of this appointment, plainly implied in the arrangement made between the several parties, that Case should continue to edit the Mercury for nothing, he having formerly received $300 per annum for that service; and it was proved that he complied with his bargain. How many hundreds of worthy men have been removed from their employment in this Department, upon pretences and suggestions equally repugnant to reason and equally corrupt, the people of this country can never be informed; for, while the evidence was in existence, the Postmaster General either refused to allow the papers in his office to be inspected, which, in general, was the only evidence that could be reached, or the party in the majority in Congress refused to investigate. But, sir, the door which might once have been opened upon a mass of evidence and proof is now closed forever! The papers in the office of appointments have been consumed by fire! Still enough remains to stamp with shame and dishonor the character of a party which could sanction a princiIde so intolerant, so tyrannical, and so utterly subversive of all public virtue. It is a fact which ought to be more publicly known, that he who is now President of these United States was the first man of any great political distinction in this country, who, as a party man, openly and shamelessly proposed that the Post Office Department should be administered upon party principles, and the immense influence of the appointing power connected with that Department should be prostituted to such uses. But this fact will sufficiently appear from the correspondence which took place in 1822 between Mr. Van Buren and President Monroe, and also with Mr. Meigs, the Postmaster General, upon the subject of the appointment of a postmaster at Albany, in New York. There every observant reader will find the germe of the spoils system. In that correspondence it will appear that the appointment of a political partisan was claimed as a matter of right on the one side, and of duty on the other, (the appointing power,) in order to give, to the dominant party in New York the advantages of a political partisan at a point so important as Albany; but the patriotism and independence of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Meigs resisted the application. They refused to act upon any such principles; and when a man was appointed, who had the misfortune to be a federalist in politics, an appeal was taken from the decision of the Postmaster General to the people. A public meeting was held in Albany, vindicating their right to have a republican appointed to the office in question, and calling upon the President to apply the constitutional remedy in such cases for their relief. And what do you suppose, sir, these republicans meant by a constitutional remedy in such cases? It was the remedy of removal from office for opin

ion's sake!

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But to return to the Message. Why consume our time in debating the remedies proposed by the President? Why pursue with relentless vengeance the incumbents of subordinate offices, particularly the miserable peculator who has only made off with a few thousand dollars? Why pursue such small game, when the great delinquents are still allowed to revel in the uninterrupted enjoyment of power, possessing neither the principles nor the capacity to be useful to the public, and daily abusing their trusts, to the infinite prejudice of every public interest? I allude, of course, to the leading executive chiefs, and, in a party point of view, the most influential-the very men who are the original and responsible authors of all the defalcations and abuses committed by the subordinates, to whose zealous and efficient support in the public elections they owe their own elevation, and without which aid they could not remain a single day in office, but for the impediment which the constitution interposes to prevent their immediate downfall. I repeat, it is

small game which we are pursuing, in an economical point of view. I had occasion to speak of the defalcations disclosed in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury made to the House at the last session, and I made an estimate of the gross amount for which Hawkins, Harris, Boyd, Linn, and others, were deficient, and found the aggregate about $400,000. If we set down the defalcations of Swartwout and Price both at a million and a half, the entire sum of the late defalcations will not exceed two millions—perhaps the ultimate loss will not exceed one million of dollars. Now, I conjure honorable members to reflect that this sum, though large, is but a fraction of the losses sustained by the people of this country by defalcations of a different kind-by, defalcations in capacity, in requisite skill, and, above all, in sound political principles, on the part of the administration. Let any man attempt to estimate the actual losses, in dollars and cents, which this country has sustained by an incompetent, unprincipled, and electioneering administration, and he will at once see that our business now is with higher game than that upon the track of which we have been put by the President. Without pretending to estimate the indefinite injury, the hundreds of millions in losses, which a few years of great commercial and financial derangement must have inflicted upon a great nation like this, let us take a more practical view of the subject. Let us set down a few of the leading items in the account, which the people may, upon clear and tangible grounds, state against the great national defaulters to whom I have alluded, and who have not been removed or dismissed from office.

First. There was the Black Hawk war-a war which originated in the sheer neglect and culpable negligence of the administration, and which cost the country $3,000,000.

Second. There was the late Creek war-a war notoriously caused or instigated by the speculators in Indian lands, and which might have been averted, but for the imbecility of some, and the want of principle, in others, of the public agents intrusted by the administration with the execution of the treaty of 1832. I estimate the cost of that war at $1,500,000.

