Alvord . The United States. THOMAS G. ALVORD AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR vs. THE UNITED STATES, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR. A. was surety for one S., as postmaster, on his official bond. On the 14th of September, 1861, a new bond, with other sureties, was accepted, whereby A. was, by statute, released from responsibility for all acts or defaults of S. committed subsequently. S. was afterwards removed from office, and at that time was a debtor to the United States. In a suit brought against A., on his bond, to recover such debt, it was not shown by the United States that S. had not in his hands, on the 14th of September, 1861, ready to be paid or applied, all the moneys of the United States with which he was justly chargeable: Held, that it must be presumed he had such moneys in his hands when the new bond was given; and that A. was not liable therefor. (Before JOHNSON, J., Northern District of New York, March 21st, 1876.) JOHNSON, J. The surviving defendants, with others, were sureties for one Sedgwick, as postmaster, upon his official bond. On the 14th of September, 1861, a new bond, with other sureties, which, in compliance with the requirement of the Department, had been given, was accepted, and thereupon, according to the statute, (Act of July 2d, 1836, 5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 88, § 37,) and by force of its provisions, the sureties in the prior bond became released from responsibility for all acts or defaults of the postmaster which might be done or committed subsequently. Sedgwick was removed from office October 21st, 1861, at which time, by his own testimony, he was indebted to the Government in $3,969 45. A Treasury transcript showed, that, between September 30th and October 21st, 1861, Sedgwick had paid, in excess of the amount debited to him during that period, and was entitled to be credited with, $1,010 14. There also was given in evidence the quarterly return made by Sedgwick, covering the period from July 1st to October 1st, 1861, by which he appeared, at the latter Alvord v. The United States. date, to be indebted to the United States in the sum of $2,933 21. It was further shown, that the amount received at the Syracuse post office, from September 14th to October 1st, 1861, was $954 09. But, it was not shown that, on the 14th of September, he had not in his possession, ready to be paid or applied as might be lawfully required, all the moneys of the United States with which he was justly chargeable. No demand upon him at this period was proved, no failure to pay or apply any such money as he was lawfully directed was shown, nor did the period for rendering his regular account arrive until the 1st of October. Now, assuming that sufficient data are contained in the proof, to enable the exact amount to be ascertained which he had, or ought to have had, in his hands, belonging to the United States, on the 14th of September, the precise difficulty is, that no light is thrown on the question, whether, in point of fact, he had then this money in his hands, as his duty required, or whether, before that time, he had, by its misapplication, become a defaulter. If he was then a defaulter, the present defendants are liable. If, on the other hand, he then had the money, and subsequently misapplied it, these sureties are not liable, for, the default, in that that case, did not occur in their day. In the absence of evidence from which an inference can be directly drawn, the presumption of fact which the law raises must control. That presumption is, that an officer has done his duty, until the contrary appears. It was Sedgwick's duty, under the law and the bond, to keep the money which should come to his hands safely, without loaning, using, depositing in the banks, or exchanging for other funds than as allowed by law, till it should be ordered by the Postmaster-General to be transferred or paid out. This duty he is presumed to have performed, until proof is made to the contrary. If the present action had been against the sureties on the bond accepted September 14th, 1861, on the same proof, they would have been held liable, by reason of the same presumption. This was decided in Bruce v. United States, (17 How., 437, 443.) That was a case both of a new commission and a new bond. It was held, that, if a balance Alvord v. The United States. was due from an officer when reappointed, the presumption is, that it was then in his hands, and, if so, his sureties, on his reappointment, are responsible for its due application. But they may relieve themselves, by showing that he was in fact a defaulter when they became his sureties; and Ch. J. Taney said, giving the opinion of the Court: "No officer, without proof, will be presumed to have violated his duty; and, if Bruce had done so, Steele had a right, under the opinion of the Circuit Court, to show it, and exonerate himself to that amount; but it could not be presumed merely because there appears, by the accounts, to have been a balance in his hands at the expiration of his first term." According to the rule declared in this case, the presumption is, that Sedgwick, on the 14th of September, 1861, was not a defaulter, but that he then had in his hands, in accordance with his duty, whatever sum he was chargeable with in favor of the