IV

Petitioner concedes that the police campaign to enforce the obscenity laws was an issue of public interest, and, therefore, that the constitutional guarantees for freedom of speech and press imposed limits upon Pennsylvania's power to apply its libel laws to compel respondent to compensate him in damages for the alleged defamatory falsehoods broadcast about his involvement. As noted, the narrow question he raises is whether, because he is not a "public official" or a "public figure" but a private individual, those limits required that he prove that the falsehoods resulted from a failure of respondent to exercise reasonable care, or required that he prove that the falsehoods were broadcast with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. That question must be answered against the background of the functions of the constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, at 84-85, n. 10 (1966).

Self-governance in the United States presupposes far more than knowledge and debate about the strictly official activities of various levels of government. The commitment of the country to the institution of private property, protected by the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses in the Constitution, places in private hands vast areas of economic and social power that vitally affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation. Our efforts to live and work together in a free society not completely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encompass far more than politics in a narrow sense. "The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S., at 388. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1941).

Although the limitations upon civil libel actions, first held in New York Times to be required by the First Amendment, were applied in that case in the context of defamatory falsehoods about the official conduct of a public official, later decisions have disclosed the artificiality, in terms of the public's interest, of a simple distinction between "public" and "private" individuals or institutions: "Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred. . . . In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions....

“... Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.'" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 163-164 (concurring opinion of Warren, C. J.).

Moreover, the constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters bearing broadly on issues of responsible government. "[T]he Founders . . felt that a free press would advance 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general' as well as responsible government." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 147 (opinion of HARLAN, J.). Comments in other cases reiterate this judgment that the First Amendment extends to myriad matters of public interest. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, we had "no doubt that the . . . opening of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest," 385 U.S., at 388, which was entitled to constitutional protection. Butts held that an alleged "fix" of a college football game was a public issue. Associated Press v. Walker, a companion case to Butts, established that the public had a similar interest in the events and personalities involved in federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering the enrollment of a Negro student in the University of Mississippi. Thus, these cases underscore the vitality, as well as the scope, of the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 270-271 (emphasis added).

If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's

primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the parti cipant's prior anonymity or notoriety." The present case illustrates the point. The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number of highly important values are potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in seeing that the criminal law is adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression. Whether the person involved is a famous large scale magazine distributor or a "private" businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue. We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."

12

Our Brother WHITE agrees that the protection afforded by the First Amend ment depends upon whether the issue involved in the publication is an issue of public or general concern. He would, however, confine our holding to the situa tion raised by the facts in this case, that is, limit it to issues involving “official actions of public servants." In our view that might be misleading. It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since New York Times the concept that the First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a "public official," "public figure," or "private individual,” as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest. See T. Emerson, “The System of Freedom of Expression" 531-532, 540 (1970). In that circumstance we think the time has come forthrightly to announce that the determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general concern, albeit leaving the delinea tion of the reach of that term to future cases. As our Brother WHITE observes, that is not a problem in this case, since police arrest of a person for distributing allegedly obscene magazines clearly constitutes an issue of public or genera interest.13

V

We turn then to the question to be decided. Petitioner's argument that the Constitution should be held to require that the private individual prove only tha the publisher failed to exercise "reasonable care" in publishing defamatory false hoods proceeds along two lines. First he argues that the private individual, unlike the public figure, does not have access to the media to counter the defamatory material and that the private individual, unlike the public figure, has not as sumed the risk of defamation by thrusting himself into the public arena. Second petitioner focuses on the important values served by the law of defamation in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.

11 For example, the public's interest in the provocative speech that was made during the tense episode on the campus of the University of Mississippi would certainly have been the same in Associated Press v. Walker, n. 1, supra, if the speaker had been an anonymo student and not a well-known retired Army General. Walker also illustrates another anomaly of focusing analysis on the public "figure" or public "official" status of th individual involved. General Walker's fame stemmed from events completely unce nected with the episode in Mississippi. It seems particularly unsatisfactory to determi the extent of First Amendment protection on the basis of factors completely unrelat to the newsworthy events being reported. See also Greenbelt Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, U.S. 6 (1970).

12 We are not to be understood as implying that no area of a person's activities fa", outside the area of public or general interest. We expressly leave open the question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, controls the enforcement of state libel laws for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news media about a person's activi ties not within the area of public or general interest.

