withdrawn. On the 18th of Decem ber, however, Napoleon captured the Little Gibraltar, by a niglit at tack; and, bringing the whole of his cannon next day upon this promon tary, Lord Hood resolved imme. diately to abandon the town. His Lordship humanely took with him all the royalists who chose to depart, and, carrying away such of the feet as were ready for sea, he des troyed as many of the remainder, with the forts and buildings and stores, as it was possible to set fire to. Napoleon, with a beautiful conciseness, describes the magnificent spectacle of the burning ships, and the more moving spectacle of the despair and terror of the Toulonese, who, but a few hours before, had judged from the distance of the be siegers, that their town was not even in danger. Not more, how ever, than two of the unfortunate royalists fell a sacrifice to republican vengeance. Napoleon was created for this service a Brigadier General of Artillery, and appointed to the chief command of the artillery of the army of Italy. We cannot conceive a finer promise of a career of glory, than that of a young officer, commencing his service, by not only correcting the errors of his veteran superiors, but by introducing a sort of new species of warfare; for so completely ignorant of Napoleon's principles of attacking this distant point were all his commanders, that to the last they viewed their possession of it only as a means of facili tating a regular approach to the town, according to the old rules of

art.

Napoleon joined the head quarters of the army of Italy at Nice, in March, 1794, and, rapidly survey ing the country, he immediately laid before his commander an exposure of the causes of those disasters which had hitherto attended the French army, and he proposed the taking possession of the Col di Tende and of other positions, as the means of driving the enemy beyond the High Alps, and putting the French in possession of impregnable points, which could be defended by few men, and thus leave larger bodies disposable for offensive operations, His plans were adopted by Eur. Mag. Oct.1823.

General Dumerbion, Commander-inchief, and on the 8th April, (1794) Massena carried them into execution, occupying, after several con fiets, Oneglia, Loano, Ormea, and the whole road to Turin. The position of Saorgio, which had cost the Piedmontese so much blood to maiutain, was now turned and abandoned, and on the 7th of May, they were driven from the Col di Tende. By these manoeuvres the French had taken sixty pieces of cannon, and had possessed themselves of all the higher Alps. The remainder of the year was employed in strengthening the line occupied by the French, and in May, 1795, Napoleon resigned his command, and returned to Paris. He had previously escaped the danger of the guillotine, for one of his military duties had been construed into a plan favourable to the Royalists.

At Paris, he refused a command offered to him in the army of La Vendée. The Italian army, after his leaving it, had been entrusted to General Kellerman, who, by the end of June, contrived to lose every advantageous position, which it had before acquired. Napoleon's talents were again put in requisition, he was summoned before the committee of government, and, by his advice, the army was made to take ap the line of the Borguetto, from which the Piedmontese forces in vain attempted to dislodge it. This position saved the whole coast of Genoa. Kellerman was superseded by General Scherer, who beat the enemy at Loano, but lost the opportunities which his victory gave him of conquering Italy. These operations, with a sort of Essay on the defence of coasts, fill up the first fifty pages of the volume.

There is now a great chasm in the volume. Napoleon's first cam paign as Commander-in-chief, and his conquest of Italy, are omitted,. as well as the expedition to Egypt, and the next chapter opens with his return from Egypt, and his landing at Frejus, on the 9th of October, 1799. We have then a long and highly interesting account of the Revolution of 18 Brumaire, by which Napoleón acquired the Consulate. The history of this event, given to 2 W

structive; it is an exposé of the state of parties in France, and of the system of government and condition of the nation, after the overthrow of the Directory. It is from this chapter, to use the words of Pope, that " Posterity will take their books." The intellect of Napoleon must have been almost super human to have overcome the myriads of difficulties that opposed him. A demoralized people familiar with blood, and habituated to the most atrocious crimes; the country torn by the conflicts of infuriated parties, no laws existing but those of force; an exhausted treasury, peculation pervading every department of government; armies unclothed, unpaid, disorganized and commanded by officers corrupt, spiritless, and ignorant of their duty; the greatest military and naval powers of Europe assailing the country on every side; these were the difficulties Napoleon had to contend with; his own genius and morals were the talisman by which, in a few years, he restored his country to the blessings of social order and good government, and by which he made her the most powerful kingdom that ever existed. If historical truth compel us to say thus much in his praise, moral truth as imperiously commands that we should do him still greater homage for the justice and mercy which he extended to all his opponent partisans. There was no proscription like that of Marius or of Sylla, nor a conventional sacrifice of human lives like that agreed upon by Mark Antony, Augustus, and Lepidus; all was mercy and oblivion of political animosities. Alas! we wish that Louis, on his second restoration, had followed so benign a precedent, and had preached" Peace and good will to all men."

