yer than whom, I think I may safely say, our experience or our recollections do not recall any one possessing greater natural powers, or more completely disciplined in all the faculties of a great forensic reasoner-I mean Mr. George Wood. And brought early into such a relation, he was by that connection brought into forensic opposition to eminent lawyers older than himself, men on the same level with Mr. Wood. When he had attracted the approval of the great leaders in the profession, by the display of his qualities of eminent fitness for the public service on the Bench, he was, readily and by the consent of all, raised to that position. He first took a seat upon the Bench, then and now the most ancient and venerable in our judicial history, a Bench having the jurisdiction of the common law, and called by one of the favorite names of the common law, the "Court of Common Pleas." His next judicial service was as a Judge of the most celebrated commercial Court, perhaps, that we have ever had in this country, the Superior Court of the city of New York. He there filled out, by a somewhat new experience of judicial service, his preparation for the highest station in the political service of the State, a place in the Court of Appeals. For it seemed as if he was so well fitted to serve us as a judge, that the chances or derangements of Courts or of politics were not long to deprive the community of his services. In the Court of Appeals, Judge WOODRUFF Completed the round of judicial honors of the State, and by this varied experience was fully fitted for new judicial station. And when, by the defeat of his election to the Court of Appeals, he was thrown out of political place, and there came up a new Court of great importance and dignity-the Federal Circuit Judgeship-to be filled, by the general consent of the profession, he first occupied that eminent seat which he has just left. When he came to this new office, there was some feeling that his professional course had not made him specially familiar with the subject of Federal jurisprudence, with admiralty or patent law, and not much, if at all, with revenue law. But, sir, a man as well instructed in the common law as Judge WOODRUFF was, by his experience at the Bar and on the Bench, has the best and only necessary preparation for any and all the special departments of jurisprudence. Those who have had the most experience in the round of these special employments and special jurisdictions best understand that the common law is wider and deeper, more various and more exacting in its demands and its discipline, than any specialty can ever be. And he who has proved himself to possess the great powers of legal reason, and the great diversity for judicial faculty, that the common law exacts, may well encounter untried special jurisdictions without fear. But Judge WOODRUFF had some personal fitness for each of these specialties that every judge does not possess. He had a very thorough and profound knowledge of mathematics, which served him in the admiralty jurisdiction and in the patent jurisdiction. He had a very thorough knowledge of the philosophies of the natural sciences, and, if he had no particular or special qualities that should fit him for the other departments of jurisprudence, the force of his intellect was adequate for them all.

And, yet, all of us that have known Judge WOODRUFF at the Bar and on the Bench have felt, and all of us have exhibited this feeling to-day, that his moral qualities as a Judge fitly expanded and dignified a great judicial character.

That he sought distinction in the profession, and desired the promotions of the Bench, is an honor to him, as it would be to any one; but no man ever found him seeking elevation by any unworthy arts, or pursuing competition with his rivals by any secret or dubious means. When there was an office for which himself and his friends might justly think him suitable, he was ready to avow his disposition to accept the office, but not to run after it. To that limit of desire he always adhered. He regarded the career of human life, not as a game, but as the discharge of a duty, and the constant observance of duty through life as the highest and best success permitted to man. He relished thoroughly the full meaning of that noble proposition of the sacred Scriptures, "Now, if a man also strive for masteries, yet is he not crowned unless his strife be lawful."

The chair announced that he had received from a gentleman who was for several years an associate with Judge WOODRUFF, upon the Bench, who was unable to be present at the meeting, a communication which, under the circumstances of the case, and in view of Judge Shipman's former relations to Judge WOODRUFF, it had been deemed not improper should be read as a portion of the proceedings of the meeting, and be published as a part thereof.

The resolutions having been unanimously adopted, on motion of Robert D. Benedict, Esq., it was voted that the following letter of Hon. William D. Shipman be incorporated in the proceedings of the meeting:

NEW YORK, Sept. 14th, 1875.

Hon. SAMUEL BLATCHFORD.-Dear Sir: Other and imperative engagements will prevent my being present at the meeting of the Bar of this city, to be held to-morrow, to do honor to the memory of the late Hon. LEWIS B. WOODRUFF, who, for nearly six years, has occupied the high position of United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit; but I am unwilling to allow the occasion to pass without a brief expression of my sense of the great loss which the Bar, the Bench, and the public have sustained by his death.

My personal acquaintance with Judge WOODRUFF Commenced at the date of his appointment to the office which he last held, though I had long known him by reputation, through his career at the Bar, and on the Bench of the Common Pleas, the Superior Court, and the Court of Appeals. I knew he was an able lawyer, and an upright judge of large experience and unblemished character. But early in 1870 I was brought into close personal and official relations with him, which continued more than three years, and gave me constant opportunity of observing his character as a man and judge. I soon came to admire his zealous and conscientious devotion to his duties, the strength of his understanding, and the never-absent labor and energy with which he discharged the constantly pressing and heavy responsibilities of his great office. No toil or selfdenial, however severe or exacting, for a moment deterred him from a thorough examination of every case which was submitted to his decision. He fully appreciated his position, and well understood the functions of a judge to be, to VOL. XIII.-35

administer justice according to settled rules. This was the guide to his judicial conduct, and in this he magnified his office. He had, indeed, a high sense of equity, and was always delighted when a sound conclusion was reached that would operate beneficially in the particular case before him. But he would never weaken established rules, nor unsettle the foundation of principles, in order to relieve the exceptional hardship of an isolated cause. He knew too well that both law and equity, to be of any value to an enlightened community, must be administered with steady uniformity, and to this end he spared neither time nor toil in the investigations which preceded his judgments, and in the preparation of his opinions which announced them. To this duty he brought a vigorous intellect, an enlightened reason, and a firm will. To say that he sometimes erred, is merely to pronounce him human.

