to talk philosophically, and to appear in various novel forms of rationalistic intermixture. Reason was first summoned to prove the dogmas, afterwards the documents; then to make quantitative distinctions in the matter believed by distinguishing essentials from non-essentials; then to go the still greater length of effecting a qualitative change by expounding the given creed in new and nonnatural meanings. But with these symptoms of a higher nature there ever mingled the baser terrestrial taint which thwarted and retarded it. There was a lack of the vital element of impartiality and freedom. How could theology be really philosophical, when assumption still anticipated argument, and the first axiom of philosophy, that of the value of knowledge for its own sake, was in principle denied? The attempt to appear so could, under the circumstances, be only a slow process of self-refutation, in which assumptions too dim to be thoroughly understood, yet too sacred to be directly controverted, were gradually sifted and discredited by ineffectual efforts for their defence. Arguments and evidences proved to be insufficient and inapplicable; the attempted distinction of "essentials was baffled by conflicting inferences, until at last it was seen that "rational theology," as understood by ecclesiastics, is a virtual self-contradiction; that the substantive denies what the adjective affirms; and that the only way in which reason can usefully deal with transmitted creeds is by tracing their historic origin and significancy; by shewing the once natural and rational sources of what seems to be essentially irrational now; by following step by step the course of their decline and transformation; in short, by a twofold process of alternate destruction and reconstruction, by overthrowing the false theology of fixture, and constituting a new theology of progress.

1

"New," at least in common parlance and appearance; for Christianity, understood in the sense of absolute idealism, already contains the principle of all progress.

The end of the struggles and hesitations of theology should be philosophy; but philosophy takes its stand too far outside of established premises and prepossessions to be popularly relished or understood. Theology, if faithful to its proper mission, is better qualified to act as mediator, and by raising the standard of reform in the midst of establishment, to facilitate its eventual transformation. Generally, however, it will be found to obey the reactionary instincts of the Order connected with it; it falters, prevaricates, and finally retreats; so that its hapless disciples share the fate of the Oxford tutor who innocently started on a London journey, but getting into the wrong coach at Henley, unexpectedly found himself at the close of the day at the door of his own college.

General Position of the Tübingen School.

Of the better kind of theology, understood in its truemeaning of philosophical enquiry directed to a peculiar class of subjects, the school founded by the late Professor Baur of Tübingen is the most memorable modern example. In combination with the negative criticism of Strauss, it may be viewed as an exceptionally creditable reaction against the halting irresolute liberalism forming the ordinary staple of theological compromise during the past and present centuries. The relative "supernaturalism" or latitudinarianism of Germany, of which, were light more popularly acceptable than darkness, the Tübingen school should have been the natural termination, was the state of theological tension engendered by those long continued assaults of rationalism on traditional orthodoxy, which, beginning with the Socinians and Arminians, and assisted by Locke, Spinoza, and the Deists, ended in what is called the "Aufklärung," or "clearing up" of the eighteenth century; when orthodoxy at last felt under the necessity of borrowing the attitude and armoury of ra

tionalism to combat rationalism, and partially underwent a real metamorphosis into the character it assumed. Church belief thus passed through many involuntary modifications, and bore the scars of many a desperate encounter. The forces of thought and learning, long timidly confined to matters of inferior interest, began to invade the highest; so that even churches shewed a prudent willingness to relent, to modify their harsher paradoxes, and by casting overboard what seemed unnecessary ballast to endeavour to save the ship. The so-called material contents of the Bible were distinguished from the formal; and, after the example roughly set by Luther, many books of the New as well as Old Testament were doubted or discarded. Then philosophy retaliated the long usurpations of medieval ecclesiasticism, and under the auspices of Kant and Hegel went the length of taking theology under its patronage, affecting to restore a sort of ghastly vitality to the collapsed and sinking creed. But its embrace proved even more deadly than the open hostilities of rationalism; and Schleiermacher's inimitable philosophical disguise only shewed how much could be achieved in the way of illusion by perverted ingenuity, and how completely, since the days of Spinoza, the relative pretensions of the two powers had been reversed. And it soon appeared that the momentary readjustment was no effectual transformation. The elements so artificially and carefully mixed in Schleiermacher's laboratory refused to combine, perversely resuming their separate form when the operator withdrew his hand and ceased to agitate; so that the masquerading theologian was followed by a crowd of undisguised reactionaries. The effects of the reaction were especially felt in the department of Biblical criticism; and it proved to be as hard for professed theologians to become really philosophical critics, as for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. They would allow candles, but not lighted ones; they tolerate Hamlet, but always with the

principal part most carefully left out.

Although it had been ostensibly admitted that Scripture was to be treated on the footing of other books, a lingering superstitious deference for the object of enquiry prevented a full and satisfactory examination of it. Many points really very questionable continued to be assumed, and enquiry was still conducted on erroneous principles. The ruling theology was ambiguous and insincere, full of subterfuge and evasion; an incongruous medley of free research and religious preoccupation; in short, it was unphilosophical, falling short of complete impartiality, and therefore incomplete in its results.

Origin of Dogma.

Of the concurrent existence of two conflicting principles in theology its history affords unanswerable proof. True theology has ever been the secret source of the mental movement which churchmen are foremost to suppress, and whose constantly recurring antagonism originated the saying, "philosophi hæreticorum patriarchæ." The true religion of the few comes into inevitable conflict with what may be called the coarse philosophy of the many, because one is essentially progressive, while the other assumes a premature attitude of finality; and, because with the necessary beliefs of natural religion, almost all religious systems combine certain practices, opinions, and books, really possessing only a temporary and accidental value, but which are put forth by authority as universally necessary and infallible. Artificial dogma formed but a small and really very subordinate part of original Christianity. There is historic truth in the saying that Christianity was not a doctrine but a life; the most memorable of all recorded phases of that idealism which is the essence of religion, and which, though here carried to excess in an

1 Tertullian adv. Hermogenem, ch. viii.

extravagant renunciation of the world, was still noble in despondency, and moreover signally distinguished by the moral reformation always more or less accompanying great religious changes.1 But the feelings and maxims of Christianity would scarcely have made a distinct historical epoch had they not been attached to an historically remarkable individual; and hence by a natural illusion the feelings and convictions of ethical and intellectual religion were eclipsed and superseded by an idolatry of the person.* Christian dogma grew out of a very common and familiar fallacy. Personal attachment to a teacher is well known. to be far more really influential than the intrinsic soundness or credibility of the lesson; and vulgar minds bow to the gown of the clergyman or professor rather than to the worth or cogency of his arguments. Hence, in ordinary cases, what is said is of far less consequence than who says it; because it is far easier to recognise titular and personal qualifications than to discriminate truth. The same thing occurred in Christianity. However convincingly evident its leading ideas,-the duties of faith, patience, fortitude in suffering, equity, and charity,-Christians profess not to have acquired these notions as rational convictions, but to hold them as divinely communicated lessons, as deriving all their importance from the personal teaching or instrumentality of One bearing a specifically official character and historical position as the Jewish Messiah or Son of God. In thus making personal adhesion and docility rather than rational obedience its primary test, and indulging in figurative allusions to an external atonement really unconnected with its internal principle, Christianity prepared the way for its metamorphosis into objective or

1 This view of the meaning of Christianity appeals to history for adjudication, not to the fanciful theories or prejudiced feelings,-which at one time insist on its being a miraculous scheme of redemption or expiatory sacrifice, at another the doctrine of theo-anthropology or of the God-man, -the doctrine of the resurrection, etc., etc.

2 "It is far worse," says Origen in his Commentary on Matthew, " to be unsound in the faith than to commit moral offences."