Succeeding to this chapter upon the internal state of France, we have a masterly outline of her system of military operations, so clearly related as to be both intelligible and instructive, and we may add, entertaining to readers of every class. The system of the republic was to maintain three great armies. One, with the head-quarters at Amsterdam, to guard the coast from the Scheldt to the Ems, and the north and north-eastern

frontier to Wesel in Treves, twenty miles south of Coblentz. The se cond under the command of Jour dan, with its head-quarters at Dus seldorf, protected the line of the Sambre and Meuse, and blockaded Mentz and Erenbriesten. The third commanded by Moreau, with its head quarters at Strasburg, was called the army of the Rhine; its left blockaded Phillipsburgh, and its right on Switzerland. In 1796, Jourdan crossed the Maine, took Wurtzburg, and took up a position on the frontiers of Franconia, and Bohemia, his right in the valley of the Danube. Moreau crossed the Rhine and Lech, and entered Bavaria in a line south of Wurtemberg. These two officers acted without concert, and the Arch-duke Charles, concentrating his forces on the Danube at Ingolstadt and Ratisbon, penetrated between the right of Jourdan's army and the left of Moreau's, and defeating Jourdan's right under Bernadotte, Moreau, who had made no movement to his support, was obliged to retrace his steps back to the Rhine. It was at this time that he made the retreat through the black Forest of Wurtemburgh that gained him so much celebrity, and covered him from the disgrace of having occasioned the retreat of both his own and of General Jourdan's army.

In 1799, by a similar plan of divided and independent operations, the French lost part of Switzerland and all their ground to the right of the Rhine. Their army of Italy had been defeated at Genoa. The Austrians occupied the beautiful plains of Piedmont and Mount-Ferrat; the French were cooped up on the other side of the Appenines, in the barren country between Genoa and the Var. Every army had been defeated, and they were without pay, clothes, spirit, or confidence in their officers. Napoleon, in 1800, repaired all these disasters. He sent Augereau to oppose the Duke of York in Holland. General Brune was dispatched to meet the dreadful insurrection in La Vendée, and, concentrating all the armies from Switzerland and the Sambre and Meuse about Strasburgh, he encreased them to 150,000 men, and gave the

command to Moreau. Austría raised two great armies, one of 120,000 men under Field-Marshal Kray, to defend the Rhine from Moreau; it extended from its left on the Tyrol to Basle, Kehl, and along the whole line of the Rhine as far north as Mentz. The other army of 140,000, men under Melas, was intended to take Genoa, Nice, and Toulon, where it was to be joined by 18,000 English and 20,000 Neapolitans. To oppose this prodigious force Napoleon had only 40,000 men to guard the Appenines and heights of Genoa, and lie posted 35,000 in the central position of the Soane, so that it might support either the army of the Rhine or that near Genoa, as occasion might require. The position of this latter corps was admirable, for it threw the Austrians into great perplexity, as by marching to the right or left it gave Napoleon the means of making either the Rhine or Italy; the principal objects of his attention. Europe now anticipated the annihilation of the French power; Mr. Pitt's hopes were at the highest; and it must be confessed, that, had France continued under the Direc tory, the conquest of that country by the allies would have been çertain, but a different genius now, directed her destinies. Napoleon's situation, however, was very critical He saw that Austria had committed a great error in making Italy the principal object of attack, for the campaign would depend upon the operations upon the Rhine. Re maining at Paris, Napoleon sent orders to Moreau, to throw the whole of his army simultaneously over to the other side of the Rhine at Schauffhausen, to take the Austrians in their rear at Basle, and, by moving in the line of Stochach, to take in the rear the whole of their corps between the right bank of the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest. Napoleon computed that in six or seven days Moreau would be at Ulm, and that all Swabia and Bavaria would be in his possession. But Moreau's tactics savoured of the old school, and he was incapable of grasping with such comprehen sive schemes. Napoleon observed that it was worse than useless to entrust the execution of schemes to

