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slowly and feebly. At two o'clock the foe seemed extremely disheartened and confused. Three times had they been dislodged from a locality known as "a hill with a house on it," which was one of the strongest positions on the field. At that point the enemy was commanded by General Beauregard in person; and his troops had been driven a mile and a half from the fiercely contested point, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of that able commander. This discomfiture, which had been accomplished by the regiments under Heintzelman, added still more to the desperate nature of the situation of the Rebels. And yet, after all this heroism and this success, when victory seemed inevitable to the Federal arms, when the exhausted host of the Rebel chiefs appeared to be in extremis, the final issue was completely reversed, and one of the most disgraceful retreats which is inscribed on the historic page, ensued. How was this unexpected and wonderful catastrophe produced?

It was about three o'clock when large bodies of troops were observed by the Federal commanders, darkening the hill-tops in the farthest distance opposite the centre of the battle-field. Soon they were seen hastening to join in the conflict; and their secession banners waving in the breeze, and the freshness and vigor of their movements, clearly proved that they were reinforcements, which had endured nothing of the heat, the exhaustion, or the agony of the long struggle. They were in fact a portion of the army of General Johnston; who, having made good their escape from Winchester, had arrived by railroad at the Junction, and were now hastening to the field to rescue the cause of the Rebels from destruction. This terrible apparition at such a time and in such a juncture, night well have appalled the stoutest heart; yet, at the moment of its occurrence no thought of flight existed, and additional troops were ordered forward to confront the advancing masses. Among these were three Connecticut regiments, the fourth of Maine and the first Tyler Brigade.

Notwithstanding the prodigious exertions which these Federal troops had already made during the protracted contest, they approached their new foes with the utmost heroism. A terrible onslaught ensued between them. One battery was eight times taken and eight times lost. Meanwhile fresh accessions to the Rebel forces were arriving in successive trains. They deployed upon the field, and were gradually and stealthily winding themselves around the left of the Federal army, with the evident purpose of surrounding them and cutting off their retreat. Nevertheless, an hour of the most desperate fighting ensued, during which prodigies of valor were performed by our exhausted-troops. Still, however, the deluge of fresh reinforcements to the enemy continued to pour down upon the field. The left of the Federal army was slowly becoming surrounded and their rear attained. The fresh troops of the Rebels rushed upon their opponents in successive tides with sanguinary fury. One regiment of Mississippians, armed with immense bowie knives, fell upon them with

the yells of maniacs and the ferocity of fiends. Then it was that, for the first time during the long and desperate conflict, our troops began to exhibit confusion and dismay, and the first indication of a panic commenced to appear. A vast body of Rebel cavalry now came pouring out of the woods upon our left, attacked the troops which happened to be near them, and assailed a multitude of unarmed teamsters, who, without any orders to that effect, had moved their wagons forward with the gen eral advance. The fatal panic which had arisen now spread rapidly from regiment to regiment. Masses of men, in the utmost disorder, rushed down from the distant hills in full retreat. The flight became general, and then ensued that marvelous and ignominious stampede from Manassas to Washington, which will forever remain one of the chief wonders and scandals of American history.

No reasonable person will condemn the Federal troops at Manassas for not maintaining the advantage they had gained, or even for retreating. A complete defeat, under such circumstances, was excusable. The crime which cannot be palliated or forgiven is, that the flight should have been continued so long and so far; that such extreme disorder and frantic fear, such groundless despair and such excesses of weakness, so total an oblivion of all shame, and such a disregard of the dignity of manhood, should have characterized the conduct of men who had exhibited such admirable heroism and endurance so shortly before.

