Roberts does not seem, from the tone of his allusion to the whole remarkable business, to have regarded his selection for this particular command as being in the nature of a distinguished compliment worthy of his acceptance. His stay at Cape Town lasted twenty-four hours, "the Government being apparently as anxious to get me away from Africa as they had been to hurry me out there."

After a stay in Madras, Lord Roberts again visited Calcutta in March 1885, while Lord Dufferin was Viceroy. It was shortly before the affair at Panjdeh, which so nearly led to war with Russia, and which was the immediate occasion of a vote of credit of several millions by the House of Commons. Public affairs were unsettled. Russia was very active in the valley of the Oxus, Skobeleff's victories having given her Merv and Sarakhs, thus making the Caspian the base of any future operations, Turkestan being also in direct communication by rail and steamer with St Petersburg. The

army in the Caucasus was now easily transportable to the boundaries of Afghanistan, and accordingly Russia was dictating terms to the Boundary Commission, and ejecting an Afghan garrison from Panjdeh under the eyes of British officers. Meetings took place between Lord Dufferin and Abdur Rahman at Rawul Pindi. The former declared that England was resolved that a Russian advance on Herat should be met by a declaration of war, and the latter was required to choose finally which of his two powerful neighbours he would have for his ally. As far as words went the Ameer chose Great Britain. The Viceroy ratified Lord Ripon's promise to defend his kingdom against foreign aggression, and presented him with

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money, arms, and ammunition. Everything was in readiness for war. "A change of Government, however," says Lord Roberts, "took place just in time to prevent the war. Lord Salisbury's determined attitude convinced Russia that no further encroachments on the Afghan frontier would be permitted: she ceased the 'game of brag' she had been allowed to play, and the Boundary Commission were enabled to proceed with the work of delimitation." The most satisfactory incident of the whole of these proceedings was the loyalty of the native chiefs who were present, and their profuse promises of help in case a recourse to arms became necessary. lar demonstrations of loyalty were made by distant native rulers. Lord Roberts says that the greatest enthusiasm prevailed, and the various camps at Rawul Pindi were crowded with men desirous of joining the ranks of our army. We were able in the height of the Mutiny to rely on the firm support of many of the most prominent native races, and it seems highly probable that that support would be still more general and even more enthusiastic in the defence of their country against a foreign invader. And every ten years that pass over our heads tend to consolidate the empire, and to confirm the acquiescence of native feudatories and allies in a rule to which they have become accustomed, and which gives them security without impairing their dignity and independence.

In 1885 Lord Roberts succeeded Sir Donald Stewart as Commanderin-Chief in India. He went with Lord Dufferin to Rangoon, and then to Mandalay, where the Viceroy formally announced the annexation by England of all that part of Upper Burmah over which King Thebaw had held sway. The chief

subject which still interested him in his high position was the security of our North-West frontier, having regard to the near approach of Russia, and our consequent promise to the Ameer to preserve the integrity of his kingdom, a promise which rendered us responsible for the northern as well as the southern

boundary of Afghanistan. Lord Roberts, contrary to the opinions of the majority of the Defence Committee, laid greater stress on the maintenance of lines of communication than on the construction of numerous fortifications. His aim was to have the means of bringing all the strategical points on the frontier into direct communication with the Indian railways, so as to be able to mass our troops rapidly. The offensive and defensive requirements of Quetta and the Bolan Pass were to be provided for, and a spot was selected on the right bank of the Kabul river between Khairabad and the Indus, and commanding the latter river, on which the garrisons of Peshawur and Noushera could fall back if necessary and await reinforcements. This is with a view to the probable hos tility of the warlike tribes, who in case of invasion would, so long as they remain hostile, combine against us from Chitral to Baluchistan, and pour into India. The Khyber Pass was the chief pass to be defended, for it alone debouched directly on cultivated country and on roads leading to the chief Punjab cities. Too many forts had to be avoided, on grounds both of finance and of the difficulty of garrisoning them. Lord Roberts also prescribed the defensive works which should be taken in hand without delay, and the roads and railways which should be constructed. And it is worth noting that he was

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so far satisfied with the attention paid to his requirements that he writes:

"Seven years later, when I gave up my command of the army in India, I ing that I left our North-West frontier had the supreme satisfaction of knowsecure so far as it was possible to make it so, hampered as we were by want of money. The necessary fortifications had been completed, schemes for the defence of the various less important positions had been prepared, and the roads and railways, in my estimation of such vast importance, had either been finished or were well advanced."

