Stephens v. Monongahela National Bank. tions, as 5197 and 5198, relating to interest, contain clauses of forfeiture and penalty for violation. But everywhere it has been held that the bank may recover the money actually loaned upon a usurious contract. Other sections, as 5201 and 5208, for violation, subject the bank to appointment of a receiver. Nearly all the sections, including 5200, relating to liabilities of any one person to the bank, are vindicated by the provisions in section 5239, which declares that a willful violation of any provision shall forfeit the rights, privileges and franchises of the association. Such violation can only be determined by suit brought by the Comptroller of the Currency in the proper court of the United States. And in case of such violation, every director who participated in or assented thereto shall be personally liable for all damages, in consequence of the violation, sustained by the bank, its shareholders or any other person. Until the forfeiture be determined, in the mode provided, the bank may do business; and no person, by a conspiracy to evade its regulations, may escape liability for borrowed money, loaned by the bank, upon personal security in the manner authorized. In O'Hare v. Second National Bank of Titusville, 27 P. F. Smith, 96; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 869, it was said, per AGNEW, C. J.: "Evidently the limita tion of the indebtedness to the one-tenth in the 29th section (5200, R. S.), was intended as a general rule for conducting the business of the bank; a rule laid down from experience to regulate its loans for its own best interest, and those of stockholders and creditors, not a rule to regulate its customers. It was, as remarked in Fowler v. Scully, a regulation to prevent these associations from splitting on the rock which has ruined so many banks, to wit, that of lending too much of their capital to one person or firm. The intention being to protect the association and its stockholders and creditors from unwise banking, we cannot suppose it was meant to injure them by forbidden recovery of the injudicious loans. We should not interpret the section so as to carry its prohibition beyond its true purpose, and thus cause it to destroy the very interest it intended to protect by regulation. To do so would be, as said by the court below, to demand a penalty in favor of one individual for an offense against the country, and invite to dishonesty under a pretense of a regard for the law." If Stephens v. Monongahela National Bank. this language was not strictly necessary to disposition of that case it is apposite here, and demonstrates that a contract purposely made in evasion of that section is not void. Of course, we have considered the offer as true, namely, that there was a conspiracy between the bank and the borrower to violate the statutory regu lation. The question is whether the note is invalid on general principles of policy, and not one of equity and justice between the parties. The public good is the ground of relief to a defendant who proclaims his own turpitude in the willful violation of a statute, and his shame in refusing payment of what he justly owes - not his worthiness. The bank is treated as a conspirator, but the fact is unmistakable that it was its officer. It is not the intendment of the statute to provide a way by which an unfaithful officer and dishonest stranger may empty the vaults of the bank, work its ruin, to the great loss of its shareholders and creditors, and the receiver of its money, wrapped in the mantle of public policy, escape liability. Error is assigned to the rulings of the court limiting set-off of excess of interest, paid on other transactions, to a period within six years preceding the trial. While it may be true, that neither time nor contract will sanctify or legalize the taking and holding of usurious interest by a National bank, it is just as certain that the remedy for the owner to recover it back is by a personal action. The right of action accrues the very instant the usury is paid. That it is barred in six years by the act of 27th March, 1713, is too plain for remark. It is difficult to imagine a case where the statute does not begin to run from payment of the nsurious money, for the owner almost necessarily has knowledge of the facts from the first. In case of fraud the statute runs from its discovery. Not a tittle was shown to toll the statute, at law or in equity. The rulings of the learned judge upon the question of jurisdiction need no vindication. They accord with the doctrine in Bletz v. Columbia National Bank, 6 Norris, 87; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 343 (ante, p. 366). But one other point requires special notice.. Since this cause was tried in the court below, it has been decided that where there has been a series of renewal notes given to a National bank, for Commonwealth ex rel. Torrey v. Ketner. the continuation of the same original loan, and the bank sues to recover its debt on the last, the borrower is entitled to credit for all the interest he has paid from the beginning, on the loan, and not merely to the excess above the lawful rate. All interest paid, or charged and put into the notes, must be credited. Overholt v. National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 1 Norris, 490; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 833; Cake v. Bank, 5 Norris, 303; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 890. Nothing can be added to the opinion of SHARSWOOD, J., in Overholt v. Bank. The rulings upon offers of testimony, answers to points, and charge, so far as inconsistent with the principles of that case, are erroneous. And for this, judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. Judgment reversed. A State court has no jurisdiction to try a cashier of a National bank for embezzling its funds.