the fociety of fuch a nation was originally founded. His fentiments on this head are thus expreffed: Admitting that the majority have a right to legislate for themfelves, they have no right to legiflate for others. An appeal to realon or equity is futile; for what appears to one man very reafonable, may to another feem perfect nonfenfe, or pernicious fophiftry. But in thefe cates, reafon is always neglected, and force or fraud must determine the difpute. The former fociety being diffolved, all rights of pre-occupancy are fuperfeded; for one party has as good a claim as the other; and they are virtually in the fituation of two independent tribes or nations, landing at the fame moment on an unfettled country. If they cannot agree to divide it, one muft expel the other. It is a legitimate caufe of war, in which neither party can affume a right to treat the other as rebels or traitors: If the victors in fuch a conteft deny the vanquifhed the liberty of withdrawing themtelves, their families, and pirty, from the difputed territory, and fettling themselves elsewhere, they violate every principle of juftice and humanity. That a part of a nation, whether they form a majority or not, may be juftitied in endeavouring to obtain an alteration in the eftablifhed conftitution, and even in committing, if neceffary, the juftice of their caufe to the decifion of the God of battles, I do not deny. But be it remembered, no flight motives can juftify them; for they in fact diffolve the focial bond, and renounce the parent that gave them birth. Whereas they who fupport the established conftitution, can in hardly any cafe deferve At blame. The fincerity of that man. who, when advanced in years, changes his religion, has always been held fufpicious; for fimilar reasons, if a man fhould at once renounce the established conftitution of his country, and adopt one of an oppofite nature, we may realonably fufpect him to be actuated by paffion, or felfish intereft. leat, if, inftead of appealing to the fword, fuch men choose to try their caufe at the bar of reafon. the onus probandi lies folely on them: their opponents have only to urge that they ftill prefer the conftitution and religion in which they were bred. If fuch a cause were to be tried by linos himself, furely the maority muft be infinitely great on the fide of the innovators, or he would decree, that it is for them to feek fome foreign fettlement, and there try what fuccefs will attend their new adopted fituations.' In chapter IV. the writer adverts to the abufes that have followed clofely on the heels of the French principles, and which (he obferves) fome politicians have endeavoured to excufe, by alluding to the grofs ignorance of the people; to which, and not to the doctrines, they afcribe the exceffes that have difgraced France. Mr. M. lays the blame on thofe who promulgated doctrines which it was not poffible that the people fhould truly underftand, becaufe they could not comprehend the niceties of metaphyfical definitions. He next examines the opinion that the most unlimited freedom of the prefs is effential to the acquirement and prefervation of freedom;' and he fays that, it by this be meant that freedom cannot exist, unless all kinds of doctrines are without without restraint promulgated among all ranks of fociety, experience has proved the maxim to be falfe. Calling history to his aid, he thus argues: The republics of ancient Greece were undoubtedly free, many carried freedom to excefs; yet the art of printing being then unknown, the communication of knowledge was neceffarily confined to a few. Books were fcarce and exceffively dear, therefore beyond the reach of the multitude: and in matters of religion, the most jealous and cruel inquifition was exercited over writers and teachers. The Swifs Cantons acquired their freedom at a period, when probably not one in a thousand could read or write; they have continued to preferve it for centuries, (many of the Cantons in the form of a pure democracy,) without the aid of newfpapers and political pamphlets, which their poverty banishes much more effectually than any law could do. In our own country, almoft in our own times, freedom triumphed over monarchical prerogative, both in the æra of Charles I. and James II. Yet from the former to the latter period, the communication of political knowledge was much confined, by the difinclination or inability of the people to read. It is faid, that now corruption and mifmanagement are in the extreme, and we are directed to reftore the conftitution to its former purity; a good one, therefore, could fubfift without this general diffufion of political knowledge, which, if it has not produced, at leaft has not prevented the progrefs of corruption.' He then goes on to animadvert en the advice given by thofe who defire that the public may not be alarmed at the want of reftraint on the prefs, for that truth and virtue will always preponderate. The