Third. We may safely estimate the extra cost of the Florida war, or the clear excess above what a competent and faithful system of administration would have expended on this war, at $12,000,000. I, sir, predict that the entire cost of this war to the country will not be less than $20,000,000. And when it is borne in mind that this disastrous war would have been prevented by a judicious selection of agents in the management of the Indians, the charge which I make against the administration of an excess of expenditure upon it will be considered moderate. This, it must be recollected, was purely an executive war-a war commenced and waged entirely at executive discretion. Congress was only appealed to, from time to time, to vote the sums of money which were said to be essential to its successful prosecution; and these appeals were often made after the troops were in the field, and no alternative was left but to vote the money. I take this occasion to remark, that it was for voting for such appropriations as these, and occasionally for large sums stipulated in Indian treaties ratified by the Senate, that the whigs in Congress have been charged by the apologists of the administration as equally to blame with themselves for the large expenditures incurred under these heads; but with what justice, the public will decide.

Fourth. The increased cost of Indian treaties and Indian emigration, in consequence of the unnecessary multiplication of officers and agents employed, the incapacity and dishonesty of many of them, and the general want of skill and fidelity in the superintendency. I estimate the loss under this head at $5,000,000 at least.

Fifth, and last, I will mention the item of $1,000,000, which the country has been taxed with to suppress disturbances on the Canada frontier. Every cent of this expenditure, I maintain, would have been saved to the nation if the President, instead of temporizing and waiting to see what public sentiment would be, and suffering the feeble proclamations of the Governors of States to go forth as a substitute for his own, had, upon the first indication of disturbances in that quarter, issued such a proclamation as he has only done within a few weeks past. But, sir, that did not suit the policy of an electioneering administration. It was hazarding quite too much to take ground in advance of public opinion throughout the Union; and so the inhabitants on the border not being advised of the real intentions of the Government, many of them became committed, of course, according to their natural sympathies and feelings, and the national character has consequently suffered with the Treasury. These few items, selected only because they are the largest and most obvious, make, in the aggregate, a loss of upwards of $20,000,000.

Let us, then, instead of wasting our energies in the pursuit of small defaulters, direct our inquiries and point the indignation of the country against the great official delinquents-against those who, being the real authors of all the abuses which exist in the land, still hold their places, and arrogantly seek to gain credit with the people by proposing remedies for evils of their own creation. This country is peculiarly situated in reference to a weak and unprincipled administration. In England, a bad ministry can be brought to the bar of public opinion at once'; and, upon the heel of any great official delinquency, judgment is pronounced upon them, and they are hurled from power before time shall have softened public indignation, or afforded the of fenders the opportunity of diverting public attention to some other subject. Here it is only at stated times, fixed by the constitution, that a bad administration can be brought to account, or be removed from their places; and they may go on for years in a constant course of administrative abuse and imbecility-they may commit the grossest infractions of the constitution itself-they may prostitute the patronage of the Government to the vilest and most selfish purposes-and, after all, escape the sentence of an injured people. Ample time is afforded to enable them to court and flatter when they find they have given offence, to get up some new subject of excitement, and turn away the stroke of popular wrath before it is allowed by the constitution to fall upon the culprits. I therefore admonish the opposition in this House not to be too sanguine of the results of recent developments, whatever impression they may make for the present. It is yet two years before the people can decide finally upon them; and the puny defaulters, whom it is proposed to pursue and hunt to destruction, will soon be forgotten. They will, at best, only become the scape-goats of their superiors in station. It is against the principles and practices of the Executive Chief himself that opposition can be made effective. It is by carrying the war into the heart of power, and exposing the defects and corruptions which exist there-it is by administering a corrective to the original fountain of evil, alone, that we can expect to bring about real reform, and confer a lasting benefit upon the country.

The next clause of the Message which struck me as deserving notice is in these words :

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"But the appointing power cannot always be well advised in its selections, and the experience of every country has shown that public officers cannot always be proof against temptation."

This must be regarded as a singular and precious admission, coming as it does from the appointed successor of General Jackson. What! the Executive not infallible! And is it admitted, at last, that there are abuses in some branches of the public service? Truly, public officers are not always proof against temptation, nor can the Executive be always well advised in its selections. But how does it happen that the late and present administrations have been more unfortunate in this respect than all those which went before them? That is the question. How does it happen that when the Executive has been well advised, how does it happen that when it has been advised of former defalcation and delinquency, they have formed no objection in making its selections, as in the case of Linn, as I understand that case, and as was certainly the case of a late district attorney in Alabama? Ill does it become such an Executive to complain that it cannot always be well advised. How has it happened that the appointees of the late and present administrations have so generally given way when exposed to temptation? I answer, because both the advice and the selections were based upon false and corrupt principles and maxims. Partisan service and party fidelity have been the only tests of fitness for office, and when the Executive was well advised upon these points, it was all that was required.