We also intimate no view on the extent of constitutional protection, if any, for purs commercial communications made in the course of business. See Valentine v. Chrestenses 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Compare Breard v. Alexander, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), with Martis Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 265-266 (1964); Linn v. Local 114, Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966),

18 Our Brother WHITE states in his opinion "The First Amendment gives... the priv lege to report... the official actions of public servants in full detall, with no requir ment that the privacy of an individual involved in... the official action be spared from public view." Post, at ---. This seems very broad. It implies a privilege to repor for example such confidential records as those of juvenile court proceedings.

We have recognized the force of petitioner's arguments, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, at 391, and we adhere to the caution expressed in that case against "blind application" of the New York Times standard. Id., at 390. Analysis of the particular factors involved, however, convinces us that petitioner's arguments cannot be reconciled with the purposes of the First Amendment, with our cases, and with the traditional doctrines of libel law itself. Drawing a distinction between "public" and "private" figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment guarantees." The New York Times standard was applied to libel of a public official or public figure to give effect to the Amendment's function to encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life. While the argument that public figures need less protection because they can command media attention to counter criticism may be true for some very prominent people, even then it is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions, and corrections are not "hot" news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story. When the public official or public figure is a minor functionary, or has left the position which put him in the public eye, see Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, the argument loses all of its force. In the vast majority of libels involving public officials or public figures, the ability to respond through the media will depend on the same complex factor on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable event of the media's continuing interest in the story. Thus the unproven, and highly improbable, generalization that an as yet undefined class of "public figures" involved in matters of public concern will be better able to respond through the media than private individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction. Furthermore, in First Amendment terms, the cure seems far worse than the disease. If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern.'

15

Further reflection over the years since New York Times was decided persuades us that the view of the "public official" or "public figure" as assuming the risk of defamation by voluntarily thrusting himself into the public eye bears little relationship either to the values protected by the First Amendment or to the nature of our society. We have recognized that "[e]xposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern. See n. 12, supra; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).16 Thus, the idea that certain "public" figures have voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction. In any event, such a distinction could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern be

14 See United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 404 F. 2d 706 (CA9 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 1969); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F. 2d 565 (CA5), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F. 2d 858, 861 n. 4, and cases cited therein (CA5 1970). See generally Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases? 18 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 371 (1970); Kalven. The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267; Note, Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 398-400 (1970); Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 Yale L. J. 642 (1966).

15 Some States have adopted retraction statutes or right of reply of statutes. See Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel. 34 Va. L. Rev. 867 (1948); Note Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1730 (1967). Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

One writer, in arguing that the First Amendment itself should be read to guarantee a right of access to the media not limited to a right to respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested several ways the law might encourage public discussion. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1666-1678 (1967). It is Important to recognize that the private individual often desires press exposure either for himself, his ideas, or his causes. Constitutional adjudication must take into account the individual's interest in access to the press as well as the individual's interest in preserving his reputation, even though libel actions by their nature encourage a narrow view of the individual's Interest since they focus only on situations where the individual has been harmed by undesired press attention. A constitutional rule that deters the press from covering the ideas or activities of the private individual thus conceives the individual's interest too narrowly.

18 This is not the less true because the area of public concern in the cases of candidates for public office and of elected public officials is broad. See Monitor Patriot Company v. Roy, U.S. (1971).

cause they happen to involve private citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of "public figures" which are not in the area of public or general concern.

General references to the values protected by the law of libel conceal important distinctions. Traditional arguments suggest that libel law protects two separate interests of the individual: first, his desire to preserve a certain privacy around his personality from unwarranted intrusion, and, second a desire to preserve his public good name and reputation. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion of STEWART, J.). The individual's interest in privacy-in preventing unwarranted intrusion upon the private aspects of his life-is not involved in this case, or even in the class of cases under consideration, since, by hypothesis, the individual is involved in matters of public or general concern. In the present case, however, petitioner's business reputation is involved, and thus the relevant interests protected by state libel law are petitioner's public reputation and good name.

These are important interests. Consonant with the libel laws of most of the States, however, Pennsylvania's libel law subordinates these interests of the individual in a number of circumstances. Thus, high government officials are immune from liability-absolutely privileged-even if they publish defamatory material from an improper motive, with actual malice, and with knowledge of its falsity. Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A. 2d 100 (1958). This absolute privilege attaches to judges, attorneys at law in connection with a judicial proceeding, parties and witnesses to judicial proceedings, Congressmen and state legislators, and high national and state executive officials. Restatement of Torts §§ 585–592. Moreover, a conditional privilege allows newspapers to report the false defamatory material originally published under the absolute privileges listed above, if done accurately. Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A. 586 (1963). Even without the presence of a specific constitutional command, therefore, Pennsylvania libel law recognizes that society's interest in protecting individual reputation often yields to other important social goals. In this case, the vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care would not provide adequate "breathing space" for these great freedoms. Reasonable care in an "elusive standard" which "would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait." Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, 385 U.S., at 389. Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be deterred. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).