Judge WOODRUFF was a man of massive and hardy nature. He was not one to reverence overmuch the lighter graces and ornamental accomplishments of a fine gentleman. But no man ever gave a higher regard or a heartier recognition to the solid virtues which constitute the essential riches of character. Within his strong and rugged frame beat a warm, gentle, and manly heart, whose sympathies were limited by no partisan or sectarian lines. He was open, frank, and generous. All who knew him will regret his departure, and mourn the loss of a just man, and an able and incorruptible magistrate.

Yours, very respectfully,

WM. D. SHIPMAN.

The chair appointed as the committee to present the resolutions. to the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court, Messrs. Henry E. Davies, George Bliss, and Joseph H. Choate.

II.

THE CASE OF EDWARD LANGE.

EDWARD LANGE was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, for stealing mail bags belonging to the Post Office Department of the United States, under section 290 of the Act of June 8th, 1872, (17 U. S. Stat. at Large, 320), which provided as follows: "Any person who shall steal, purloin, or embezzle, any mail bag, or other property in use by, or

belonging to, the Post Office Department, or who shall, for any lucre, gain or convenience, appropriate any such property to his own or any other than its proper use, or who shall, for any lucre or gain, convey away any such property, to the hindrance or detriment of the public service, every such person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, shall, if the value of the property be twenty-five dollars, or more, be deemed guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, for every such offence, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years; and, if the value of the property be less than twenty-five dollars, the party offending shall be imprisoned not more than one year, or be fined not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars." The indictment contained twelve counts, and charged three different offences. Upon a trial, at the October Term, 1873, before the Honorable Charles L. Benedict and a jury, he was convicted. The verdict rendered was a general verdict of guilty. Thereupon, on November 3d, 1873, he was sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of one year, and to pay a fine of $200. Thereafter, and at the same term, he procured a writ of habeas corpus, and, upon the return thereof to the Circuit Court, held by Judge Benedict, showed to the Court that $200 had been deposited with the Assistant Treasurer of the United States, at the city of New York, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, as the fine imposed by such sentence, and claimed to be discharged from imprisonment upon the ground that the fine had been paid, and that he was, therefore, not liable to be imprisoned, inasmuch as the statute aforesaid, creating the offence, did not warrant a sentence of both fine and imprisonment, The Court held that the facts shown did not entitle the defendant to be released, and the writ was dismissed. After that, and on the 8th of November, 1873, at the same term, the Court, still held by Judge Benedict, directed that the sentence pronounced on the 3d. day of November be vacated and set aside, and thereupon proceeded to pass judgment anew, and sentenced the defendant to be impris oned for the term of one year. A second writ of habeas corpus was then applied for, and, a hearing being had before Judges Woodruff, Benedict and Blatchford, holding the Circuit Court, under section 2 of the Act of February 7th, 1873, (17 U. S. Stat. at Large, 422), the application for the writ was refused. Subsequently, a third writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the prisoner was released by that Court. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Miller, is reported in 18 Wal

lace, 163. Mr. Justice Clifford and Mr. Justice Strong dissented, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clifford is reported at page 178. After the release of the defendant he brought a suit against Judge Benedict, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, to recover damages for false imprisonment. The imprisonment set forth as the cause of action was that resulting from the sentence pronounced November 8th, 1873. In that suit, upon a demurrer to the complaint, the Special Term, (Van Brunt, J.,) overruled the demurrer. The General Term, in October, 1876, (Davis, Brady and Daniels, JJ.,) upon appeal, reversed the order of the Special Term, and dismissed the complaint. An appeal to the Court of Appeals was taken by the plaintiff.

The case was argued before the General Term by Benjamin F. Tracy, Esquire, on behalf of Judge Benedict, and the points taken by him were as follows:

I. The complaint shows the plaintiff charged with several offences against the United States, and his conviction of all the offences charged. The conviction is conceded to have been lawful. Upon such conviction the plaintiff became liable to the punishment imposed upon him by either or by both the sentences set forth in the complaint. There was, therefore, no false imprisonment.

(1.) The indictment set forth in the complaint, on its face, shows to this Court that the plaintiff was not put on trial for a single transaction. The indictment necessarily covers three separate and distinct offences, committed on different days and in respect to different lots of mail bags. These charges against the plaintiff were required by statute to be joined in one indictment. Section 1024 of the United States Revised Statutes provides as follows: "When there are several charges against any person for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts or transactions of the same class of crimes or offences, which may be properly joined, instead of having several indictments, the whole may be joined in one indictment, in separate counts; and, if two or more indictments are found in such cases, the Court may order them to be consolidated." So far as is known, under this statute, it has been the constant practice, in Courts of the United States, to include several offences in a single indictment, and, upon a conviction, to inflict punishment for each offence.* There can be no doubt that

* United States v. Mills, Massachusetts District. The case was tried before Shepley, Circuit Judge. The indictment contained sixty-nine counts. The defendant was convicted on seven counts, for seven different transactions. Sentence was passed imposing a fine of $3,000 for each offence, in all, $21,000. (See 15 Int. Rev. Record, 18.)

United States v. Crane, Vermont District, March, 1875, before Shipman, J. Two separate indictments were found by the grand jury, one for embezzlement, the other for making a false entry. The Court ordered the indictments to be consolidated. The defendant thereafter pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to pay $1,000 and be imprisoned one year for one offence, and, for the