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IV. Every duly registered elector shall have one vote only, but may vote in the alternative for as many candidates as he pleases; and his ballot-paper shall be deemed to be given for the candidate opposite whose name is placed the figure 1. But it shall be transferable to the other candidates in succession in the order of priority designated by the figures set opposite their respective names, in the event of its not being required to be used for the return of any prior candidate.

V. The voter having received a ballot-paper, shall retire into one of the inner compartments provided, and shall there, alone and secretly, insert opposite to the names of the candidates for whom he wishes to vote the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or fewer, in the order of his preference. He shall not strike out from the ballot-paper the names of any candidate.

VI. As soon as all the ballot-papers are received from all the polling places in the electoral district by the Chief Electoral Officer at the central polling-place of such district, the said Electoral Officer shall open the boxes in the presence of the Resident Magistrate of the district, or of two Justices of the Peace, who shall attend at his request, and taking the said ballot-papers from the several boxes or packets, shall mix them up together and place them in an open box without unfolding any of them.

2. The ballot-papers after being thus mixed, shall be drawn out of the box, and in succession; each paper as it is drawn out being marked with a number in arithmetical series beginning with the number "1," so that no two papers shall have the same number, and the resident magistrate or the two justices of the peace shall sign a document stating the entire number as a whole, of the ballot papers received from the various returning officers, which shall be carefully preserved by the said election officer for production when required by lawful authority.

3. The election officer shall first reject all ballot papers which have not the official mark on the back, and all on which no numbers have been placed by the voter, and all those in which the same number has been placed against more names than one, but he shall not reject any ballot paper whereon the numbers of designation are fewer or in excess of the number of members to be elected.

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4. The election officer shall then proceed to ascertain the quota by dividing the gate number of all the ballot papers tendered at the election by six, and the quotient, exclusive of fractions, shall be the number required for the return of any candidate.

5. Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or in excess of the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the votes as make up the quota shall be set aside as his votes his constituency-to be of no further use.

6. On each ballot paper beyond the necessary quota, the name of the elected candi: date shall be cancelled, and the candidate marked "2" on each paper, shall take the first place and the election officer shall transfer the vote to him.

After the surplus votes, if any, have been transferred according to the contingent choice of the voters, the election officer shall declare the candidate having the fewest first and transferred votes not elected, and his votes shall be given to the second choice in each ballot paper, if he is not already elected, when the third is made use of. After this distribution, the ballot papers of the man who now has fewest votes are dealt with in a similar way and given to the first name down the series who has not been declared elected, or who has not been declared not elected. This process shall be applied successively to the lowest on the poll until there are no more candidates left standing than are required for the electoral district, when these shall be declared to be elected, whether they have attained the full quota or have fallen short of it. For example of an actual scrutiny for the return of six representatives out of twelve candidates, see Appendix I.

FOR FILLING UP A VACANCY.

VII. All the ballot papers given at each election for each electoral district shall be preserved by the election officer, and the ballots appropriated for the return of each candi

date shall be kept together and labellel with his name, and a correct recor1 shall also be kept of the number of first votes given to each of the unsuccessful candidates which were afterwards transferred.

VIII. When by death, resignation, or other cause, any seat shall be declared vacant, the election officer, in the presence of the resident magistrate of the district, or of two justices of the peace, shall take the votes which made up the quota for the dead or retiring member, and shall distribute such of these as are not limited to the six successful candidates among the unsuccessful candidates, and add these contingent ballot-papers to the number of first votes originally polled by each man, and the candidate having the greatest number, shall be declared elected for the remainder of the term for which the retiring member was appointed to act as representative.

For an example of how this would work. see Appendix II.

FOR READJUSTMENT OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS.

IX. After every decennial census, a revision of electoral districts shall be undertaken by a parliamentary committee, and whenever an electorate shall have increased proportionately to the aggregate population of the said Province of South Australia by one 54th part, (be the same a little more or less) that district shall return seven members at the next and succeeding elections, and whenever an electorate shall have decreased in population by a 54th part, (be the same a little more or less) that diminished electorate shall return five members at the next and at succeeding elections, but the number of representatives shall remain the same, 54 representatives for the whole Province, and shall not be altered without a vote of a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

For the Upper House, or Legislative Council of South Australia elections, all the change that would be necessary to secure proportional representation would be that in the four electorates returning six members each, all six should retire at once and not two in rotation, and to require the qualified electors to record preference by the single transferable vote as provided for in the preceding clauses for Assembly men.

It would indeed be better if the Upper House could be elected by the votes of the whole Province, as was originally done, but unfortunately by scrutin de liste, or voting at large the very worst system of majority voting. If it were done by means of the quota ascertained by the single transferable vote, it would be Hare's grand ideal realized in one English-speaking community, at least.

APPENDIX I.

Results of Scrutiny of Voting Papers filled in at various meetings held for Effective Voting, 10th March, 1893.

TOTAL VOTES, 3,824-QUOTA, 637.

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637

3680

144

3824

*Having voted for members already returned, or others not possible.

In order to follow the tabulated result it is necessary to observe first the number of first votes given in the vertical column of figures after the names. This shows two candidates who have a surplus.

The larger 45, Charleston's is Count No. 1, and down Charleston's column we see how these went.

Magarey's surplus of 19 is taken in Count 2.

Count 3 begins the minus votes, and Robinson's are eliminated for distribution first, as he has fewest votes.

Count 4 distributes Harrold's.

Count 5 distributes Guthrie's.

Count 6 takes Fowler's.

Count 7 distributes Buttery's, and during that count Stirling makes up his full quota of 637;-following the horizontal line we see that the 466 first votes have been swelled by accessions from two surplusages 4, and 13; and by 31, 4, 63, 22, 13, and 17 votes given for men who failed to make up a quota.

