that sections 9 and 15 of chapter 93 of Acts of 1882, are most unjust and oppressive, and that they unnecessarily and injuriously interfere with the natural rights of every citizen to engage in the practice of medicine; that they thus interfere with the rights of the citizen by granting to a board the arbitrary right to pass upon his qualifications to practice medicine, and by providing that, unless his qualifications to practice medicine have been shown in the manner arbitrarily prescribed in section 9, if he should practice medicine, as he has a natural right to do, he should be liable to be punished as if he had committed a criminal offense.

Before considering these positions of counsel in any detail, it will be well to consider some general views, which have been taken by many courts and judges, bearing on the general subject. The conclusions reached by Judge Cooley after reviewing or referring to many authorities are as follows:

"The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operates according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, except as those rights are governed by some constitutional provision, which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protection against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign capacity can correct the evil; but courts can not assume their rights. The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute, when it conflicts with the constitution. It can not run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason and expediency with the law-making power. Any legislative act, which does not encroach upon the powers apportioned to other departments of the government, being prima facie valid must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the constitution and the case shown to come within them. If courts are not at liberty to declare statutes void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither can they do so, because they appear to the minds of the judges to violate fundamental

principles of republican government, unless it shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the constitution. The principles of republican government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and active in the constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to variation and modification from motives of policy and public necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which experience has demonstrated that any departure from the settled practice works injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of them in the constitution in such a form as to make them definite rules of action under all circumstances."-Cooley on Con. Lim. 168.

These views of Judge Cooley are certainly entitled to the gravest consideration. He admits, however, on page 164 of the same work, that in certain extreme cases judges of great eminence have been understood to intimate, if not decide, doctrines different from those he asserts. While these views of Judge Cooley must be regarded as laying down correct principles, which should generally guide courts in deciding on the constitutionality of any statute, yet it may be that in certain extreme cases they ought to be departed from, but whether they are or are not of universal application I need not consider in this case, as it is no such extreme case; and the constitutionality of these sections 9 and 15 of chapter 93 of the Acts of 1882 is readily shown by the application to them of undisputed principles well settled by numerous decisions.

The several States of this Union possess a general police power, by which persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State; and the legislatures of the several states have the perfect right to pass laws to effect these objects and to adopt whatever necessary measures, they may deem proper to secure the comfort, health and prosperity of the State or of its citizens, by requiring every citizen to observe the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non ladas. These principles are laid down in the opinion of Justice Strong in Railroad Company v. Husens, 5 Otto 469; and they were cited and approved by this Court in State of West Virginia v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 24 W. Va. 783.

There can be no doubt that the legislature of this and and every other state should permit the utmost freedom of action by each citizen, that may consist with the public welfare; and it ought not by law to impose any restraint which the paramount claims of the community do not demand. But of course it does not follow, that the legislature can not legitimately restrain the action or conduct of any individual or citizen by a general law applicable alike to all, when such restraint is imposed for the purpose of promoting the comfort, health or prosperity of the community at large. Under these circumstances the legislature of any of the states has a perfect right under its general police power to pass laws placing individuals under restraint in the exercise of any business, calling or profession. This power has been constantly exercised by state legislatures; and the courts have, so far as I know, universally recognized such power and have held, that acts of the state legislature passed in the exercise of this power were constitutional and valid.

In a great variety of cases state legislatures have required licenses to be granted, before a citizen could engage in certain kinds of business or in certain professions, when from the character of the business or profession the public was liable to be imposed upon, unless the individual citizen was placed under this and other restraints imposed on all who engage in such business or profession. Thus laws have been passed to license bakers and to regulate both the weight and price of bread and to prohibit the baking of bread for sale by those not licensed. And such acts of the legislature have been held valid and constitutional. (The Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile v. Quille, 3 Ala. 137.) In no state in this Union, so far as I know, is a citizen permitted to engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquors without being placed under restraint by legislative acts. These restraints vary much in different states; and in very many of them the person desiring to engage in such business has first to obtain a license from a specified body or person, and before obtaining such license has to establish his fitness to engage in such business by proving his moral character. The general right of the legislature by statutes to regulate the sale of

