debt, of the insolvency of the debtor, is not sufficient to warrant the Court in setting aside the security as a fraudulent preference. Sanford, Assignee, vs. Fellows, U. S. Cir. Ct., N. D. Ill.

A secured creditor has a right to hold on to his security, and he cannot participate in composition proceedings, neither can he be compelled to surrender his security and prove his claim in composition, or to have his security valued and make proof of any balance. His failure to do so cannot be taken as evidence that he intends to rely wholly upon his security for payment of his demand.-Cavanna vs. Bassett et al., U. S. Cir. Ct., W. D. Ill.

Proceedings to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy must be strictly construed. The bankrupt must comply substantially with all the conditions requisite and precedent to obtain his discharge. In order that a contingent liability-such as liability as a stockholder-may be discharged by composition proceedings, the bankrupt must include such contingent liability in his statement of debts, and the creditors holding such contingent claim must have notice that a discharge from such liability is sought. -Flower vs. Greenebaum, U. S. Cir. Ct., N. D. Ill.

PREFERENCE. It is competent for a creditor to institute a suit against a bankrupt and obtain judgment by default, and issue execution; and unless the bankrupt does some act by which he has in some way participated in this action of the creditor, the preference thereby acquired will be valid. The mere fact that one of the debtors announced his intention of going to another county, and this intention was communicated to the creditor who thereupon instituted suit in such county, with service of process upon such debtor, and thereby secured a speedier judgment than could otherwise have been obtained, is not sufficient ground upon which to base an assumption that such debtor participated in the act of the creditor, so as to make the preference void.— In re Bartholomew Runzi, bankrupt, U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. Illinois. BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

Bills of exchange are written orders or requests from one party to another for the payment of money to a third person or his order, on account of the drawer; and if payable at sight or at a date subsequent to the acceptance by the drawee, the instrument must be duly presented for payment. When a bill is expressed to be payable at a particular place on demand, it is always sufficient to prove that it was presented there, to charge the acceptor. Where a bill was addressed to " Messrs. Cox & Cowan, New York, N. Y.," and accepted by them without explanation or condition, the legal construction of the instrument is that it became payable at the place designated by the address as the place where the acceptance took place.-Cox et al. vs. National Bk. of N. Y., U. S. Supreme Ct.

COMMERCIAL PAPER.—

Coupon bonds are commercial paper, and the rights of holders are regulated and protected by the law merchant. The holder of commercial paper, who receives it only as collateral security for an antecedent debt, is not a holder for value; and a title thus acquired is subordinate to that of the true owner. The holder of such paper, who receives it in discharge of an antecedent debt, and without notice of a defect in the title of the person from whom he received it, has a title superior to that of the real owner, although the person from whom he received it had no title. Commercial paper in the hands of one who receives it after maturity is subject to all equities to which it was subject in the hands of the person from whom the holder received it, whether the latter had notice of such equities or not. The holder of commercial paper who takes it under due for value, and without notice of equities or defenses, may enforce payment, although the person from whom he received it could not. general rule is that the owner of property cannot be divested of his title without his consent, express or implied. But if negotiable paper be lost or stolen, and passed in the ordinary course of business, before maturity, into the hands of an innocent holder for value, the holder, though he takes it from the finder or the thief, gets a title superior to that of the real owner. This exception to the general rule exists, however, only where the taking is before maturity; if after maturity, the general rule applies, and the title of the real owner is superior to that of the holder.-Greenwell vs. Haydon, Court of Appeals of Kentucky. COMMON CARRIER.

The

The liability of a carrier of passengers for the safety of their baggage does not extend to the contents of a trunk consisting of samples of merchandise belonging to a traveling salesman; but the carrier, by taking the property into his charge and putting it into a warehouse for safe keeping, assumes the relation of an ordinary bailee, and is bound to take such care of the property as a man of ordinary prudence would of his own under like circumstances.-Penn. R. R. Co. vs. Miller, Sup. Ct. Ohio. CONGRESS, POWERS OF.—

Municipal corporations in a Territory may, under appropriate legislative authority, issue valid railroad aid bonds. Congress has sovereign power over the Territories, restricted only by the express or implied prohibitions of the Constitution. Although the organic Act of Dakota contains no express reservation of power in Congress, yet that does not prevent Congress from subsequently legislating directly for the local government. It may make a void Act of the Territorial Legislature valid, and a valid Act void. Congress can validate municipal bonds subsequently issued by the officers of the corporation in a Territory in aid of a railroad, although when the vote was taken there was

no valid law in existence authorizing the vote to be taken or the bonds to be issued, and although the vote was to donate the bonds and Congress required the railroad coompany to give stock in return.-The First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine, vs. County of Yankton, Dakota, U. S. Sup. Ct.

CONTRACTS.

A railroad company, in consideration of the conveyance to it of certain lots by the city, agreed to build all its depots, both freight and passenger, in a specified locality in the city in East Des Moines, and stated that it would build depots in no other portion of such city. It afterwards commenced to build depot buildings in another part of the city, in West Des Moines. In a suit brought by the city for damages by reason of violation of the contract: Held, that the contract was against public policy and void, and no action for its breach could be maintained.Williamson vs. C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., Sup. Ct. Iowa.

CORPORATIONS.

