Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

residence, and the full postage prepaid. When the service is by mail, under this rule, it shall be double the time required in case of personal service, except notice of a motion, which may be made ten days before the time appointed therefor, and except service of notice of trial and final hearing, which may be made sixteen days before the term at which the trial or final hearing is to be had, including the day of service.

JUNE 28th, 1876.

In actions at law, a consent to a reference of the whole issue must likewise contain a provision that judgment shall not be entered until after ten days' notice of the filing of the report of the referee and of the judgment proposed to be entered thereon. After a reference, at any time before the entry of judgment, either party may move for a new trial upon a case or exceptions, and, if such motion be denied, the decision of the motion and the questions involved in it may be entered on the record, as if it had been a ruling made upon a trial by the judge without a jury, and excepted to in like manner. When a motion for a new trial is intended to be made, the Court may extend the time for entering judgment, upon the application of the moving party, and may stay all other proceedings until the decision of the motion.

Rule of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, adopted since the publication of the ninth volume of these Reports.

JANUARY 22d, 1877.

1. Notice of an intended application to the Circuit Court for the exercise of the general superintendence and jurisdiction conferred by section 4986 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, must be given within ten days after the entry in the District Court of the order complained of, by filing such notice in the clerk's office of that Court, and serving the same on the adverse party. The application must be made within thirty days after the entry of such order, or within such further time as may be allowed by an order of the District Judge filed within said thirty days in the clerk's office of that Court. An application cannot be made at a later period.

2. Except where special provision is otherwise made by statute, or where the aggrieved party proceeds by bill in equity, the application must be by petition, filed in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court, and verified by oath. The petition must designate the order complained of, and set forth the facts of the case, so far as may be necessary to show the errors, whether of fact or of law, alleged to have occurred in the District Court, and must point out such errors specifically, and the relief sought therefor.

3. The petitioner must, within five days after filing the petition, procure from the clerk of the Circuit Court a certificate of the filing of such petition, designating the order therein complained of, by its date, and file the same in the office of the clerk of the District Court.

4. Within ten days after filing the petition, the petitioner must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, who may file an answer thereto, verified by oath, within ten days after such service, and must, in that case, serve a copy of the answer on the petitioner within the further period of ten days. The petitioner may, within ten days thereafter, file a reply to the answer, and serve a copy thereof on the adverse party. The clerk may once extend either of these periods, by order made before its expiration.

5. The application will be heard upon these papers only, unless the Court shall, of its own motion, otherwise direct. As soon as the case is disposed of, the clerk of the Circuit Court must certify the order to the District Court.

Rule of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, adopted since the publication of the tenth volume of these Reports.

[ocr errors]

In Equity, APRIL TERM, 1876.

The parties shall be allowed to examine their witnesses and exhibit their proofs in open Court, at the hearing of the cause, in the same manner as on the trial of actions at common law. Provision shall be made by the party or parties so examining the witnesses in Court, for taking down the testimony of such witnesses, and placing a transcript thereof on file, in all appealable cases.”

The foregoing Rule, adopted at the April Term, 1857, shall hereafter apply to those cases only in which the parties, or their solicitors, shall file with the clerk a stipulation in writing, signed by them, containing a waiver of their right to the mode of proof according to the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, and an agreement that the mode of proof shall be according to the foregoing rule: Provided, that such stipulation shall have no effect upon any causes now at issue, unless filed at least three months before the session of the Court at which the cause is claimed for trial, nor upon any cause not now at issue, unless filed within sixty days after issue joined. But this provision may be waived by the written consent of both parties.

INDEX.

A

ACTION.

See DUTIES, 1 to 6.
PROVOST MARSHAL.

ADMIRALTY.

1. On a libel in rem, in the District
Court, against a vessel, the vessel was
there discharged, on a stipulation for
value. The libel was dismissed, and
an appeal was taken by the libellant
to this Court. Thereafter the stipu-
lators for value became insolvent, and
the libellant moved, in this Court, that
the claimant file new security for
value: Held, that the motion must be
granted, and that the Court had the
power to require the claimant to fur-
nish new stipulators, and to enforce
such requirement. The Virgo,

255

[blocks in formation]

5. A collision between a schooner and
a steamer occurred in July, 1868,
whereby the schooner and her cargo
sank and were totally lost. The
steamer carried the master and crew
of the schooner to New York. The
libel was verified in July, 1870, but
was not filed until February, 1873.
In January, 1872, a mortgage on the
steamer and three other vessels was
executed, payable two years after
date. It did not appear that any part
of it had been paid. No excuse was
shown for the delay in bringing the
suit: Held, that the collision claim
must, on account of its staleness, be
postponed to the mortgage. The
Columbia,
521

See COLLISION.
LIEN.
PARTY, 2.
WHARFAGE.

AGENT.

See BANK.

LIFE INSURANCE.

ARREST.

See BANKRUPTCY, 11.

AUTHOR.

See COPYRIGHT.