Moreover, we ordinarily decide civil litigation by the preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, the judge instructed the jury to decide the present case on that standard. In the normal civil suit where this standard is employed, "we view it as to no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (concurring opinion of HARLAN, J.). In libel cases, however, we view an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent misstatement-the three-quarter-million-dollar jury verdict in this case could rest on such an errorbut the possibility of such error, even beyond the vagueness of the negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate. These dangers for freedom of speech and press led us to reject the reasonable-man standard of liability as "simply inconsistent" with our national commitment under the First Amendment when sought to be applied to the conduct of a political campaign. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy.U.S. (1971). The same considerations lead us to reject that standard here.

17 Our Brothers HARLAN and MARSHALL Would not limit the application of the First Amendment to private libels involving issues of general or public interest. They would hold that the Amendment covers all private libels at least where state law permits the defense of truth. The Court has not yet had occasion to consider the impact of the First Amend ment on the application of state libel laws to libels where no issue of general or public interest is involved. See n. 1, supra. However, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). recognized a constitutional right to privacy and at least one commentator has discussed the relation of that right to the First Amendment. T. Emerson, supra, 544-562. Since all agree that this case involves an issue of public or general interest, we have no occasion to discuss that relationship. See n. 12. supra. We do not, however, share the doubts of our Brothers HARLAN and MARSHALL that courts would be unable to identify interests in privacy and dignity. The task may be difficult but not more so than other tasks in this field.

We are aware that the press has, on occasion, grossly abused the freedom it is given by the Constitution. All must deplore such excesses. In an ideal world, the responsibility of the press would match the freedom and public trust given it. But from the earliest days of our history, this free society, dependent as it is for its survival upon a vigorous free press, has tolerated some abuse. In 1799, James Madison wrote:

"Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among those sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the Government contemplates with awful reverence and would approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public mind than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. However desirable those measures might be which might correct without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised in America." VI Writings of James Madison, 1790-1802, 336 (Hunt ed. 1906) (quoting a memorial to a French minister) (emphasis in original).

This Court has recognized this imperative: "[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732 (1968). We thus hold that a libel action, as here, by a private individual against a licensed radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Calculated falsehood, of course, falls outside "the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 75 (1964).

18

Our Brothers Harlan and Marshall reject the knowing or reckless falsehood standard in favor of a test which would require, at least, that the person defamed establish that the publisher negligently failed to ascertain the truth of his story; they would also limit any recovery to "actual" damages. For the reasons we have stated, the negligence standard gives insufficient breathing space to First Amendment values. Limiting recovery to actual damages has the same defects. In the first instance, that standard, too, leaves the First Amendment insufficient elbow room within which to function. It is not simply the possibility of a judgment for damages which results in self-censorship. The very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is threat enough to cause discussion and debate to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" thereby keeping protected discussion from public cognizance. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., U.S. —, [21]-[29] (1971. Too, a small newspaper suffers equally from a substantial damage award, whether the label of the award be "actual" or "punitive."

The real thrust of Brothers Harlan and Marshall's position, however, is their assertion that their proposal will not "constitutionalize" the factfinding process. But this clearly is not the way their test would work in practice. Their approach Leans only that factfinding will shift from an inquiry into whether the defamatory statements were knowingly or recklessly uttered to the inquiry whether they were negligently uttered, and if so, to an inquiry whether plaintiff suffered "actual" damages. This latter inquiry will involve judges even more deeply in factfinding. Would the mere announcement by a state legislature that embarrassnent and pain and suffering are measurable actual losses mean that such damages may be awarded in libel actions? No matter how the problem is approached. this Court would ultimately have to fashion constitutional definitions of "negligence" and of "actual damages."

18 At oral argument petitioner argued that "the little man can't show actual malice. How can George Rosenbloom show that there was actual malice in Metromedia? They never heard of him before." Transcript of oral argument 39. But i will toward the plaintiff, or bad motive, are not elements of the New York Times standard. That standard requires only that the plaintiff prove knowing or reckless falsity. That burden, and no Tore, is the plaintiff's whether "public official." "public figure.' or "little man.' It may be that jury instructions that are couched only in terms of knowing or reckless falsity. and omit reference to "actual malice," would further a proper application of the Times standard to the evidence.

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