A corporation is not to be dissolved by reason of any misuse or non-user of its franchise until the default has been judicially determined and declared. In order to justify the inference that a corporation has surrendered its franchise, it is not sufficient that it has become utterly insolvent, or even that every vestige of its property has been sold by a Sheriff, but it must also have lost all power to continue or resume its business. Under Section 1 of the Insurance Law, the order to be made by the Court upon the petition of the Auditor in the first instance is only interlocutory-until a full hearing can be had, or otherwise, as the Judge may direct-but this has no reference to the appointment of a receiver. A receiver may be appointed only when the charter is forfeited or annulled, or the corporation is restrained from further prosecution of its business, or is dissolved as provided by the statute. Upon the question of dissolving a corporation the stockholders are necessary parties, and are entitled to a hearing; and a decree rendered without making them parties cannot be enforced against them.-Ward vs. Farwell, Sup. Ct. Ill.

CORPORATIONS—ASSESSMENT OF CAPITAL STOCK.— Gas companies were not intended to be included in the class of corporations "organized for purely manufacturing purposes" mentioned in the revenue law whose capital stock should be exempt from assessment for purposes of taxation. The power of the Legislature is not only plenary as to the manner in which the property and franchises of corporations created by the State shall be taxed, but it may also classify such corporations for the purposes of taxation.-Williams vs. Rees et al., U.S. Cir. Ct., N. D. Îll.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Under a statute providing, among other things, that if any licensed retail or bar-room liquor dealer fails to comply with the provisions thereof, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and fined, etc. An indictment alleging that the defendant was a bar-room liquor dealer, but which fails to allege that he was licensed as such, is fatally defective.-Glass vs. Commonwealth, Sup. Ct. Appeals, Virginia.

DEED.

Where a deed of conveyance describes the lands intended to be conveyed as extending to the center of a street "as to be extended," and refers to a plat on which the street is traced, the grant is subject to the street, and the subsequent use of such street as a public highway does not constitute a breach of covenants against incumbrances, or of general warranty.-City of Cincinnati vs. Brachman et al., Sup. Ct. Ohio.

DIVORCE.

DIVORCE ANNULLED, EFFECT OF. When a decree of divorce is set aside and annulled, the marital relations of the parties are placed back in the same condition as they were before the divorce was granted; and it can make no difference that the party to whom the divorce was granted has married in the meantime, or that a child has been born as the fruit of this second marriage; for the Courts cannot be divested of their power to set aside decrees of divorce by the subsequent acts of the party procuring the divorce, or by the subsequent acts of third persons. Comstock vs Adams et al., Sup. Ct. of Kansas.

AGREEMENT, WHEN VOID. Where a divorce is wrongfully obtained, a subsequent agreement between the parties that it shall not be disturbed is against public policy, and void.-Ib.

WILL OF HUSBAND-RIGHT OF WIFE.-A husband has not the power to exclude by will, against the consent of his wife, her right to receive, after his death, one-half of his property, real and personal, although she may never have been a resident of Kansas.-Ib.

DIVORCE

JURISDICTION-PRESUMPTION. Where it is shown that a Court of a sister State possesses general jurisdiction, including the power to grant divorces, and such a Court grants a divorce and then sets the same aside, it will be presumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that such Court had the power and jurisdiction to set aside said divorce.--Ib.

EASEMENT.

Where the owner of a close and of land wholly surrounding it grants the land surrounding the close and reserves the close, the implied grant or re-grant of a right of way by the grantee to the grantor to enable him to get to the reserved close is a grant

of a right of way for the purpose of enjoying the reserved close in its then state, and not a general right of way for all purposes; so where at the time of the grant the reserved close was used for agricultural purposes, the owner of the reserved close and his tenants were not entitled to a right of way thereto for the purpose of using it as building land.-Mayor etc. vs. Riggs, 42 Law Times, 580.

ELECTIONS.

CANVASSING VOTES MOSTLY FRAUDULENT-MANDAMUS REFUSED—— DISCRETION OF COURT. At an election held in the County of Harper for county officers and for the location of the county seat, the returns made to the canvassing board showed a vote of 2947. There were in fact only about 800 legal voters in the county. On application for mandamus to compel the board to canvass these returns and declare the result: Held, that notwithstanding the fact that the duties of the board are mainly ministerial, and that it is not charged with the duty of inquiring into the reception of illegal or the rejection of legal votes or fraudulent practices at the election, this Court will not, in the exercise of a sound discretion, even apparently sanction so gross an outrage on the purity of the ballot-box by issuing a mandamus, or compel, in the name of a technical compliance with duty, the canvass of returns which are so palpably a mere farce as an expression of popular will, as well as a crime against republican institutions: Held, further, that returns so grossly and manifestly untrue have no force as evidence, and have no value in any proceeding to determine the result of the election.--State vs. Stevens et al., Sup. Ct. of Kansas.

CANVASSING BOARD-DUTY AS TO RETURNS. Where returns of an election on file in the office of a County Clerk are regular in form and genuine, and the result of the election is not procured through fraud or illegality, it is the duty of a canvassing board to canvass all the returns; and where the board canvasses only a part, it may be compelled by mandamus to discharge its whole duty, and canvass all.-State of Kansas vs. Commrs. of Hodgeman Co. et al., Sup. Ct. of Kansas.

NEWLY ORGANIZED COUNTIES TERMS OF OFFICE. Where the first election in a newly organized county is held for county officers on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November, the day for holding general elections, all county officers then elected continue to hold their offices until the next general election, and until their successors are elected and qualified: Comp. Laws, 1879, p. 267 § 8.-Ib.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.

A specific bequest made in lieu of dower and accepted by the widow is not, by reason of being in lieu of dower, entitled to priority over debts and other legacies. It is but a debt against