Thus Lord Beaconsfield's wellknown policy for the construction of a scientific frontier to the northwest of our Indian empire has been carried out. The declaration of that policy was at the time derided by the party hacks and political nincompoops of the time; but successive Viceroys have given thought and attention to it, realising that so long as invasion remains a remote risk we could not look unconcernedly on, while Russia crept step by step closer to our dominions. Lord Lytton's forward movement was the first step in carrying out this policy, and from first to last Lord Roberts has been a main instrument in its execution.

It must not be supposed that all occasion for anxiety has been removed, but at least the plans have been adopted and executed to an extent which was satisfactory. Rawul Pindi on the right and Quetta on the left marked the boundaries of the frontier line, Multan having been rejected. There was also a scheme for utilising the armies of native States as an auxiliary force for the service of the empire. Lord Roberts was at first doubtful of the wisdom of encouraging a high state of efficiency amongst the troops of

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independent States. But having fought side by side with natives, he had gained confidence in their desire to co-operate with us and in their unmistakable loyalty. But for the saving clause, "so long as our Government continues just and sympathetic," we should infer that he had at the close of his career fallen a victim to that excessive trust in the natives which he found so rife when he first landed, and which was the prime cause of the Mutiny. The chiefs of course cordially responded to proposals of this kind, and steadily improved their armies under the guidance of carefully selected British officers. It is a policy which we must take on trust, confiding in our experts. Sub. stantial results are said to have been already obtained, the Chitral expedition having had valuable help from the transport trains organised by the rulers of Gwalior and Jeypoor, and by the troops of the Maharajah of Kashmir. Still for our part we rely with greater confidence in regard to the future on this circumstance, that instead of British troops being in the proportion of less than 1 to 6, as they were in the days before the Mutiny, we have now, or had in 1885 (vol. ii. p. 390), 70,000 British with 414 guns, and 128,636 natives, a proportion of more than 1 to 2. So long as our trust in native loyalty and professions does not lead us to tamper with this proportion, and to take all the securities which a position, pre carious in spite of all our efforts, requires, there can be no political unwisdom in cultivating friendship and inspiring confidence in

native States, a policy which we hope will, before many generations have passed away, lead to the introduction of friendly sentiments and civilising agencies even amongst the hostile tribes who hang like a dark cloud over our North-Western frontier.

We lay down these volumes with the feeling that they are the record of the life not only of a brave and capable soldier, but of a loyal friend and of a very kindly and modest-hearted gentleman. When he succeeds, it is his "luck," when others fail, it is their "misfortune." There is not an unkind word from beginning to end, and when an adverse criticism is inevitable, it is free from bitterness, and names are withheld as far as possible. Those who served under him in later life were made to feel that his eye was on them, and that their actions would be appraised in an ungrudging and appreciative spirit. The record of his young days is fresh and full of charm, recalling the bright young officer "Bobs" whose sobriquet of throughout the service was the Indian unerring sign of genial manners and personal popularity. And throughout the book, from the day when he "found his fate" to the hour when he penned its dedication, we we have occasional glimpses of the domestic sentiment which Englishmen recognise as the basis of national greatness, and without whose gilding this life of strenuous activity of Fortyone Years in India' could not be

the happy retrospect it is. By such men our Indian empire was won, and by such men it must be held.