At this point in the scrutiny there are three men returned with full quotas, and four left in the running; this is the crisis between the competitors as to who is to be thrown

out, on which the uncertainty with regard to allocation of surplus from the top from the bottom or the middle, has been made an objection to the Hare system altogether. In point of fact both Charleston's and Magarey's heap were cut once, and the 47, and the 19 votes taken then from the top. But at this crisis how did Birks the single tax candidate stand in comparison with Baker the second man on the capitalist side? What effect would any change in distribution of surplusage have had on the relative position of the two?

Birks had 361 first votes and 129 contingent votes, 490 in all, while Baker had only 262 first and 80 contingent, 342 votes in all, so there was no question which should go. In two other scrutinies with considerable numbers, one of 1,423 votes for six poets out of twelve at Port Adelaide, South Australia, and another of over 1,100 in the Register (S. A.) newspaper office, called the Ministerial Ballot, there was the same great disparity between the last man to be thrown out and the last man left in.

If we note in the tabulated results of the scrutiny of 10th March, 1893, that 144 votes were apparently ineffective because given to men who had not been able to reach the quota, and men already in, we know that to that extent some men will have short quotas. Glynn was 22 short and Birks 120, and there were 2 votes beyond the required number, a remainder from 3,824 divided by six. In all these 3,824 votes, I found only two really ineffective, because they had voted for six unsuccessful candidates. These might have a chance in case of a vacancy,-treated in Appendix II.

It may be noted that each of the outside parties succeeded in bringing in a representative, but this was owing to the greater interest taken in this subject by third parties. The four capitalist candidates only mustered 941 first votes, and the four labour candidates had 1080. To make up two full quotas required twice 637, or 1274, so neither of them could return two men. The contingent votes for capital helped Stirling who had capitalistic opinions along with his woman's suffrage, and were given to Glynn rather than to Birks. The contingent labour votes assisted Birks and Glynn and Stirling.

In an ordinary election, probably only two of the outside parties would succeed in obtaining a representative, but the contingent votes of the unsuccessful would affect the return of other candidates.

APPENDIX II.

Method of filling up a vacancy by death or resignation of any member of parliament during the term for which he was elected. The voting papers must be kept, and all votes appropriated to the return of each member shall be tied up together. Suppose in this case Stirling retired. The number of first votes given to each unsuccessful candidate has been tabulated, even though their votes have been distributed, and to these original numbers should be added those which may fall to each from Stirling's 637 votes. may run thus ::

ORIGINAL FIRST VOTES-STIRLING'S CONTINGENT.

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Thus the distribution of Stirling's votes brings in Fowler, who makes a larger total than any of the others—and as having the larger share of Stirling's votes, he seems most worthy of stepping into his shoes.

SOUTHERN CROSS.

Representative government is a series of mechanical devices which in modern civilised countries performs two functions. First, by means of it the electors of a county, nation, district or city, unable on account of their great numbers, to meet together for purposes of legislation, attempt to delegate the law-making power to a limited number of persons. Second, the persons thus delegated have opportunities for information, deliberation and wise judgment, superior to what the busy people themselves could obtain were they assembled in mass meeting.

Representative government is not an immutable unconscious creature of natural laws, but is an artificial creature of self-governing people. It is not a sacred and moral institution like the family, nor is it a fundamental, organic institution like the State itself, but it is simply a contrivance invented by human beings, improved and remodeled as a result of various experiments, and intended to serve as a set of m chinery for expressing and enforcing the popular will. It has never fulfilled its purpose precisely, has always failed and broken at points, but on the whole, has succeeded in solving momentous political difficulties.

Yet as society becomes more complex, and problems more intense, weaknesses of the machine become more and more serious. The stage coach, which in former days served well the needs of rural society and small cities and villages, would poorly support the traffic of a world and the shifting populations of a continent.

Representative government originated without much thought regarding principles of government or political philosophy. It grew out of necessity. It was continued to secure an immediate result. Not until several hundred years after its first introduction

did it become a subject of study, and then it had become so firmly established that to many students it was a sort of shock to discover that the system had had a beginning. When the system under new circumstances reveals weaknesses there needs must be a conscious study of its principles-and this is the era which began with the eighteenth century. The essential idea of representative government consists in the election of a deliberative body of law-makers, whose will stands for that of the community and is obeyed as the voice of the electors themselves. The executive and the judiciary may also be elected, but this is not essential. These are expected to execute the laws, not to make them. legislature. If they do not obey the law-making body, then Provisions for their obedience are a necessary part of the machinery of representation. But it is subordinate to the main mechanism. Representative government is a modern invention. It belongs to those modern nations which we call civilized, i.e., those which have taken their rise in Europe and have spread thence over the new world.

They are the agents of the representation is a failure.

In these nations the idea of representation has achieved an astonishing development. Not only the important interests of government are dependent upon it, but in every phase of private life it finds a useful and necessary place. The stockholders in a private corporation have no immediate direction of their property; they delegate control into the hands of directors and managers. Religious organizations are controlled by representatives instead of by the body of the communicants, from the local committees which manage the local churches, to the delegated assemblies, conferences, synods and parliaments, which direct the interests of an entire national ecclesiastical body. Educational interests and institutions are managed by committees and trustees. Political parties are not groups and masses of voters, but "machines" composed of those who are supposed to represent the party's voters. All of this delegated power, often so absolute and powerful, would have been incomprehensible to the ancients. Why Greece and Rome never adopted this device of representation is an interesting and pertinent question.

J. S. Mill, in his profound treatise on representative government, in asking how far forms of government are a matter of choice, observes that "political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked by men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their active participation, and must be adjusted to the capacities

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