Regiment after regiment now came rushing along the road and over the fields toward Centreville. But soon all distinctions of regiments and companies, of infantry, cavalry and artillery, were lost. The confusion. of Babel was synthetic order and perfect symmetry when compared with the chaotic confusion which now prevailed. Mary of the men threw away their arms and knapsacks, lest they might be impeded in their escape. The heavy guns were abandoned, the traces cut, and the horses, covered with fugitives clinging to them on all sides, were spurred forward in the flight. Soon the passage became choked with private conveyances, with terrified civilians, with broken gun carriages, all tumbling and crashing against each other. Wounded horses plunged to and fro in the midst of the demented mass of human beings. Many were crushed to death. Many threw themselves upon the earth, being either wounded or exhausted, and unable to continue their flight. A few officers, indeed, endeavored to stem the tide and stop the panic, but their efforts were utterly fruitless. Thus the tumultuous sweep of fugitive wretches continued to roll onward without the least pause or abatement, until they reached Centreville. There the presence of the reserve under Colonel Miles, and especially Blenker's brigade, tended to diminish the disorder to some extent. But this effect was only partial. The great mass continued to hurry forward to Fairfax, to Alexandria, and even to Washington, where they arrived during the ensuing night and day. Our dead and wounded were

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left on the battle-field. Much heavier losses of artillery and ammunition occurred during the flight than during the engagement. No officer eminent for ability on the Federal side had fallen. The loss of the Rebel army in this particular was much greater than that of their opponents. The only pursuit attempted by the victorious and astonished enemy was made with their cavalry, and the assaults of these were effectually terminated at Centreville by the vigorous charges and deadly aim of Blenker's rifle brigade. That officer even recovered some of the guns which had been abandoned during the flight.

Thus ended the battle, the defeat, and the rout of Manassas. At first the loss on the Federal side was supposed to be much greater than actually proved to be the case; as was subsequently demonstrated by the official return made by General McDowell to the government. According to that return, the Federal army lost four hundred and eighty-one killed, one thousand and eleven wounded, twelve hundred and sixteen missing. The missing included the prisoners taken by the enemy, and those who, having escaped from the slaughter, never returned to the service. The number of artillery lost was seventeen rifled cannon, eight small-bore guns, twenty-five hundred muskets, and thirty boxes of old firearms. But, though the Rebels had obtained a victory, there never was an instance in which conquerors more signally failed to improve their advantages. One of the highest arts of a military commander, is that of following up effectually the opportunities which the favor of fortune may have bestowed upon him; and more ability has been displayed by some generals in the skill with which they turned a triumph to good account, than they exhibited in gaining it. Many other generals have shown higher genius in the success with which they have averted the consequences of a defeat, than their successful opponents exhibited in gaining the victory. In the present case it proved almost a barren triumph on the one side, and nearly a harmless repulse on the other. The Rebels might, in the midst of that overwhelming and preposterous panic, have marched upon Washington, entered it, dispersed or captured the officers of the Federal Government, and thus have struck a blow as deadly and decisive as that which Hannibal might have inflicted, if, immediately after the terrible slaughter of Cannæ, he had thundered with his legions at the gates of Rome, and had taken possession of the Eternal City. But, like Hannibal, Beauregard failed to improve the propitious moment; and, that moment, being once lost in the vicissitudes of nations, it never returns again.

CHAPTER XI.

THE IMPRESSION PRODUCED ON THE PUBLIC BY THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS-VARIOUS CAUSES OF THE FEDERAL DEFEAT-THE PRECEDING MARCH-INFERIORITY OF NUMBERS-EFFECT OF MASKED BATTERIES-INCOMPETENT OR INEXPERIENCED OFFICERS-REMOTE POSITION OF THE RESERVÉS-PERNICIOUS PRESENCE OF SPECTATORS-THE COUP-DE-GRACE-ARRIVAL OF GENERAL JOHNSTON'S TROOPS ON THE FIELD-IMMENSE LOSSES OF THE REBEL ARMY-WAS THE DEFEAT IN REALITY A MISFORTUNE TO THE UNION-ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS-ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ARMY-ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION-IT BECAME THE MEANS OF AVERTING GREATER CALAMITIES—IT WAS THE CAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT SUCCESSES TO THE FEDERAL FORCES.

