value is measured. The tendency of this measure is, to prevent those fluctuations, by preventing, in some degree, the expansions and contractions produced by the over-issues of banks, and thus give stability to property.

the banks. The Government is not to be a hoarder | Nothing is more destructive to the rights of properof money. What it collects it soon expends; and ty than fluctuations in the standard by which t it has seldom occurred in our history that it has had on hand, at the same time, more than six or eight millions of dollars. It ought not to continue any system of revenue which will enable it to hold a regular surplus exceeding five millions. This is not more than a large bank finds it necessary to retain to carry on a safe business. The late Bank of the United States frequently had from ten to fifteen millions. For years to come, it is probable that the whole amount of money in the Treasury will not average three millions, and will scarcely be equal to one week's recent importation of specie. It is idle to suppose that this can materially affect the operations of the banks.

It is alleged that this measure is part of a scheme to force on the country a currency purely metallic. This is unfounded. A specie currency for the ordinary daily transactions of life, and such a specie basis for paper as will always ensure its convertibility into specie, when required by the holders, is what is contended for; and such is the only tendency and real design of the measure proposed, so far as the banks are concerned. A purely metallic currency is no part of the Independent Treasury plan, as proposed by the Administration, and supported by its friends. In fine, with the exception of a very small number, who are in favor of depositing the public money specially in banks, the question at issue between us, and those who favor a deposite in the banks, may be stated thus: THEY wish to have the public money deposited in banks, not to be kept by them, but to be lent out for private uses. WE are opposed to lending out the public money for private uses; and, effectually to prevent it, are in favor of having it kept by public officers, under heavy bonds and securities not to use it, or suffer

The only mode in which their operations will be effected is, that they will no longer have the privilege of lending out money which is not their own. Is the withdrawal from them of this privilege necessarily an act of hostility? A farmer has been in the habit of depositing his money in a bank, but as he could not get it to pay his hired hands when he wanted it, the bank having stopped payment, he concluded that it was more safe, and more just to his creditors, to keep it himself. Was there any hostility to the bank in that? It is just so with the Government. The banks had lent out the public money, and could not collect it. With millions nominally in the Treasury, the Treasary De-it to be used for any private purpose whatsoever, and to partment could scarcely pay a dollar in the legal currency of the country. It does not desire to be again placed in such a situation. It does not wish to be dependant on those whom its experience has taught it are not always to be depended upon.

is true.

pay it out only in pursuance of appropriations made by law, as prescribed in the Constitution.

We do not think that to furnish the banks with money to lend or to accommodate the customers of banks with the use of the public money or property, is one of the purposes for which the power to lay duties and taxes was delegated to the Congress of the United States.

The Government only desires to manage its own business in its own way; to let the banks alone, and to be let alone by them; to use them when the public interest and safety require it, but not to be On the contrary, we look upon the employment compelled to use them to the public detriment. Is of it, knowingly and deliberately for such a purit just to charge every citizen with hostility to the pose, or where such is known to be the natural banks who does not keep his money in them? The and necessary result, as an abuse of the most agidea is absurd, but not more so than that a Treasu-gravated character. It is taking one man's prory independent of the banks is in hostility to them.perty and delivering it over to another, under false It is objected that it is a measure of hostility to a pretences, and may justly be denounced, (not as a sound currency. The reverse of this proposition levelling operation, but) as an exercise of arbitrary It will prevent the inflation of our paper power, wresting money and property from those to currency, which arises from the use of the public whom it belongs, for the use of those to whom it money, and, in that degree, tend to prevent fluc-does not belong. We oppose this practice, as one tuations, and suspensions of specie payments. By of injustice. We are in favor of collecting only exhibiting an inflexible determination on the part as much money from the people as may be neces of the Government to recognize nothing as money saey for public purposes, leaving the rest to be but specie, or its equivalent, it will inspire the used by those to whom it belongs. We are not banks with a salutary caution, not by the excess of the enemies of the banks, but we are not so much their issues to endanger that standard. In fine, it their friends as to take money out of the pockets of will leave the banks to be sustained by their own our constituents, and deposite it with them to swell capital and prudence, without tempting them with their active capital, and increase their proâts. Let the uncertain and dangerous aid of a fluctuating them be content, as every honest man ought to be, public deposite. with using that which properly belongs to them.

