control the action of State officials in effecting a strictly national function, has since been declared well founded by the national court of last resort.

There was, too, one other still more desperate resort than all others against slavery, which has since become very popular in some quarters, the attempt to incite servile insurrections by means of military incursions set on foot in the free States against the slave States, to which, of course, no man of such comprehension and appreciation of the just obligations of civil allegiance as Mr. Chase could give the slightest countenance. His recorded opinion, as Governor of Ohio, when addressed upon the subject by Governor Wise of Virginia, in the autumn of 1859, just after the invasion of the latter State at Harper's Ferry, is worthy of repetition. "Whenever it shall be made to appear, either by evidence transmitted by you or otherwise, that unlawful combinations by any persons or at any place in Ohio have been formed for the invasion of Virginia, or for commission of crimes against her people, it will undoubtedly become the duty of the executive to use whatever power he may possess to break up such combinations and defeat their unlawful purposes; and that duty, it need not be doubted, will be promptly performed."

And when accused by Senator Butler, of South Carolina, of having drawn up and advocated a resolution in the antislavery convention of Ohio recommending those called to subscribe or take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, to do it with the mental reservation that the provision for surrendering fugitives from labor was so absolutely void as to form no part of it, a view which he had in fact most strenuously opposed when offered by others, he declared in the Senate, "I never proposed the resolution; I never would propose or vote for such a resolution." By thus showing Mr. Chase's adherence to conservative principle in all his opposition to slavery, we may, possibly, not add very essentially to his present popularity, but we nevertheless deem it important to a just estimate of his true character, and important as tending very essentially to the more perfect comprehension of some other of his public acts not well understood by all. And we have no apprehension that his fame, in the long run, will suffer any

abatement from the truth in this respect being fully and distinctly understood by all.

II. Mr. Chase's last great public office was that of Chief Justice of the National Supreme Court, as the immediate successor of two such incumbents as Marshall and Taney, both of whom deservedly rank among the greatest and best of all our eminent public men. Mr. Chase was appointed Chief Justice by Mr. Lincoln, with the approbation of the Senate, on the 6th of December, 1864, and received the oath of office and took his seat upon the bench on the 13th of that month. We do not suppose that Chief Justice Chase's opinions, during the nearly nine years that he held the office, although confessedly very able, will do complete justice to the high character of his weight and influence in the tribunal. His mind had been devoted to, and absorbed almost exclusively by other studies than those here demanded of him, for a very long period considering that it came out of the ripest portion of his mature life. He was now more than fifty-six years of age, and it was too late for ordinary men to make great proficiency in studies so long disused. But Mr. Chase's energy and devotion to duty enabled him sensibly to advance year by year in the attainment of that almost unparalleled excellence of judicial character and attainment ascribed by common consent to his great predecessors, till he was finally recognized by all the more eminent of the American bar as scarcely below the highest measure of greatness attained by any who had before graced the place he held.

For real greatness of soul and true nobleness of character he was indeed second to none, and for high and difficult attainments in the learning of the profession he had few if any superiors. His views were clear and far reaching, without becoming either hair-splitting in refinement or cloudy and obscure from the infinity of the range of their speculations. He always seemed to comprehend the true principles involved, in every case which came before him, even where he was not at first blush entirely familiar with all the learning upon the subject, but this he always mastered with astonishing celerity and accuracy. And his dignity and courtesy in presiding; his patience in listening to argument, sometimes to the dullest and

most useless speculations of counsel which it would be an absurd anomaly to dignify by calling argument, and which manifests itself before this great national tribunal in larger measure and more offensive forms than in the State courts; his firmness in following his convictions, without forgetting, even for a moment, the respect due to the opinions of those who might fail to see the subject in the same light which he did, and his unwavering courage and determination to allow no obstacle to come between the court and the justice of the case, however humble or unpopular the cause or the parties, have left him an imperishable name among the noblest and the best American judges, the long list of whom will not, we believe, suffer in comparison with those of any age or country, either for learning or character. Chief Justice Chase's summary of the judicial qualities of one of the most valuable of the members of the court, Mr. Justice Catron, presents the outline of the highest judicial character, and, in many respects, is but a reflection of his own qualities as a judge. After dwelling briefly upon other excellences of his departed associate, he adds: “He was even more distinguished by strong practical good sense, by firmness of will, and straightforward honesty of purpose. Ever frank and earnest in the expression of his opinions, he was yet void of desire to impose them arbitrarily upon others. The candor and patience with which he listened to argument found fitting counterpart in the impartiality and equity of his judgments. While the records of this court endure they will recall the memory of the just and fearless magistrate who pronounced them." It is no doubt true that this must have been a somewhat studied eulogium of his departed brother, but if anything demands study and deliberation, it is what we say of the dead, that we may "nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice." But we must all feel and confess, that the man who entered upon his great office, with such a sublime estimate and comprehension of the eminent qualities of mind and heart demanded for the full discharge of its difficult duties, could not fail to reach a very high place among great judges. Such a comprehension of the high and difficult duties of his place seems even more indispensable, if possible, than the very highest attainments of professional learning, though this