following obfervations on this head are juft and forcible : Let parents and tutors anfwer for the youth under their care; let us, if poflible, rife above our own vices, and answer for ourfelves. Have we not experienced, that the exhortation of the divine, the lecture of the moralift, though aided by the dictates of our own confcience, form but an infufficient barrier against the fuggeftions of paflion, and the corruption which artful fophiftry, flattering inclinations which we are fecretly athamed of, pours into the heart? In the declining age of Greece and Rome, did the doctrines of Zeno or Epicurus make the greater number of profelytes? In both nations there was no want of men, who, by their writings, even by the examples of their lives and actions, endeavoured to uphold the cause of virtue; yet they fcarcely retarded, the did not prevent, the rapid progrefs of vice, which purfued its triumphant course, until it expired in the ruins of a corrupted people." Having combated the opinions of others refpecting the licentioufnefs of the prefs, he thus delivers his own: The licentioufnefs of the press, fuch as is now permitted, is incompatible with national profperity; it requires to be regulated; but to afcertain the line which feparates excefs of liberty from improper reftraint, and to determine where the power of enforcin gthe law fhould be placed, is a talk which which requires, if it does not exceed, the greateft abilities. Thus much, however, may be established as certain; it is better that many things fhould be concealed which might be communicated, than that even a few thould be communicated which ought to be withheld. It is abfolutely neceffary to take every precaution against this dan gerous clafs of men. The eloquence of a writer is as powerful as that of an orator, is more extenfive in its effects, and full as likely to be made an engine to introduce defpotifm into the bofom of liberty.' The 5th chapter of this work treats of luxury; by which term the author means that exceffive appetite for enjoyment of any kind, mental or corporeal, active or paffive, which leads a man to neglect bis duties, and to injure himself or others, in order to obtain the object of his defire. Mr. M. unequivocally denies that luxury, which is a vice in thofe who are addicted to it, is productive of good to others; and-hear it, ye financiers, who look to luxury for the chief fource of revenue; hear it, ye manufacturers, who are engaged in thofe branches by which luxury is fed, and the kingdom, it is faid, is enriched!-he maintains that no national advantage whatever can justly be ascribed to luxury.' Chapter VI. contains a differtation on the law of Primogeniture; which Mr. M. feems to confider as unjut, but which he would not venture to abolith, because he thinks the abolition would be attended with fome collateral injurious circumstances, more than counterbalancing the good that might be expected from it. An equal right of inheritance would In chapter VII. Mr. M. enters at large into the difcuffion of the much agitated queftion, which ought moft to be encouraged, "great or fmall farms?" and on this fubject he difplays much knowledge and ability: but we cannot pretend to give a fummary of his different arguments, the matter branching out into a great variety of collateral confiderations, such as poor's rates, new inclofures, &c. In the agitation of this important queftion, he has principally in his eye Mr. Arthur Young's Syftem of Agriculture, which he in many intances ftrongly condemns. Chapter VIII. treats of the Game laws. However they might have been originally introduced, Mr. M. is of opinion that in fome countries in Europe they are oppreflive, and perhaps abfurd in England; England: but he does not allow, with modern reformers, 'that every one fhould have a right to kill game wherever he can find it' After all, Mr. M. recommends a material alteration in the whole fyftem of game laws, and thinks it would be better for the public that game should be made private property. From game the author proceeds to the confideration of the tithe laws. He pronounces the opinion to be ill-founded, which ftates tithes to be a heavy burthen on the farmer; whofe fituation would, according to him, be precifely the fame, whether a tenth, a fifth, or a twentieth of the produce of the land were levied for the fupport of the clergy. He contends that this tax falls folely on the landlord who is obliged to let his land proportionably lower on account of the tithes. He how. ever, admits the tax to be impolitic, for this plain reason, that it is a continually varying one, on the produce of fkill and labour, and on the uncertain bounty of nature; and confequently that it is always galling and vexatious. Chapter I. of Book II. opens with the important queftions, whether there ought to be allowed, in a itate, a distinction of orders among its citizens; and which form of government is