* William Torrey, the prisoner and relator, was charged with embezzling, abstracting and misapplying the funds, moneys and assets of the First National Bank of Ashland, in Schuylkill county ; a bank duly incorporated, organized and established under the laws of the United States, commonly known as the National Banking Act. The prosecution, which was commenced before a justice of the peace, was returned to the Quarter Sessions of Schuylkill county, and in that court a true bill was found, and the indictment and record show upon the face of the proceedings that the offense charged was for embezzling, abstracting and misapplying the *See U. S. v. Conant, ante, 148. Commonwealth ex rel. Torrey v. Ketner. funds of the First National Bank of Ashland, created under the National Banking Act. Torrey was arrested and lodged in the county prison, then took out this writ of habeas corpus, and in obedience to its command, Ketner, the warden of the Schuylkill county prison, produced the body, and made return that he held the prisoner by virtue of above-named proceedings. By virtue of article V, § 3 of the Constitution of 1874, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in cases of habeas corpus, have original jurisdiction. William A. Marr, James Ryon, William B. Mann and John W. Ryon, counsel for relators, contended: 1st. That the court below had not jurisdiction, for embezzlement was never a criminal offense at common law. 2 Russ. on Crimes, 163; 4 Bl. Com. 230; United States v. Clew, 4 Wash. 700. Congress has power to give the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1-24; 1 Kent Com. 398; Curtis Com. 176; Claflin v. Houseman, 3 Otto, 141. Where an act of Congress creating a corporation provides a punishment to be inflicted upon any officer of the corporation who embezzles its property, it is not competent for the State legislature to make the same act an offense against the laws of the State. Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Met. 313; Commonwealth v. Pelton, 101 Mass. 204; Commonwealth v. Barry, 116 id. 1; State v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280. By section 711 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (U. S. Rev. Stat. 134), the jurisdiction vested in the United States courts is exclusive of the State courts. Section 5209, et seq., of the National Banking Act provides for punishing embezzlement by officers. 2d. That the acts of assembly of the Pennsylvania legislature did not cover this case, admitting that the legislature had power to pass such an act; that sections 116, 117, 118 and 119 of the Crimes Act of 1860 (P. L. 411; Purdon's Dig. 348, §§ 169, 170, 171 and 172), were repealed by the act of June 12, 1878 (P. L. 196), and as that changed the penalty and the period of the Statute of Limitations after the alleged crime was committed, the relator could not be sentenced under it. That the act of May 1, 1861 Commonwealth ex rel. Torrey v. Ketner. (P. L. 515; Purdon's Dig. 124, § 41), only applied to State banks. The National banks were not in existence then. A. W. Schalek, district-attorney, and Hughes & Farquhar, counsel for respondent, contended that the State court had jurisdiction, as the charge against the relator was not for violation of any provision of any act of Congress, but is simply a charge of embezzlement by an officer of a bank in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth. Jurisdiction of State courts has been sustained in Buckwalter v. United States, 11 S. & R. 196; White v. Commonwealth, 4 Binn. 418; Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, 4 Dall. 27; United States v. Hutchinson, 4 Clark, 211; Jett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 265; Claflin v. Houseman, 3 Otto, 130; Coleman v. State of Tennessee, 7 id. 509, especially the dissenting opinion of CLIFFORD, J., not differing in this respect from the majority of the court. PAXON, J. It appears by the return to this writ that the relator is held to answer an indictment in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Schuylkill county, charging him, as cashier of the First National Bank of Ashland, with having embezzled the funds and property of said bank. There are three counts in the indictment, each varying the form of the charge, but not essentially changing its substance. It is almost needless to say that a habeas corpus is not a writ of error. Hence if the court below had jurisdiction of the offense, we cannot correct its rulings in this proceeding, however erroneous they may be. On the other hand, it is equally clear that if the relator is being prosecuted for a matter which is not an indictable offense by the law of Pennsylvania, or one over which the court below has no jurisdiction, it would be our right, as well as our plain duty, to discharge him. No authority is needed for so obvious a proposition. Embezzlement by the cashier of a bank is not a common-law offense. This indictment must rest upon some statute of this State, or it cannot be sustained. Has it such support? As preliminary to this question, it is proper to say that section 5209 of the United States Statutes provides specifically for the punish |