THE defeat of the Federal arms at Manassas overwhelmed the nation with astonishment, indignation and shame. They were astonished, because such a catastrophe was previously considered as beyond the range of possibility. They were indignant, because they regarded it as the result of inexcusable neglect, incapacity and cowardice. They were mortified, because victory had graced the arms of an enemy whom they despised and execrated.

Various theories were subsequently offered to account for the occurrence of this disaster. At the present time, when the excitement and confusion of the crisis have passed away, and men may scrutinize events calmly and dispassionately, it is evident that the causes of it can be easily indicated; so, clearly indeed, as to show that a contrary result must have been almost impossible. A number of adverse events conspired to produce the defeat of the Federal army, though some of these were more important and more potent than others. In the first place, it was evidently imprudent to exhaust the physical energies of the Federal troops, by marching them from two o'clock in the morning, immediately before engaging the enemy. The physical powers of men have their limits of endurance; and when we remember that the battle continued to rage during the whole day, from sunrise almost until sunset, it is not singular that, toward the termination of the struggle, the strength of the troops should have become exhausted. Nor did the Federal commanders gain any thing on the score of secresy, by thus postponing the march until the day of the battle; for the enemy were amply forewarned of their approach when they lay at Centreville.

It is evident also that the number of Federal troops was too small, and was inadequate to the difficult service of assailing and taking Manassas. Not much more than twenty thousand men took part in the engagement; and against these twenty thousand there were arrayed, in the end, nearly forty thousand; who, in addition to their superiority in numbers, possessed also an important advantage in being familiar with the ground, in being

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fresh to the encounter, and in being intrenched behind powerful batteries. The peculiar manner in which these batteries had been arranged contributed greatly to the Federal defeat. The guns of the enemy, in this instance, were placed at irregular and zigzag points, in endless retrocession; so that as soon as the troops which served one of their batteries had been overpowered, and were compelled to give way, they merely fell back upon other guns served by fresh men, who received the advancing victors with a fresh volley of shot and shell. The Federal troops took many of these batteries seriatim; they drove the Rebels for more than a mile from battery to battery; and yet they still encountered other guns, which were worked with an energy and effect equal to the first. The peculiar manner in which these batteries were hidden added to their formidableness. They were so masked and concealed, either by brushwood or by being planted in holes dug in the ground, with their muzzles only protruding above the surface of the earth, that they were invisible to the assailants, and were thereby rendered more deadly.

It must also be admitted that, though the men fought bravely, many of the subaltern officers were utterly incompetant to perform their duties. There were many majors, colonels, lieutenants, and other officers who had never received any military training, who possessed no military knowledge or experience, and who were useless on the battle-field. Nor will this appear singular when we remember that many of the officers were mere civilians, whose patriotism or ambition had urged them to enter the career of arms, and who had been able to obtain military rank, without possessing a particle of military skill. It is not possible for such men, however intelligent they may be, to acquire a competent knowledge of military affairs by six weeks' drilling. What little they may have been able to learn during that interval would be of small service in the midst of the fearful excitement and confusion of an actual battle. The drill-room is a very different arena from the tumultuous field of strife and blood. A scientific military training is just as indispensable to the officer on land, as it is to the officer at sea. Naval tactics are not more intricate and difficult than those of the land service. Let us suppose that a British fleet of a hundred sail suddenly menaced the Atlantic coast; that an American fleet of equal strength was sent to attack them; and that this fleet was for the most part commanded and officered by men who had never before sailed upon the deep, much less had charge of a vessel, and had only six weeks' experience in studying the details of naval architecture, service and warfare. It is clear that the sailors might be brave, the ship might be staunch, the artillery might be powerful, the officers might be personally heroic; but that such a fleet, in the face of a veteran British armament, would be battered to pieces, and the wrecks of our vessels would soon be scattered far and wide over the ocean and the strand. It must be thus with any land force officered by lawyers,