to pray, or to attend an evangelical ministry, if in his power-but to be baptized? because it strongly implies, that every such person, let him be as profligate as he may, is duly qualified. For, surely, he does not mean to assert, that it is incumbent on any to be baptized, who are not qualified to receive the ordinance.-If, by its being incumbent on the forementioned persons to be baptized, he mean, that it is their duty, not immediately, but only in a remote sense, he is guilty of perverting language, and of abusing his readers: for he might as well have said, that it is incumbent on every unbaptized profligate in this country, to be a member of some particular church, and to receive the Lord's supper; which, nevertheless, Dr. W. neither asserts nor believes.

Some, therefore, may perhaps imagine that, by "moral qualifications," he intends natural powers for moral agency, and that these constitute a proper subject of baptism but this would be an abuse of language, of which I think him incapable; for moral qualifications are the amiable qualities, the virtuous turn, and the righteous exercise of natural powers for moral agency. Had he meant those natural powers themselves, detached from the idea of their qualities and exercise, his talking of moral qualifications for baptism, would have been only saying, that men, and not brutes-that rational creatures, and not stocks or stones, are to be baptized. But neither the Pædobaptists, egregiously as, in his estimate, they have blundered, and especially with regard to the nature of positive institutions; nor yet the Baptists, who are so prone unmercifully to "SCREW" positive institutes in "the vice of bigotry;" had the least need of an Elihu to " show his opinion" respecting this particular.

Having taken these different views of his very extraordinary hypothesis, respecting the qualifications for baptism-an hypothesis invented by Dr. W. to relieve Pædobaptism from some of those difficulties under which

it labours I shall only farther observe, that it neither supports the cause for which it is brought, nor does any honour to the genius of its inventor. For, considered in various lights, it appears to be inconsistent with the scriptural doctrine of baptism, respecting the moral state of man, the revealed character of God, and the design of the ordinance, as explained by Dr. W. himself. It is also inconsistent with his own practice, and, either with common sense, or with intelligible composition. If the latter, it will be needful for him to publish a comment, in order to "show his opinion" relative to this affair, that it may no longer be, what he elegantly calls, “ a latent mystery;" that is, in plain English, a secret secret.

But my opponent endeavours to demonstrate, that moral qualifications for baptism are “not measurable by any positive rule" and thus he argues: "If the nature of the qualifications required be such as do not, nor possibly can, admit of a positive standard to determine them, it is absurd to say, that the qualifications themselves, be they what they may, make any part of the positiveness of an institution. But all moral qualifications are such.”*—This, however, is far from proving his point. The question before us consists of two branches. One of them is, Do the qualifications of the subject constitute any part of the baptismal statute, considered as positive? The other is, Are those qualifications to be known or determined by a positive rule? Each of which he strongly denies; but it is negation without proof. His argument takes it for granted, that moral qualifications cannot be under the direction of a positive rule; whereas, that is one main thing to be proved.

That there is a standard by which to determine the qualifications of the subject, seems to be fully allowed by Dr. W. That standard, therefore, must be either human or divine. If the former, the power of creating and fixing it must reside, either in the wisdom and pleasure

* Vol. ii. 391.

of a collective body, or in those of individuals; perhaps, in the prudence of administrators, for which my opponent declares. It is manifest, however, that in both cases the standard will vary, in proportion to the difference there is among the framers of it, respecting their piety, their parts, their prejudices, their secular interests, or their caprice. So that there may be as many different standards as there are administrators: yet each of them warranted to abide by his own, in contradistinction to all the rest. Nay, the very same adminis-. trator, in different, though perfectly similar instances, may form his determination by a different standard. Thus the rule of qualifications for the baptismal institute would be a mere Proteus; which is contrary to the nature of a standard, and to the analogy of positive rites.

If the latter, it must be either moral or positive. If moral, it must be either what is called the law of nature, or the written law. But as the law of nature knows nothing of Christian baptism, so it must be equally ignorant of the proper qualifications for that institute. Besides, the law of nature being the law of humanity, extends its obligation to all mankind, in every age and in every country. Consequently, if the qualifications might be known by that law, it would be incumbent on every man, without exception, to be baptized. This, however, is not only absurd, but contrary to our author's own sentiment; for he confines the obligation to those that live in a Christian country.-If by the moral written law, it must be that which requires us to love God with all our hearts, and our neighbours as ourselves; for there is no other. But this law, as before observed, insists upon perfection, both as to moral qualities in the heart, and moral conduct in the life. If, therefore, the moral qualifications for baptism are to be learned from the moral written law, independent of any positive precept or direction, the administrator will never be able to fix on any qualifications that come short of moral per

fection or of complete obedience; the law itself, which is the rule of his conduct, not being satisfied with any thing else. Thus, instead of infants in general, and of all consenting adults, in a Christian country, being duly qualified for baptism, our author will not be able to find a single individual that is fit for the ordinance. It follows, therefore, by inevitable consequence, either that none should be baptized, or that we must look for the requisite qualifications in some rule of a positive kinda rule which, with regard to man, involves the idea of ignorance and of guilt; but, respecting God, of instruction and of pardon, through the Mediator. Such a rule, we may venture to say, is contained in the law of baptism; and agreeably to that rule was baptism administered in the apostolic times.

But Dr. W. proceeds thus: "If the qualifications required be such in their nature, as are infinitely variable, according to the infinitely variable circumstances in which the subject may be, it would follow, that none could be proper administrators of baptism, on our author's principles, but such as possessed infinite knowledge! But the moral qualifications of faith, repentance, knowledge, and so on, which our opponents contend for, are such; therefore the qualifications cannot be ranked as any part of a positive institute, but upon this supposition, that God communicates to the administrators what is incommunicable, which is an exact knowledge of the moral state of their fellow-creatures in circumstances infinitely variable, which is absurd."* Never, surely, was the idea of extreme variableness pushed to a greater extent, than it is in the present case! Three times does our author connect the epithet infinitely with the term variable; though the generality of writers would have thought the word indefinitely strong enough. But, be that as it may, if this argument have any force, it will prove too much, and lie equally against the hypothesis * Vol. ii. 391, 392.

of Dr. W. as against ours; for the design of it is to evince, that moral qualifications, being extremely variable in their degrees, can have no certain standard in merely positive law to guide the administrator. But while our author admits that the qualifications are entirely moral, and that they come short of sinless perfection, those qualifications must appear equally variable, when viewed by an administrator with reference to a merely moral, as to a positive standard: for that variableness does not consist, more or less, in the rule, whether it be considered as moral, or positive, but in the qualifications themselves; consequently, the administrator will have as much of "infinite knowledge," in the one case as in the other.

Again: Various as the degrees "of knowledge, repentance, and faith may be," in different subjects, Mr. B. is able to determine, without possessing "infinite knowledge," that mere infants have no degree of repentance, faith, or knowledge of spiritual things. On his own principles he may, therefore, safely conclude, that they are not proper subjects of the baptismal rite. Nor can he hazard much by determining, that those adults, who are grossly ignorant of themselves as perishing sinners, and of Jesus Christ as the only Saviour, or those that are habitually and notoriously profligate, have not any degree of spiritual knowledge, of genuine repentance, or of living faith.* He may, therefore, agreeably to his own principles, conclude that they are not suitable subjects of the ordinance. Thus far, in the negative, he may venture to go, without possessing the attribute of omniscience; and whether he have need of "infinite knowledge" to determine on the positive side of the question, shall now be considered.

Be it observed, then, that this argument proceeds on a great mistake. For it supposes that, according to our principles, no administrator can determine whether any