is more demanded in the office of a judge than in almost any other.

III. But we must briefly allude to two cases, where Chief Justice Chase has been sometimes criticised in no friendly spirit, his agency in the first decision upon the legal tender question, and the part he took in the impeachment trial of President Johnson: 1. His judicial opinion in regard to the constitutionality of the issue of paper money and declaring it legal tender for all private debts, past and future, by act of Congress, would probably never have been questioned, certainly not in any spirit of rancor and bitterness, had it not been for the part he took, as Secretary of the Treasury, in the creation of this same paper and having it declared legal tender. The gravamen of the charge, therefore, brought against the Chief Justice is, that he could not have been sincere in both cases; and as he is known to have been intensely serious and in earnest in all his war measures, the inference of some heated partisans has been that his opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold (8 Wallace, 603) must have been the result of some transition state in regard to party affinities. This criticism of Mr. Chase seems to possess two very unfortunate, not to say discreditable elements,-discreditable, at least, to those who use it. First, it seems to imply that all opinions of public men, even of judges, must and will, if sincere, conform to the principles of the political party with which they act, at the time of their appointment. Secondly, there seems to be some kind of belief or claim sheltered under this particular form of the charge against the Chief Justice, that he was under a kind of imperfect moral or honorary duty towards the party which called him to the place, either never to change his legal views and opinions upon any subject of party policy, or, if he did, still to disguise his real convictions out of deference to those who gave him his place, in order that he might still continue to serve them "with a perfect mind and willing heart." One might have supposed any such claim impossible, if we did not know from observation how terrible to weak and cowardly minds is the effect of party terror. There have been thousands in our country, no doubt, and are still many more, who sincerely believe that the obligations to serve the party whose

interests they espouse are superior to all other obligations, human or divine. There is some ground for hope that this vicious excess of party discipline is beginning to give place to better counsels, in some quarters at least, but it has thus far unquestionably in all parties been the cause of much evil and of more folly. The pretence that any one is not at liberty to change a legal opinion upon any subject while acting as judge sworn to do equal right and justice to all men, argues a depth of absurd ignorance or depravity, only to be found, one might fairly hope, among the blindest and the weakest of party following. Any one who had ever had much experience in judicial administration would never fail to feel the gross absurdity of all such pretensions. The writer of this article, although never, so far as he knows, suspected of any unreasonable distrust of his own opinions, whether those of first impression or not, feels compelled, in obedience to a proper respect for the truth, to declare that he has not seldom changed his opinion of the true principles of law governing a case more than once during the argument, and without question such has been the experience of all judges who have felt the same anxiety to reach the truth, as Chief Justice Chase always did. The saddest defect of capacity, either in a judge or any other person, is to become so satisfied with the speculations and conclusions of his own mind that he is no longer capable of listening to argument with a ready and teachable disposition to reach the truth without regard to his present convictions, except as they form part of the basis by which he hopes ultimately to reach the absolute or comparative certainty of what truth is. The just reply to all such cavils against any change of opinion will be found in the homely proverb, that "Wise men often change their opinions, but fools never."

It is known to all that Mr. Chase, as Secretary of the Treasury, adopted the opinion of making anything but coin legal tender, with extreme reluctance and distrust, and merely upon the ground of the exceptional necessities of the pressing exigencies of the war and with the determination to return to specie payment at the earliest practicable moment. The extended argument upon the question before the court by the ablest members of the American bar, and the very unsatisfac