The Relation of Inference to Fact in Mill's LogicUniversity of Chicago Press, 1916 - 50 páginas |
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absolute actual inference actual sensations analysis antecedents and consequents antinomies assertion asso associational associational psychology associationism assumed causal laws colligation conception of inference consciousness considered criterion data of inference Descartes difficulty disproof distinction empiricism ence evidential ex post facto FACT IN MILL'S factor Formal Logic given proposition Hume immediacy immediate implies import of propositions independent INFERENCE AS DISCOVERY INFERENCE TO FACT inferential process inquiry interpretation intuition and inference Kant Kantian knowledge known later logically independent mental facts merely MILL'S LOGIC mind minor premise nature neo-realists objective facts objective level operate organization particular facts particulars to particulars permanent possibilities philosophical place for inference point of view possibilities of sensation precisely principles problem process of inference proof question recognized by Mill relation of inference scheme sense sequence statement subjective supposed syllogism system of meanings tautologous tentative theory of inference tion truth universal propositions universality and necessity UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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Página 17 - Our sensations we carry with us wherever we go, and they never exist where we are not; but when we change our place, we do not carry away with us the permanent possibilities of sensation ; they remain until we return, or arise and cease under conditions with which our presence has in general nothing to do.
Página 19 - The state of the whole universe at any instant, we believe to be the consequence of its state at the previous instant; insomuch that one who knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space, and all their properties, in other words, the laws of their agency, could predict the whole subsequent history of the universe...
Página 17 - The conception I form of the world existing at any moment comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation — namely, the whole of those which past observation tells me that I could, under any supposable circumstances, experience at this moment, together with an indefinite and illimitable multitude of others which though I do not know that I could, yet it is possible that I might, experience in circumstances...
Página 17 - ... the fundamental reality in Nature. The permanent possibilities are common to us and to our fellow-creatures ; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of when, and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of unless I tell them.
Página 44 - ... he extemporizes, from a few of the particulars, a first rude theory of the mode in which the facts took place, and then looks at the other statements one by one, to try whether they can be reconciled with that provisional theory, or what alterations or additions it requires to make it square with them. In this way, which has been justly compared to the Methods of Approximation of mathematicians, we arrive, by means of hypotheses, at conclusions not hypothetical.!
Página 18 - Now, of what nature is this fixed order among our sensations? It is a constancy of antecedence and sequence. But the constant antecedence and sequence do not generally exist between one actual sensation and another. Very few such sequences are presented to us by experience. In almost all the constant sequences which occur in Nature, the antecedence and consequence do not obtain between sensations, but between the groups we have been speaking about, of which a very small portion is actual sensation,...
Página 45 - An hypothesis being a mere supposition, there are no other limits to hypotheses than those of the human imagination; we may, if we please, imagine, by way of accounting for an effect, some cause of a kind utterly unknown and acting according to a law altogether fictitious.
Página 44 - Let any one watch the manner in which he himself unravels any complicated mass of evidence ; let him observe how, for instance, he elicits the true history of any occurrence from the involved statements of one or of many witnesses...
Página 48 - The conceptions, then, which we employ for the colligation and methodization of facts, do not develop themselves from within, but are impressed upon the mind from without...
Página 49 - That the conception we have obtained is the one we want, can only be known when we have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it ; when we completely understand the general character of the phenomena, or the conditions of the particular property with which we concern ourselves. General conceptions formed without this thorough knowledge, are Bacon's " notiones temere a rebus abstractae.