It is objected that this measure is hostile to the We look upon the withdrawal of the public derights of property, and essentially levelling in its posites from the banks, as a measure beneficial to character. The reverse of this is true. The mo- the banks themselves, and calculated to promote ney of the Government is the property of the peo- stability in the business and currency of the counple. The object of an Independent Treasury is to try. So long as the public moneys are made the preserve this property for the use of the true owners, in-basis of bank issues, they will necessarily produce stead of handing it over to those to whom it does fluctuations in credit and currency. As the depo not belong, to be lent out for their emolument. Its site accumulates, bank loans and bank notes intendency is to protect individual property also. crease in number and amount; as the deposite di

attempt to abolish it in the States themselves would be.
the motive and object intended, and not the means, that de-
termine the character of the act. There is no code of morals
which justifies the doing of that indirectly which is forbidden
house, it would be equally unlawful to fire another, or even our
to be done directly. If it be unlawful to burn our neighbor's
own, with the intention of burning his. If there be a difference,
the latter, by adding craft to guilt, is of a deeper dye.
of public men as to the character of the domestic institutions
We also hold that, whatever may be the individual opinions
of the slaveholding States, they have no right, when acting in
public stations under the Federal Government, by any of their
acts, to discriminate between their institutions and those of the
other States. It must be borne in mind that ours is a Federal
Republic, as has been already stated, formed by sovereign and
independent States, for their mutual security and happiness;
and that they instituted this Government, and clothed it with
powers to carry into effect these important objects. Such be-
ing the character and object of our system, it is clear that this
Government can have no right whatever to give a preference
to the institutions of one portion of the Union over those of an-
other, or to use its power to abolish one or establish the other;
and to do so, be the pretext what it may, would be directly sub-
versive of the object for which it was established, by destroying
that which it was intended to protect. Instead of preserving
peace and tranquillity, it would become an instrument, in the
hands of the stronger portion of the Union, for assailing the in-
stitutions of the weaker, and engendering thereby the bitterest
feelings of hostility, which, in the end, would destroy the Union
itself.

It is manifest that the power over this subject is one of those not delegated to the General Government, and, of course, is one of the reserved powers: as such, it is under the entire control of the respective States, within whose limits the institution may exist, and within which neither this Government, nor that of the other States, nor their citizens, have any more right to interfere, directly or indirectly, than with the existence of slavery in Cuba, or any other foreign country.

From this it follows that any such interference on the part of this Government, would be without authority, and a manifest breach of the Constitution. I would, in truth, be more than a simple breach of that instrument; it would be destructive of the primary object for which the Government was instituted, which was to preserve and protect more effectually the domestic peace and tranquillity of the States, and their citizens.

It also follows, that such interference on the part of other States, or their citizens, would be in violation of the national compact, which they mutually pledged themselves to each other to preserve inviolate on entering into the Union.

It also follows, that the States, separately and individually, where slavery exists, are alone responsible for it, either for good or evil; and the impression that any other State or its citizens are responsible, in any way, for its existence, originates in the gross and mischievous Federal conception, that ours is a great national consolidated Government, where the whole is re sponsible for the parts, just as the States are for counties, instead of a Federal Republic, composed of sovereign and independent States, united together for their mutual advantage, tranquillity, and security.

Such, anl so formidable, are the barriers against an interference with this dangerous subject, within the limits of the States. Nor will those against an mterference by the General Government, in any manner, in this District, be found less formidable, when duly considered.

Resting on these bold and inconvertible principles, we hold abolish slavery in this District, with a view of abolishing it in it to be clear, beyond dispute, that Congress has no right to the States, or to exercise any of its powers with that intention. Nor do we deem it material in coming to this conclusion, to in quire what is the extent of its powers over this District; be they what they may, they are all conferred for special purposes, to be exercised, like all such powers, in subordination to the known objects for which they were granted. To pervert them to any other purpose inconsistent with the object of the grant, would be a violation of the Constitution, not the less dangerous because not expressly forbidden.