Government. As the Court says: "If it was not wasted or misapplied during his first official term, but still remained in his hands, to be applied according to his official duty, the sureties in his first bond would not be liable." A reversal must be adjudged on the ground thus far considered. In respect to the other questions presented, and especially in respect to the claim for a set-off, I agree with the decision of the District Judge, and substantially for the reasons assigned by him. The judgment of the District Court must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event. John C. Hunt, for the plaintiffs in error. Richard Crowley, (District Attorney,) for the defendants in error. Williams v. King. CHARLES B. WILLIAMS vs. BELINDA M. KING. A woman married in Connecticut, in 1864, executed there, in 1868, a promissory note, which was made and signed by her alone. The consideration for the note was the sale to her, by the payee, of some shares of stock in a corporation. At the time of her marriage she had real and personal property, part of the latter consisting in stocks of corporations, some of which were sold after her marriage, and the proceeds were reinvested in other stocks, both before and after the note was executed, so that the value of the property was not diminished. The shares of stock purchased or subscribed for were issued to her in her own name, and the subscriptions therefor, when made, were made by her husband acting as her attorney. There was no settlement to her separate use of the property she owned at her marriage, nor had any of her after-acquired property been conveyed to her in consideration of her personal services during coverture. In a suit at law brought against her to recover the amount of the note: Held, that, at the time of the execution of the note, she had separate property, under the statutory system of Connecticut in regard to the property of married women, which was intended to be, and was, bound by her contract, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Under an Act passed in Connecticut, in 1872, a married woman may be sued at law for a cause of action on which she would previously have been liable in equity. Where a married woman who has a separate estate enters into a contract for its benefit, or for her exclusive benefit, it will be presumed that such contract was made upon the credit of her estate. A debt contracted for the purchase of property which goes into the actual or constructive possession of the purchaser, is a debt contracted for the benefit of his estate. The statute of Connecticut in regard to the personal property of married women, construed. Whether real estate in Connecticut, conveyed to a married woman without words indicating that it was conveyed to her sole use, is to be considered as her separate estate, quere. (Before SHIPMAN, J., Connecticut, March 27th, 1876.) SHIPMAN J. This is an action of assumpsit against a married woman, to recover the amount of a negotiable promissory note for the sum of $2,500, made and signed by her alone, dated December 17th, 1868, and payable eighteen months after its date, to the order of William C. Hurd, and by him Williams v. King. endorsed to the plaintiff. The defendant executed this note in consideration of the sale to her, by the payee, of certain shares of the corporation known as the Silix Lead Company. The case was tried by the Court upon the following agreed statement of facts: "The defendant was married November 2d, 1864, to O. B. King, of Watertown, Connecticut, with whom she has ever since lived as his wife. She executed the note in question at said Watertown, upon the day of its date, to wit, December 17th, 1868, for the consideration stated in the declaration. At the time of her marriage, she was possessed of property, real and personal, exceeding in the aggregate twenty thousand dollars. A portion of the personal property consisted of stocks in sundry incorporated companies, some of which stocks have been sold since her marriage, and reinvestments made of the avails thereof in other stocks, both before and since the execution of said note, which reinvestments have not diminished the value of the property owned by her at the time of her marriage. In making the reinvestments, the shares of stock purchased or subscribed for have been issued to the wife in her own name, and the subscriptions therefor, when made, were made by her husband acting as her attorney. None of the property owned by her at the time of her marriage had been settled to her sole or separate use, nor has any of her property, since acquired, been conveyed to her in consideration of her personal services during such coverture." The General Assembly of the State of Connecticut passed, in the year 1872, the following Act: "Actions at law may be sustained against any married woman upon any contract made by her, upon her personal credit, for the benefit of herself, her family, or her estate, * * * * in the same manner as if she were sole, single and unmarried." It is admitted that this Act simply changed the form of the remedy for liabilities which had been, or should be, incurred by married women, and did not create any new liability, and, therefore, applied to pre-existing contracts. (Buckingham v. Moss, 40 Conn., 461.) The statute authorized an action at law against |