In the same paragraph every well-informed reader will be astonished to find a true constitutional principle connected with such a subject, recognised by such authority, and an exhortation to Congress to enforce it.

“Congress,” says the President, "cannot be too jealous of those who are intrusted with the public money, and I shall at all times be disposed to encourage a watchful discharge of this duty." "If a more direct co-operation on the part of Congress in the supervision of the conduct of the officers intrusted with the custody and application of the public money is deemed advisable, it will give me pleasure to assist in the establishment of any judicious and constitutional plan by which that object may be accomplished.”

Who would have believed that we should have had so decided and unequivocal a recantation of the doctrines applicable to this subject avowed and so successfully maintained under the late administration, and that, too, by a man pledged to walk in the footsteps of the late Executive Chief? That Congress cannot be too jealous of those who have the custody of the public. money, is frankly admitted; and the President actually tells us that he will encourage the exercise of that duty! But he earnestly recommends a direct co-operation of Congress in the supervision of the conduct of public officers! This must appear incredible to those who have been conversant with the doctrines of the party in power for several years past-but nevertheless it is true. Congress is actually invoked to co-operate with the President in the business of superintending the conduct of his subordinate officers! This amounts almost to revolution. Still all is not yet told. The President further submits to our consideration

“Whether a committee of Congress might not be profitably employed in inspecting, at such intervals as might be deemed proper, the affairs and accounts of officers intrusted with the custody of the public moneys. They might report to the Executive such defalcations as were found to exist, with a view to a prompt removal from office, unless the default was satisfactorily accounted for."

The great democratic party must certainly be confounded by this last proposition or is this Message intended to be a new confession of political faith for the whole party? Congress is unequivocally invited to institute investigations into the conduct of executive officers, and not one word is said of the necessity of specifications, or of impeachments, as conditions precedent! The doctrines and recommendations of this part of the Message appear to me to be so entirely repugnant in every particular to the opinions 2

and sentiments of the late President, that I am tempted to go back to the messages and other state papers emanating from the late administration, and to trace the contrast, that we may see what the creed of the dominant party is to be for the future.

From the grant, in general terms, of "the executive power" to the President, by the constitution, and the assignment to him, in the same general terms, of the duty of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed," and the terms of his oath of office, by which he is required to " preserve, protect, and defend, the constitution," a degree of power was deduced and arrogated to the Executive, under the late administration, which was truly appalling, and would, if sustained by the country, inevitably lead to despotic power. From the grant of the "executive power," the late President claimed the exclusive direction and control of every thing in the affairs of Government, in its nature executive and not legislative. It being made his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to preserve, protect, and defend, the constitution," it followed that this duty devolved upon him exclusively, and that any interference on the part of Congress, with a view to the same object, was gratuitous and unconstitutional, except in the discharge of the duties expressly assigned to it in the constitution. He also derived from the same source the idea of his exclusive responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, and the preservation, protection, and defence, of the constitution; and, building upon this foundation, he claimed, first, the right, in all cases, to give such construction to the constitution and laws as he thought proper; for, it was contended it would be highly unreasonable and absurd to make any man, or any department of the Government, responsible for the protection and defence of the constitution, and the faithful execution of the laws, according to the construction of any other department, or any other tribunal whatever. Secondly, he maintained that every officer under the Government, except the judges of the courts, were only instruments in his hands, created for no other purpose but to enable him to execute these solemn constitutional duties. From hence, also, was deduced the doctrine that the supervision of the conduct of all public officers was the sole right and duty of the Executive. From hence, also, the deduction was natural and easy, that the President ought to be allowed not only to select all the instruments to be used by him in the execution of the laws, and for the preservation of the constitution, in the manner provided in the constitution, but that he ought to have the further power, not given in the constitution, of setting aside those instruments at his discretion.

If these doctrines and assumptions of executive duty and authority do not present a perfect scheme of despotic power-if they do not amount to a clear and substantial concentration of all power in the hands of one man-I have no conception of what more would be requisite for such a consummation. If any one of these powers can be maintained in the extent contended for, then the late President was well warranted in maintaining that Congress could pass no law, however ingeniously devised-adopt no form or mode for the deposite, safe keeping, or disbursement, of the public moneys-which could deprive him of the actual custody and disposition of them. He had a perfect right to consider not only the Secretary of the Treasury, but the Bank of the United States also, as his mere instrument, contrived with a view to enable him to discharge his appropriate duty of keeping the public moneys safely, and paying them out for the support of Government, according to his own construction of his duty and power in this as in every other branch of executive administration. He had a right to dispense with either,