We held, in the first place, that, to attempt to abolish slavery in this District, as an intermediate step to abolishing it in the States themselves, by this Government, or the non-slaveholling States, or their citizens, would be as clearly and manifestly liable to all the objections, in their full force, to which a direct

OF

HON. EDWARD EVERETT, OF MASS.,

ON

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN TREATY.

DELIVERED

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 21, 1853.

WASHINGTON:

PRINTED AT THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE OFFICE,

1853.

CENTRAL AMERICAN TREATY.

The Senate having the subject of the Central American Treaty concluded with Great Britain on the 19th April, 1850, under consideration,

Mr. EVERETT said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: It has not been my intention, as I had the honor to state to the Senate on Thursday last, to engage in the debate which has been conducted with so much ability in this place, during the last eight or ten days.

It was quite natural, in fact it was unavoidable, that the Senator from Delaware, [Mr. CLAYTON,] after returning to the Senate, of which for twentyfour years he had been one of the brightest ornaments, should be desirous of availing himself of the first opportunity of vindicating the negotiation of the treaty of the 19th of April, 1850, which was conducted by him under the direction of President Taylor. It was not less a matter of course that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, [Mr. MASON,] and that the Senator from Illinois, [Mr. DOUGLAS,] who had taken part in the debates of the last session, should reply to the statements of the honorable Senator from Delaware. But, for my own part, my humble connection with the affairs of Central America is much more recent and slight. Entirely a stranger to the negotiation of the treaty, and not less a stranger to the debate which took place in this Chamber in the early part of the last session, I should have considered it rather obtrusive to throw myself into the discussion of the general subjects which have been controverted with so much ability by the gentlemen to whom I have just alluded. I will also take the liberty to say, that when I took my place upon this floor about three weeks ago and I consider it the highest honor of my public life that I have been permitted to have a seat hereI came here in such a state of complete exhaustion, bodily and mental, after the fatigues of the last winter in another capacity, that I felt myself altogether indisposed to any considerable mental exertion.

But the discussion that has taken place in reference to the history of past events has connected itself with the present condition of affairs in Central America, toward which my attention has been recently called. A communication was made to the Department of State in the early part of Feb

||ruary by the Minister of the British Government, at Washington, with the express intimation of a wish that the purport of that communication should in some proper public form come before the Government of the United States. That was done through the medium of a report from the Department of State to the President, of the 16th of February, which was by him sent to the two Houses on the 18th of the same month. That communication seemed to me to afford an opportunity of making a new effort, with considerable prospect of success, to bring all the difficult controverted matters in that quarter to an amicable and desirable issue. It seemed to me particularly to suggest the propriety of putting our diplomatic relations with Central America upon a better and more efficient footing than they have stood upon for some time past. This suggestion was made by me to the President; it was approved by him, was by him submitted to Congress, and has been honored by their sanction, the two Houses having made the requisite appropriation for a full minister to be sent by this Government to the States of Central America, to reside at either or any of the capitals of those States, respectively, as he may expedient, and thus to be able to bring to bear all the influence of his character and station in reconciling the difficulties which exist between those Republics, and bringing the questions at issue be

tween them and us to an amicable settlement.

think

There are other circumstances which led me to suppose that this was a propitious moment for making this effort; and it does seem to me, from the character of the recent debate, that if it should now finally terminate without any allusion to those circumstances, it would, as I stated last Thursday, leave upon the public mind, not only an incorrect, but a somewhat painful impression as to the real state of affairs in that part of the world, and our connection with them; that the country would be alarmed with the idea that the state of affairs is more critical in that quarter than it really is. To rectify this impression is the main object of my addressing the Senate at this time.

Before I do this, I wish to make my acknowledgment to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, [Mr. DOUGLAS,] whom I do not at this moment