act. It was passed, however, only under a strong protest; and many persons of high authority, clerical as well as laymen, were of opinion that not only was the measure injurious to the rights of patrons, degrading to the church, and pregnant with bitter consequences to the people for

The reasons of dissent, signed by 106 members of the assembly, were the following: :

1st. Because, in the opinion of the undersigned Dissentients, it is unwise to disturb, by a measure conferring great additional power on one of the parties, the well-established balance of the three several rights possessed by the church judicatories, by the crown and qualified subject patrons, and by congregations, composing the system under the operation of which the ministers of the church of Scotland are appointed; the practical result of which system confessedly is, that a body of clergy is thereby composed, which, in point of respectability and usefulness, cannot suffer by comparison with that of any other church now or formerly existing.

2nd. Because the measure referred to must, in the opinion of the Dissentients, not only disturb and introduce confusion into the system under which the appointment of ministers is conducted, thereby creating animosities, litigation, and injurious delays in the settlement of parishes; but does further confer on congregations such a paramount power in the appointment of ministers, as in practice, ultimately to render nugatory the rights belonging both to the church courts and to patrons.

whom that church existed, but that the assembly, in enacting it, had exceeded its powers as an ecclesiastical court, and had attempted to do that which, from its encroachments on the rights of others as they at present existed, could be effected only by the legislature.*

3rd. Because the ancient and undoubted right of the church, in particular, seems directly invaded by this measure, whereby her judicatories are no longer the sole and ultimate judges in all questions regarding the qualifications of nominees to spiritual charges; but congregations are empowered to judge of their qualifications, and to determine the same without assigning reasons, without record, and without review.

4th. Because the measure referred to assumes the character merely of an act, declaratory of the existing law of the church; while, in the opinion of the Dissentients, its provisions are subversive of laws and usages existing in conformity with the statutes 1567, 1592, 1690, through all periods of the history of the church, and are therefore in violation of the character of a declaratory act, and of the rights of presbyteries established by the Barrier Act.

5th. Because a measure of this character appears to the Dissentients by no means calculated to prove a final measure, or to give satisfaction to the discontented; but, on the contrary, to be peculiarly dangerous in the present season of public excitement, by opening up the way to irregularities and innovations, wholly destructive of our venerable

church.

laws, as more useful for collecting facts than any parliamentary committee. The inquiries of the commissioners were to be directed towards ascertaining what was the cause why, in some parts of the country, the poor-laws were considered a benefit by parishes, while in others their operation had been ruinous and destructive; and why in some agricultural districts certain parishes existed in which the poor-laws appeared to do no harm at all. It was expected that the information thus obtained would enable parishes, where injurious effects had arisen, to profit by the example of other parishes where different arrangements had led to different consequences. The commissioners had made their report, and an abstract of the evidence which they had taken had been printed in the course of the preceding session. That report impressed government so strongly with a conviction of the evils produced by the system in many districts of the country, that they resolved to propose a remedy to parliament. Lord Althorp accordingly, on the 17th April, moved for leave to bring in a bill to alter and amend the laws relating to the Poor.

The necessity of interference was maintained upon the ground that the present administration of these laws tended directly to the destruction of all property in the country, and that even to the labouring classes, whom they had been intended to benefit, nothing could be more fatal than to allow the present course to be continued. It was the abuse of the system, not the system itself that was to blame. The abuses were scarcely older than the beginning of the present century, and had origin

ated in measures intended for the benefit of that class of the community to whose interests and welfare they were now most destructively opposed. A feeling at that period had got abroad that discontent existed amongst the working classes of the country, and a principle was then adopted in legislation, which, though well intended and very humane, had been productive of the most baneful effects. The 36th of George III, laid down the principle, that the relief to paupers ought to be given in such a manner as to place them in a situation of comfort. Now, however desirable it might be to place all our countrymen in a situation of comfort, yet to give such relief as was described in this statute was the duty of private charity, and should not be provided for by a compulsory rate. The effect of this law had been to give the magistrates the power of ordering relief to be given to the poor in their own dwellings; and the same principle being followed up by the magistrates, it led from bad to worse, till all feelings of independence on the part of the labourers had been almost entirely extinguished in many parts of the country, and instead of the paupers being placed in a state of comfort, all the labouring population, in many districts of the country, had been brought into a state of deplorable misery and distress.

