Mr. BALDWIN :-I move that my substitute be taken up, and ask that it may be read.

It was read as follows:

Whereas unhappy differences exist, which have alienated from each other portions of the people of the United States, to such an extent as seriously to disturb the peace of the nation and impair the regular and efficient action of the Government within the sphere of its constitutional powers and duties;

And whereas, the Legislature of the State of Kentucky has made application to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States;

And whereas, it is believed to be the opinion of the people of other States that amendments to the Constitution are, or may become, necessary to secure to the people of the United States, of every section, the full and equal enjoyment of their rights and liberties, so far as the same may depend for their security and protection on the powers granted to or withheld from the General Government in pursuance of the national purposes for which it was ordained and established:

This Convention does therefore recommend to the several States to unite with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to be submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, or to Conventions therein, for ratification, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress, in accordance with the provision in the fifth article of the Constitution.

I propose to avail myself of the privilege of a short reply to the arguments against my proposition; and in order that I may occupy as little time as possible, I have reduced my reply to writing. At the risk of repeating some of the remarks I made at the opening of the discussion, I wish to recur to the facts on which my report is based.

The resolution which I have moved to substitute, recommends to the several States to unite with Kentucky in her application for the calling of a Convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution.

On the 28th day of January, seven days before the assembling of this Conference Convention, the Governor of Kentucky transmitted to the President of the United States the joint resolutions of the General Assembly of that Commonwealth, "recommending a call for a Convention of the United States," with a request that the President would lay the same before Congress; and on the 5th of February, the day after the assembling of this Convention, they were, by a special message of the President, communicated to Congress, with the expression of great satisfaction in the

performance of that duty, and of confidence that Congress would bestow upon those resolutions the careful consideration due to the distinguished and patriotic source from which they proceeded, as well as to the great importance of the subject which they involve. The resolution requesting the call of a Convention I have already read to the Conference.

There are sir, but two modes provided by the people of the United States for altering the fundamental law of their Government, both of which are specified in the fifth article of the Constitution:

1. Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall PROPOSE amendments to the Constitution; or,

2. On the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for PROPOSING amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures, or by Conventions in three-fourths of the States.

The first mode is recommended by the majority of the committee, in the expectation that Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, will propose, on the request of this Convention, for ratification by the States, the several amendments they have reported.

The second mode is the one proposed by the Legislature of Kentucky, and which, in accordance therewith, I have moved to substitute for the recommendation of the committee.

There are now but few days remaining before the termination of the functions of the present Congress. If it were within the fair scope and interest of the constitutional provision that Congress should act, in the proposing of amendments, on the recommendation of this Conference Convention, no one, I think, can reasonably expect them to consider and deliberately act on such recommendation during the few remaining days of the present Congress. Other questions, of engrossing interest, now pending before them, and the acts of necessary legislation at the close of the session, will prevent it. It must, therefore, go over to the next Congress. Assuming that during the term of that Congress the amendments recommended by this Convention shall, by twothirds of both houses, be deemed necessary, and be proposed to the States for ratification; there would probably be no earlier final action by the requisite number of States, than in the mode propos

ed by Kentucky, and recommended by the resolution which 1 have moved to substitute for the mode of amendment reported by the committee. But the great objection, in my mind, to the mode of amendment contemplated by the majority report, is that it is not in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. The people of the United States intended, when they adopted the Constitution under which we have for more than seventy years enjoyed a higher degree of prosperity than has fallen to the lot of any other people, that it should remain in full force and unchanged, except in one of the two modes prescribed in that sacred instrument for its own amendment.

It is a Constitution which binds the people of every State, as the supreme law of the land, until it can be changed by the action, in the first instance, of those who are sworn to support it. No amendments can, consistently with the letter or the spirit of the Constitution, be proposed by Congress, unless two-thirds of both houses, acting under the responsibility of their official oaths, shall "deem them necessary." No interference or pressure by any extraneous body unknown to the Constitution, was contemplated, or can be allowed with safety to the people, to impair the exercise of this function under all the responsibilities and official sanctions that properly appertain to it. The judgment of two-thirds of both houses of Congress in regard to the necessity of the amendments, must precede their proposal to the States for ratification.