intoxicating liquors and to place persons engaged in this business under whatever restraints the legislature deems necessary to protect the community from injury either to its morals or health is universally recognized by the courts and is so well understood, that no decisions need be referred to as recognizing the validity of this species of legislation. Other sorts of business have been put under restraint and regulation, the general rule being that the legislature may restrain any one in the exercise of his natural rights to engage in any business, whenever the promotion of the public safety, health or prosperity requires such a restraint.

The principle involved in this regulation by law of various sorts of business has been extended to various callings and professions. Thus, so far as I know, the practice of law is a profession, which the legislature of every state has deemed one which should be regulated by law, and those engaged in this profession are under restraint for the protection of the general public. The person proposing to practice law is everywhere required to obtain a license from some person or persons qualified to determine whether the applicant has the qualifications necessary to practice law. The constitutionality of such laws or even their propriety has never been questioned. The legislatures have, however, frequently gone further and imposed a tax on persons practicing law as lawyers; and although this right of the legislature to impose such a burden on members of this profession, while no such burden has been imposed on others, has been disputed, yet that right has generally been upheld by the courts. State v. Gazley, 5 Ohio 21; Cousins v. The State, 50 Ala. 113; Me Caskell v. The State, 53 Ala. 510; Simmons v. The State, 12 Mo. 268; Lanquille v. The State, 4 Texas 312; State v. Hayne, 4 S. C. 403; State of Louisiana v. Frank King, 21 La. Ann. 201.

These cases as a matter of course recognize the authority of the legislature to require every one engaging in the prac tice of law to obtain a license. They may also be usefully consulted in determining what should be inserted in any indictment against any person for practicing a profession whether legal or medical without a compliance with the statute-law placing restraints on the practice of such profes

sion and subjecting to indictment parties engaging in such professsion in violation of the statute.

The following additional cases may be referred to as showing not only that the right of the legislature is universally recognized to restrain persons in their business or profession, when the public security or prosperity would be promoted by such restraints, but also as showing what should be alleged in indictments for violations of statutes imposing such restraints: Goldthwaite v. Montgomery, 50 Ala. 486; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Col. 322; Yale ex parte, 24 Cal. 241; Spencer ex parte, 10 Nev. 323; Porter & Co. v. State 58 Ala. 66; Antle v. State, 6 Tex. App. 202; State v. Goldman, 44 Tex. 104; Wheat v. State, 6 Mo. 455; Schmidt v. State, 14 Mo. 137; State v. Hale, 15 Mo. 607; State v. Richeson et. al, 45 Mo. 575; Ford v. Simmons, 13 La. Am. 397; Sheldon v. Clark, 1 Johns 513; Zimmerman v. Morrison, 14 Johns. 369; Thuson v. Johnson, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 154; Great Western R. R. Co. v. Bacon 30 Ill. 347; Gunnur & Son v. Sterling, 93 Ill. 569.

These statutes requiring that every person, who undertakes to practice law must first be examined by judges competent to determine, whether he had the requisite qualifications, are based upon the well known fact, that none but those who have been specially educated with reference to practicing law can do so without great injury to the community, who must employ lawyers in their business, and who are nessessarily incompetent to a considerable extent to judge of the qualifications of a lawyer, and are thus subject to be imposed upon by pretenders ignorant of their profession. To furnish the community some protection against such imposters the statute-law in perhaps every State in the Union prohibits any one from practicing law till he has first been examined by a competent judge or by a competent body of men, and a certificate of his qualifications and a permission to practice law has been obtained.

The same reasons would seem to require that no one should be allowed to practice medicine, who has not been first examined by some competent person or body of men as to his qualification to practice medecine and has not obtained permission to do so; for it is obvious, that the doctor equally with the lawyer requires a special education to qual