The dangers to be incurred by leaving matters as they stood, were so great and so urgent, that although the length of time, during which this system had been going on, rendered it necessary to legislate with caution, it was absolutely necessary to meet the difficulties of the case, adopt sounder principles, and carry them unflinchingly

into execution. In truth there were already examples to be followed. In about 100 parishes, in different parts of the country, the evils of the existing system had already compelled the inhabitants to have recourse to an improved mode of administration. Some of these parishes were in districts which had been entirely pauperized, and in every instance the experiment had succeeded. Where again the former system still prevailed, cultivation in some parishes had been actually abandoned so heavy was the pressure of the rates, and so great the evils of mismanagement. The conse quence was, that the neighbouring parishes were compelled to support their poor; they, too, would soon be reduced to a similar situation; and thus pauperism would stride with increasing rapidity through out the land.

:

It was on the nature of this growing mischief, and the necessity of effectually checking it, that lord Althorp defended the first part of the government plan, which consisted in intrusting the poor-laws to a board of commissioners. He admitted that this was an anomalous course of legislation, and that the board would be vested with great and extensive powers; but this was rendered unavoidable by the necessity of the case. A discretionary power must be vested somewhere to carry into effect the better principles now to be introduced. The local magistrates could not be the fittest depositaries of this power, because, however good their intentions, they would not have the command of those sources of information and comparison which were open to a board of commissioners, and, how ever excellent their motives, they

would be apt to be biassed by local prejudices and feelings. This power, therefore, was proposed to be vested in a central board of commissioners to be named by the king. Above all things it would be necessary, even before extending any discretionary power, to fix a day on which the allowance system should cease, and in the bill it would be fixed in some of the summer months, when the labourers were in full employment. This allowance system, the practice of supporting a labourer by the parish paying part of his wages and his employer the other, was the foundation of almost all other evils; and until it was completely got rid of, any attempt at amending the poor-laws would be utterly useless. Where this system prevailed, the farmer obtained an advantage to which he had no right, namely, assistance from parochial funds to pay those whom he employed in his own labour, Its abolition was necessary for the benefit of the labourers themselves. Some, indeed, had supposed that, as the labourer at present had the wages received from his employer increased by an addition from the parochial funds, (the addition being regulated according to the number of his family), the effect of taking away that assistance would be to make it impossible for him to maintain himself and family. Such would not be the case. As the labourer regarded the parochial assistance, added to the wages he received from his employer, as making the total wages to which he was entitled for his labour and industry, in a very short time after the removal of that assistance wages would rise to an equivalent amount; and as soon as that was the case,

the labourer would be placed in a situation infinitely preferable to that in which he at present stood.

The allowance system being thus abolished, and the central board established, next came the powers of the commissioners. In the first place, as it was desirable to have one uniform system operating over the whole country, they were to have power to make general rules and orders as to the mode of relief, and for the regulation of workhouses, and the mode of relief afforded therein. As a check against any abuse, every such rule,order,or regulation so'proposed by the commissioners would be submitted to the Secretary of State; forty days were to elapse before it could be brought into operation; and during that period it should be competent by an order in council, issued for that purpose, to prevent it from being carried into effect. The discretionary powers, proposed to be granted to the commissioners, were, no doubt, extraordinary; but, at the same time, it would be utterly impossible to carry an improvement in the present system of poor-laws into effect, without acting upon great discretionary powers; and there was no more proper quarter in which that necessary power could be vested. The commissioners would farther have power to make specific rules and orders for the regulation and mode of relief of the poor in separate districts and parishes,-to form unions of parishes, in order to make larger districts, to arrange classifications of poor in the same or different workhouses, -to exercise a general control in such unions as might be established without their consent, and to dissolve unions which might VOL. LXXVI.

now exist. Unions having been once formed, each parish in the union would have to maintain its own poor, or contribute to the general fund the proportion of expense which it had heretofore borne by itself. The individual parishes, if the vestries in each parish should agree to such a proposition, might make a different arrangement; but it was desirable, that parishes should have power to unite for the purposes of parochial settlements, and for the poor-rates altogether. The commissioners would, likewise, have power to call the attention of parishes and unions to the state of their workhouse establishments, and to suggest to them the propriety of adding to those formed, or of building separate and distinct establishments. At present the vestries were composed of ratepayers, and no one else, and in many instances a large expenditure was inflicted on those who had no vote in the vestry. It was, therefore, proposed, that with respect to raising permanent sums of money, such as for the purpose of facilitating emigration, and improving and building workhouses, the landlord as well as the occupier of land should have a vote in the vestry. It was only equitable, that such should be the case, because where the occupier had not been long in possession of a farm, and had very little interest in the expenditure, it was most desirable that the permanent interest in the land should have a vote in these cases.

Another fertile source of mischief had been the practice of ordering out-door relief, that is, of ordering parochial relief to persons in their own houses. The bill, therefore, would provide, that [Q]