The Government of the United States, in its sphere of duties, is supreme. The State Governments, when they consented to its formation by the people of the United States, surrendered so much of their separate sovereignties as was essential to its strength and efficiency. To that extent we became one people. This Government, for all national purposes, took the place of the State Governments, as well in regard to the paramount allegiance as to the duty of protection of the people of every State in the enjoyment of all their federal rights. It spowers can neither be enlarged nor diminished, except in the constitutional mode, without violating the rights of the States as well as of the people.

Any attempt from without, by combinations and associations not responsible to the people, to coerce or overawe Congress, or in any way to impair the free and deliberate exercise of its judg

ment in proposing amendments "as deemed necessary" by Congress, is a palpable violation of the privileges of the people. They elected the members of the House of Representatives with the intention that they should freely and deliberately, under their official oaths, propose amendments, or not, to the Constitution, as they might deem necessary, and not at the dictation of States even, who cannot themselves propose amendments, but can only require of Congress to call a Convention of all the States for that purpose. Much less can a convention of delegates from the Legislatures, or the Executive of a part only of the States-a body unknown to, and unauthorized by, the Constitution-assume to exercise, or dictate to Congress the exercise of this high prerogative.

We do not represent the people of the United States. This Government, for every purpose for which it was established, is a separate, and in some sense a foreign government to the States. It operates directly on the people, and is itself their true protector in all their Federal rights.

Any number of States, less than two-thirds, have no more right to call into action the power of Congress either to call a Convention, or to propose amendments, than the individual members of their Legislatues in their private capacities; and Congress might as well, and probably would, treat our interference with their official duties as an usurpation; as much so as if we should seek to interfere with the appropriate duties of the Legislatures of Virginia or Massachusetts. And, sir, I cannot but regard it, so far as the free action of Congress should be influenced by the recommendations of this body, as in the nature of a revolutionary proceeding for which there is no sufficient cause or justification Sir, all the States are not here represented. All have not even had an opportunity to be here. And yet we are endeavoring to influence the action of Congress in a manner which may deeply affect their interests. If, under any circumstances, a body so convened, would have a right to act upon Congress, by the expression of our opinions as a Convention of States, ought not all to have an opportunity to participate in our deliberations? Most certainly they ought.

But it is said some of the States are threatening to secede from the Union; others have seceded, and must be induced to

come back, by the speedy action of Congress on the amendments recommended by the committee. Does the Constitution authorize amendments under such circumstances, with less care and deliberation than in time of peace and tranquillity?

This Government, sir, cannot recognize the fact that States have seceded. It is not a Government over States, but over the people of the United States, irrespective of the State in which they live. This Government, and not the States, protects them in their Federal rights, and requires allegiance and obedience from the people in every State, to the Constitution and laws of the United States as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the laws or ordinances of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. It is the people and not the States that are governed by that law, within the sphere of its constitutional operation.

I have said that the course proposed by the majority of the committee is, in my judgment, not only against the letter, but the spirit of the Constitution. The State of Kentucky, ever patriotic and conservative, must have so regarded it, when, instead of asking Congress to propose the amendments they desired, they requested their sister States to unite with them in an application in the mode prescribed by the Constitution to Congress to call a Convention for that purpose.

Our fathers, who framed that Constitution, and the people of the United States, who ratified it, set it forth in the preamble as their first great purpose "to form a more perfect Union." They intended to establish thereby a Government of perpetual obligation and of self-sustaining vigor. They did not contemplate the necessity of amendments for any other causes than such as, after calm, deliberate, undisturbed consideration should be judged necessary. They did not intend that it should be exposed to the danger of hasty action under the influence of excited passions or timid and groundless apprehension. They would not trust the entire people even with the right of amendment, except in the mode prescribed, with all the delays incident to that mode; and then only by the action, in every stage of the proceeding, of persons bound by solemn oath to support it.

The Constitution, in prescribing the modes of proposing amendments, endeavored to provide against irregular combination of a part only of the States to effect them. Hence it pro