a General who did not even comprehend them; and, after many mo difications of the original plan, he was obliged to order Moreau to pass his army in three divisions at Strasburgh, Brisach, and Basle, enjoin ing him to depart from the old sys tem of divisions, and to have but one single line of operation. The army passed the Rhine according to these directions, and the three divisions formed a junction at Wuttach on the 27th of April, 1800. On the 1st of May the French captured Fort Hohentwoel with eighty pieces of cannon, but Moreau's inactivity gave Field Marshal Kray time to assemble in line with his left at Stochach, and his centre at Engen, and which occasioned the battle of Hohenhoven, won by Moreau, the Austrians losing 11,000 and the French 7,000 men. The battles of Moeskirch, Biberach, and Memmingen, were successively gained; and on the 12th of May the French were manœuvering before Ulm. But it appears that Moreau had lost many fine opportunities of completely ruining the Austrians, and so divided and detailed were his opperations that, after some unskilful manœuvres and disastrous fighting before Ulm, he found himself with five of his divisions on the right and six on the left of the Danube, and his troops scattered over a line of fourteen leagues in length. It is useless to trace the minutiae of the campaign, but suffice it to say, that Moreau with his vastly superior force, in spite of his irresolution, his tardiness, and his insulated movements, gained possession of Ulm and Munich, and compelled the Austrians to sign an armistice on the 15th of July, 1800.

In the mean time Melas commenced offensive operations against Massena in Italy. He broke up for the Var in the beginning of March. Napoleon had placed Massena's troops in the best possible state of equipment. The grand operations commenced on the 6th of April, and Massena's little band performed prodigies of valour, but they were eventually driven into Genoa by the immensely superior force of the Austrians, and became, in short, the mere garrison of the town, from the 21st of April, (1800). Melas

swept all before him, blockading Genoa, he entered Nice on the 11th of May. Suchet defended some intrenched posts in the mountains with great bravery, but his position was about to be turned by the Austrians, who now planted their flag on the territory of the Republic. General Melas was in the full tide of success when he suddenly learned, on the 21st of May, that Napoleon, at the head of the 35,000 men from the Soane, had crossed the St. Bernard, and had arrived in his rear at Aoste. He directly marched to oppose this unexpected attack. On the 23d he entered Coni. Massena, hearing of this diversion, attempted by a sort of desperate valour to drive the blockading force from Genoa, but his efforts were fruitless, and his eventual surrender was retarded only by his confidence in the vigour of Napoleon's operations. No succour arrived, and, compelled by famine, he sent his aid-de-camp to the head-quarters of the blockading army to propose a capitulation, but just before the arrival of this aid de-camp, an Austrian officer had brought intelligence of the rapid movements of Napoleon, and of General Melas's orders to raise the blockade of Genoa immediately. The French, however, not aware of this news, finally surrendered, but on advantageous terms. On the the 28th May the blockading army broke up from Genoa, garrisoning the city with 10,000 men, Napoleon was pushing the Austrians with the rapidity of lightning; and in spite of his very great inferiority of numbers his successes were as constant as they were swift. On the 14th of June he won the decisive battle of Marengo, and which led to the total ruin of the Austrian interests in Italy. Genoa was retaken by Suchet, on the 24th of June. All the details of these events are given in the volume before us with great precision and clearness, and they are followed by Napoleon's observations upon Massena's campaign, in which he shews where Massena's movements were erroneous, and by what means he might have main tained himself in his positions till the arrival of Napoleon. We apprehend that these chapters of Napoleon will render future warfare in Pied

mont and the south-eastern provinces of France a mere matter of mechanical calculation; he has reduced to such exactness the best and only good plans of campaign adapted to this line of country.

We have next a most circumstantial detail of the passage of St. Bernard, of the battle of Marengo, with all its antecedent movements, and of all its glorious consequences. The " pride, pomp, and circumstances of glorious war," are here detailed in manner that warms the imagination, and carries the feelings of the reader in the career of the hero of the piece. We can say, moreover, of this work, what we can say of no other work of this description that we ever perused, we mean that even those parts, that relate purely to military movements, are always intelligible and often interesting to readers unacquainted with military affairs. The relation of the manner in which Napoleon disguised his real object in making Dijon on the Soane the rendezvous of his reserves, his breaking up from Dijon, the passage of the St. Bernard, the manner of transporting the cannon over the mountain in hollow trees, the point of honour in not deserting a single gun, the military bands triumphantly playing up the ascent of this cloud-capt mountain, the critical passage of the Fort Bard, are narrations which have the authority of history,and excite a breathless anxiety in the reader, somewhat similar to the effect produced by the dilemmas of a melo-drama.

The arrival of Dessaix from Egypt on the eve of the battle of Marengo, and Napoleon sitting up with him all night to talk over the affairs of Egypt and their campaign in that country, is a sort of historical picture. It has always been a received notion that the battle of Marengo was won by a desperate charge of cavalry, headed by Dessaix; but the absur dity of this report is evident from the plan of the battle given in this volume. The brave Dessaix was shot through the heart as he gave the word to charge; but the battle was won by no charge, but by Napoleon's manœuvres in altering his line of retreat after the battle had gone against him in the beginning of the day. This sanguinary battle