Satterwhite v. Sherley et al. which it was alleged that the north boundary of the land so owned by said Isabella Craig was fifty rods south of the north line of said section four, and a decree was entered in said cause quieting the title to said land; an order was made for the sale of the same, and the land sold by Major, executor, and the appellant became the purchaser. The appellees derive title from Lafayette Sims, who was a party to that suit. The decree and judgment in the case of Major, executor, against Sims et al., fixed and settled the line between the parties to such suit, and those claiming under and through them, and established the north line of the tract owned by Mrs. Craig to be fifty rods from the north line of section four. This survey is being made to fix the line between the appellant and appellee under their respective titles. The survey appealed from fixes the line some fifty-two rods south of the north line of section four. This is arrived at by the surveyor and sustained by the court by ignoring the judgment quieting the title and taking some former survey had between the original owners about 1860. It is conceded by counsel for appellees that the judgment is erroneous, if the judgment in the case of Major v. Sims et al. is binding upon the former owner, Lafayette Sims. But it is contended by counsel that the suit by Major was not to quiet title against Sims, but to correct a mistake made in a partition proceeding between the heirs of William A. Craig, deceased. Counsel make this general claim, and refer to the complaint as supporting it, but give no reason upon which such contention can be sustained; and, certainly, no such contention can be maintained. The complaint describes the land, and alleges that Sims is claiming some interest in it, and asks for judgment against him; and a decree is entered up, in due form, quieting the title, and forever enjoining and restraining the defendants from ever setting up title to the same, etc. When Sims was made a party to that suit it was his duty to look after his interest. If he was claiming a tract of land 127 62 132 474 127 62 160 332 Whitlock v. The Consumers Gas Trust Company. extending more than fifty rods in width, it was his duty to set up his title, and litigate the question in that suit. The judgment is binding upon all the parties to it, and those claiming title under and through them, and having been disregarded by the court, the finding is not sustained by the evidence, and is contrary to law. The appellant was entitled to have his line established in accordance with the decree, or to have the survey set aside, and the judgment must be reversed. Judgment reversed, with costs. Filed Nov. 25, 1890; petition for a rehearing overruled Jan. 30, 1891. 127 62 162 399 No. 14,704. WHITLOCK V. THE CONSUMERS GAS TRUST COMPANY. INJUNCTION.-Pleading.-Answer.—In an injunction proceeding to restrain a natural gas company from laying its pipes on the land of the plaintiff, an answer denying the ownership of the plaintiff and asserting title in a third person, from whom the defendant had permission to enter upon the land, is good. SAME.-Evidence.-Nature of Threatened Injury.-Evidence that the plaintiff had acquiesced in the occupancy of the land, and that she had offered to receive a certain compensation for allowing the defendant to construct its line of pipe, is competent, as tending to show the nature and extent of the threatened injury sought to be restrained. SAME.-Evidence.-A deed executed by plaintiff's grantor to a third person, conveying an interest in the land, is properly admissible in evidence as showing the character of the injury. SAME.-Finding of the Jury.-Court May Disregard.--An injunction proceeding is one of exclusive equitable cognizance, and the trial court is not bound by the finding made by the jury. From the Hamilton Circuit Court. A. F. Shirts and G. Shirts, for appellant. W. P. Fishback and W. P. Kappes, for appellee. ELLIOTT, J.-The appellant avers that she is the owner Whitlock v. The Consumers Gas Trust Company. of the land described in her complaint, and that the appellee threatens to enter upon it and lay therein pipes for the transportation of natural gas. The prayer is for an injunction. The appellee alleges in the first paragraph of the answer that it is engaged in the business of supplying natural gas to the citizens of Indianapolis; that it owns and maintains a line of pipe for that purpose, and that the inhabitants of Indianapolis are dependent upon it for their supply of fuel and light; that it is solvent and able to pay all of its liabilities; that at no time has it entered upon or intended to enter upon any lands belonging to the plaintiff; that by a license and right to do so from the Midland Railway Company it did enter upon the right of way owned and occupied by the company for its track and did construct a line of pipe thereon, which right of way adjoins the land de'scribed