B
BANK.

id. 1. A bank in Illinois, owning a draft

on one W., in Washington, North
Carolina, transmitted it by mail to a
bank at Wilmington, North Carolina,
with directions to collect and remit
the returns. W. resided 170 miles
from Wilmington. The Wilmington
bank credited the draft to the Illinois
bank, and entered it for collection,
and so advised the latter by a letter
mailed at Wilmington, and then sent
the draft to B., a banker at Washing-
ton, who was its correspondent and
collecting agent there. B. collected
the draft, but failed before remitting
the amount to the Wilmington bank,
although in good credit when the
draft was sent to him, In a suit
brought by the assignee of the Illi-
nois bank against the Wilmington
bank, to recover the amount of the
draft: Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover. Kent v. Dawson
Bank,
237

2. The contract of the defendant was
made in North Carolina, and to be
wholly executed there, and was not
governed by the law of Illinois, but
by that of North Carolina. id.

3. The question of the liability of the
defendant for the default of B. is an
open one, so far as any statute or ju-
dicial decision in North Carolina is
concerned, to be determined by the
general principles of commercial
law.
id.

2.

the United States to recover, and a
judgment in favor of the United
States was rendered. The United
States proved, as a debt, against the
bankrupts, the claim for the value of
the goods, and sustained it by evi-
dence derived from the books and
papers of the bankrupts, seized un-
der a warrant issued under $2 of
the Act of March 2d, 1867, (14 U.
S. Stat. at Large, 547): Held,

(1.) That the claim was provable
as a debt under § 19 of the bank-
ruptcy Act of March 2d, 1867, (14
U. S. Stat. at Large, 525);

(2.) That the claim was not so
merged in the judgment as not to be
provable;

(3.) That the evidence from the
books and papers was competent.
In re Vetterlein,

[ocr errors]

44

The provisions of the 29th section
of the bankruptcy Act of March 2d,
1867, (14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 531,)
that, at any time after the expira-
tion of six months from the adjudi-
cation of bankruptcy, or if no debts
have been proved against the bank-
rupt, or if no assets have come to
the hands of the assignee, at any
time after the expiration of sixty
days, and within one year from the
adjudication of bankruptcy, the bank-
rupt may apply to the Court for a
discharge from his debts," require
the application for a discharge to be
made in all cases within one year
from the adjudication of bankruptcy,
whether there are debts proved or
assets received, or not. In re Sloan,

67

4. An undertaking to "collect" is not
merely an undertaking to select a
suitable agent, and transmit the pa-
per to him to collect as agent for the
owner, but is an undertaking to re-
spond for any default of the agent 3. The District Court has no power, in
selected.
id. any case, to grant a discharge, un-
less it be applied for within one
year from the adjudication of bank-
ruptcy.
id.

See CORPORATION, 1 to 3.
BANKRUPTCY.

1. Before the commencement of pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, the United
States brought an action at law
against the bankrupts, to recover the
value of goods which had been for-
feited for violation of the customs
revenue laws. The defendants, after
the bankruptcy proceedings were
commenced, admitted the right of

4. In a suit in equity, brought by an

assignee in bankruptcy, to recover
certain notes alleged to have been
transferred in violation of the bank-
ruptcy Act, the bill alleged the filing
of a voluntary petition by the bank-
rupt, the appointment of the assignee,
and the assignment to him. These
allegations were admitted by the an-
swer: Held, that it was not necessary

[blocks in formation]

he be arrested by the marshal, or his
deputy, and committed to jail to be
safely kept until discharged by or-
der of said Court. The deputy of the
marshal demanded the books and
papers and costs from the bankrupt,
in New Hampshire, which he refused
to deliver or pay, and then the dep-
uty arrested him in New Hamp-
shire, and committed him to jail in
Vermont. On a habeas corpus sued
out by the bankrupt: Held,

(1.) The order of the register was
the order of the Court, and, when it
was disobeyed, it was proper to in-
stitute proceedings for contempt di-
rectly on such disobedience;

(2.) It was proper to direct that
the bankrupt be committed until dis-
charged by order of the District
Court;

(3.) The arrest in New Hampshire
was illegal, and the imprisonment in
Vermont, in pursuance of such arrest,
was, therefore, illegal, although the
warrant of arrest was valid.
Allen,

In re

271

12. A. was appointed receiver of an in-
solvent corporation, by a State Court.
The corporation being afterwards ad-
judicated a bankrupt, the assignee in
bankruptcy, in this suit against A.,
obtained a decree that the appoint-
ment of A. as receiver, and the trans-
fer thereby of the property of the
corporation to him, was void, as
against the rights of the plaintiff un-
der the bankruptcy Act, and that A.
must account to the plaintiff for the
property. In taking such account:
Held,

(1.) The services of attorney and
counsel were properly and necessari-
ly rendered to A., as receiver, so far
as such services benefitted and pre-
served the estate, and were not hos-
tile to the proceedings in bankruptcy;

(2.) Nothing can be allowed to A.,
out of the fund, for the services of
his counsel in this suit, or in refer-
ence to the bankruptcy proceedings,
he having unsuccessfully resisted
such proceedings, or in the matter of
the accounting of A. before the State
Court, which took place after this
suit was brought, or for the referee's
fees in such accounting. Platt v.
Archer,

351

« ZurückWeiter »