GENERAL GORDON'S remarkable career and tragic end at Khartúm have frequently been described; but the public know little of the man who, at a few hours' notice, was ordered to accompany Gordon to the Súdán, and acted as his staff officer. It is evident, to any one who studies the history of Gordon's mission, that Colonel Stewart's appreciation of the position created in the Súdán by the successes of the Mahdi was juster than that of his chief. And a notice of his brief career and services may not be without interest at the present moment when the reoccupation of Dongola, and the declared intention of Government to continue the advance southward this year, have reawakened interest in the Súdán, and in the events connected with General Gordon's mission in 1884.

John Donald Hamill Stewart was born on the 15th October

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1845, and was not quite thirtynine when he was treacherously murdered in the house of Fakri Wad Etman at Hebba. He was an Ulsterman; and one of the most distinguished of living Ulstermen thus wrote of him :

"Amongst the many noble and fine soldiers I have known, I have met scarcely any one for whom I conceived a greater respect and admiration. His charming manners, his high sense of duty, his unselfishness, and his great ability, impressed every one who came into contact with him."

Stewart passed first out of Sandhurst in June 1865, and was gazetted ensign in the 12th Regiment. In the following month he was transferred to the 11th Hussars, in which regiment he obtained his lieutenant-colonelcy on the 1st July 1881. The earlier years of his service were passed in India, and here he de

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veloped that love of travel and faculty of observation which were marked characteristics of his brief life. He travelled widely in India, Java, Sumatra, China, and Japan; and, when the regiment was ordered home, he returned by China, Siberia, and Russia. On this occasion he crossed the great Gobi desert with a single Russian attendant. A wide reader, a good linguist, gifted with an iron constitution, insensible to fatigue, careless of creature comforts, and blessed with one of those happy dispositions which make the best of everything, Stewart was ideal explorer. He loved beautiful scenery and the excitement of constant change; but his great interest was in the people, their history, their manners and customs, their system of government, and their military capacity. In these earlier journeys he obtained a knowledge of oriental life and character which was afterwards of the greatest service to him.

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During the winter of 1878-79, Stewart, with only a native servant, travelled through some of the troubled districts of Asia Minor, and on his return to Constantinople was asked to give some account of his journey to the Embassy. His report showed such keen insight into the causes that had led to the wretched condition of the country, and such warm sympathy with the sufferings of the peasantry, Moslem and Christian, that it at once attracted attention. As a result he was offered and accepted a military vice-consulship in Anatolia, and was appointed to Konia. Here his upright character and strong common-sense soon won the respect and esteem of the Turkish officials, from the Governor-General downwards. He never interfered needlessly, but when a genuine case of injustice was brought to his notice he was

ever ready to press for redress, and generally met with success. His warm sympathy with distress was known far and wide, and, when famine was almost at the door, many a poor peasant had reason to bless the unostentatious charity of the British consul.

Whilst temporarily acting as consul at Aleppo, Stewart made a remarkable journey in the desert between the Euphrates and Tigris. The Arabs, at the time, were in a state of ferment, and it was desirable to ascertain what was going on from other than Turkish sources. Stewart, with a single attendant, left Aleppo as if for a morning's ride; but, at a village in the neighbourhood, he exchanged his horses for camels, and travelled rapidly, by Palmyra, to the Euphrates. Crossing the river and passing through a district where the Sultan's writ does not run, he visited the supreme sheikh of the Shammar Arabs, and eventually emerged from the desert at Mosul. His journey, which was one of great hardship, with a fair share of adventure, was a complete sucsess, and added to his previous high reputation.

In the summer of 1882 Stewart was sent to the little known country of the Dersim Kurds; and no communication had been received from him when Alexandria was bombarded and occupied. It was a time of great excitement, caused by the sedulous circulation of false rumours of British defeats, and some anxiety was felt for his safety. So persistent were the rumours that when Stewart reached Kharpút, travel-stained by his rough life in the Kurdish mountains, a report ran through the bazár that the British troops had been driven from Egypt and that one of the fugitives had just made his appearance. At Kharpút he re