constitutional provision had existed declaring him ineligible for a second, the nation might have been placed in great peril, for it is by no means certain that any other Republican could have been elected against the Democratic nominee, who stood upon a platform which denounced the war as a failure, and substantially demanded peace upon any terms-with or without the preservation of the Union as a condition. It is probably fortunate for our people, and perhaps has been the means of preserving them as a nation, that the framers of our Constitution did not, as a few of them desired, limit the election of the same person as President to a single term, but permitted his perpetual reëligibility.

The duration of his term, the manner of his election, and whether or not he should thereafter be eligible for reëlection, were subjects discussed at considerable length and with much warmth in the Convention which met at Philadelphia in 1787 to frame our Constitution. On these questions there was great diversity of opinion. Some insisted that he should be elected by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, and be thereafter ineligible; others, that he should be ineligible until a certain time after the expiration of his term; and some, that he should be appointed during good behavior. To the latter tenure objection was made that it would