in the complaint; that the right of way belonged to and was in the possession of the railway company by virtue of a deed executed by Sarah Guilkey, May 1st, 1873. The answer is not well drawn, but it is, in effect, an argumentative denial. It denies the ownership of the plaintiff and asserts title in a third person, and hence must be held good as a denial. The refusal to admit testimony of the witness, Whitlock, was not such an error as will warrant a reversal, if, indeed, there was any error at all. The declarations were in the main mere expressions of opinion as to what would be the result of litigation in the trial court and what it would be on appeal, and it is quite clear that there was very little, if any, probative force in the declarations one way or the other. There was no error in admitting evidence of the appellant's acquiescence in the occupancy of the strip of land, nor was there any error in admitting evidence of what she offered to receive as compensation for allowing the appellee to construct a pipe line in the strip of land occupied by the railroad company. This evidence was competent as tending Whitlock v. The Consumers Gas Trust Company. to show the nature of the injury which the appellant sought to restrain by injunction. It is to be remembered that this is a suit for injunction and not an ordinary action at law, and that injunction is an extraordinary remedy. It is by no means every wrong that will authorize relief by injunction; on the contrary, the elementary rule is, that where there is an adequate remedy at law injunction will not lie. Under this familiar rule it has been held again and again that injunction will not lie to restrain the commission of a trespass. Our statute, indeed, allows the courts to award. injunctions only when the threatened act will produce great injury, and the construction placed upon it has been that it does not authorize an injunction where the plaintiff can be fully and readily compensated in damages and there is no fear of a multiplicity of actions. Clark v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co., 44 Ind. 248; Indianapolis Rolling Mill Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 29 Ind. 245. We do not mean to hold that where there is a wrong about to be committed under color of authority that can not be fully compensated in damages, an injunction may not be awarded, but what we do hold is, that evidence tending to show the nature and extent of the threatened injury is competent. In admitting evidence tending to prove a material fact the court does not determine the weight or value of such evidence; it simply determines that the evidence shall be heard. Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148; Colglazier v. Colglazier, 124 Ind. 196. The deed executed by a former owner of the land to the predecessor of the Midland Railway Company was properly admitted in evidence. This deed showed that the plaintiff's grantor had conveyed some interest to the predecessor of the Midland Railway Company, and, whether that interest was a fee or a less estate, the deed was competent in connection. with other evidence as tending to prove the nature and extent of the injury to the plaintiff. If there was an existing and continuing servitude burdening the land, and the use which the defendant proposed to make of it did not add to Whitlock v. The Consumers Gas Trust Company. the burden, the damages of the plaintiff would, at least, be materially lessened. At all events, the evidence was competent for the purpose of showing the character of the injury. It was competent, irrespective of the allegations of the first paragraph of the answer, under the general denial pleaded. The trial court was not bound by the finding made by the jury, as the case is one of exclusive equity cognizance. It might have adopted the finding of the jury, but it was under no obligation to do so. Platter v. Board, etc., 103 Ind. 360. The record affirmatively shows that the finding was rejected by the court, for it is expressly stated that the court finds that the material" allegations of the answer are true," and that the "court finds for the defendant." There is much evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff sustained no injury from the acts of the defendant, and this evidence, of itself, warranted the finding and judgment that no case was made for an injunction. Under the evidence we can not say that the trial court was not justified in treating the case as one not warranting interference by the extraordinary remedy invoked by the appellant. It may, too, well be that the appellant may maintain an action for damages and yet not be entitled to an injunction. Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577. We can not without a departure from a long and well settled rule adjudge that the finding is wrong upon the evidence. Judgment affirmed. Filed Jan. 30, 1891. 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