preferable, a monarchical or a republican. For his arguments on thefe topics we muft refer to the chapter itself, which contains much found fenfe and able reafoning. We fhall content ourfelves with ftating that he is decidedly for the exiftence of a body of nobility; without which, he maintains, there would be an infinitely greater diftance than with it, between the rich and the poor; he infifts that populatiou is increased by an inflitution which contributes to render marriages more frequent in the higher claffes of fociety, becaufe, wherever birth, without any other recommendation, is a palport into fociety, celibacy will be lefs frequent; that it checks the rage of appearance, the vanity of fhew, and removes one great temptation to expence, the chief caufe of venality; that it brings forwards to public life that defcription of men by whom the nation has the beft chance of being ferved; that it renders manners more amiable and fociable; and finally, that almost all the objections, which are urged against the inftitution of nobility, may be equally if not more juftly urged against wealth; the abolition of which would convulle and deftroy fociety. The difcuffion of this fubje&t, together with that of the form of government, is carried on through the first five chapters of the fecond book, and branches out into a very long, interefting, and ingenious diflertation refpecting a landing army; for which Mr. M. is a firenuous advocate. He does not argue for a flanding army as a mere machine of government, calculated to enable the crown to enforce measures dangerous to or incompatible with a free conftitution,but, for a standing army modelled on principles that would make it a guardian and firm fupport of the conftitutional liberty of the fubject; a body fo organized and officered as that, though the crown might at all times look for its co-operation in all conftitutional pursuits, It would be the last part of the community from which the go, vernment would dare to atk for or expect affiftance, when the fervice in which it was to be employed would be attended with injury or even danger to the liberty of the country. Mr. Michell fuggefts feveral im provements refpecting the age at which gentlemen fhould be allowed to fit in parliament. At 21 he thinks a man cannot be properly qualified for the important duties of a legiflator; and therefore he is of opinion that he ought not to be eligible by law for a feat in the legillature, before he has attained the age of 30 years. In chapter VI. Mr. M. fpeaks of the qualification of electors; and, inftead of extending the right of fuffrage to every male of the age of 21, he contends moft ftrenuoufly for withholding it from all thofe who poffels not fixed property, but who are altogether dependent for their fubfiftence on the wages of their daily labour; and he maintains that, without this reftriction, it is impoffible that the conftitution should be fecure. Mr. M. would disfranchife only the populace, and would communicate the right of voting to all above that clafs, with the double view of preventing an ariftrocratic tyranny, and fpreading as widely as poffible an intereft in the public welfare. To mark the line of difcrimination is the bufinefs, (fays he,) of a legiflator occupied in framing a particular conftitution, and must be adapted to the manners of each particular people. It belongs to him alfo to afcertain what are the offices which may be rendered elective, and to what in a monarchy the prince, in a republic the fenate, fhould nominate.' The queftion of fuffrage naturally leads to that of reprefentation. The author gives an hiftorical account of the manner in which it was introduced into our conftitu. tion, and then obferves that the idea of it became at laft fo cherished by the people, that reprefentation was with them a fynonimous term for liberty; fo that those who were not reprefented were confidered as not free. Mr. M. infists that this opinion is founded in error; or that it must be admitted that women, minors, and foreigners, refiding among us are flaves; for they are not reprefented by any one deputed by them to appear and act for them. He concludes the chapter with fome very handfome compliments to the British Houfe of Commons; from which, he fays, conftituted as it always has been, the nation. has derived great happinefs, wealth and glory. The VIIth chapter treats of a monarchical and a republican form of government, and gives to the former a decided preference. In chapter VIII. he treats of the nature and extent of power that ought to be trufted to the king. He renrarks that, if a fovereign does not poffefs fufficient legal power to enforce a vigorous and effective government, he muft obtain it through influence, or anarchy will enfue. In chapter IX. he investigates the origin, progrefs, and decay of abfolute power in France; and this difcuffion leads him to fearch for the foundation of British free dom, |